Résumés
Résumé
L'auteur rappelle d'abord les pistes tracées par les travaux néoréalistes en relations industrielles, puis il propose une perspective se situant dans le cadre d'une hétérodoxie institutionnaliste française afin de prolonger cette perspective. Après avoir distingué au sein du rapport salarial les règles organisationnelles et les règles institutionnelles, il porte son attention sur le système de relations professionnelles défini comme l'ensemble des règles institutionnelles. Il développe ensuite une hypothèse d'endogénéité relative des règles de contenu du système de relations professionnelles vis-à-vis des régimes d'accumulation. Puis il élabore une typologie qui met en évidence le type de relations professionnelles qui favorise l'enchaînement macroéconomique propre à chaque régime d'accumulation. Enfin, il considère les différences nationales qui sont mises sur le compte de la capacité exogène des acteurs, dotés d'une rationalité procédurale, à mettre en phase dans le temps les règles du système de relations professionnelles avec la régulation en place, d'où la possibilité de fortes marges d'indétermination.
Abstract
In this article, three perspectives that have emerged from neorealiststudies in industrial relations are explored. An initial analytical contribution of this article is to hierarchize the various categories of rules, particularly by distinguishing procedural rules from content rules and labour relations rules from human resource management rules. Secondly, through the concept of the "system of rules", the article examines the "national" character of rules located in a single "economie space" and examines the interaction of these rules with this space. A third contribution is to identify strategies pursued by collective actors, the interaction of which has become more and more central to the understanding of the dynamics of the system for those working within the neorealist tradition. In pursuing these three themes, the article draws upon the tools of several heterodox institutionalist theories developed in France, notably, the "Regulation Approach" and the "Economics of Conventions" school.
As regards to hierarchy of rules, the article focuses on a set of rules which is seen as an industrial relations system whose nature is specified. These rules stem quite precisely from collective bargaining and labour legislation. They frame labour force management practices within firms and, to varying degrees, encourage the spread of local innovations in wage relations. The existence of the industrial relations system is justified theoretically because the wage relationship is conflictual by nature, due to the open-ended character of the employment contract. However, although the labour contract is the legal form of agreements at the level of the firm, it also seems to be the case that this contract is the subject of a legitimation process which is wider than the firm. This process of legitimation involves the state through its legislative function. It implies as well that the power relations between actors will be organized with a view to influencing the terms of contracts. In order to situate various countries in an international perspective, a typology of industrial relations Systems is proposed. This typology takes into account actors' strategies, the role of the state and the degree of centralization of collective bargaining. It includes macrocorporatist, microcorporatist, pluralist and conflictual Systems.
Regarding the relationship between rules and their technical-economic environment, a relative endogeneityhypothesis of substantive rules of industrial relations Systems in relation to macroeconomic growth regimes is then developed. Although taking into account existing research concerning the different types of macroeconomic regulation, the present discussion stresses the type of industrial relations that favours the macroeconomic logic characteristic of each regime of accumulation. Four Weberian ideal-types are constructed based on existing empirical studies in industrial relations, economics of conventions and regulation theory.
The "extensive-competitive" accumulation regime tends to generate a conflictual industrial relations System. The "extensive-dualist" accumulation regime tends to be associated with the establishment of competitive rules in a pluralist industrial relations System. The "intensive-Fordist" accumulation regime typically is marked by the search for a macrocorporatist compromise in industrial relations. The "intensive-Toyotist" accumulation regime leads to a tendency to seek microcorporatist compromises. The typology developed here is synchronic. Obviously, over time countries may shift between the different poles in line with the choices of actors concerning the local agreement, choices which are then generalized to the macroeconomic level. Even within a given type of macroeconomic regulation, the performance of individual national economies depends on the actors' capacity, over time, to bring industrial relations System rules into line with the regulation in place. This gives rise, therefore, to zones of indeterminateness explaining differences between countries with similar Systems of macroeconomic regulation. This underscores the importance of comparative studies of the strategies of social actors which, being conditioned by social history and by procedural rules specifie to each industrial relations System, are for the most part determined exogenously.
Resumen
Después de haber distinguido en el seno de la relaciòn salarial las reglas organizacionales y las reglas institucionales, la atenciòn se aporta al sistema de relaciones profesionales definido como el grupo de reglas institucionales. Una hipòtesis de endogenidad relativa a las reglas del contenido del sistema de relaciones profesionales comparativamente a cada régimen de acumulaciòn identificado es desarrollada. Apoyàndose en los estudios empïricos existentes, una tipologïa pone en evidencia para cada caso el tipo de relaciones profesionales que favorecen el encadenamiento macro-econòmico propio de cada régimen de acumulaciòn.