Résumés
Résumé
L’intérêt des chercheurs et décideurs politiques au sujet de la corruption a généré une production d’articles sans cesse grandissante depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Cet article propose une revue de la littérature sur l’économie de la corruption, avec une emphase sur les solutions pour réduire la corruption. Malgré la quantité d’information disponible, les chercheurs se sont surtout concentrés sur les effets de la corruption et peu sur les moyens d’y remédier. Je recense les solutions anticorruption qui ont été proposées dans diverses disciplines. En chemin, je souligne des pistes de recherche proposées pour réduire la corruption.
Abstract
The interest for corruption by academics and policy makers has generated a growing body of literature since the end of the Cold War. This paper presents a literature review on the economics of corruption with an emphasis on solutions to fight corruption. Even though an important mass of information on the subject exists, researchers have focused more on identifying the effects of corruption and less on potential anticorruption solutions. I focus on approaches devised to combat corruption, suggested in economics and other disciplines, and point to some directions for future research on anticorruption solutions.
Parties annexes
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