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Résumé de l'article

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Abstract

Newfoundland's post-Confederation cultural revival is a significant factor in how Newfoundlanders were able to maintain their distinct identity within Canada. Another considerably related factor is the role the provincial government played in the decades following Confederation. As F.L. Jackson wrote in 1984, "the conservation of Newfoundland's cultural heritage is [...] only really possible if there is also a conservation of Newfoundland's political integrity and autonomy." During this period, there was an increase in cultural and heritage initiatives, particularly from the Progressive Conservative provincial governments from the mid-1970s onward. This government involvement reflects the earlier developments in the arts scene and within the academic community at Memorial University that came to be known as the cultural revival. The provincial government's utilization of the cultural revival movement to leverage political support from their citizenry during inter-governmental negotiations with the federal government demonstrates an evolution in the province from a purely cultural nationalism, to a more developed economic and political nationalism by the 1980s.

Introduction

As much as Newfoundland philosopher F.L. Jackson considered Newfoundland's culture, he also contemplated the province's particular political situation in the 1980s. Newfoundland had chosen to become part of Canada but was previously its own political entity, and Newfoundlanders continued to hold on to their particular cultural nationalism after the union. Due to some Newfoundlanders having the living memory of being their own country prior to joining Canada, as well as the continuation of cultural nationalism throughout the province, Jackson noted the need for increased autonomy akin to a level of decentralized federalism in the post-Confederation period. Jackson believed that only through increased sovereignty, by way of having additional control over its affairs, would Newfoundland be able to ensure its cultural survival. Both the cultural and the political realms would need to work together to ensure the survival of Newfoundland's identity.

This paper exhibits how the Newfoundland provincial government aided the continuation of a distinct Newfoundland identity in its post-Confederation period, from 1949 until 1989. The rationale for ending the inquiry in 1989 is two-fold. The change of government back to the Liberals under Clyde Wells in 1989 accompanied the beginning of another era of intergovernmental politics for Newfoundland: the Cod Moratorium and the Charlottetown Accord. With the Cod Moratorium in 1992, the already tense relationship between Newfoundland and Ottawa became increasingly difficult. Unlike the challenges offshore oil development brought to the intergovernmental relations between the two governments, the history of the cod fishery and its deep-rooted cultural ties to Newfoundlanders permitted a devastating blow to the working relationship. Also in 1992, the Charlottetown Accord was another example of intergovernmental challenges as Wells remained firm in his opposition to the accord after Peckford supported an earlier iteration, the Meech Lake Accord, in 1987. These contentious episodes, while also quite emblematic of the Newfoundland government

displaying more nationalist tendencies during intergovernmental relations, remain for a different study.

Post-Confederation Newfoundland between 1949 and 1989 can be divided into two distinct political eras: the Smallwood Liberals (1949–1972) and the successive Progressive Conservative (PC) governments of Frank Moores (1972–1979) and Brian Peckford (1979–1989) — with the Liberals under Clyde Wells taking the reins again in 1989.² The Smallwood governments are characterised by their initiatives geared towards the progress and modernization of Newfoundland, while after such long-held opposition status the PCs made change when they took to leading the province. While continuing a mandate focused on economic and social development, the PCs steadily shifted the narrative of progress and modernization to one of increased self-reliance and reinvigorating ‘traditional’ Newfoundland culture and identity. In this way, the successive PC governments used the ongoing cultural revival to bolster support and demonstrate their juxtaposition with the long-reigning Liberals who had been in power since Confederation. The Moores and Peckford governments pursued this endeavour through the usual methods of intergovernmental relations and policy platforms, but more intriguingly they did this through their use of language when describing Newfoundland itself (and its relationship with Canada and the federal government) and by funding initiatives that supported the ‘traditional’ and distinct Newfoundland culture they were describing.³

This paper analyzes the role the provincial government played in the preservation of Newfoundland’s identity from its union with Canada in 1949 until 1989 through a close reading of public political documents and news coverage that relay evidence of the provincial government’s evolving position pertaining to matters of Newfoundland culture, heritage, nationalism, and ultimately identity since Confederation. First addressing the Smallwood era from 1949–1972, followed by the Progressive Conservative era of Moores and Peckford from 1972–1989, it is argued that the provincial government endeavoured to strengthen Newfoundland culture and identity in its post-Confederation era. A number of survey studies and opinion polls from the period reflect the

increasing and generational shift toward a strengthening Newfoundland identity in the later post-Confederation period, which was bolstered by the increasingly nationalist stance of the Newfoundland government during a time when 'traditional' Newfoundland culture was experiencing a resurgence during the cultural revival. Accordingly, publications from the Newfoundland government and political parties, as well as the proceedings of Newfoundland's House of Assembly, intergovernmental documents, and political news coverage, are examined to demonstrate the growing appreciation of Newfoundland identity in the period when the province was adjusting to the political reality of being a Canadian province. From these documents, it is demonstrated that the provincial government used the cultural revival to its advantage, both at home and during contentious negotiations with Ottawa, to garner support at home and help maintain Newfoundland's cultural and political distinction within Canada.

Context: Nationalism & Identity

The historiography pertaining to post-Confederation Newfoundland demonstrates disagreement within the understanding of its own regional, cultural, and even national identity. In his *Newfoundland and Labrador: A History*, Sean Cadigan argues ardently against the notion of Newfoundland being a nation, cultural or otherwise, while Robert Thomsen orients his work around the belief that Newfoundland is indeed a nation with a distinct cultural identity and an unreserved political nationalism in its post-Confederation period. Others such as Jeff Webb have investigated Newfoundland's distinct cultural identity in its post-Confederation period, and Mekaela Gulliver's work on the revival of 'traditional' culture in the province is particularly worthy of note. As well, Raymond Blake has thoroughly addressed Newfoundland's integration as a Canadian province and the challenges between Newfoundland and Ottawa that have occurred in the time since, but always in the socio-economic, political, and intergovernmental spheres as opposed to the cultural.⁴ The role that intergovernmental politics

played in the lives of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, and consequently the shaping of their cultural and political identities, remains an under-examined terrain.

There are a variety of studies that address expressions of nationalism in Newfoundland, including both the political and cultural aspects, but also ethnic, resource, and symbolic representations of nationalism in the province.⁵ Alex Marland has explored nationalism in Newfoundland under the political leadership of Premier Danny Williams, as well as in relation to the controversial seal hunt, noting that in the political context of Canada, nationalism in Newfoundland is “second only to Quebec’s.”⁶ Valérie Vézina and Karlo Basta’s notable work highlights that while “nationalism is an underlying feature of Newfoundland politics” it is “best understood as [...] non-separatist nationalism.”⁷ Poignantly, James Baker posits the question of whether Newfoundlanders constitute an ethnic group, concluding “that while Newfoundlanders can be considered a distinct ethnic group” he does not see a strong iteration of a post-Confederation nationalism having emerged in the province.⁸ Nevertheless, these (and other) studies have not explicitly focused on the interplay between the political and cultural realms.

Moreover, the literature pertaining to folk revivals and their relation to nationalism and identity is a topic of long-held and growing interest amongst scholars. In particular, Jerry Bannister has explored the “relationship between nationalism and the writing of Newfoundland history since 1972,” putting forward an argument that “nationalism cannot be ignored as a cultural and political force in Newfoundland and Labrador.” As well, James Overton has argued that the Newfoundland government has used appeals to cultural nationalism to further their political and economic goals.⁹ This paper supports Bannister’s and Overton’s positions and expands on those ideas, particularly focusing on the role that the Newfoundland government had in this relationship between nationalism, culture, and politics in the province by seeking evidence for how intergovernmental politics aided in the shaping of Newfoundland identity via the promotion of cultural difference and regional identity within Canada.

Throughout the literature, Newfoundland/Newfoundlander identity in the post-Confederation period has been under-analyzed from a perspective centred on national or cultural identities. My issue is not with what has been written but that the particular line of inquiry addressed in this paper has yet to be given proper focus; my work seeks not to correct or disprove earlier work but rather to add to the narrative, illuminating a line of inquiry and perspective previously ignored or undervalued. Generally, there is a separation of the social-cultural from the more directly political narratives in Newfoundland's historiography. Identifying links between these areas of historical writing provide a more robust understanding of the history itself as well as the connection between Newfoundland's political and cultural identities.

