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Natalie M. Fletcher

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Résumé de l'article

The concept of empathy has gained appeal in many educational initiatives in recent years, notably in the charitable sector, yet conceptual confusions endure and the challenges associated with educating for empathy tend not to receive the attention they deserve. This article strives to help clarify the concept of empathy for educative purposes by examining one such challenge—conceived as "narrow empathetic scope"—drawing on central ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. The article explores the ways in which moral imagination, as a precursor to empathy, may be uniquely able to assist with the cultivation of practical wisdom in children since it enables them to visualize contexts they have not yet encountered and broaden the moral lens through which they approach and assess their lived experience. The article will also present the Philosophy for Children model as an effective pedagogical method for cultivating the virtue of empathy through morally imaginative dialogue.

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NATALIE M. FLETCHER
Concordia University

Abstract: The concept of empathy has gained appeal in many educational initiatives in recent years, notably in the charitable sector, yet conceptual confusions endure and the challenges associated with educating for empathy tend not to receive the attention they deserve. This article strives to help clarify the concept of empathy for educative purposes by examining one such challenge—conceived as “narrow empathetic scope”—drawing on central ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. The article explores the ways in which moral imagination, as a precursor to empathy, may be uniquely able to assist with the cultivation of practical wisdom in children since it enables them to visualize contexts they have not yet encountered and broaden the moral lens through which they approach and assess their lived experience. The article will also present the Philosophy for Children model as an effective pedagogical method for cultivating the virtue of empathy through morally imaginative dialogue.

Introduction

“If you can learn a simple trick, Scout, you’ll get along a lot better with all kinds of folks. You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view, until you climb inside of his skin and walk around in it.”

—Atticus Finch, *To Kill a Mockingbird* (Lee, 1988)

The concept of empathy has gained appeal in many educational initiatives in recent years, notably in the charitable sector. Non-profit organizations like the Canadian-based Roots of Empathy program and the international Ashoka “Start Empathy” project are dedicating their efforts to developing innovative children-friendly curricula that educate for empathy, with the overarching goal of fostering responsible citizenship at an early age.¹ While this gradual shift toward empathic education is a promising and

¹ The Toronto-based charity Roots of Empathy (www.rootsofempathy.org) was founded in 1996 by child advocate Mary Gordon to help develop empathy in children by allowing them to regularly witness and analyze the loving interactions between an infant and parent, and practice taking on each other’s perspectives through careful listening. Launched in 1980, the international social entrepreneur network Ashoka’s Start Empathy initiative helps young people use empathy to better resolve conflict, work collaboratively and listen effectively, motivating them to become positive change-makers (empathy.ashoka.org).

valuable development, it also reveals conceptual confusions: as a moral concept, empathy is defined rather broadly, making it difficult to decipher what set of attitudes and behaviours it designates, and how to determine its successful implementation, particularly with respect to children.² This article aims to help clarify the concept of empathy for educative purposes by drawing on central ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue theory—a normative approach to ethics concerned with examining the character of individuals rather than emphasizing their actions. Whereas moral conduct forms the focus of other leading ethical approaches like consequentialism and deontology, virtue theory underlines the importance of the agent herself and the life she endeavours to lead (Hursthouse, 1990).³ In the words of John McDowell, a major proponent of neo-Aristotelian ethics, “according to this different view, although the point of engaging in ethical reflection still lies in the interest of the question ‘How should one live?’, that question is necessarily approached via the notion of a virtuous person” (McDowell, 1979, 332). By extension, the question “How should one live empathetically?” can be illuminated by exploring the notion of a virtuously empathetic person.

Aristotle defines virtue as a “purposive disposition” that can be acquired through the habitual performance of virtuous acts: to become empathetic, a person has to engage in empathizing (Thomson, 2004, 32).⁴ Yet habituation alone is not enough: the virtuous person also knows what balance to reach, using her reason and emotions in correct measure. She avoids both the excess of empathizing too much and the deficiency of empathizing too little by achieving the mean condition—hitting the “target” of empathy rather than falling short of it (40–41). A moral virtue is thus a “mean between two kinds of vice, one of excess and the other of deficiency,” and the virtuous person can determine the mean through practical wisdom—an intellectual virtue that enables her to grasp the particulars of each set of circumstances and make equitable judgments accordingly (41, 154–156). It is in this sense that Aristotle writes about the “mark of virtue” as having “feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way is to feel them to an intermediate, that is to the best, degree” (40). But what happens if an educational initiative promotes empathy without this sort of specification? What if the empathic orientation they encourage is too narrow in its scope, with children falling short of the empathy “target” by empathizing with too few people for the wrong reasons? This article focuses on this possible deficiency of empathy and the ways it may be addressed. I will argue from a neo-Aristotelian virtue perspective that practical wisdom is vital to educating for empathy since it sensitizes children to the particulars of situations that call for empathetic

Other non-profit organizations with similar mandates include PeaceFirst (www.peacefirst.org), which teaches empathy as one of its “peacemaker skills,” and ChangingWorlds (www.changingworlds.org) which uses empathy to enhance cross-cultural understanding.

² For instance, Roots of Empathy defines empathy as “the ability to identify with another person’s feelings...to see and feel things as others see and feel,” while Ashoka’s Start Empathy characterizes it as “the ability to understand what other people are feeling and to guide one’s actions in response.”

³ Although this article draws on virtue theory as its theoretical framework, there is no reason to think that other leading moral theories like consequentialism and deontology would not share the concern over “narrow empathetic scope” that will be developed in the following sections, nor in moral imagination as a way to combat it and expand empathic response. For example, in “Are Empathy and Morality Linked?” Giuseppe Ugazio et al. consider a similar formulation of empathy from consequentialist perspectives, noting that when placed in a utilitarian thought experiment like the trolley dilemma, individuals tend to show stronger empathy for ingroup members than outgroup members (revealing their narrow empathetic scope), suggesting that empathy “ultimately motivates morally dubious behaviour by causing a person to show partiality toward the ‘more human’ peers in her ingroup” (170). See Heidi L. Maibom, ed., *Empathy and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 156–171.

