ror.org/03h2b9f40
Résumés
Résumé
Nous étudions l’incidence des mécanismes de gouvernance sur les décisions stratégiques prises par les dirigeants, en particulier celles liées au capital risque industriel (CRI). Ce thème peu débattu par la littérature traitant du marché français mérite d’être approfondi. Notre étude englobe toutes les opérations de CRI initiées par les entreprises du SBF 120 sur la période 2000-2018. Nos principaux résultats mettent en exergue le rôle joué par la structure de propriété, les ressources spécifiques ainsi que le profil de l’actionnariat dans la réalisation des opérations de CRI. Ainsi, ce travail contribue à l’enrichissement du débat sur l’utilité de ces véhicules de financement de l’innovation pour l’économie française.
Mots-clés :
- Système de gouvernance,
- capital-risque industriel,
- structure de propriété,
- conseil d’administration,
- théorie d’agence
Abstract
We study the impact of governance mechanisms on strategic decisions made by corporate managers, in particular those related to corporate venture capital (CVC). This topic has not been treated in much detail in the extant literature dealing with the French market and deserves to be deepened. Our study covers all the CVC operations initiated by the SBF 120 firms over the period 2000-2018. Our main results highlight the role played by the ownership structure, the specific resources and the shareholding profile in carrying out CVC operations. Thus, this study contributes to enrich the debate on the usefulness of these vehicles for financing innovation in the French economy.
Keywords:
- Governance system,
- corporate venture capital,
- ownership structure,
- board of directors,
- agency theory
Resumen
En este artículo estudiamos el impacto de los mecanismos de gobernanza en las decisiones estratégicas tomadas por los gerentes corporativos, en particular los relacionados con el capital de riesgo corporativo (CRC). Este tema, que ha sido poco discutido en la literatura sobre el mercado francés, merece ser analizado en profundidad. Nuestro estudio cubre todas las operaciones de CRC iniciadas por las firmas SBF 120 durante el período 2000-2018. Nuestros principales resultados destacan el papel desempeñado por la estructura de propiedad, los recursos específicos y el perfil accionario en la realización de las operaciones de CRC. Por lo tanto, este estudio contribuye al debate sobre la utilidad de estos vehículos para financiar la innovación en la economía francesa.
Palabras clave:
- Sistema de gobierno,
- capital de riesgo corporativo,
- estructura de propiedad,
- junta directiva,
- teoría de agencias
Parties annexes
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