Résumés
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that much of the recent discussion on deep disagreement is grounded in a semantic framework that fails to capture how the concept actually works. It overlooks a key point that we aim to emphasize: attributing depth to a disagreement is, at its core, an evaluative act. Drawing on a pragmatist perspective, we propose a more refined framework that reveals how certain terms serve to express—or make explicit—the speaker’s attitudes and intentions in the act of speaking. We argue that this is exactly what occurs when depth is attributed to a disagreement.
Keywords:
- deep disagreements,
- expressivism,
- higher-order concepts,
- pragmatism
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous soutenons qu'une grande partie des discussions récentes sur le désaccord profond repose sur un cadre sémantique qui ne parvient pas à saisir le fonctionnement réel de ce concept. Ces discussions négligent un point important que nous tenons à souligner : qualifier un désaccord de « profond » constitue, fondamentalement, un acte évaluatif. En nous appuyant sur une perspective pragmatiste, nous proposons un cadre plus raffiné qui met en lumière la manière dont certains termes servent à exprimer—ou à expliciter—les attitudes et les intentions du locuteur au moment de la prise de parole. Nous soutenons que c'est précisément ce qui se produit lorsqu'on attribue de la profondeur à un désaccord.
Parties annexes
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