⁴ Aristotle writes: “Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it: people become builders by building...Similarly we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones.” Thomson, 2004, 32.

response. Further, I will propose that children can gain practical wisdom relative to their life experience by exercising moral imagination, a concept I define as the capacity to envision given contexts from multiple frames of reference to ensure a broadened lens with which to approach and assess lived experience. In my first section, I will examine the challenge of narrow empathetic scope, drawing from interdisciplinary research on empathy and neo-Aristotelian accounts of virtue. In my second section, I will illustrate how my conception of moral imagination can serve practical wisdom, using key ideas from Martha Nussbaum's *Love's Knowledge*. In my third section, I will present the Philosophy for Children model as an effective pedagogical method for cultivating the virtue of empathy through moral imagination, borrowing concepts from Mark Johnson's account of imaginative rationality.

The challenge of narrow empathetic scope

Current research across the disciplines abounds with interest in empathy, and this abundance has contributed to conceptual confusions surrounding the term, notably in the educational context. Depending on the field and the definition, empathy appears to involve both cognitive and affective dimensions, require aesthetic perception, and encompass many moral orientations, including kindness, justice and sympathy, with which it is sometimes conflated.⁵ While a full survey of these conceptualizations is beyond this section's reach, before analyzing empathy as a virtue, I want to consider a few relevant definitions from leading empathy theorists in the fields of ethology, psychology, and neurobiology, respectively. I will then discuss the virtue of empathy, defining narrow empathetic scope as a minor deficiency of empathy that deserves conceptual attention, and I will elucidate the role of practical wisdom in imparting the perception necessary for addressing this deficiency.

In his extensive studies of the evolutionary origins of cooperation and mirror neurons, Dutch ethologist Frans De Waal suggests that "empathy offers direct access to 'the foreign self'" (De Waal, 2009, 65). He argues that though "we can't feel anything that happens outside ourselves...by unconsciously merging self and other, the other's experiences echo within us" (65). Based on this definition, the empathetic person can be characterized as extending herself outward into another's experience. Further, for psychologist Carl Rogers, founder of the humanistic approach to therapy, empathy requires a certain sensibility. He describes the empathic process as "entering the private perceptual world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it...being sensitive, moment by moment, to the changing felt meanings which flow in this other person...temporarily living in the other's life, moving about in it delicately without making judgements" but also "without ever losing the 'as if' condition" (Rogers, 1975, 3-4). On this account, the empathetic person is able to extend herself into the other's experience, all the while recognizing that this experience is not her own; she maintains her own sense of agency. Additionally, according to neurobiologists Jean Decety and Philip Jackson, the empathetic agent also maintains a sense of judgment; her empathic process does not have to turn into sympathetic concern since she can remain impartial. They define empathy as "the capacity to understand and respond to the unique affective experiences of another person" though this sharing

⁵ Karsten Stueber provides a comprehensive overview of empathy within the field of philosophy. Karsten Stueber, "Empathy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed. <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/empathy/>>.

“does not necessarily imply that one will act or even feel impelled to act in a supportive or sympathetic way” (Decety & Jackson, 2006, 54). To sum up, then, from this interdisciplinary perspective, an empathetic person is one who extends herself outward into another’s experience with sensibility and judgment, without losing her sense of agency or her impartiality.

Returning to Aristotle’s conception of virtue, this characterization offers a starting point for thinking about the “target” of empathy. If the mean of empathy is, as described above, a judicious extending outward into another’s experience, then the excess of empathy—one of the corresponding vices—would be an agent extending outward to the point of losing herself: she conflates her own feelings with those of the other and distances herself too much from her own personal perspective due to her hypersensitivity or empathic fatigue (what I will henceforth call self-alienation for short). On the other end of the spectrum, the deficiency of empathy—the second corresponding vice—would be a form of tunnel vision: the agent extending outward with a limited point of view motivated by egoism or indifference, seeking in the other what she herself values and thus misconstruing their experience (what I will henceforth call self-seeking for short). These notions of excess and deficiency are captured well in a quote by Jeremy Rifkin, whose book *The Empathic Civilization* offers a revisionist account of human history from an empathic viewpoint: “The empathic observer doesn’t lose his sense of self and fuse into the other’s experience, nor does he coolly and objectively read the experience of the other as a way of gathering information that could be used to foster his own self-interest” (Rifkin, 2009, 13). Of course, as virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse points out, virtue possession is a matter of degree and “blind spots” can derail even a fairly virtuous person, without necessarily leading them completely off course into the territory of vice.⁶ Aristotle notes that “the man who deviates only a little from the right degree, either in excess or in deficiency, is not censured—only the one who goes too far, because he is noticeable” (Thomson, 2004, 49). With respect to empathy, I want to call this slight deviation, or this minor deficiency, narrow empathetic scope.⁷

Narrow empathetic scope is a failure to hit the virtue “target” but it does not constitute a vice: it involves an agent empathizing to an insufficient degree because her limited frame of reference causes her to misconstrue the circumstances of others. This problem involves two dimensions: the “who” of empathy—its objects, the people to which the agent directs her empathizing; and the “why” of empathy—its circumstances, the reasons justifying an agent’s empathizing with particular people. If an agent has narrow empathetic scope, she may empathize with fewer people for inadequate reasons that caricature or trivialize the situation in question. For instance, she may only empathize with people who share her worldview or with a minority group whose circumstances she misreads as pitiable. In either case, her scope of empathy is constricted. She has not collapsed into the full vice—the deficiency of self-seeking—but her current perspective restricts the degree to which she can embody the full virtue of empathy, though this restriction is not intentional on her part. Aristotle argues that acts of virtue and vice are voluntary, meaning their “originating cause lies in the agent [herself], who knows the particular circumstances of [her] action” (54). One might say that the agent with narrow empathetic scope

⁶ Hursthouse writes: “Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree, for most people who can be truly described as fairly virtuous...still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect.” Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed. <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/ethics-virtue/>>.

⁷ For reasons of space and focus alone, this article will focus on the deficiency of empathy. It is certainly worth considering the equally important excess of empathy—or self-alienation. For a detailed discussion of the excess of empathy as a kind of extreme perspective-shifting that threatens personal agency, see Peter Goldie’s “Anti-Empathy” in Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, eds., *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012): 302-318.

voluntarily acts in an empathetic way but misreads her particular circumstances. She is not deliberately doing the wrong thing, which would make her vicious, but rather falling short of the target because she lacks a certain quality of perception, namely: practical wisdom.

Neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists have greatly contributed to conceptualizing practical wisdom. For David Wiggins, it involves a careful reading of contexts. “The person of real practical wisdom,” he writes, “is the one who brings to bear upon a situation the greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns and genuinely relevant considerations commensurate with the importance of the deliberative context” (Wiggins, 1998, 233). For her part, Sabina Lovibond describes practical wisdom as “that comprehensive grasp of what matters in life,” adding that it entails “good judgement about the relative practical urgency or ‘saliency’ attaching, from moment to moment, to different ethical considerations” (Lovibond, 2002, 27-29). Similarly, Martha Nussbaum depicts the person of practical wisdom as “cultivating the sort of flexibility and perceptiveness that will permit [her]...to ‘improvise what is required’” (Nussbaum, 1990, 71). Practical wisdom, then, is what enables virtue since it makes an agent more receptive to and perceptive of the various situations she encounters and what they demand of her.⁸ The virtuous agent exhibits a sensitivity—or as McDowell phrases it, “a distinctive way of seeing things” (McDowell, 1979, 246).

Correspondingly, the agent who does not act virtuously lacks this sensitivity—she does not possess practical wisdom. Now, an agent who has narrow empathetic scope may be aiming for virtue but not be perceptive enough to see and be sensitized to all the salient features of the circumstances, so she fails to hit the target, despite succeeding at empathizing to a certain (albeit inadequate) degree. For this agent, empathy is not yet a full virtue; it is not, as Linda Zagzebski puts it, “a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end” (Zagzebski, 1996, 137). The agent may be unaware of a tendency toward bias that could be leading her to empathize exclusively with people to whom she can relate or to interpret people’s conditions in a one-sided manner. As Aristotle underlines, those who are committed to virtue must therefore “notice the errors into which [they are] liable to fall” based on their own natural tendencies, and “drag [themselves] in the contrary direction” (Thomson, 2004, 166). Additionally, they must learn to distinguish between virtues and dispositions that appear similar but are not equivalent. Just as many traits may parade as courage but actually entail a different disposition altogether, the virtue of empathy has its share of impersonators.⁹ Personal distress, for example, though instigated by another’s situation, is ultimately self-centred: a person may react with intense anxiety in response to seeing someone suffer but, as neurobiologists Decety and Jackson observe, “the focus would then become [her] own feelings of stress rather than the other’s need” (Decety & Jackson, 2006, 57). All things considered, for the aspiring virtuous agent, developing practical wisdom can be a painstaking, error-prone process.

So where does this leave children and the tall order of educating for empathy? The cultivation of practical wisdom seems vital to empathic education since it can sensitize children to the salient particulars of situations that call for an empathetic response. Yet according to Aristotle and a few other virtue ethicists, notably Hursthouse, children lack the life experience for practical wisdom—they have not confronted a wide enough range of circumstances to read the contexts they do encounter with

⁸ Further, Aristotle argues that “the possession of the single virtue of [practical wisdom] will carry with it the possession of them all.” Thomson, 2004, 166.

⁹ Aristotle identifies five dispositions that resemble but do not constitute courage: civic courage, experience of risk, spirit or mettle, sanguineness or optimism, and ignorance (Thomson, 2004, 70-73).

enough thoroughness and sensitivity. “In the moral sphere,” writes Hursthouse, “we do assume there is a distinction between being mentally a child and mentally an adult”—namely, the capacity to act from reason (Hursthouse, 1990, 15). When it comes to empathy, children may not perceive all the relevant considerations in a situation and thus misconstrue it, resulting in a narrow empathetic scope that excludes certain people or distorts their experience. Further, this tendency may follow them into adulthood—as Aristotle highlights, a person’s bad habits will affect their resulting dispositions, “so it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the earlier stage—it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world” (Thomson, 2004, 32). So how can narrow empathetic scope be addressed? How can an education for empathy cultivate practical wisdom relative to children’s life experience? To my mind, moral imagination provides a very promising avenue, which I will now explore.

Moral imagination in the service of practical wisdom

Though defined in great and varying detail by many of its proponents outside of philosophy—notably in the fields of law, medicine and business—moral imagination, like many important ethical concepts including empathy, is a vague and imprecise notion.¹⁰ For my purposes, however, I want to propose a specific definition of moral imagination as the capacity to envision given contexts from multiple, even incompatible, frames of reference to ensure a broadened moral lens with which to approach and assess lived experience. Narrow empathetic scope, then, can be interpreted as a failure of moral imagination. In this section, I want to show how moral imagination can serve practical wisdom by enhancing perception. I will argue that morally imaginative agents, even in childhood, may be more able than their unimaginative peers to discern the ethically salient features of situations and better empathize with others because they are able, through moral imagination, to envision contexts they have not yet had the opportunity to encounter in their lived experience, and to compare real situations with counterfactual or alternative realities. I will begin with a hypothetical case and then propose three features of moral imagination worth considering, linking these to Nussbaum’s ideas about perception.

For illustrative purposes, I want to offer the following hypothetical case of empathy in a young boy:

Charlie is an outgoing and kindhearted fourth-grader with a close circle of friends. At school, his teachers unanimously praise him for his considerate, mild-tempered manner and he takes pride in this good reputation. On weekends, he volunteers with his parents at a home for the elderly and last summer he taught Sam, his timid, reluctant best friend, how to ride a bicycle, after months of gentle convincing. One day after school, Sam arrives at the playground in tears—his bike has been stolen. Charlie can tell his friend is very upset and, while he can hear the other kids laughing at Sam for crying, he does not judge him for reacting strongly. He lost his roller blades last year and remembers how badly he felt. Plus, he has been Sam’s closest friend since

¹⁰ For some insightful accounts of moral imagination from outside philosophy, see: in the field of law, Susan A. Bandes and John Hasnas; in the field of medicine, Carl and Britt Elliott, Patricia Beattie Jung and B. Smith; and in the field of business, Patricia Werhane, David Caldwell, Minette E. Drumright, Timothy Hargrove, Laura Hartman, Paul G. LaForge and Dennis Moberg. Full citations can be found in the references section.

kindergarten and he helped him get over his fear of bicycling. That night on the evening news, the local police announce they have arrested a homeless teenager for stealing a handful of bikes in Charlie's neighbourhood, including Sam's two-wheeler. It turns out the teenager had not eaten a full meal or taken a shower in weeks, ever since his mother, a single parent, checked herself into a rehab facility for her drug addiction. He stole the bikes to get money for food and shelter. Despite hearing these details, Charlie does not empathize with the teenager and when his parents ask why he seems so conflicted, he responds: "Why would I bother with some nasty kid who stole my friend's bike?"

