Abstracts
Abstract
Our intuition is straightforward: yes, argumentation changes minds. But many cognitive and discursive habits suggest otherwise. As the literature in the psychology of reasoning incessantly emphasizes, we hardly change our minds because a predisposed robust confirmation bias (or myside bias) is at work when we argue. To adequately answer the questions of why, how, and if argumentation changes minds, I frame the problem from an evolutionary perspective. I argue argumentative competence changes minds because its ultimate goal is to construct the future, to predict more accurately. This converges with evolutionary analyses of other cognitive skills and cultural inventions. To explain my perspective, I use the distinction between ultimate and proximal goals of a trait.
Keywords:
- Adaptation,
- argumentation,
- control,
- evolution,
- prediction,
- ultimate and proximal functions
Résumé
Notre intuition est simple: oui, l’argumentation change les mentalités. Mais de nombreuses habitudes cognitives et discursives suggèrent le contraire. Comme le soulignent sans cesse les écrits sur la psychologie du raisonnement, nous ne changeons guère d’avis parce qu’un biais de confirmation robuste (ou biais de-mon-côté) prédisposé est à l’oeuvre lorsque nous argumentons. Pour répondre adéquatement aux questions de pourquoi, comment et si l’argumentation change les mentalités, je pose le problème dans une perspective évolutionniste. Je soutiens que la compétence argumentative change les mentalités parce que son but ultime est de construire l’avenir, de prédire avec plus de précision. Cela converge avec les analyses évolutionnistes d’autres compétences cognitives et inventions culturelles. Pour expliquer ma perspective, j’utilise la distinction entre les buts ultimes et proximaux d’un trait.
Appendices
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