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Many teachers and education scholars are quick to endorse discussing controversial issues in classrooms, especially in the context of “divisive concept” legislation that proposes bans or limitations on how contentious matters are taught in schools. This approach, however, may not be the best choice in a post-truth and populist setting that challenges the values of liberal democracy and the norms of discussion that are endorsed in deliberative democracy. Rather than recommending doubling down on traditional approaches in this new context, this article proposes a form of pragmatist inquiry as a better pedagogical method. Pragmatist inquiry shares some tenets with aspects of populism and post-truth, yet heads off some of their worst tendencies. It offers a more suitable pedagogical approach than the liberal democracy approaches more closely aligned with typical classroom discussion and related forms of deliberation and debate.

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It is no secret that humanities professors find themselves disenchanted by the current state of neoliberal universities; as the story goes, jobs are scarce, enrollment continues to drop, and students seem increasingly disconnected from the value of humanities-based classes. Universities and departments strive for new ways to respond to the current “crisis” in higher education internally, by appealing to the usefulness of the liberal arts, and structurally by institutionalizing the diversity of universities via DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) requirements and offices. On the surface, such measures seem “Deweyan” in spirit, by increasing social diversity, by removing class barriers, and by removing “waste” in the divisions between vocational and humanities studies. However, such responses to neoliberal institutions reproduce the very logic to which they respond and reflect a refusal to think institutionally. Using Dewey’s theories of democracy, growth, and waste, as well as contemporary literatures on the neoliberal university and virtue hoarding in education, we argue that these seemingly Deweyan measures reproduce the problems which they purport to resolve.

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What distinguishes the philosophies of education advanced by pragmatists? Does pragmatism have something distinctive to offer contemporary philosophy of education? This paper applies these questions, which Randall Curren asks in “Pragmatist Philosophy of Education” (2009), to a more specific current debate in philosophy of education: the debate over educating for critical thinking, and/or for intellectual virtues. Which, if either, should be given priority in higher education, and why? This paper develops a Deweyan approach to these questions, inviting character content but also offering specific ways for educators and institutions to stay alert to the pedagogical and indoctrination concerns with character education initiatives, including those for intellectual virtues specifically.

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This article explores Dewey's understanding of the nature of education through three seminal works written over a 32-year period. In Democracy and Education (1916) Dewey developed a concept of education which can be understood through two German words for education, Erziehung and Bildung. Through considering the approach to these concepts by two Dewey scholars, Gert Biesta and Dietrich Benner, the first section of this article seeks to explore Dewey's understanding of education and its relationship to democracy. The second section of the article carries the study forward to Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct (1922) to show how Dewey conceived of education even more broadly and equated it with morals. The concepts of Erziehung and Bildung also are important in this section, as they are expanded to show that, for Dewey, education was a guide in how to live. The third section of the article expands the concept of education still further to view education as philosophy. This section discusses Dewey's book Experience and Education (1938) which he wrote in light of his metaphysical study Experience and Nature (1925). Dewey expanded his understanding of education beyond both Erziehung and Bildung and beyond morals to develop an understanding of education as based upon a philosophical consideration of experience. The goal of the article is to show the breadth of Dewey's understanding of education and to show how his view of education forms the basis of a broad philosophical view of life.

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Drawing primarily on John Dewey’s Experience and Nature, but putting his metaphysical commitments into conversation with pedagogical experience, this article asks: how might a Deweyan understanding of nature and our experience within it support environmental progress? More specifically, how might we respect pluralistic relationships with philosophy in the classroom while simultaneously cultivating an understanding of experience that clarifies the embodied nature of our meaning-making within it and the contextual urgencies of today? How might observing the “generic traits of existence” and their particular and qualitative manifestations foster an appreciation for how the natural world acts as wellspring of human values? For Dewey as well as William James, experience is “double barreled,” designating both the “planted field” and “the one who plants and reaps”: functional distinctions serve a purpose, but experience emerges at, and astride the tensional energies that characterize, the permeable boundaries of self and world. Taking Dewey’s insights to heart illuminates how issues like biodiversity preservation are deeply existential concerns that are ripe for a Deweyan pedagogical intervention.

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The following article traces the legacy of John Dewey’s A Common Faith (1934) and Dewey’s concept of “the religious” in the thought of Philip H. Phenix, a prominent philosopher of education during the 1950s and 1960s. Phenix frequently cited A Common Faith and echoed Dewey’s commitments to naturalism, creativity, and ethical commitment, all of which he associated with transcendent sources of meaning. In this respect, Phenix’s position was almost identical to Victor Kestenbaum’s subsequent interpretation of Dewey in The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal (2002). Unlike Kestenbaum, however, Phenix found no trace of transcendence in A Common Faith and repeatedly criticized Dewey on the point. This article ascribes Phenix’s attachment to the transcendent and his interpretation of A Common Faith to contemporary changes in science and religion, particularly the intellectual influence of theoretical physics and existentialist theology, with implications for our understanding of religious and educational thought at midcentury.