The Newfoundland and Canadian historical narratives are divergent, with Newfoundland's place in the Canadian historical narrative seen as an addition, an added chapter to the Canadian history text with its Confederation understood as an inevitability in the Whiggish tradition of colony-to-nation historical narrative.¹⁰ Notions of competing 'Canadianisms' are evident across the scholarly work concerned with Canadian identity; the differences are not just between English and French Canadian historiography but this divide does permit a notable distinction. The Canadian state contains a multitude of minority nations and the French Canadian nation consists of Québécois, Franco-Ontarians, Acadians, and so on, with each having their own distinct cultural identity. In the case of French Canadian and Quebec historians, the writing on national identity often deviates from the official identity of the Canadian state, focusing instead on their distinct, regional, and even marginalized cultural (and national) identities. This is not to say that there is ignorance of the larger Canadian nation and its identity, as some prominent historians in Quebec such as José Igartua are well known for their work on official Canadian identity.¹¹ As well, Jocelyn Létourneau's insights on Canadian historical writing are pertinent. He has addressed the concept of "Canadianness" and its role in the writing of Canada's history, seeing it as a "neglected, even forgotten theme of the great collective narrative of Canada."

Létourneau defines “Canadianness” as “the way of being together that has developed within the space of social political interrelations called Canada,” specifying that it is the result rather than an intrinsic property of the “Canadian historical experience.” He agrees with the understanding that it has never been possible to impose one single vision of Canada on its inhabitants, as there is much ambiguity in the Canadian experience, though there have been attempts to eliminate this through federal government-endorsed efforts of national unity and officialized national identity.¹²

The official Canadian identity underwent significant transformation in the twentieth century, moving from a primarily ‘British’ identity to one that is more ‘multicultural’ in character. When the transition happened, and how long the transition occurred, are frequent questions by those interested in the subject. Throughout the early twentieth century, Canadian culture was dominated by its connection to Britain and its reliance on “Britishness” for cultural mores in an attempt to ward off thorough Americanization, though it is clear that there was an attempt to portray a uniquely Canadian culture during this period. However, the British cultural identity remained intact well into the mid-twentieth century, as José Igartua and C.P. Champion evidence in their respective works on the ‘clash’ between “Canadianness” and “Britishness” during the 1960s. Igartua’s *The Other Quiet Revolution*, and Champion’s response, *The Strange Demise of British Canada*, are key works in an evolving historiography about the problem of English Canadian national identity, and specifically the process of moving away from “Britishness” towards “Canadianness” during the initial postwar period. The larger arguments, evidence presented, and analyses reveal the wilful separation of “Britishness” from the official Canadian identity, while noting that the struggle of developing an official Canadian identity in the presence of a diminishing British identity is not a unique problem when considering the other former dominions that also dealt with this issue in the development of their own national identities.¹³

Before Ramsay Cook and J.M.S. Careless forwarded the concept of ‘limited identities’¹⁴ in the late 1960s, which noted an increasing

focus on region, ethnicity, and class in the scholarly literature of the period and indicating that this pattern in Canadian historiography demonstrated how the national identity could be better understood, historians had rarely focused on the question of Canadian identity, more often putting the emphasis on the Canadian state.¹⁵ In recent years, there has been increasing interest in Canadian identity(ies) in the postwar period, and while this work is an informative start, there is more to be done. Issues of scope and scale persist in the historiography on official Canadian identity, with some historians preferring to limit their focus to the more provocative period of the 1960s and often relying on the positions of the federal government while largely ignoring the scholarly and lay understandings of national identity and, more pertinently, how minority national identities in Canada affect and reflect the official Canadian national identity. Newfoundland's minority nationalism and its national identity are avenues to continue exploring constructions of identity within and across Canada.

The context of Newfoundland's post-Confederation period witnesses much interaction between the cultural, economic, political, and governmental spheres that occurred within and across each of these levels of society. These societal spheres need to be considered together, whereas typically they have been dealt with separately. The linking of the cultural revival movement to the provincial government, during the PC era in particular as they were actively reflecting society by embracing the movement, is key for understanding how Newfoundland pursued distinctiveness in Canada by cultivating and promoting its regional identity by way of its ostracization within the nation-state.

The cultural and political aspects of the cultural revival period in Newfoundland are inextricably tied. The early years of the cultural revival were reactionary to the societal situation under the Smallwood government, whereas by the early 1970s the Progressive Conservatives were running the show and began utilising the cultural revival. After that change in government, the cultural and political aspects of Newfoundland's cultural revival can be seen as working in tandem to further Newfoundland's cultural, political, and economic nationalism.

Publications from the Newfoundland government, its political parties, and speeches exhibit how the provincial government used the cultural revival to its advantage to garner support and help maintain Newfoundland's cultural and political distinction within Canada.

The notion that Newfoundland has been more docile in its relationship with the federal government in comparison to Quebec is grounded in the oft-mentioned economic dependency that Newfoundland has found itself in since Confederation, but the changing economic realities of Newfoundland from its Confederation era, during the immediate post-Confederation decades, and more recently, tell a more nuanced account of this simplistic understanding. The relationship between the federal government and Newfoundland in terms of its economy, especially regarding its natural resource development, has often been contentious. Such episodes regularly demonstrated heightened cultural nationalism within the province due to its rebellious feelings toward Ottawa. These events evidence not only socio-economic themes on the part of Newfoundland but cultural as well. For example, the Progressive Conservative government during the 1970s and 1980s strengthened their socio-economic argumentation by appealing to traditional Newfoundland culture to garner a more significant impact with their political campaigning, as evidenced in their political platforms from the era. For analyzing Newfoundland's relationship with the federal government, the debates from the House of Assembly of the provincial government of Newfoundland throughout the period and the accompanying Throne Speeches were examined, along with documents from the Dominion-Provincial (Federal-Provincial) conferences, as well as pertinent news coverage. In particular, provincial Throne Speeches from the 1970s and 1980s focused on socio-economic self-sufficiency and increasing autonomy for the province, in contrast with the desire of centralization from the Trudeau governments, highlighting the strengthening of Newfoundland's resolve in regards to maintaining its distinct status in the confederacy at a time when the province was undergoing a cultural revival. A reading of these documents provides evidence of Newfoundland's combative interaction

with the Canadian government in terms of how many Newfoundlanders understood Canada and how the province defended and protected its own position at the time, with Newfoundland politicians often invoking nationalist rhetoric.

Regarding Newfoundland identity since Confederation, there are several prominent archival avenues to explore. While the regional identity has naturally evolved and modernized over time, a 'traditional' culture has remained at its core. There have been many publications and news editorials focused on Newfoundland's Confederation with Canada, in both positive and negative lights. Additionally, there have been many studies regarding Newfoundland's place and feelings toward Canada since Confederation; in particular, a survey report from 1979 on Newfoundland's attitudes regarding Confederation and a 1982 election survey both reveal expressly pertinent statistical information on such views. Information such as this provides evidence of how the process of adopting the larger national identity does not diminish the persistence of a regional identity, and that one need not negate the other. In addition, the importance placed on heritage and tourism in the relevant provincial government department documents demonstrates governmental concern with maintaining the province's distinct cultural identity. There is a notable connection between the cultural revival and the provincial government. In 1972, there was a change of government in Newfoundland. Prior to this, the cultural revival began in response to the rapid modernization measures put in place by the province's Liberal government. When the Progressive Conservatives came to power in 1972, they utilized the social movement behind the cultural revival, and a variety of political party and government documents evidence these connections.