Clearly, Charlie is capable of empathy and gets satisfaction from having others praise his good qualities. And yet, he has narrow empathetic scope. Recalling Aristotle's mark of virtue, Charlie empathizes "at the right times" and "for the right motive" when it comes to his friend, but not "on the right grounds"—his partiality clouds his judgment. Likewise, he fails to empathize "toward the right people" and "in the right way" when it comes to those with whom he does not easily identify, like the homeless teenager. He misses the "target" of empathy though he does not do so voluntarily in the way that a self-seeker might; rather, he only exhibits a certain degree of the virtue—a subtlety that advocates of empathic education may inadvertently neglect. What Charlie lacks in this case are certain features of moral imagination that specifically contribute to the kind of discerning perception that Nussbaum champions in many of her books, notably *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature*. I want to focus on the following three features, which I deem crucial to moral imagination's support of practical wisdom:

i) Acknowledgement of limited perspectives

First, Charlie seems unaware of his own limitations of perspective and thus does not heed the call to imagine a different set of possible vantage points to diversify and problematize his own. He does not see how he is favouring Sam because he knows him and cares for him, while dismissing the homeless teenager as unworthy of his empathy because his actions hurt his friend. The point of acknowledging these limited perspectives is not for Charlie to overcome bias entirely—an unfeasible task—but for him to become aware of the ways in which his current conceptual frameworks, values and commitments may be preventing him from considering other relevant viewpoints as pertinent. In an essay on judicial empathy, John Hasnas contends that moral imagination acts as a guard "against our natural tendency to focus on what is immediately before us and familiar and overlook more remote or unusual possibilities and consequences" (Hasnas, 2012, 30). Nussbaum makes a similar claim, asserting that moral imagination enhances an agent's perception by making her aware of her parochial confinement. "Quoting Aristotle, she notes that since "we have never lived enough," by feeding moral imagination through narratives and deliberations about unfamiliar life experiences, an agent can see in her own conceptual shortcomings the need for ethical flexibility. By extension, she does not simply approach "each situation prepared to see only those items about which [she] already knows how to deliberate" (Nussbaum, 1990, 47, 67)."

ii) Recognition of commonality

Second, due to these unacknowledged limited perspectives, Charlie also fails to recognize overlaps in lived experiences between himself and the homeless teenager, or between the homeless teenager and other similar cases of desperation. He prioritizes the differences between himself and the teenager rather than seeing their commonality, meaning he is not adequately informed about what the situation demands of him, namely that he should strive toward a more complete view of the other's needs, goals, motivations and obstacles. Yet as Carl and Britt Elliott remark in an article about empathy in the medical profession, "there are enough core similarities between various kinds of human experience to ensure we have something to learn from the experiences of others, and that we can, with some help, imagine what many varieties of human experiences are like" (Elliott, 1991, 173-174). Charlie may not think of himself as someone who would steal a bike, no matter the circumstances, but he could recognize the things he shares in common with the homeless teenager, like the need for nourishment, clothing, family support and a roof over his head. As Nussbaum emphasizes, moral imagination highlights humanity's shared aims and needs in the struggle for existence, dismantling the idea of the "other" as a foreign or lesser being. Specifically, morally imaginative agents "learn to appreciate vividly the ways in which common human weaknesses are experienced in a wide range of social circumstances, understanding how social and political arrangements of different kinds affect the vulnerabilities that all human beings share" (Nussbaum, 2010, 39-40).

iii) Receptivity to competing considerations

Lastly, Charlie does not appear to realize the complexity of the situation at hand. He imposes a black-and-white reading on the circumstances rather than perceive their shades of grey. In a study of the "moral myopia" of advertising practitioners, Minette Drumwright and Patrick Murphy suggest that people may deny others empathy due to a "distorted moral vision that results largely from rationalization or from an unwillingness to focus on the problem so that it is seen clearly" (Drumwright & Murphy, 2004, 11). Charlie may firmly grasp his own values and priorities but he does not see how these can conflict with one another and with others' considerations, so he misconstrues situations based on his own rationalized preferences. He seems unreceptive to the fact that his values of friendship and integrity are in tension with other equally important values like human dignity—of which the homeless teenager is bereft due to unfortunate and desperate conditions. Without excusing the teenager's behaviour, Charlie could perceive his position as tragic and envision his hardships from a less biased perspective. Moral imagination facilitates receptivity to considerations in this way by heightening respect for what Nussbaum calls the non-commensurability of the valuable things (Nussbaum, 1990, 36). Values are seen as neither interchangeable nor replaceable, "each generating its own claims, but each having, as well, its own general definition and being instantiable in any number of particular situations and actions" (86).

In short, Charlie needs to become more morally imaginative. When practiced and well honed, these three features of moral imagination can translate into a "complex responsiveness," which Nussbaum qualifies as "the ability to discern, acutely and responsively, the salient features of one's particular situation" (55, 37). By enhancing perception, moral imagination broadens the scope of empathy, illuminating a greater number of salient particulars and increasing sensitivity toward dimensions of a situation that may otherwise go overlooked. Through the exercise of moral

imagination, an agent can expand her criteria for determining the “who” and “why” of empathy, identifying more candidates with whom to empathize and perceiving circumstances more impartially than she did previously, thus drawing nearer to Aristotle’s “target” of virtue. In this way, moral imagination functions in a manner similar to practical wisdom, though it operates in a mental landscape rather than a concrete one. It enables an agent to actively envision what she may not have encountered for herself in reality. Moral imagination is a kind of lived experience in its own right and through it even children can gain practical wisdom despite their relative immaturity. As Nussbaum stresses, since practical wisdom integrates intellectual, emotional and imaginative faculties, “the only procedure to follow is...to imagine all the relevant features as well and full and concretely as possible, holding them up against whatever intuitions and emotions and plans and imaginings we have brought into the situation or can construct in it” (74). This imaginative responsiveness improves over time: the moral agent becomes increasingly able to perceive salience with every particular situation encountered, “through a long process of living and choosing that develops the agent’s resourcefulness and responsiveness” (75). Accordingly, moral imagination can serve practical wisdom and address narrow empathetic scope because it can “link particulars without dispensing with their particularity,” drawing on memory and past readings of situations to “form new combinations, not yet experienced, from items that have entered sense-experience” (77-78).

