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Trade Policy Linkages and Disconnects Drivers, governance and effects of integrated trade policies in a fragmenting world economy [Record]

  • Louise Dalingwater ORCID logo,
  • Richard Ouellet,
  • Gabriel Siles-Brügge and
  • Jean-Baptiste Velut ORCID logo

…more information

  • Louise Dalingwater ORCID logo 0000-0002-4798-5332 louise.dalingwater[at]sorbonne-universite.fr

  • Richard Ouellet Richard.Ouellet[at]fd.ulaval.ca

  • Gabriel Siles-Brügge gabriel.siles-brugge[at]bristol.ac.uk

  • Jean-Baptiste Velut ORCID logo 0000-0001-8129-8088 jean-baptiste.velut[at]sorbonne-nouvelle.fr

The China shock, the rise of nationalism, the climate crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trump’s return to the White House all have a common consequence for the international trading system: they have led to a major rethinking of trade policies and their relation to other policy spheres. To begin with, the meteoric ascent of China as the world’s first manufacturing producer and exporter has been a tectonic shift in world politics and economics, with dramatic socio-economic effects that have been – and continue to be – felt across industrialized countries (Autor et al. 2016; Autor & Hanson 2025). This has had three notable consequences for trade policy linkages. First, the China shock(s) has(/have) redefined the links between domestic and international politics by straining the policy consensus in favour of trade liberalization and free market policies, leading to a resurgence of economic interventionism in multiple forms, not least with protectionist or new industrial policies (Bulfone, 2023;  Criscuolo et al., 2022; McNamara, 2023; Velut 2024). Second, and in parallel, the dislocating effects of the China shock have been widely instrumentalized for electoral purposes, leading governments to connect protectionist discourse with anti-immigrant rhetoric (Noland, 2020; Grossman & Helpman 2018). These new trade-migration linkages have normalized economic nationalist narratives. Third, intensified great power competition has contributed to a new – or more accurately renewed – “geopoliticization” or “securitization” of trade where security and economic interests are increasingly interconnected. Geo-economic competition has translated into a diversification of trade policy instruments. Countries have moved away from traditional free trade agreements (FTAs) to an ever-expanding list of export restrictions, investment screening and other “autonomous” or unilateral policies, as well as sectoral “mini-deals” ranging from critical mineral agreements to memoranda of understanding and strategic partnerships (Cernat, 2023; De Ville, Happersberger & Kalimo, 2023; Garcia-Duran, Eliasson & Costa, 2023; Claussen, 2023). The Russian invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the new prominence of the trade-security nexus and contributed to the diversification of trade policies, not least with an unprecedented array of economic sanctions ranging from import bans to export restrictions and asset freezes. As another illustration of the growing complexity of trade linkages, the Covid-19 pandemic compelled decisionmakers to reconsider the tensions and conflicts between trade, health and national security objectives in the face of public health emergencies and supply chain bottlenecks. This marked a departure from purely market-driven trade policies, as illustrated by unprecedented government intervention in vaccine development and the resurgence of managed trade, but also by the rise of “health populism” or “vaccine nationalism” which prioritized national interests over international cooperation and public health (Baldwin & Evenett 2020; Bown 2022; Bollyky & Bown 2020; Dalingwater 2023). Environmental and climate issues are not immune to the new politics of economic nationalism, creating new tensions between trade, security and sustainability objectives under a new trilemma. On the one hand, environmental issues have gradually shifted from being an afterthought in trade policy to forming part of a more robust trade-environment nexus seeking to balance out economic and environmental objectives (Jinnah & Morin 2020; Laurens, Brand & Morin 2022). This briefly hinted at a potential climate policy matrix trumping commercial interests (Velut 2022). On the other hand, the convergence between nationalist politics and great power competition – for critical minerals, technology or markets – are antinomic to the notion of “Global Commons” and risk undermining the “greening” of trade. The US assault on multilateral efforts to develop pollution standards on cargo shipping in 2025 speaks to the persistent tensions between trade and the environment. Equally disruptive to the conduct of trade policies, the digitalization …

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