Progress & Modernization: The Smallwood Era, 1949–1972

On 1 April 1949, the first Newfoundland provincial government was put in place with 'Father of Confederation' Joey Smallwood at the helm. From the outset, when the new provincial government formed

there was “great importance” placed on the creation of a governmental department for economic development, as well as a desire to develop tourism in the province, and even discussion of a “Buy Newfoundland” campaign throughout the province. As well, fisheries management was now under federal control and caused increased concern with the industry for the province, which was evident from the early post-Confederation days. These measures and concerns demonstrated that even within the initial years of Confederation, and under the Smallwood Confederation-endorsing government, there was evidence of difficulties with having lost a level of independence and the push to create or maintain what independence they could.¹⁶

In March 1950, the *Times Survey of Canada and World Trade* had an interview with Smallwood addressing Newfoundland in 1950 and the effects of its “changed status” since Confederation. He was quoted as saying, “Newfoundland has realized her destiny by entering the union of Canadian provinces as a full partner.” Smallwood described Newfoundland as being “well off” in its year since Confederation because of Canada assuming most of the island’s debt upon joining. He further discussed his desire to develop natural resources in an effort to keep people in Newfoundland rather than having them continue to migrate to other provinces for economic opportunities.¹⁷ While Confederation had created a cycle of continued prosperity in the early years of the union, it was often mentioned that “not all Newfoundlanders enjoy the standard of living to which, as Canadians, they are entitled,” which was a leading cause of the pattern of outmigration in the period.¹⁸

On 10 January 1958, *The Daily News* had a statement from Premier Smallwood on the government’s plan for centralization as a means to improve social services and the standard of living in the province. Smallwood reassured the people of Newfoundland that at present the government was surveying residents of isolated coastal communities to measure the level of willingness to move to more populated centres to improve conditions across the province. He clarified that the “Government has no centralization plan” but that there may be one in the future, depending on the outcome of the information

they were gathering. The realities of the isolated communities in question, with the lack of schooling, services, and roads were not permitting a reasonable, modern way of life for those residents nor in keeping with the province's obligations to meet Canadian national standards for such services. Smallwood stressed that the government would "try to work out a plan of helping" those who wish to move to a "bigger and better" settlement, but only for those who "wish to move."¹⁹

Referring to a First Ministers' conference in January 1950, Lieutenant Governor of Newfoundland Sir Leonard Outerbridge described the Newfoundland ministers during the conference as taking a "strong stand against any change that might weaken the important minority rights written into the Terms of Union of Canada and Newfoundland."²⁰ The Newfoundland government believed the Terms of Union were "not finalized in 1949" and would not be until the Royal Commission tasked with carrying out Term 29 completed their mandate and steps were taken to implement their recommendations.²¹ By 1954, the provincial government had formally begun the work necessary to carry out Term 29 of the Terms of Union, in order to "review the effect of Confederation upon the finances of Newfoundland as a Province of Canada," by appointing and formulating the Royal Commission on Revision of the Terms of Union to carry out this task.²² In the provincial government's opening Speech from the Throne on 20 January 1958, Lieutenant Governor Campbell Macpherson proclaimed that the first era of Confederation was over, as the eight years had passed that were required for the establishment of the Royal Commission on Newfoundland Finances as described in Term 29, but the next era had yet to begin as the Commission's work was not yet complete. He further stated that the second era of Confederation would mean better public services and further economic development of the province's natural resources.

As well, a decision made at a previous First Ministers conference is mentioned, where the Atlantic Provinces were to be given "special adjustment grants" from the federal government to address the "backwardness of the four Atlantic Provinces in relation to the rest of Canada," regarding the economy and their particular financial positions. This

was welcomed news for the Newfoundland government and strengthened the goodwill between the two levels of government, which also left the provincial government feeling as though the outcome of the Royal Commission would be favourable in terms of financial beneficence for the province.²³ However, this would be short lived. In his February 1959 opening Speech from the Throne, Macpherson expressed that the recommendations of the Canadian government's Royal Commission on Newfoundland Finances were not generous enough to bring the public services up to par in the province.²⁴ In his closing speech later that year in July, he stated that the Newfoundland government was "concerned over the legislation recently adopted by the Parliament of Canada in connection with the implementation of Term 29 of the Terms of Union between Newfoundland and Canada. In their view this legislation is an inexcusable violation of Term 29. It is their policy to seek by all proper means the restoration of Term 29 in its full original meaning."²⁵ The provincial government was intent on ensuring that what had been agreed to during the negotiations that brought Newfoundland into Canada were honoured in full, thus allowing Newfoundland to acquire all the benefits they believed to be entitled to the province when they joined Canada.

For Newfoundland, joining with Canada was an "obvious" advantage as they would no longer be going it alone financially, as well as gaining the benefits of social security and a "reduction in the costs of living," and that "union with Canada would restore responsible government to Newfoundland." Smallwood surmised, "It would be good for both. There were no disadvantages at all to either. But that was only at first sight," as he explained that Newfoundland lost revenue that originally came from customs and excise duties and taxes which now went to Ottawa. The union, while making the people of Newfoundland "more prosperous," also "bankrupt[ed]" the provincial government. Canada needed to "find some way of providing more financial assistance for the government of the new province" in order to maintain a balance regarding the standards of private living and public services — the diminishing Transitional Grant from Ottawa would be the solution

for this. However, this was an uncertain answer; hence, the outlining of Term 29 regarding the appointing of a Royal Commission within eight years of union to review the finances of the province to determine what sorts of additional accommodation might need to be made for the province to maintain appropriate standards in line with the other provinces. The Royal Commission was mandated to “determine and recommend to the Canadian government the amount of additional financial assistance which the negotiators themselves had not determined when the Terms proper were being drafted.” When Prime Minister Diefenbaker put a five-year limit on the Commission’s recommended annual financial assistance on 25 March 1959, Smallwood was greatly displeased as he was not consulted on the matter.²⁶

Montreal’s *Gazette*, on 31 March 1959, contained an article covering the dispute between the Prime Minister and Premier Smallwood regarding the matter, stating “no one believes for a moment that Newfoundland, which has received so many benefits from its union with Canada, is in the least contemplating secession,” while acknowledging that there was considerable tension. The problem between the two was regarding the financial assistance outlined under the Terms of Union that was set to end in 1962. Smallwood felt that Diefenbaker was not treating Newfoundland fairly and dramatically proclaimed that he would resign if it meant that the Prime Minister would treat Newfoundland more favourably in this regard. The article discussed how the Terms of Union were vague concerning how and when the “special assistance” would end and what would happen after 1962, further commenting that Canada had given Newfoundland a considerable amount of money and perhaps Smallwood’s government had not “made the best use” of it.²⁷

In the opening Speech from the Throne of the thirty-second general assembly in April 1960, Macpherson described the government’s continued concern with the “grave problem of Term 29” but that they were abstaining from further action until the upcoming Dominion-Provincial Conference.²⁸ At the July 1960 Dominion-Provincial conference in Ottawa, Premier Joey Smallwood wanted to “present Newfoundland’s case under Term 29 of the Terms of Union that united

Newfoundland and Canada into one country.” However, he said, “I must decline emphatically to do any such thing” as the conference “can decide nothing with regard to Term 29.” Although, Smallwood did go as far as to declare, “I cannot forebear at this point to remind this Conference that what happened in 1949 was not the absorption of Newfoundland by Canada. It was not the annexation of Newfoundland by Canada. It was rather a case of two of Her Majesty’s Dominions [...] deciding of their own free will to unite themselves into one country.” He stressed the mutually desirable union between them “for Canada could never achieve her destiny while the great Island of Newfoundland and its great territory of Labrador remained outside of Canada’s national boundaries.” In addition, he stated, “It would, so some of us thought, give Canadians considerable added self-respect to see the independent-minded Newfoundlanders throw in their lot with them. It would enhance Canada’s status a little in the eyes of the world. It would complete the dream of the great Fathers of Confederation who saw a nation existing from sea to sea. It would be one of the few cases in this century of a whole people voting in a secret ballot to join their nationality to that of another country,” reminding those across the country what was achieved through the most recent Confederation installment and what this meant for Canadian unity, while simultaneously providing a reminder of what Newfoundland had given up in doing so.²⁹

Smallwood relayed that the Royal Commission had recommended “eight million dollars a year for each of the years up to March 31st, 1961, but this amount was to be reduced in each of those years by the small amounts remaining of the Transitional Grant. The Royal Commission also recommended that eight million dollars a year be paid each year thereafter. The Prime Minister and his colleagues decided otherwise,” without consulting Newfoundland. He further remarked that the province was “shocked and stunned” by this unilateral decision. Once again, Smallwood reiterated “this matter is entirely outside the scope of authority of the Conference,” as it was “exclusively between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland.” In closing he implored, “I hope that no one in Canada will suppose

that because Newfoundland has this one grievance she is disgruntled or dissatisfied with her decision to unite herself with the great Canadian nation [...] there are no regrets, and there are no recriminations. We are intensely proud to be Canadians.”³⁰

