Résumés
Abstract
Sometimes we argue about cats or about whether there is a largest prime number. Other times we argue about arguments. When we do this, we engage in meta-argument. Most accounts of meta-argument in the literature view it retrospectively: we meta-argue about arguments that have already been made. In so doing, we may find meta-reasons for rejecting an otherwise good argument, among other things. This paper considers meta-argument in the other direction, that is, prospectively. To illustrate this concept, we explore cases where one has meta-reasons for intentionally making bad arguments or where one argues not by offering an argument, but by communicating in a non-argumentative fashion that supports other arguments. We call these later cases para-argument.
Keywords:
- meta-argument,
- para-argument,
- signaling,
- ad baculum arguments
Résumé
Parfois, nous discutons à propos de chats ou de l'existence d'un plus grand nombre premier. D'autres fois, nous discutons d'arguments. Dans ce cas, nous nous engageons dans une méta-argumentation. La plupart des descriptions de méta-argumentation dans la littérature l'abordent rétrospectivement : nous méta-argumentons sur des arguments déjà avancés. Ce faisant, nous pouvons trouver des méta-raisons de rejeter un argument par ailleurs valable, entre autres. Cet article aborde la méta-argumentation dans l'autre sens, c'est-à-dire de manière prospective. Pour illustrer ce concept, nous explorons des cas où l'on a des méta-raisons de formuler intentionnellement de mauvais arguments, ou, dans d'autres cas, où l'on argumente sans argumenter du tout, mais en communiquant de manière non argumentative pour étayer d'autres arguments. Nous appelons ces derniers cas des para-arguments.
Parties annexes
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