Résumés
Abstract
This discussion examines the plausibility of applying an oppression framework to the case of nonhuman animals. I identify two conceptions of oppression, which I call the social group conception and the ideological conception. The former is the standard account of oppression advanced by feminist philosophers. On this account, the existence of social groups (gender groups, racial groups) is a necessary condition of oppression. The second approach, which is also drawn from Marxist analysis and critical theory, treats oppression as “pejorative” ideology which is both epistemically and morally criticizable. I argue that the application of the social group conception to nonhuman animals faces explanatory and conceptual obstacles. While the application of the ideological conception is more straightforward, it is difficult to articulate an effective notion of ideology critique for the case of nonhuman animals.
Résumé
Cet article examine la plausibilité de l’application du cadre de l’oppression au cas des animaux non-humains. J’identifie deux conceptions de l’oppression, que j’appelle la conception de groupe social et la conception idéologique. La première est la conception standard de l’oppression avancée par les philosophes féministes. Selon cette conception, l’existence de groupes sociaux (groupes de genre, groupes raciaux) est une condition nécessaire de l’oppression. La deuxième approche, tirée de l’analyse marxiste et de la théorie critique, traite l’oppression comme une idéologie « péjorative » qui est à la fois épistémiquement et moralement critiquable. Je soutiens que l’application de la conception de groupe social aux animaux non-humains rencontre des obstacles explicatifs et conceptuels. Bien que l’application de la conception idéologique soit plus directe, il est difficile d’articuler une notion efficace de critique idéologique pour le cas des animaux non-humains.
Parties annexes
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