Concerning the discussions of the “constitutional future of Canada” during the late 1960s, Lieutenant Governor Fabian O’Dea remarked of “Newfoundland’s determination to play an honorable part in the great task of preserving the unity of Canada” regarding legislation to make French equal with English in the House of Assembly and Parliament.³¹ Despite being relative newcomers to Canada, the Newfoundland government were keen to revel in the “precious privilege of Canadian citizenship” and for the nation’s centennial in 1967 they had created a Confederation Centenary Committee to “prepare plans for and to encourage the participation of Newfoundland in the fitting observance of these celebrations.”³² In addition to celebrating being Canadian, the Newfoundland government also celebrated the province during the 1960s, regaling of a “Come Home Year” project set for 1966 in conjunction with the launch of a “long-awaited tourist and travel enterprise,” as well as inculcating a sense of Newfoundland pride with the planned ceremonies to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Beaumont-Hamel on 1 July 1966.³³ Balancing a sense of pride and belonging to both Canada and Newfoundland were not seen to be at odds with one another.

Throughout the 1960s, *The Daily News* in St. John’s published annual pieces discussing how the year had been for Newfoundland politically, economically, and otherwise. In 1961, the continuing of progress since Confederation was the primary theme with advances in education, communications, the opening of Memorial University’s new campus, and development in Labrador listed as key evidence of such progress. While acknowledging that it had been a difficult year for the fishery and forestry sectors, it highlighted how the tourism sector was doing well. These annual updates typically included a rather propagandist message from Premier Smallwood. In the 1961 edition, Smallwood stated, “there was much too much unemployment amongst our people” but also that “hundreds of people this year had their ancient

isolation destroyed for them by the opening of new roads. Hundreds more had the blessings of electricity brought to them.” Smallwood ended his message declaring that “our wonderful march to greatness, commenced with the coming of Confederation, will continue.”³⁴

The Daily News reported that 1963 “was another year of progress for Newfoundland.” While unemployment was still high and stress on public services was increasing from the continued “population explosion,” there had been “advances in education, health and roads.” The problems within Newfoundland were said to “exist in a province that has made more progress in the past ten years than in all the previous years of Newfoundland’s history” and “in spite of them, the year is ending on the most promising note of the whole confederation period.” The message from Smallwood again focused on continued economic and natural resource development, as well as the intent to rapidly expand electricity in rural areas, and the plan to build new schools and hospitals. He finished by saying the “next year will see the biggest programme of road building and paving ever known on this Island.” Smallwood routinely promised continued progress for the province, to further reinforce his decision to push Newfoundland towards joining Canada and that this action would not be in vain.³⁵

In March 1968, the *Evening Telegram* published an article on the federal government’s equalization policy. Provincial Minister of Justice Alex Hickman felt the new policy would provide the “last clear chance for rapid sensational development in Newfoundland” and that this policy “does not envisage Newfoundland going to Ottawa with hat in hand and hopefully expecting to receive a few crumbs from the federal government.” Rather, this policy “constitutes a recognition by the people of Canada that they have an obligation to see to it that the blessings of a confederacy exist from Vancouver to Bonavista.”³⁶ Later that year, *The Daily News* reported there had been a “reversal of the political tide” regarding the new Liberal federal government; it was believed there now was a “less flexible attitude in Ottawa towards aid to the provinces... [and] much of what happens in Newfoundland may be influenced by the decisions of the Federal Government, particularly in the

area of the correction of regional disparity.” It is with this statement we can see a shift in the provincial government’s attitudes concerning what the role of the federal government should be regarding Newfoundland’s socio-economic development.³⁷

In reflecting on the progress made in the province since Confederation, while also highlighting Newfoundland’s much longer history, Lieutenant Governor O’Dea stated in the opening of the third session of the thirty-fourth general assembly that “these have been the most wonderful twenty years in our nearly five centuries of history as a people.” The Newfoundland government felt that the federal government should help the province become more self-sufficient and in advocating for the new federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion, the provincial government declared that the ambition of all Newfoundlanders was to have the province “quickly become independently self-supporting,” which the provincial government believed this federal department could help make possible.³⁸

At the twentieth anniversary of Confederation in 1969, *The Daily News* published its annual review looking ahead to the problems facing the 1970s and describing 1969 as a “year of economic and political trauma,” with the economy still vulnerable and further industrial development still needed. There was a fallout regarding the joint federal-provincial outport relocation program that had been in place since 1965, with the “total depopulation of once prosperous and well-populated” areas and employment in the relocation centres being limited, as well as the burdensome cost of moving and mortgages for those who had previously owned their homes. Conversely, there was a slowing of this scheme as the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) planned to review the viability of the program. As well, slowed population growth due to outmigration, largely because of the scarcity of jobs, was becoming an increasing concern for the provincial government and the viability of their plans for economic development.³⁹ In the last stage of the Smallwood government’s reign, it was understood that the province “must resolutely reject permanent dependence on Ottawa as a principle means of our existence.”⁴⁰

Throughout the Smallwood government era, establishing and strengthening ties with Canada was necessary for becoming an integral part of the national fabric. However, this did not eliminate contention between the province and the country, which is apparent in the occasions the provincial government addressed the Terms of Union in the aftermath of Confederation. While the narrative changed from one of progress and modernization to increased self-reliance and reinvigorating a 'traditional' Newfoundland culture under the PCs, this did not mean that the Smallwood governments were without any notion of retaining Newfoundland's regional culture and often used language that supported this understanding and occasionally pushed for initiatives that reinforced the province's cultural identity. With that said, progress and modernization were the buzzwords and mandate of the Smallwood governments.

Much of the cultural revival was seemingly in reaction to the early provincial government-led modernization initiatives, in particular the resettlement programs. However, it would be mistaken to portray the Smallwood government as being anti-cultural, and it would be erroneous to misalign Smallwood's character as anything less than a Newfoundland (cultural) nationalist. Historian James Overton has described Smallwood as a "key figure in these developments," as his government had "created the policy framework and the institutions within which the growing interest in Newfoundland culture and history would flourish." Upon becoming president of the Newfoundland Historical Society in 1966, Smallwood declared "much of our heritage would disappear unless the older generation acts quickly to preserve it," towards which he made valiant efforts with establishing Memorial University.⁴¹

Smallwood considered the development of Memorial University an important part of developing Newfoundland culture, as he "imagined the university in industrial terms and considered it a locus for perpetuating an awareness of Newfoundland life where no such locus had existed before." Additional measures taken by the Smallwood government include "Come Home Year 1966," which was a "scheme [...] to induce thousands of expatriate Newfoundlanders to visit the

province” and regale in the “characteristic milieu” of the island. The event “created a link between public funding and the arts” and solidified the “idea that traditional outport life could be commodified and marketed.” As well, the creation of the Arts and Culture Centre in St. John’s was the province’s “major centennial project,” which the Smallwood government decided to construct with “the federal government’s contribution from the Canadian Centennial Fund.” After Smallwood, the Progressive Conservative governments of Moores and Peckford “took new measures based on an appeal to nationalist sentiment” and as Ronald Rompkey has mentioned, “the government of Brian Peckford was the first to openly embrace the arts as an expression of the provincial character.”⁴²

Increased Self-Reliance & Cultural Revitalization: The PC Era, 1972–1989

After the 1972 provincial election, Frank Moores became Newfoundland’s first Progressive Conservative premier. This change in leadership from the long reign of successive Smallwood Liberal governments to a new era of PC leadership saw a shift in priorities for the province, from a preoccupation with progress and modernization to a focus on self-reliance and a renewed emphasis on developing Newfoundland’s unique cultural identity. From the outset, the Moores government took the position that they believed “the people of this Province are eager to accept the challenge of change but will, with equal vigor, defend our life style as a treasured heritage unique within the family of Provinces that make up our great nation.”⁴³ In the opening of the first session of the new PC government, they made clear that progress for Newfoundland should not be incompatible with its heritage and that such a rich heritage should only be seen as an enduring element of the Canadian nation.

