Résumés
Abstract
Emotions often lead to akrasia and practical irrationality but can also help us respond to our practical reasons for action. If we think there exists an important distinction between akrasia and weakness of will, how should we then rethink emotions’ contribution and threats to practical rationality? By drawing on recent work on willpower, I invite Tappolet to consider this question.
Résumé
Les émotions conduisent souvent à l’akrasie et à l’irrationalité pratique, mais elles peuvent aussi nous aider à répondre à nos raisons pratiques d’agir. Si nous pensons qu’il existe une distinction importante entre l’akrasie et la faiblesse de la volonté, comment devrions-nous alors repenser la contribution des émotions et les menaces qu’elles représentent pour la rationalité pratique ? En m’appuyant sur des travaux récents sur la volonté, j’invite Tappolet à réfléchir à cette question.
Parties annexes
Bibliography
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