Résumés
Abstract
I sketch evidence for a normative view of fittingness that poses a challenge to the nonnormative view of fittingness that Christine Tappolet defends in Philosophy of Emotion (2023). This challenge is important given that fittingness is crucial to her view of evaluative features and thus to her view of emotions as representations of evaluative features.
Résumé
J’esquisse les preuves d’une vision normative de l’adéquation (fittingness) qui remet en question la vision non normative de l’adéquation défendue par Christine Tappolet dans Philosophy of Emotion (2023). Ce défi est important car l’adéquation est cruciale pour sa conception des caractéristiques évaluatives et donc pour sa vision des émotions comme représentations de ces caractéristiques.
Parties annexes
Bibliography
- Berker, Selim, “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” in Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness, New York, Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 23-57.
- Card, Claudia, “Gratitude and Obligation,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, 1988, pp. 115-127.
- Gert, Joshua, “Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 116, no. 4, 2007, pp. 533-562.
- Glanzberg, Michael, “Truth,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/truth/
- Lewis, Max, “Gratitude: Its Nature and Normativity,” Philosophy Compass, 2024, e13015/.
- Macnamara, Coleen, “Gratitude, Rights, and Benefit,” in Robert C. Roberts and Daniel Telech (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Gratitude, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2019, pp. 96-117.
- Manela, Tony, “Obligations of Gratitude and Correlative Rights,” in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 5, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 151-170.
- Martin, Adrienne, “Personal Bonds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 102, no. 1, 2021, pp. 65-86.
- Naar, Hichem, “The Fittingness of Emotions,” Synthese, vol. 199, 2021, pp. 13601-13619.
- Solomon, Robert C., In Defense of Sentimentality, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Tappolet, Christine, Philosophy of Emotion: A Contemporary Introduction, New York, Routledge, 2023.
- Wallace, R. Jay, “Discretionary Moral Duties,” in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 9, New York, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 50-72.