In 1974, the provincial government declared that they were entering a “new era of Federal-Provincial relations” during the province’s twenty-fifth year in Canada and celebrations were planned to mark the

occasion. In keeping with cherishing Newfoundland's heritage, the Moores government worked with the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion to establish a General Development Agreement to facilitate development in all areas of the province, enabling the continuation of rural areas rather than merely allowing the larger urban centres to continue to develop at the cost of those rural areas.⁴⁴ This era saw an increased focus on government initiatives in cultural affairs with the completion of the Arts and Culture Centre in St. John's, as well as continued funding for the development of the Newfoundland museum that began under the Smallwood administration.⁴⁵

Tourism was another area where the PC government saw they could further revitalize Newfoundland heritage. Increased attention was given to this industry during the period, with the government insisting that the "warmth and hospitality" of Newfoundlanders was the industry's "greatest asset."⁴⁶ Newfoundland's uniqueness was at the centre of this tourism development, as Lieutenant Governor Gordon A. Winter specified, "the cornerstone of our tourism policy is to preserve, enhance, and market an image of uniqueness. Newfoundland is truly a vacation with a difference. Our scenic, cultural, and historical attractions are unique in North America." With this mentality, the creation of a model fishing exhibit was planned which would include "a typical home, surrounding buildings, and a fishing stage, all in conjunction with a gift shop and a restaurant with traditional menu," further reinforcing such 'traditional' Newfoundland ways of life and cultural heritage for both visitors to the island and those who called it home.⁴⁷

Regarding Newfoundland regaining some semblance of self-reliance, the PC government was concerned with the continued dependence on federal government transfer payments. Lieutenant Governor Winter evidenced this, declaring:

Let us be wary of the danger of building our economic house on the sands of transfer payments, unemployment insurance and other government assistance programs. They offer only temporary benefits. They must not be allowed to replace our self-reliance, dedication, or

ingenuity, or to quench the independent spirit that has marked Newfoundlanders for centuries.⁴⁸

The way forward would be to focus on resource development within the province, while achieving better deals with the federal government pertaining to resource ownership. In the opening session of the first post-Smallwood government, Lieutenant Governor John A. Harnum stated that the government acknowledged mistakes of the past administration in the areas of resource development and were looking forward, particularly with the offshore oil and gas potential. The new government wished to establish a provincial policy of basic resource development where “all base resource sources — will be, as is our birthright, the property of the people of Newfoundland.”⁴⁹ Premier Moores later reiterated this sentiment during his opening statement at the First Ministers Conference in April 1975, stating that “ownership of resources by the provinces is one of the main cornerstones of Confederation and that because of this the provinces have the right to receive the revenues accruing from that ownership” and that anything less “undermines the whole basis of Confederation.”⁵⁰

The Moores government wanted to “avoid a protracted legal dispute with the Government of Canada concerning ownership of the Province’s offshore resources” and earlier in 1973 had announced it was working with the Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec governments to “negotiate with the federal authorities” on such resource ownership issues and further stressed that Newfoundland was a “special case with respect to rights off its coastal areas.”⁵¹ In March 1978, during the opening of the third session of the thirty-seventh General Assembly of Newfoundland, Lieutenant Governor Winter referred to the Supreme Court of Canada hearings “with respect to the offshore jurisdiction” that were set to begin later that year. Winter stated that the government was “confident that these hearings will resolve in our favour, confirming our moral and legal right to manage the resources which we brought with us into this great Confederation.” This was the key issue for the Newfoundland government, and why they

believed themselves a “special case” — the offshore resources came with Newfoundland into Canada and therefore the province should have a right to the potential revenue.⁵² A focus on ensuring that Newfoundland benefitted appropriately from its natural resources and the contention with Ottawa concerning this remained throughout the decade. It was not just in the areas of oil and gas that the province fought with the Canadian government but the fisheries as well, with the provincial government arguing that the federal government “must act decisively and unilaterally in gaining control of the fish stocks” on the continental shelf and which left the Newfoundland government feeling as though the Canadian government was failing the province in this regard.⁵³

In November 1978, Moores presented a “Statement on Regional Development” at the First Ministers Conference on the economy in which he described the situation of regional development within Canada as making the various regions fit “into the mould” of national policy “whether they fit or not.” He further deplored the state of affairs, insisting that it was “time to recognize that Canada is not a homogeneous country” and that policies need to be developed with the regions in mind rather than having the regions adapt to a policy that does not fit their particular situation. Moores advocated for policies and programs that would “help regions help themselves,” as despite Newfoundland having “more than kept pace with the nation” since Confederation it still was a “long way from parity” and he believed more “effective regional policies” could provide a solution.⁵⁴

The Progressive Conservative Party’s platform for the 1979 provincial election outlines the vision the party’s new leader Brian Peckford had for Newfoundland, asserting that “a strong provincial government is essential to the preservation of our heritage and our position as an equal in Confederation.” The platform focused on the development of the province’s “social and cultural potential” as being a key element of a “strong and prosperous economy,” and iterated that this would be central in a re-elected PC government.⁵⁵ The provincial government under Peckford’s leadership was oriented around promoting Newfoundland cultural traditions and heritage, which is consistently

presented throughout the publication. The platform outlines an intention to promote in-province travel to Newfoundlanders through its proposed “See Newfoundland and Labrador First” program. It stressed that the PC party did not want to see those in rural Newfoundland forced to move for access to public services and a better quality of life.⁵⁶ There is also a focus on education, whereby “educational programs must increasingly help to build an awareness of the value of our culture, our traditions and our heritage.” It is mentioned that the PC party was “growing increasingly aware of the need to preserve our rich heritage, to keep it alive and thriving” and intended to establish a Newfoundland and Labrador Arts Council. As well, the platform highlighted that a Peckford government would “bargain hard for the powers necessary to allow us to move forward as an equal partner in Confederation — powers in relation to fisheries and off-shore oil that were consistently denied to us by the Liberals in Ottawa.”⁵⁷ In the 1980s, Peckford further developed the themes of self-reliance and a revitalization of Newfoundland culture that began under Moores.

With a goal of becoming an equal in Confederation, the relationship between the Newfoundland and Canadian governments was a priority for the Peckford government. Two key examples of this were the debate around constitutional reform and the continuation of the battle of offshore resource ownership rights for the province. In the opening to the first session of the Peckford government, Lieutenant Governor Winter stated, “while it is clear that our entry into Confederation cannot be questioned, there is a growing realization that the present structure of Confederation does not allow this Province to realize the full economic benefits of its own resources or to adequately promote the enhancement of our unique cultural heritage.” The government was certain that Newfoundlanders wanted to “assure their future as a distinct society” and that this “can only be achieved” by Newfoundland having “adequate control” of its “marine resources — fisheries and offshore oil and gas.” Winter further proclaimed that if Newfoundland is to “move forward, there must be constructional change and a new attitude in Ottawa towards the role that this Province, indeed every

Province, is to play within our Confederation” and the need to “break this vicious cycle” of depending on Ottawa was necessary, not only for Newfoundland to become more self-reliant but also to be seen as an equal in Confederation.⁵⁸

During May 1980, Peckford released a discussion paper on “Major Bilateral Issues” between Canada and Newfoundland wherein he addressed the issue of economic inequality between the province and the nation-state, as there was an 86% disparity between Newfoundland and the national average. Peckford laid forth an argument of Confederation having not been successful for Newfoundland and claims that “Canada as a nation cannot survive if there are permanently rich and permanently poor provinces.” He furthered this with the province’s inability to take control of its future to “create the type of cultural, social and economic society which [they] deem desirable” due to the federal government having ownership of the continental shelf and thereby its natural resource revenue. Peckford insisted that Newfoundland merely wanted the “same degree of control over our development which other provinces now enjoy and take for granted.”⁵⁹

