Résumés
Abstract
In “Epistemic Coverage and Argument Closure,” Catherine Hundleby brings together Sanford Goldberg’s work in social epistemology with Douglas Walton’s work in argumentation theory, on the topic of arguments from ignorance and truth-to-testimony conditionals. This paper explores the uses and limits of such arguments and conditionals, especially in connection with the problem of epistemic bubbles.
Keywords:
- argument from ignorance,
- epistemic coverage,
- epistemic bubble,
- dogmatism paradox
Résumé
Dans « Epistemic Cover-age and Argument Closure », Catherine Hundleby met en relation les travaux de Sanford Goldberg en épistémologie sociale et ceux de Douglas Walton en théorie de l’argumentation, portant sur les arguments fondés sur l’ignorance et sur les énoncés conditionnels du type « Si c’était vrai, je l’aurais déjà su ». Cet article explore les usages et les limites de ces arguments et de ces énoncés conditionnels, notamment en lien avec le problème des bulles épistémiques, qui excluent des informations pertinentes.
Parties annexes
Bibliography
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