Abstracts
Résumé
Cet article se propose de faire un réexamen des facteurs d’inefficacité de la régulation des télécommunications en mettant en avant le rôle de l’opportunisme qui lui est associé et les coûts de transaction qu’elle génère pour les firmes. En effet, bien que la présence d’organes de régulation dans cet environnement soit justifiée par le souci pour les pouvoirs publics de corriger les défaillances de tels marchés, l’évolution rapide de la technologie des télécommunications rend inadaptés les éléments caractéristiques de la régulation dans ce secteur (les objectifs, les outils et le processus décisionnel). Sujette à l’opportunisme et génératrice des coûts de transaction, la régulation des télécommunications, si elle permet d’assurer l’efficience statique au sens où la concurrence qu’elle favorise peut aider à réduire le pouvoir de marché des firmes, et donc à l’accroissement du surplus des consommateurs, elle est cependant loin d’intégrer les aspects inhérents à la dynamique propre du secteur des télécommunications, ceux qui conduiraient à l’efficience dynamique. D’où la nécessité de concevoir un système de régulation optimal intégrant les modèles dynamiques qui puissent concilier efficience statique et efficience dynamique.
Abstract
This article intends to make a review of the inefficiencies of telecommunications regulation by highlighting the role of opportunism and its associated transaction costs it generates for firms. Indeed, although the presence of regulatory bodies in this environment is justified by the need for government to correct the deficiencies in such markets, the rapid development of telecommunications technology makes them unsuitable characteristic elements of regulation in this sector (objectives, tools and decision making). Prone to opportunism and generating transaction costs, the regulation of telecommunications, if it ensures static efficiency in the sense that it promotes competition, can help reduce the market power of firms, and thus increased consumer surplus, it is far from integrating aspects inherent to the dynamics of the telecommunication sector, those that would lead to dynamic efficiency. Hence the need to design an optimal control system integrating dynamic models that can reconcile static efficiency and dynamic efficiency.
Appendices
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