Later in July 1980, Premier Peckford issued a statement via the executive council that he had previously sent to Prime Minister Trudeau, which stressed that he and the rest of Newfoundland were looking forward to the “process of constitutional reform” and that it would bring a “new air of confidence and equality” to Canada. Peckford felt that constitutional reform should be open to areas of grievance from other provinces; while not lessening the importance of Quebec’s linguistic rights, other province’s rights were important as well. He underlined that “just as we recognize Quebec’s special linguistic rights and its inherent veto over that matter, so too do we expect and deserve a similar positive response to our deep interest in matters such as the offshore and fisheries. We ask for a similar respect for our position as to the treatment of these matters in the constitutional process.”⁶⁰

A few weeks later on 18 August 1980, the Newfoundland government published a document regarding their position on constitutional change. Peckford begins with the insistence that Newfoundlanders are

very much concerned with the state of affairs in their home province but as “loyal and proud Canadians, [they] also have a deep attachment to [their] country, its people and institutions.” Within the document, the provincial government outlines four points of “fundamental importance” concerning constitutional change, namely: parliamentary democracy, balanced federalism, equality of opportunity for provinces and people, and consensus.⁶¹ Their official position was one of full support for “major changes” in the Canadian federation and sought to approach the constitutional discussions in a “positive, constructive and cooperative manner.” Several principles of Newfoundland’s constitutional position were outlined, ranging from support for the entrenchment of “democratic rights and fundamental freedoms,” to the inclusion of a statement of “principles which constitute [a] common Canadian heritage,” and the recognition of the continental shelf as being considered “in the same manner as resources located on land.” One principle in particular highlighted the importance the Newfoundland government placed on the recognition of culture, stating their support for an “increased provincial role in communications so that the unique culture of Newfoundland and of other provinces can be preserved and strengthened in the Canadian context.” The provincial government felt that as the “newest province and as a people cherishing their own identity and values as well as sharing the Canadian ideals,” they felt confident about constitutional change and what it would mean in the “larger context of Canada’s national life.”⁶²

The following month during a Federal-Provincial First Ministers conference on the constitution, Peckford presented a statement regarding offshore resources that continued to double down on his steadfast position of its importance to Newfoundland’s development as a province, while asserting, “strong provinces make a viable nation.” His resolve that resources should be owned provincially, regardless if on land or in water, and “must be accorded the same constitutional treatment” was furthered by his position that anything less would be “to suggest there are different classes of provinces, some of which are more legitimate than others.” Peckford drew on previous constitutional

amendments in 1912 (increased the size of Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba) and 1930 (resource ownership transferred to Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba) regarding natural resources for other provinces to support his stance and made a point of noting that Ontario “owned and controlled the underwater resource of the Great Lakes” since Confederation in 1867.⁶³

In a province-wide address on 20 October 1980, Peckford highlighted issues with the proposed constitutional changes discussed at a recent conference in Ottawa. He felt the proposed changes would affect the “most vital aspects of life” in the province, namely “the right to educate our children in our own way, and the sanctity of our Labrador boundary.” If the constitutional proposal that was being discussed at that time was to go ahead the Peckford government would not accept the proposals and called on all Newfoundlanders to stand against it.⁶⁴ Later in February 1981, the provincial government was opposed to the federal government’s introduction of the Constitution Act, 1980 into the House of Commons, as Newfoundland wanted equality of the provinces and felt the reform went against the 1949 Confederation agreement, leaving the provincial government to ultimately see the constitutional proposal as “unCanadian,” with the centre becoming stronger than the periphery.⁶⁵ In this statement the province is insinuating that it is more Canadian in its outlook than the Canadian government, a strongly worded sentiment in this contentious period of intergovernmental relations that illustrates the tactic the Newfoundland government was using to battle the federal government and demonstrate that while they had pride in their distinction they too were proudly Canadian and wanted those Canadian ideals upheld.

On 11 June 1981, Premier Peckford gave a statement in the House of Assembly on the “contribution of the province of Newfoundland to the federal government and other provinces,” in response to statements made that insinuated Newfoundland received more from Confederation than it provided. Peckford stated, “the general conclusion reached is that we should accept our role in the nation as the most ‘have not’ province and live off the generosity of the rest of the nation.”

He was adamant to demonstrate how Newfoundland was making a “very significant contribution to the rest of the nation and there is absolutely no reason for us to feel we are living off the rest of Canada and, hence, that we cannot assert our views on major issues.” Peckford clarified that his comments were not “anti-Canadian or anti-federal government,” only that he wanted to insist that Newfoundland receive the same benefits as other provinces, but because it was a “have not” province, it did receive more in terms of equalization payments. With that being the case, he furthered that Newfoundland contributed to the nation in the way of taxes, the “massive contributions” to Quebec via the Upper Churchill, and by paying high tariffs for goods produced in Ontario and Quebec, thereby showing that Newfoundland “is not a drain on the rest of the nation” and is “contributing just as much to the nation as we are receiving.” Peckford concluded by declaring that he is proud “that as Canadians living in Newfoundland we contribute very substantially to the nation.”⁶⁶

In October 1981, a pamphlet was issued to those living in the province from Premier Peckford and the Government of Newfoundland addressing the Supreme Court judgement of the Constitution Act. The pamphlet stated, “if the Constitution Act passes, we have no more guarantees!” and warned that with the proposed constitutional changes the Terms of Union could be unilaterally changed without the consent of Newfoundland. Upon heading into another constitutional conference, the Newfoundland delegation had “two key points” in mind: the protection of the Terms of Union and offshore hiring regulations. An additional information sheet provided to the public outlined how a new constitution “based on a formula put forward by Premier Peckford” would ensure that “no changes to our Terms of Union can be made without our consent.”⁶⁷ By May 1982, what the Newfoundland government had been fighting for became “enshrined” in the new constitution, as it “fully recognizes the equality of the Provinces” and “reinforces the concept of a federal state within which sharing amongst all Canadians is embodied.” The new constitution “accepts and reaffirms provincial natural resource ownership and control” under Section 109

of the BNA Act, with Lieutenant Governor W. Anthony Paddon further stating that the provincial government “has had to take action to confirm ownership and control of Newfoundland’s resources to protect the rights of our people. In this Newfoundland is unlike the other Provinces.” Paddon went on to say that the provincial government “demonstrated its willingness to resolve the offshore ownership dispute in the Canadian tradition of negotiation,” suggesting that in regards to this Newfoundland was once again described as being more Canadian than Canada. When the negotiations began the federal government “gave only lip service to its stated intention to put ownership aside” and treated Newfoundland as a “subordinate rather than an equal partner” and the Newfoundland government would not accept this unCanadian behaviour.⁶⁸

Back in January 1980, the executive council released a statement from Premier Peckford in which he was correcting “misimpressions in the press” regarding his meeting with Prime Minister Joseph Clark. Peckford clarified that Newfoundland “already owns” its offshore resources and that the Prime Minister acknowledged this and “thus deserved the support of all Newfoundlanders.” He went on to say that Prime Minister Clark was “confirming’ the Province’s rights, not ‘giving’ us what we never had.”⁶⁹ Peckford was referring to Section 37 of the Terms of Union, which outlined that the resources belonging to Newfoundland shall remain to belong to the province. In the opening of the fourth session of the thirty-eighth general assembly of Newfoundland, referring to the provincial government’s position against the Trudeau federal government during the offshore dispute, Paddon stated that “the well being of Canada as a nation is the sum of the states of well being of its constituent parts, the Provinces of Canada,” implying that what was good for Newfoundland was in turn good for Canada.⁷⁰

The provincial government’s stance regarding the dispute with Ottawa over offshore ownership was that without Newfoundland joining Canada in 1949, Canada would have no claim to natural resources in the province. The Newfoundland government believed it was unfair that this had become a legal issue as the “Western Provinces

were given their resources by the Federal Government in 1930," therefore "one would think that a parallel exists today for Newfoundland and Labrador to be treated in the same fair and equal manner." What the provincial government desired was the same level of "fair revenue sharing" and joint management of its resources.⁷¹ In a ministerial statement from Premier Peckford regarding offshore resources in April 1984, he expressed that Newfoundland was not getting the same kind of agreement as Alberta and Saskatchewan had and provided a reminder that "Canada would not have the continental shelf today if it was not for Newfoundland. Canadians resident in Central Canada and Canadians resident in Western Canada own and manage their resources. We are not even asking for that. All we are asking is that Canadians living in Newfoundland have a real say in management and a fair share of revenues." It is in this statement where Peckford provides his well-known phrase: "Some day the sun will shine, and have not will be no more."⁷²

