Résumés
Abstract
Daniel Bell and Wang Pei’s recent monograph, Just Hierarchy, seeks to defend hierarchical relationships against more egalitarian alternatives. This paper addresses their argument, offered in one chapter of the book, in favour of a hierarchical relationship between human and nonhuman animals. This relationship, Bell and Pei argue, should conform to what they call “subordination without cruelty:” it is permissible to subordinate and exploit animals for human ends, provided that we do not treat them cruelly. We focus on three aspects of their view: their argument for a hierarchical view; their understanding of cruelty; and their account of the heightened duties they claim we owe to nonhuman animals who are intelligent, domesticated, and/or “cute.” We argue that the reasons that Bell and Pei offer fail to support their conclusions, and that, even if one accepts a hierarchical view, the conclusions that Bell and Pei draw about the permissibility of practices such as killing animals for food do not follow. We conclude by emphasizing philosophers’ responsibility to thoroughly test their arguments and to engage with existing debates, especially when the practices they seek to justify involve harms of great magnitude.
Résumé
Dans leur récent ouvrage, Just Hierarchy, Daniel Bell et Wang Pei se donnent pour tâche de défendre le principe de hiérarchie au détriment des relations plus égalitaires entre les êtres. Dans cet article, nous commentons la position qu’ils défendent dans un chapitre de leur livre consacré à la relation qu’entretiennent les êtres humains avec les autres animaux. Cette relation, soutiennent-ils, devrait relever de ce qu’ils appellent une « subordination non cruelle ». Il serait selon eux légitime d’assujettir et d’exploiter des animaux pour des fins humaines, à condition que nous ne les traitions pas cruellement. Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons sur trois aspects de leur position : leur défense du principe de hiérarchie, leur manière d’envisager la notion de cruauté et ce qu’ils regardent comme les devoirs accrus que nous aurions, jugent-ils, à l’égard des animaux intelligents, domestiqués et/ou « mignons ». Selon nous, les arguments avancés par Bell et Pei ne permettent pas de défendre adéquatement leur thèse ; en outre, même en admettant leur hypothèse sur la hiérarchie, les conséquences qu’ils en tirent au sujet de la légitimité morale de certaines activités telles que l’élevage pour la viande ne nous semblent pas recevables. Nous concluons en soulignant la responsabilité qui incombe aux philosophes de mettre scrupuleusement à l’épreuve leurs arguments et de connaître les débats actuels dans le domaine qu’ils abordent, tout particulièrement lorsque les pratiques qu’ils entreprennent de justifier sont la cause d’immenses souffrances.
Parties annexes
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