Abstracts
Abstract
Conceptions of fallacies suggested by philosophers vary significantly. Often these contributions are little more than lists, only sometimes approaching a fully-developed theory of fallacy. Where there is a clear understanding of what is meant by the term fallacy, the problem of how to identify them in discourse remains, often leading to a conflation of descriptive and evaluative analyses. We present a two-tier procedure that strictly distinguishes the descriptive and normative dimensions of identifying fallacies. The combination of the descriptive Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP), which enables the characterization of an argument in terms of the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA), and the evaluative Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA), provides a basis for systematic, repeatable, and explainable argument acceptability judgements. We explain how this two-tier procedure overcomes some of the difficulties of fallacy identification and categorization and list several other advantages that a procedural approach to fallacies brings.
Keywords:
- argument evaluation,
- fallacy theory,
- explainable argumentation theory (XAT),
- Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA),
- Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA)
Résumé
Les conceptions des sophismes proposées par les philosophes varient considérablement. Souvent, leurs contributions se limitent à de simples listes, n'abordant que rarement une théorie pleinement élaborée du sophisme. Même lorsque la notion de sophisme est clairement définie, la difficulté de les identifier dans le discours persiste, ainsi conduisant fréquemment à une confusion entre les analyses descriptives et évaluatives. Nous présentons une procédure à deux niveaux qui distingue clairement les dimensions descriptives et normatives de l'identification des sophismes. La combinaison de la Procédure d'Identification des Types d'Arguments (PITA), qui permet de caractériser un argument à l'aide du Tableau Périodique des Arguments (TPA), et de la Procédure d'Évaluation Globale de l'Argumentation Naturelle (PEGN), fournit une base pour des jugements d'acceptabilité des arguments systématiques, reproductibles et explicables. Nous expliquons comment cette procédure à deux niveaux surmonte certaines difficultés liées à l'identification et à la catégorisation des sophismes et énumérons plusieurs autres avantages qu'apporte une approche procédurale des sophismes.
Appendices
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