Though many accounts of moral imagination focus on its usefulness as a guide for action, this proposed neo-Aristotelian conception of moral imagination locates its role prior to any decision-making procedure. Certainly, when facing an ethical dilemma, the ability to imagine the potential consequences of an act is paramount: as business ethicist Patricia Werhane and her many advocates argue, this kind of anticipatory moral appraisal can help uncover alternatives that are at once practically feasible and more ethically sound. (Werhane, 1999). Yet viewing moral imagination as an ability of the virtuous agent—and of the aspiring virtuous agent who is aiming for virtue despite a minor deficiency—reveals its potential for strengthening moral character. Indeed, an agent who actively exercises her moral imagination can better embody the virtue of empathy because she develops the perception and sensitivity to empathize with everyone. She can perceive anyone as a candidate for empathy because her capacity to envision their context and its possible implications is sufficiently developed to uncover the salient features that explain (though not necessarily excuse) their circumstances, enabling her to construe their experience more accurately. As such, on one extreme, the virtuously empathetic agent can empathize with her worst enemy, and on the other, with people who simply conduct themselves differently than she does.

Of course, a robust moral imagination does not imply an obligation to envision the circumstances of all people encountered at every moment—such a requirement risks resulting in an agent reaching an excess of empathy where she extends herself outward to the point of losing herself and self-alienating.¹¹ Rather, moral imagination implies a commitment to acknowledging limited perspectives, recognizing commonality and being receptive to competing considerations. Further,

¹¹ It is worth considering the possibility of a counterpoint to narrow empathetic scope—a kind of overly wide-ranging empathy that might cause the hypersensitivity and empathic fatigue previously connected to an excess of empathy, or self-alienation. Is it possible to extend imagination too far and empathize too much, to an inordinate degree that negatively affects practical wisdom? In his book *L’imagination en morale* Martin Gibert considers whether imagination applied to moral circumstances can actually lead to detrimental expressions of empathy, notably in cases where a counterfactual requires imagining a nefarious world context, like one in which torturing innocent people is acceptable. In such cases, the pressure to empathize with the torturers might alienate an individual from her values in ways that impede her agency and her capacity for practical wisdom. See Martin Gibert, *L’imagination en morale* (Paris: Hermann, 2014).

though moral imagination broadens the scope of empathy, it does not require the more involved move toward sympathy or compassion since candidates for empathy may not deserve such concern or validation, especially if driven by vice. For instance, using moral imagination, a virtuously empathetic agent may learn a lot from extending herself outward into a criminal's experience without having to commiserate with him: the imaginative process of envisioning his conditions from diverse angles can generate a more refined understanding of the conditions leading up to felonies, thus challenging her preconceptions of criminal minds. In reference to moral imagination's three proposed features, this envisioning would allow the agent to acknowledge and problematize limited perspectives (e.g., racial profiling; appeal-to-fear fallacies; sweeping assertions like "All criminals are psychopaths," etc.), recognize common human needs and disparities (e.g., the effects of socioeconomic inequalities; poor education; domestic abuse; attachment disorder, etc.), and negotiate competing considerations (e.g., arguments for rehabilitation versus capital punishment; conflicting values of forgiveness, retribution and atonement, etc.). In this way, the morally imaginative agent exhibits a spirit of inquiry with respect to the people with whom she empathizes, perceiving them as complex characters with intricate life stories rather than judging them prematurely based on certain isolated acts that do not capture the full picture of their context. Moral imagination, then, is not only a moral virtue but also an epistemic virtue, since it can help to nuance the epistemological vantage points and resulting knowledge that inform moral judgments.

Even so, is it ethically sensible or even desirable to suggest that moral imagination be harnessed to extend empathy to anyone and everyone? Could restraints on empathy be beneficial?¹² In her analysis of moral and aesthetic defects, Amy Mullin cautions against the possible moral corruption that can arise from habitual exposure to works of art that present an unethical position. "Certainly," she writes, "even a single instance of such an imaginative experience can destroy a kind of moral innocence, in which, for example, some kinds of cruelty had simply never occurred to one" (Mullin, 2004, 252). Correspondingly, an agent who extends herself outward into a criminal's experience as I suggested above may lead her to consider a kind of lifestyle that is morally detrimental, even dangerous. After all, can an agent really "un-see" mental imagery afforded to her by her moral imagination? In his article "Empathy for the Devil," Adam Morton claims that the decency of morally good agents constrains their imagination so as to disable empathy towards those who commit atrocious acts. He argues that "these barriers affect our imagination of choice as well as our actual choices, so that they inhibit us from making nasty choices vivid" (Morton, 2012, 321). In both of these accounts, the authors express justifiable concern over an agent becoming desensitized to atrocity and inclined to normalize it. While I find these challenges significant, I think they lose some force if I reaffirm the distinction between the virtue of empathy as I have conceived it and sympathy as a kind of emotional identification with another's plight. As mentioned in my brief interdisciplinary survey of empathy theorists, empathy involves sensibility, certainly, but the emotion required is a type of wholehearted commitment to the process of extending oneself outward into another's experience—it is not a sharing of the other's

¹² "As a challenge to my account of narrow empathetic scope, a purposefully restrained empathy could be justifiable in some cases to help focus empathic energies on people and policies in ways that ensure depth of concern and practical feasibility. For instance, some may argue that it is better to concentrate on local initiatives that improve immediate communities or to restrict immigration to a more modest number of families to increase chances of successful integration. It seems that moral imagination would still be necessary in these cases but directed more focally toward empathic pursuits where outcomes carry a greater ethical weight than virtuous character. Such a challenge to my account may be consequentialist in nature and deserves consideration as an alternative to the neo-Aristotelian virtue theory approach explored in these pages.

feelings but a recognition of these feelings as part of their situation's salient features. A virtuously empathetic agent is not expected to partake in the emotional experience of the criminal—say, the anger that motivated his behaviour—but to sincerely (rather than resentfully or disdainfully) commit to reconstructing his vantage point through an envisioning of his context from multiple reference points, that is, through moral imagination. As Nancy Sherman underlines in *The Fabric of Character*, “at stake will be the capacity to re-enact the agent’s point of view and to consider what it is like for that agent to do that action in that context” (Sherman, 1991, 36).

