Résumés
Abstract
This commentary investigates chapter 7’s central thesis that emotions can be a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. I focus on two key challenges to this thesis, one rooted in the purported unreliability of emotions and another in their own susceptibility to justification. My aim is to buttress the chapter’s responses to these challenges, charting promising avenues forward.
Résumé
Ce commentaire examine la thèse centrale du chapitre 7 selon laquelle les émotions peuvent être une source de justification immédiate des croyances évaluatives. Je me concentre sur deux défis clés de cette thèse, l’un ancré dans le manque de fiabilité présumé des émotions et l’autre dans leur propre susceptibilité à la justification. Mon objectif est de renforcer les réponses du chapitre à ces défis, en traçant des pistes prometteuses.
Parties annexes
Bibliography
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