Résumés
Abstract
While appeals to emotion have traditionally been dismissed as fallacious, recent scholarship has highlighted their potential reasonableness. Yet the role of emotion in these appeals remains underexplored. To address this, under the constraint that appeals to emotion are conceived as premises-conclusion complexes, this paper develops an analytical framework featuring two distinct paths linking premises to the conclusion: a logical path and an emotional path. This framework shows that evaluating such appeals involves first assessing each path individually and then integrating them. Notably, different emotions may either reinforce one another or work in opposition. An agent commits the fallacy of appeal to emotion if they mistakenly perceive the conclusion to be justified when it is not. Drawing on this model, I offer two explanations for how strong emotions can lead to such a misperception. Finally, I examine how the emotional mode can influence the strength of an appeal to emotion, thereby illustrating the epistemological role of emotion in argumentation, as discussed by Howes and Hundleby (2018).
Keywords:
- appeal to emotion,
- emotion,
- emotional path,
- fallacy,
- logical path,
- multi-modal
Résumé
Bien que les appels à l'émotion aient longtemps été considérés comme fallacieux, des travaux récents ont mis en lumière leur possible pertinence. Cependant, le rôle des émotions dans ces appels reste encore peu exploré. Pour y remédier, et en considérant les appels à l'émotion comme des complexes prémisse-conclusion, cet article développe un cadre analytique présentant deux voies distinctes reliant les prémisses à la conclusion : une voie logique et une voie émotionnelle. Ce cadre montre que l'évaluation de tels appels implique d'abord d'examiner chaque voie individuellement, puis de les intégrer. Notamment, différentes émotions peuvent se renforcer mutuellement ou s'opposer. Un individu commet le sophisme de l'appel à l'émotion s'il juge, à tort, la conclusion comme justifiée alors qu'elle ne l'est pas. À partir de ce modèle, je propose deux explications sur la manière dont des émotions fortes peuvent conduire à une telle erreur de perception. Enfin, j'examine comment le mode émotionnel peut influencer la force d'un appel à l'émotion, illustrant ainsi le rôle épistémologique des émotions dans l'argumentation, tel qu’en discutent par Howes et Hundleby (2018).
Parties annexes
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