And so, to speak of moral imagination as serving practical wisdom by enhancing perception is to speak about its potential for broadening the moral lens with which virtuous agents approach and assess lived experience, with one possible outcome being a widened scope of empathy. Still, moral imagination does face the trap of subjectivity: it is difficult for an agent to transcend her individual point of view regardless of her commitment to virtue and to envisioning given contexts from multiple frames of reference. This obstacle calls for a collaborative approach to moral deliberation, especially with regard to children and the task of educating for empathy. As the next section aims to show, the Philosophy for Children model offers a valuable atmosphere of collective exploration in which to challenge personal assumptions about empathy and problematize associated perspectives, distributing the practice of moral imagination among many individuals and thus enriching its potential. As Zagzebski maintains, it is through consistent commitment over time that a virtue becomes ingrained in an agent’s sense of identity and turns into a meaningful quality for which she is responsible (Zagzebski, 1996, 104).

Philosophy for Children and morally imaginative practice

In her book *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*, Nussbaum bemoans the current silent crisis in education caused by an overemphasis on profit-oriented pursuits and resulting in “flaws in reasoning, parochialism, haste, sloppiness, selfishness [and] narrowness of the spirit” (Nussbaum, 2010, 142). She argues instead for an education model rooted in the arts and humanities that promotes democracy by nurturing the critical reasoning, global consciousness and imagination required for individuals to “see other human beings as full people, with thoughts and feelings of their own that deserve respect and empathy” (143). Toward this end, she advocates the Philosophy for Children (P4C) model founded by educational philosopher Matthew Lipman as a promising pedagogical method. Weighed by similar concerns about small-mindedness, Lipman adapted the pragmatist ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey in his design of the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI), a dialogical method intended to foster multidimensional thought (or combined critical, creative and caring thinking), which he viewed as “a balance between the cognitive and the affective, between the perceptual and the conceptual, between the physical and the mental” (Lipman, 2003, 200-201). A CPI can equip children—or, for that matter, adults—with the means to tackle contestable questions they deem central to their lives and formulate reasonable, revisable judgments through structured group dialogue. In this third section, I will endeavour to show the merits of the CPI method as a morally imaginative practice, borrowing concepts from Mark Johnson’s highly rigorous account of imaginative rationality in *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics*.

I contend that a CPI must awaken and exercise the moral imagination of its members in order to

cultivate their practical wisdom and, in turn, assist in broadening the scope of their empathy. To be clear, without this emphasis on morally imaginative practice, children may become adept at using logic to understand the analytic aspects of their community's exchanges (critical thinking), but they may not necessarily be able to imagine their way beyond their own perspectives to identify the salient features of a given context and empathize accordingly (creative and caring thinking). However, if moral imagination is incorporated as a deliberate, active practice through specific skill-building, a CPI can create an authentic, meaningful lived experience of collective ethical inquiry—a kind of “dress rehearsal” that exposes its members to unfamiliar circumstances and allows them to experiment with empathetic responses. Interestingly, a CPI is both a lived experience itself and an inquiry into lived experiences through imaginative deliberation about fictional instances (like narrative storytelling), hypothetical instances (like thought experiments) and actual instances (like real life examples and historical references). Dubbed as “stimulus materials” by practitioners of the method, these instances prompt philosophical reflection in inquirers by connecting them to previously unexamined dimensions of their lives that can subsequently be questioned and thought through collectively.¹³ The following examples of stimulus types illustrate possible ways within P4C for an empathic education model to illuminate the challenge of narrow empathetic scope in order to provoke dialogue about who “deserves” empathy and why, and to help children learn to acknowledge their limited perspectives, recognize commonality and be receptive to competing considerations:

Fictional instances: Especially applicable to small children, the morals of fairy tales tend to propagate a hero/villain dichotomy to the point of caricaturing the fable's “bad guy” and dismissing him as a worthy candidate for empathy. Nussbaum highlights the possible ramifications of this dichotomy, including “the bifurcation of the ‘pure’ and the ‘impure’—the construction of a ‘we’ who are without flaw and a ‘they’ who are dirty, evil, and contaminating” (Nussbaum, 2010, 35). For instance, the wolf in *The Three Little Pigs* is depicted as a gluttonous trickster motivated solely by his voracious appetite for ham. Whether for storytelling purposes or not, no other salient features of his context or character are spotlighted so readers only get a partial view, which could result in the kind of tunnel vision I have associated with the deficiency of empathy. By contrast, John Scieszka's popular parody, *The True Story of the Three Little Pigs*, puts forward a wholly different reading of the salient features of the wolf's situation, portraying him as a well meaning if clumsy eccentric trying to borrow a cup of sugar from his porcine neighbours to bake his grandmother's birthday cake, all the while suffering from the common cold and its signature sneezing fits. In the words of the alleged antagonist: “I don't know how this whole Big Bad Wolf thing got started, but it's all wrong” (Scieszka, 1989)—no one seems to empathize with him because no one knows the real, salient particulars of his situation.

Hypothetical instances: In the realm of animal ethics, the issue of speciesism—or prejudice

¹³ Lipman designed the CPI method as a five-stage dialogical inquiry process involving a group of children and a trained P4C facilitator who acts as their guide by keeping track of their dialogue's evolution, helping them navigate their various investigations and offering valuable procedural prompts to promote critical, creative and caring thinking. As originally conceived, the stages proceed as follows: “Stage 1. The offering of the text: Students read or enact a philosophical story together; Stage 2. The construction of the agenda: Students raise questions for discussion and organize them into an agenda; Stage 3. Solidifying the community: Students discuss questions as a community of inquiry facilitated by an adult with philosophical training; Stage 4. Using exercises and discussion plans: The philosophical facilitator introduces relevant activities to deepen and expand the students' inquiry; Stage 5. Encouraging further responses: These include self-assessment of philosophy practice, art projects and action projects.” Gregory, 2007, 163.

against non-human animals—is often repudiated by people who appeal to a list of ostensibly relevant differences between humans and other life forms, notably the capacity to reason or communicate preferences. In response, the argument over what makes a life form worthy of moral concern could be reformulated as an imaginative scenario focusing on one apparent difference, such as the power of speech. The thought experiment could be, “If animals could talk, would we treat them differently?” This visualization may shed light on a host of neglected considerations, including the emotional range of different species, their non-verbal communication of pain and distress, the prioritization of human suffering, and the means-to-an-end mentality behind certain farming practices and scientific testing. Moreover, the thought experiment may elicit analogies similar to those made by J.M. Coetzee’s protagonist Elizabeth Costello between animal cruelty and the Holocaust, where the capacity to express agony has little bearing on moral treatment (Mulhall, 2009, 22). In this way, the scope of empathy can be extended beyond the human sphere to include animals, for reasons that do justice to the complexity of their experience rather than skew or sentimentalize it.

