Résumés
Abstract
I discuss Christine Tappolet's treatment of so-called arational actions (chapter 8). Brought to philosophical attention by Rosalind Hursthouse, arational actions are actions done simply because we are in the grip of an emotion (as when we leap up to reach for leaves out of joy). I argue that certainly many instances of so-called arational actions are in fact rational.
Résumé
Je discute de la manière dont Christine Tappolet traite des actions dites arationnelles (chapitre 8). Portées à l’attention philosophique par Rosalind Hursthouse, les actions arationnelles sont des actions accomplies simplement parce que nous sommes sous l’emprise d’une émotion (comme lorsque, par joie, nous sautons pour attraper les feuilles des arbres). Je soutiens que de nombreux exemples d’actions dites arationnelles sont en fait des actions rationnelles.
Parties annexes
Bibliography
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