Résumés
Abstract
The curative fallacy is a unique error in reasoning. It has not yet been identified in fallacy theory, so we propose here an initial statement of how to identify and criticize the error. One commits the fallacy when one reasons that means that would have prevented an unwelcome outcome are also means, after the outcome has come about, for eliminating or mitigating the outcome. That is, one takes prevention to be ipso facto also cure. This reasoning is appropriate under what we call symmetric conditions, where the preventative is also the curative, but it is not appropriate under asymmetric conditions, where the preventative not only does not remediate but can actually make things worse. This fallacy is particularly appealing for political and interpersonal circumstances, and we identify a few examples of it in contemporary intellectual culture.
Keywords:
- political argumentation,
- fallacy theory,
- causal reasoning
Résumé
Le sophisme du remède est une erreur de raisonnement singulière. N'ayant pas encore été répertorié dans la théorie des sophismes, nous en proposons ici une première formulation, ainsi qu'une méthode pour l'identifier et le critiquer. On commet ce sophisme lorsque l'on raisonne en supposant que les moyens ayant permis de prévenir une issue indésirable constituent également, une fois cette issue survenue, des moyens de l'éliminer ou de l'atténuer ; autrement dit, on considère que la prévention équivaut ipso facto à la guérison. Ce raisonnement s’applique dans ce que nous appelons des conditions symétriques—où le moyen préventif est aussi le moyen curatif—mais il ne l'est pas dans des conditions asymétriques, où le moyen préventif, loin de remédier à la situation, peut au contraire l'aggraver. Ce sophisme s'avère particulièrement séduisant dans les contextes politiques et interpersonnels ; nous en relevons quelques exemples au sein de la culture intellectuelle contemporaine.
Parties annexes
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