Résumés
Abstract
In the event of a pandemic, demand for vaccines may exceed supply. One proposal for allocating vaccines is to use a lottery, to give all citizens an equal chance, either of getting the vaccine (McLachlan) or of surviving (Peterson). However, insistence on strict equality can result in seriously suboptimal outcomes. I argue that the requirement to treat all citizens impartially need not be interpreted to require equal chances, particularly where citizens are differently situated. Assuming that we want to save lives, we should also seek to use vaccine efficiently, so far as this is compatible with equality. Thus, in allocating vaccine, we may want to be sensitive to (i) different levels of need and/or (ii) effects on vaccine production. While such policies may result in unequal chances, they may even improve everyone’s chances. In such cases, the resultant inequality is not a violation of impartiality, but a consequence of considering each person’s claim seriously.
Résumé
Dans le cas d’une pandémie, il est possible que la demande pour des vaccins excède l’offre. Une proposition concernant la distribution des vaccins est d’employer une loterie, afin de donner à tous les citoyens une chance égale soit de recevoir le vaccin (McLachlan) soit de survivre (Peterson). Toutefois, l’accent mis sur une stricte égalité peut produire des résultats gravement sous-optimaux. Je soutiens que l’exigence de traiter tous les citoyens de manière impartiale ne doit pas forcément être interprétée comme une exigence d’égalité des chances, particulièrement en ce qui concerne des citoyens qui sont dans des situations différentes. En supposant que nous voulons sauver des vies, nous devrions également viser à employer les vaccins de manière efficiente, dans la mesure où cela demeure compatible avec l’enjeu d’égalité. Ainsi, notre distribution du vaccin devrait tenir compte de (i) différents degrés de besoin et/ou (ii) des effets sur la production du vaccin. Bien que de telles politiques risquent de conduire à une inégalité des chances, elles peuvent néanmoins améliorer les chances de tous. Dans de tels cas, l’inégalité qui en résulte ne va pas à l’encontre de l’impératif d’impartialité, mais découle plutôt d’une considération sérieuse de la demande de chacun.
Parties annexes
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