Résumés
Abstract
Christine Tappolet’s Philosophy of Emotion: A Contemporary Introduction is a comprehensive inventory of recent developments in the philosophy of emotion. Part 2 of the book examines various theories that answer the first question from chapter 1: What is the essence of emotions? My commentary compares these theories with Amélie Oksenberg Rorty’s argument for a skeptical answer to this question.
Résumé
Philosophy of Emotion: A Contemporary Introduction par Christine Tappolet est un inventaire complet des développements récents de la philosophie de l'émotion. La deuxième partie du livre examine diverses theories qui répondent à la première question du chapitre 1 : quelle est l’essence des émotions ? Mon commentaire compare ces théories avec l’argument d’Amélie Oksenberg Rorty en faveur d’une réponse sceptique à cette question.
Parties annexes
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