Résumés
Résumé
Les stratégies des entreprises en matière de responsabilité sociale dépendent de la structure de leur actionnariat. Cet article examine l’effet de l’écart entre les droits aux bénéfices et les droits au contrôle (excès de contrôle) sur la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE). L’analyse d’un échantillon d’entreprises françaises cotées montre que les entreprises détenues avec un excès de contrôle réalisent des performances RSE nettement inférieures à celles détenues sans excès de contrôle. La présence d’un actionnariat familial accentue l’effet négatif de l’excès de contrôle sur la performance RSE alors que la présence d’autres actionnaires importants neutralise cet effet. Nos résultats sont robustes à l’utilisation de plusieurs mesures de l’excès de contrôle, de la performance RSE et au contrôle des problèmes d’endogénéité potentielle.
Mots-clés :
- Excès de contrôle,
- entreprises contrôlées,
- propriété concentrée,
- actionnaire ultime,
- performance RSE
Abstract
Corporate social responsibility strategies depend on the ownership structure of the firm. This article examines the effect of the discrepancy between cash-flow rights and control rights (excess control) on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The analyses of a sample of French listed firms show that firms with excess control achieve significantly lower CSR performance than those without excess control. Family ownership increases the negative effect of excess control on CSR performance, while the presence of other major shareholders neutralizes this effect. Our results are robust to the use of multiple measures of excess control, CSR performance, and control for potential endogeneity issues.
Keywords:
- excess control,
- controlled firms,
- concentrated ownership,
- ultimate shareholder,
- CSR performance
Resumen
Las estrategias de las empresas en materia de responsabilidad social dependen de la estructura de su accionariado. Este artículo examina el impacto de la diferencia entre los derechos a los beneficios y los derechos de control (exceso de control) sobre la responsabilidad social de las empresas (RSE). El análisis de una muestra de empresas francesas cotizadas en bolsa muestra que las empresas detenidas con un exceso de control tienen unos resultados de RSE significativamente inferiores a las detenidas sin exceso de control. La presencia a un accionariado familiar acentúa el impacto negativo del exceso de control sobre los resultados de la RSE, mientras que la presencia de otros accionistas importantes neutraliza este impacto. Nuestros resultados son robustos al uso de varias medidas de exceso de control, de rendimiento de RSE y al control de posibles problemas de endogeneidad.
Palabras clave:
- Exceso de control,
- empresas controladas,
- propiedad concentrada,
- accionista final,
- resultados de RSE
Parties annexes
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