Actual instances: For a more mature audience, issues surrounding the sex industry can also call attention to the narrow scope of empathy and underline some relevant particulars that often go unnoticed. For instance, conjectures about the goings-on between female employees and their clients in the shady corners of brothels suggest a lack of attentiveness to the conflicting needs, motivations and obstacles experienced by both parties. This disregard may lead to an incomplete picture of the circumstances. Women may be deemed as inferior, promiscuous and indecent, choosing a life of prostitution freely, when their line of work may in fact be a last resort—a decision made under conditions of disadvantage and inequality. As Catharine MacKinnon notes in her study of sex discrimination, “Few weep the whore’s reputation”—sex workers may not be considered worthy of empathy because their vulnerabilities go unacknowledged (MacKinnon, 2011, 14). Conversely, as Aziza Sindhu’s film documentary *Meeting John* reveals, the stereotype of men who purchase sexual services as chauvinistic, crude and violent obscures the true motives of a significant proportion of them, notably those propelled by loneliness, timidity, self-consciousness, and even grief (Sindhu, 2010). Again, a broadening of the “who” and “why” of empathy does not require sympathetic identification or approval, but rather a sincere construal of the relevant particulars characterizing a complex context.

As possible topics of a CPI dialogue, in their intricacy and nuance, these examples demonstrate the significant role of moral imagination and re-emphasize the dangers of failed attempts to acknowledge limited perspectives, recognize commonality and remain receptive to competing considerations. In Lipmanian terms, they stress the “caring” and “creative” aspects of multidimensional thinking and show that a disengaged critical rationality cannot do the work alone. Echoing the neo-Aristotelian emphasis on reasoning being accompanied by appropriate emotion, Lipman’s sense of “reasonableness” combines rational scrutiny and moral sensibility.¹⁴ By extension, in his view, moral imagination must be taken seriously:

¹⁴ Lipman and Nussbaum offer similar claims in this regard. Arguing against intellectualism, Nussbaum observes how “frequently, it will be [the agent’s] passional response, rather than detached thinking, that will guide her to the appropriate recognitions.” Nussbaum, 1990, 79. Similarly, Lipman argues that with an overly intellectualist view of thinking, “we fail to see how profoundly our emotions shape and direct our thoughts, provide them with a framework, with a sense of proportion, with a perspective, or better still, with a number of different perspectives.” Lipman, 2003, 262.

Moral imagination is sometimes treated as though it were a merely playful dealing with fictions. On the contrary, it is a procedure that makes moral seriousness possible. It is when we do not put ourselves in the other person's place that we are merely playing at being ethical. To be sure, the empathic act does not require that we accept the other's evaluation: We still have a judgment to make. But now we have better reasons, and the judgment we make can be a stronger one (Lipman, 2003, 70).

Of course, in a CPI, the formulation of judgments is a collaborative effort, one that epitomizes the old adage that many heads are better than one. Children have the valuable opportunity to enhance their perception by engaging with others who are dedicated to the same purpose of following the inquiry where it leads. From the perspective of virtue theory, this kind of collaboration is also highly valuable. As Sherman asserts, it is "through listening to and identifying with the viewpoints of others [that] an agent's vision becomes expanded and enlarged...the agent comes to learn different ways of reading a situation and different questions to pose in order to see the picture with increased insight and clarity" (Lipman, 2003, 270).

Moral imagination in a CPI dialogue involves particular philosophical "moves" on the part of inquirers and facilitators to enable them to envision the implications of their viewpoints, consider novel possibilities, identify undetected assumptions, and self-correct accordingly. This self-correction can widen what the CPI members count as criteria for empathy, not only in the types of instances—or "stimulus" materials—they explore but also within their own inquiry circle (how they treat one another in their dialogical exchanges) and within their personal relationships (how they treat the people in their everyday lives). Specifically, the philosophical moves of interest are those that bolster moral imagination as a deliberate, active practice. In my view, these moves are best understood with reference to Mark Johnson's work on imaginative rationality—a term he uses to capture the way individuals ought to engage in moral deliberation. In his book *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics*, Johnson explores the implications of the prototypes, conceptual frames, metaphors and narratives used in moral reasoning. He writes:

We need self-knowledge about the imaginative structure of our moral understanding, including its values, limitations, and blind spots. We need a similar knowledge of other people, both those who share our moral tradition and those who inhabit other traditions. We need to imagine how various actions open to us might alter our self-identity, modify our commitments, change our relationships, and affect the lives of others (Johnson, 1993, 187).

Within a CPI, this knowledge of imaginative structure can be gradually gained even in young children through facilitation and inquiry moves that call into question certain assumptions and illustrate alternative perspectives. I want to consider two elements of this imaginative structure—conceptual framing and metaphorical thinking—and point to some of the ways they can broaden the scope of empathy.

i) Conceptual framing

Johnson argues that an agent's understanding of a situation depends heavily on the way it is framed. Returning to the fictional instance of *The Three Little Pigs*, the destruction of the straw and stick houses can be interpreted as the cunning ploy of a bloodthirsty killer or as the tragic but unintended

consequence of a sinusitis-afflicted neighbour, depending on the conceptual framing. Similarly, the prostitute's plight could be strategically framed as an affront to family values and society's moral fabric by a card-carrying conservative, while framed by an anti-pornography feminist as a type of exploitative harm that violates women's civil rights. For Johnson, an agent must become aware of this imaginative process and learn to mobilize it in order to responsibly grasp the full breadth of circumstances: "Knowing about the precise nature of the particular frames we inherit from our moral tradition and apply to situations is absolutely essential, if we are to be at all aware of the prejudgments we bring to situations" (192). In so doing, ambiguities in concepts expose themselves, as P4C theorist Michael Pritchard notes in *Studies in Philosophy for Children*: "Stimulating the moral imagination, for example, can lead us to analyze key moral concepts or principles. Analyzing key moral concepts or principles can help us recognize hidden moral issues, and it can also stimulate the moral imagination to think of new possibilities...disclos[ing] uncertainties about how far our responsibilities extend, and so on" (Sharp & Reed, 1996, 55).