During 1983 and 1984, Peckford held a national tour giving speeches regarding the offshore dispute. In a speech, "The Offshore: Sharing Sea to Sea," delivered to the Canadian Club of Ottawa on 9 May 1984, Peckford presented the "moral case to the court of public opinion." He stressed, "this great country represents a delicate weaving of regional cultures and strengths into a vibrant national fabric. The strengths of Canada is the strength of its parts. The energy, vigour and creativity that is Canada is contributed by all the people in all regions across this land." Peckford acknowledged that the context of when Newfoundland joined Canada differed from when the other provinces did and consequently led to different issues arising between the province and the federal government but that "you cannot solve those problems by abandoning the principles that brought this nation together." He concluded his speech by envisioning a more united Canada without the regional squabbles and focused on the collective interest of the nation.⁷³

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada pertaining to offshore resource ownership was unfavourable to the Newfoundland

government, arguing it put Newfoundland in an unequal position compared to the other provinces and it needed redress to ensure the “equality of Canadians.” In March 1984, Lieutenant Governor Pad-don declared that the provincial government “reaffirms its conviction that this Province will take its proper and rightful place as an equal partner in Canada only when the Canadian tradition of provincial ownership rights over its natural resources is recognized.”⁷⁴ The Atlantic Accord came into being on 11 February 1985, solidifying the revenue sharing for offshore petroleum and thereby permitting the Newfoundland government to see their province as more equal to the other provinces. The Accord gave the Newfoundland government a “tool with which to make our Province and its people proud and prosperous contributors to the Canadian Confederation” and signified a “new era for the Province” that would surely bring about the self-reliance the PC governments sought.⁷⁵

Part of the Newfoundland government’s push for resource development and ownership was to increase employment in the province, as unemployment had been a growing issue. In the early 1980s the unemployment rate in the province was “twice the national average” and a Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment was established in 1985 to address this recurrent issue.⁷⁶ The Newfoundland government established the Commission, chaired by Doug House, to “investigate all aspects of employment and unemployment in the Province of Newfoundland.” The Commission held “42 public meetings in all regions” of the province, in addition to “many informal meetings with groups and individuals,” and was given “216 briefs and verbal presentations.”⁷⁷

The Commission took eighteen months to fulfill its mandate and visited forty-one communities to hold the forty-two public meetings. Unemployment at the time was between a quarter and a third of the population and the explained reason for this was a combination of lacking education, a reliance on the government, and lacking initiative in creating employment. Job opportunities were being lost for not fitting in with a “particular set of beliefs,” the mindset of Newfoundlanders, and there was a need for “a ‘made-in-Newfoundland’ approach” to solving

the issue. The Commission recommended a “new vision” of doing away with past ideations of a “highly industrialized Newfoundland,” as it was now seen as not viable due to a “small local market” that was “distant from major urban markets.” It was also mentioned that the province struggled from being “too dependent upon outside ownership of its major resource industries” and that should be rectified going forward.⁷⁸

The report criticized the romanticized view of the past that some had suggested Newfoundland return to, such as the “independent self-sustaining fishing outports,” as that pre-Confederation outport life was in reality a difficult period which many who lived it were quick to forget. It is mentioned that the traditional outport way of life benefitted those during periods of unemployment through self-sufficiency, though this is not the case for those in urban centres. The report highlights the Canadian welfare state and industrialization as having “left Newfoundland outports in danger of becoming rural welfare communities.” The Commission advocated looking forward into the “post-industrial age” where these communities would “have to develop into modern communities” and therefore a “revolution” was needed in terms of education and culture. Going forward they prescribe a plan of “building on our strengths” arguing that “flexibility, adaptability, occupational pluralism, home production, the rhythm of a seasonal life-style, household self-reliance [were] all integral to Newfoundland society.” It addressed that while the Newfoundland population was growing, its job market was not and that the oil and gas industries cannot “solve [Newfoundland’s] economic problems.” The Commission report outlined a “21 point programme for employment creation,” which highlighted areas such as the “benefits from oil and gas,” “revitalizing the inshore fisheries,” tourism, improvements in education, “promoting provincial development,” and that Native peoples and those living in Labrador need specialized and tailored programs moving forward.⁷⁹

In the Commission’s aftermath, the provincial government’s “Week in Review” for 24–31 March 1988 included a release from the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs Ron Dawe who commented on

the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment. Dawe noted, “the Commission had criticized the government for adhering to a policy of ‘non-alignment’ with the Maritime Provinces — to the detriment of initiatives of potential mutual benefit.” He also said, “Newfoundlanders want a government which pursues a distinct and separate identity within Confederation. Many ‘Atlantic’ regional initiatives do not benefit this province but rather concentrate economic activity in Halifax or Moncton.”⁸⁰ While criticizing the Commission, Dawe reinforced the PC government position of Newfoundland distinctness as being a priority, yet failed to recognize that the Commission had often focused on Newfoundland’s uniqueness when addressing the issue of unemployment in the province.

While the PC governments of the 1970s and 1980s focused on self-reliance and becoming equals in Confederation, they were as adamant about preserving the distinct culture and heritage of the province. In the opening session of the Peckford government Lieutenant Governor Winter advocated that the “preservation of our heritage and culture” was of considerable importance to the government, as well as supporting artists who have “helped preserve our heritage,” while acknowledging that all Newfoundlanders embrace and continue to engage with their culture. The government felt that the “arts community must now be encouraged more than ever to chronicle our past, analyze our present and portend our future” and planned to introduce a bill to incorporate a Newfoundland and Labrador Arts Council to further “encourage the preservation and public awareness of cultural heritage” throughout the province.⁸¹

Even though the Newfoundland government was intent on developing its natural resources, it was also mindful to be “ever vigilant to ensure that such developments do not overwhelm those standards and values which constitute, in essence, what we are as a society.” This was furthered by Winter stating that the Newfoundland “social environment is, if anything, more complex and intricate than any natural eco-system, encompassing as it does our heritage, customs, traditions, cultures and social institutions.” Moreover, it was seen as “essential that

we maintain our collective sense as a distinct society within Confederation and that we promote a lively debate upon our past, present and future.” Winter mentioned the adoption of a provincial flag and the importance of such a flag to cultural significance, as the “distinctive provincial flag” would “link our collective identity.” As well, Winter expressed that the “freedom and right to build a strong Province is not considered inconsistent with a strong, united Canada,” alluding to economic self-sufficiency and how this will also help to pursue Newfoundland’s distinction within Canada.⁸² During the opening of the third session of the thirty-eighth general assembly, the Newfoundland government is described as having an “ultimate goal of a vibrant, rural society” and was in need of a “stimulating and enlightened cultural policy.” It was believed that the “cultural uniqueness and individuality of [the] Province [was] as important as material benefits. For this reason, [the] Government [was] committed to preserving the Newfoundland heritage and developing artistic creativity.”⁸³ Throughout its mandates, the Peckford government was keen to “nurture and develop [Newfoundland’s] unique heritage” and continued to view “cultural expenditures [as] an investment in the well-being of our people and therefore should be funded even in the severest of restraint periods,” remaining to “preserve Newfoundland’s heritage, individuality and cultural uniqueness.”⁸⁴

Not just focusing on arts policies alone, the tourism industry in the province relied heavily on a particular portrayal of the cultural heritage of Newfoundland and by 1970, the government became increasingly interested in tourism for economic development. The imagery of Newfoundland used in the tourism industry, Overton argues, was “not invented just for tourists [...] The same totems, icons, and images highlighted for tourists came to be seen as the essential symbols of Newfoundland national identity.”⁸⁵ While the cultural revival itself had been dying down for several years, in 1992 the provincial government outlined its Strategic Economic Plan with proposals that “constituted perhaps the broadest attempt ever made to bring cultural life within the ambit of the provincial government” and that were set to invigorate development in the areas of tourism and culture predicting

that Newfoundland could be a “cultural region,” demonstrating that the government was not yet ready to throw in the towel in terms of using culture to differentiate itself on the national level as well as to bolster a nationalist pride within the province.⁸⁶