In a morally imaginative CPI dialogue, with the help of their facilitator, inquirers will have to consistently call into question the source and accuracy of their conceptual framing through procedural prompts like these:

- "How else can the situation be perceived?"
- "Are certain concepts too narrowly defined?"
- "Could we benefit from some new criteria?"
- "How can we see this problem differently?"
- "Are we making any assumptions we have not noticed?"
- "Can we understand our inquiry question in another way?"
- "Are there contexts in which we might hold a different position?"

ii) Metaphorical thinking

Johnson claims that moral judgments can be likewise impeded or expanded by metaphorical thinking, which can include the unreflective use of metaphors, an agenda-driven use of metaphors or a more judicious use of metaphors. The thought experiment about talking animals introduced earlier may be limited by an agent's existing prototype regarding what she understands as a beneficiary of moral concern, in this case a rationally competent human. This prototype can be indirectly supported by negative metaphorical constructs in ordinary language that refer to animals, like the disparagement of a person's moral character ("he's a weasel," "she's a bitch"); condescending statements about ability ("you can't teach a dog new tricks," "monkey see, monkey do"); snide descriptions of hopeless situations ("flogging a dead horse," "going to the dogs"), etc. Yet Johnson maintains that conscientious metaphorical thinking can explode such prototypes, and this could in turn lead to a broadened scope of empathy that includes as candidates not only humans but also animals and the wider natural environment. In Johnson's words, "what we call 'lessons of life' are thus possible because of our ability to reason metaphorically. Often we learn from an experience by metaphorically extending from that particular experience to our present situation, which is not exactly the same" (Johnson, 1993, 195).

In a morally imaginative CPI dialogue, members will have to purposefully set these lessons in

motion by creating new metaphorical constructs and identifying existing ones through these kinds of procedural prompts:

“Are we making any hasty generalizations?”

“How is this problem more complex than we thought?”

“What are the consequences of thinking this way?”

“Are there alternatives to thinking this way?”

“Can we interpret this situation differently?”

“Can we draw analogies to help us understand this problem?”

“What would an opposing position sound like?”

“What new metaphors could help us with this problem?”

Though conceptual framing and metaphorical thinking are just two examples of imaginative rationality, they reveal the potential for moral imagination as a deliberate practice when done collaboratively. For Johnson, moral imagination is “the chief activity by which we are able to inhabit a more or less common world—a world of shared gestures, actions, perceptions, experiences, meanings, symbols, and narratives” (201). In this light, the deliberate, disciplined exercise of moral imagination in a CPI can serve the purpose of enhancing the perception of its members and, in turn, broadening the scope of their empathy. Once mastered in a CPI, morally imaginative practice can extend beyond the “dress rehearsal” of a dialogical inquiry into children’s everyday reality, where they can put to use their emerging capacity for virtue or, in the words of Lovibond, their “capacity for thinking correctly about how to respond to particular situations as they arise” (Lovibond, 2002, 11). Of course, if educators engaged in CPI dialogues with children want to include stimulus materials that provoke morally imaginative thinking as well as emphasize morally imaginative facilitation moves like those suggested above, they themselves will have to hone the quality of perception involved in practical wisdom, notably by being aware of their own conceptual framing and use of prototypes and metaphors. Given the important role that facilitators play in guiding children’s CPI dialogues, recalling Aristotle’s remarks on virtue, they must ensure their interventions are done at the “right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive” (Thomson, 2004, 40). An educator with narrow empathetic scope would likely be ill-equipped to support the moral imagination of children in the ways described thus far. In all, the P4C program can be deemed particularly effective at honing moral imagination since it emphasizes critical, creative and caring thinking in equal measure, and provides through the CPI an intensified lived experience that can cultivate practical wisdom by giving children multilayered opportunities to become more sensitized to salience and engage in “target practice” on their way to becoming more discerning virtuous agents.

Conclusion

For many individuals across various fields, empathy seems to be the new panacea for moral ills, supposedly encapsulating the desirable traits of an emergent global citizenry. Though much has been said about the pivotal role empathy can play in education, conceptual confusions endure and the

challenges associated with educating for empathy tend not to consistently receive the attention they deserve. In this article, I have sought to examine one such challenge, which I have called narrow empathetic scope—a minor deficiency of empathy that involves an agent empathizing to an insufficient degree because her limited frame of reference causes her to misconstrue the circumstances of others. In trying to hit the target of empathy—that mean between the extreme of self-alienation and the deficiency of self-seeking—the agent falls short because she lacks a certain quality of perception which neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists call practical wisdom. Drawing from this rich virtue ethics tradition, I have considered the ways in which empathic education may help children gain practical wisdom relative to their life experience by sensitizing them to the salient particulars of situations that call for empathetic response. I have argued that moral imagination, the capacity to envision given contexts from multiple frames of reference, is uniquely able to assist with the cultivation of practical wisdom in children since it enables them to visualize contexts they have not yet encountered and broaden the moral lens through which they approach and assess their lived experience. I have identified three particularly important features of moral imagination, namely the acknowledgement of limited perspectives, the recognition of commonality with others and the receptivity to competing considerations, and briefly illustrated how these may be sharpened through the Philosophy for Children's CPI method and an emphasis on conceptual framing and metaphorical thinking. Ultimately some important questions about the connection between moral imagination and empathy remain: If an agent becomes truly morally imaginative, does she still need to be empathetic or does the broadened lens afforded by her moral imagination suffice for practical wisdom? By extension, would her moral imagination have motivational force if she were no longer concerned with questions of empathetic scope? It is my hope that the arguments and examples I have proposed in this article can serve to highlight the complexity of empathy, above and beyond the conventional wisdom of "putting oneself in another's shoes," underscoring the need to reflect further on this intricate concept and to recognize the value of moral imagination in the pursuit of virtue.

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About the Author

Natalie M. Fletcher works as a philosophical practitioner and researcher in Montreal, Canada, pursuing interdisciplinary doctoral studies in philosophy and pedagogy at Concordia University. She teaches philosophy at John Abbott College and is the founding director of Brila Youth Projects (www.brila.org), an educational charity that uses the internationally recognized, UNESCO-endorsed Philosophy for Children model to foster critical thinking, creativity and social responsibility in young people. Her work has been published by Routledge, Rowman and Littlefield, *Childhood and Philosophy* and *Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis*. She can be reached at natalie@brila.org.