As mentioned, Peckford highlighted throughout his political platform his desire to see Newfoundland heritage taught in schools across the province. Since joining Canada, Newfoundland had used textbooks that were produced in and for central Canada. This changed in the 1980s when Robert Cuff and Royston Kelleher's *A Journey of Discovery: Living in Newfoundland and Labrador*, a grade three social studies textbook, was developed by the provincial Department of Education with assistance in research and development from the federal Department of Communications. The text, published in 1989 and used at least into the late 1990s, is an example of Peckford's intentions for teaching Newfoundland heritage in provincial schools.⁸⁷ According to the teacher's resource book, the program's key concepts included: identity, diversity, interdependence, citizenship, culture and multiculturalism, migration, and nation and province. The major understandings focus on the similarities between Newfoundland and Canada in terms of people's needs and how they are met, as well as how communities change over time. Some of the specified goals included: developing “a sense of identity with other Newfoundlanders and Canadians” and “to reinforce [...] pride in our way of life and faith in our future.”⁸⁸

Six chapters highlighting different communities comprise the content of the text with the final chapter comparing the capital cities of St. John's and Ottawa, designed to “place the province of Newfoundland and Labrador within its Canadian context.”⁸⁹ There are many pictures throughout the text, showcasing a variety of areas, peoples, and industries throughout Newfoundland and Labrador. There are also several maps throughout, often indicating the case study communities in relation to one another to foster connections between communities across the province. Also worth noting, there is no content on the Indigenous peoples of Labrador in the chapter on Labrador City, nor is there any mention of any Indigenous peoples across the island. Themes of

isolation and relocation are discussed in relation to Fogo Island and a summary of a typical Newfoundlander's day included "traditional" dishes such as toutons and molasses, fish and potatoes, and fishcakes.⁹⁰

This textbook is an indicative example of the shift in education to reconnect Newfoundlanders with their traditional heritage and cultural identity that was not provided by earlier post-Confederation curricula. At this time, the cultural revival had been ongoing for more than 20 years and had not effectively made its way into the curriculum by way of the Progressive Conservative government's use of this movement in their political platform for the province. By focusing on the youth in the province, the provincial government's initiatives in education concerning a reinvigoration of 'traditional' Newfoundland culture could become more long-lasting by reconnecting a generation of Newfoundlanders who never knew life on the island without also being Canadian.

Conclusion

In 1988, Newfoundland scholar James Overton provided commentary on Newfoundland culture toward the end of the cultural renaissance, questioning the cultural revival itself. He described regionalism as being a central concern in Canada during the 1980s in relation to the "powerful current of regionalist sentiment" that had been occurring in Newfoundland since the 1960s, which he described as having "economic and political dimensions."⁹¹ Overton argued that Smallwood's philosophy of "develop or perish" and his government's policies of modernization and industrialization were "destructive of outport life and folk culture," which spawned the movement itself though acknowledged that it was "largely a phenomenon of the 1970s and 1980s," that gained increased support when Peckford became premier in 1979. He posits that many "lament the loss of a distinctive way of life rooted in the outports" and "complain about the destructive effects of mass culture and North American values on 'traditional culture' and attempt to preserve and revive this unique culture," indicating that this is not simply a Newfoundland problem but one for any cultural or regional identity

that varied from the centre. Overton also clarified that Newfoundland culture was not homogeneous and that the province had a “number of sub-cultures.” However, these sub-cultures “retain the idea of an overarching Newfoundland culture” grounded in the “key assumption of the revival,” which claimed the existence of “a distinctive Newfoundland culture, way of life, ethos, character, soul, or ethnic identity” and that this “unique culture centered on the outports has been undermined by industrialization, the welfare state, urbanization, and the introduction of North American values” since Confederation and because of this “Newfoundland culture is now threatened with extinction.”⁹²

In 1972, Newfoundland’s Progressive Conservative governments began increasing their initiatives pertaining to Newfoundland’s culture and heritage. These efforts, combined with the preceding developments in the arts and academic communities, helped solidify the cultural revival and safeguard Newfoundland’s culture. Moreover, the provincial government emphasized the promotion of Newfoundland’s distinctive regional culture to its advantage in intergovernmental issues throughout the period. Newfoundland’s cultural nationalism in its early post-Confederation period evolved and combined with a level of political and economic nationalism during the 1970s and 1980s under the PC government.⁹³ Confrontations between the provincial and federal governments at this time fueled the cultural revival and further encouraged Newfoundland’s “emergent nationalism,” while the provincial government’s incorporation of this sentiment prevented hardliner separatist activity from gaining any ground in the province at a time when it was ripe for such movements.⁹⁴

Newfoundland’s economic development was tied to its natural resources; the successive provincial governments readily acknowledged this with it often becoming a point of contention between the Newfoundland and Canadian governments as the jurisdictional lines became muddled with offshore oil and gas exploration.⁹⁵ By the 1980s, the difficulties between the two levels of government were at an all-time high, with Premier Brian Peckford representing the generation of Newfoundlanders who were disappointed with their experience of being the

“newest Canadians,” feeling as though Newfoundlanders had not joined Canada but surrendered to it. The battle between Newfoundland and Ottawa pertaining to jurisdictional rights and offshore oil exploration led to Peckford’s hardened ‘anti-Ottawa’ stance during the period. As well, Labrador’s natural resources and economic development were involved in these disputes, as the Newfoundland government saw fit to use resettlement in Labrador in an effort to dispossess the Innu of their rights and physically move them away from areas of natural resource development, arguing that the resettlement provided them with better services. This process meant increased assimilation and dispossession of Labrador’s Indigenous populations and the exploitation of natural resources in the region by the Newfoundland government; ironically these were the same colonial practices that the provincial government was intent on avoiding from the Canadian government.⁹⁶

How Newfoundland pursued their distinct identity while becoming part of Canada lies in the continued effort to revive and promote their ‘traditional’ culture and praise their differentiation from the rest of Canada. When the province’s academic community began a program of studying Newfoundland in the 1950s and the provincial government began endorsing Newfoundland’s culture and heritage more ardently in the 1970s, it solidified the distinct identity of the province that would hold strong against the current of assimilation into the larger Canadian and North American identities. Newfoundland is not alone in their use of culture when they feel their identity is threatened by Canada politically, economically, or otherwise; Quebec is also well-known for this pattern of utilising their ‘otherness’. In its post-Confederation era, Newfoundland was balancing “their traditional sense of identity with a newly acquired sense of otherness” that was bestowed upon them when they joined Canada. The measures they took to safeguard this balance are evidenced by the cultural revival itself and the provincial government’s backing of this movement.⁹⁷ The provincial government’s focus shifted from progress and modernization under Smallwood, to reinvigorating and maintaining ‘traditional’ culture under the Moores and Peckford governments of the

1970s and 1980s. The increased government support for the ongoing cultural revival in the period is demonstrated by their use of language regarding the province, as well as funding and policy initiatives in the areas of culture, education, and tourism.

Newfoundland pursued distinctiveness while becoming a Canadian province by reinforcing a sense of otherness through its post-Confederation cultural revival. Increased provincial government support of the cultural revival from the 1970s onward further strengthened this endeavour by establishing policies and programs that were used to help preserve Newfoundland cultural and regional identity. Moreover, the successive PC governments of the 1970s and 1980s used the cultural revival for its own political advantage during elections and negotiations with the federal government, which further bolstered nationalist sentiment in the province during contentious episodes with Ottawa. The surveys, studies, and expressed opinions from the post-Confederation period indicate a growing number of Newfoundlanders considering themselves distinct from the rest of Canada, as well as a level of discontent with having joined with Canada. The cultural revival and the provincial government's endorsement and use of it was in part a reaction to this discontent, as well as a way to remain distinct from the rest of the larger nation they had become a part of, which carried on well into its post-Confederation period and in more recent decades has seen a second-wave revival both for cultural and political gain under the Progressive Conservative government of Danny Williams in the early 2000s.⁹⁸

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Notes

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