

Globalization and social protests: where and how? The case of Canada and France

La mondialisation et les protestations sociales : où et comment ?

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
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Résumé de l'article

Même si parler de la mondialisation peut être considéré maintenant une bonne stratégie de « marketing », c'est de plus en plus difficile de choisir comment aborder ce sujet, étant donné la littérature abondante qui y est consacrée. Dans cet article, nous ne chercherons pas à aborder la mondialisation économique ou les tendances objectives de la mondialisation qui se produisent dans la sphère économique. De même, nous n'analyserons pas non plus la mondialisation comme un facteur externe qui peut contribuer au développement économique national, ni comme une force économique hégémonique qui peut empêcher le développement social. Autrement dit, le terme de mondialisation, tel qu'il est utilisé ici, n'est pas un facteur causal. Cet article essaie plutôt d'appréhender la relation entre la mondialisation en tant que nouvel espace de protestation sociale (un espace d'action et de discours) dans deux pays : le Canada et la France. On observe que la lutte pour la justice globale s'inscrit dans des contextes nationaux, chacun de ceux-ci interprétant à sa manière la problématique globale. Le rôle de l'État est particulièrement central pour la compréhension de cette variation. De la même manière, la mondialisation, en tant qu'espace de débats et de conflits, influence la forme de protestation sociale au niveau national, en modifiant tant son cadre que sa portée.



La mondialisation et les protestations sociales : Où et comment ?

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Pascale Dufour

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As Beck has recently noted, globalization has produced a new space and a new framework of action. Policy is less dependent on borders and state power, new actors have emerged, new roles, new resources, new rules of the game, new contradictions, and new sources of protest or disputes have appeared.¹ The temptation is high for social scientists to be over-enthusiastic or over-sceptical when confronted with globalization, or to be overwhelmed by these new events. Every field of political science seems to be affected by the globalization problematic in at least two ways. First, discussing globalization seems to be a good marketing strategy; however, in order to study globalization, one must also accept some of the challenges posed by this problematic. In the field of social protest, in which we include the social movements and contentious politics literature, (economic) globalization is predominantly seen as an external factor impacting on the types of collective actions undertaken against it² (possibly leading to a trans-nationalization of protest), or on the forms and framework of national social protest.³ Our point of departure is slightly different. We claim that whatever globalization is or is not, it occurs somewhere. Thus, globalization is not external but occurs here, in our backyard, with all actors (local or not, collective or not, social or not) participating in its construction. Furthermore, if globalization can be located, it should be possible to describe a particular form of it depending on the place considered. In other words, globalization should be viewed as a specific field of protest, whose forms vary depending on the time and place under consideration. Finally, if globalization as a space of protest is not unique, we should be able to explain why this is the case.

Consequently, this paper has two main objectives. In the first part of the paper, we propose a theoretical framework that allows for the differentiation of the forms of the globalization space between Canada and France, concentrating the analysis on a short period of time (1993-2003). In the second and third parts of the paper, the empirical analysis demonstrates how forms of globalization differ, depending on the way nationally situated actors invest and invent this space. The distinctive role of the state (part IV) in the two cases considered is central. We show that in the case of France, the relative consensus against economic neo-liberal globalization and the relative openness of the state to critical forces have produced sharper divisions for progressive social forces. In the Canadian case, where political and social actors were more divided on the issue of globalization (including the state), progressive social forces are been more involved in rebuilding their movement, and new clearer political cleavages are emerging around this issue.

Globalization as a space and an issue

While it is impossible within this paper to provide an exhaustive review of the literature concerning globalization in the field of social protest, we can simplify the incredible amount of work done on this subject into two main camps. In the first group, an important part of the research analyses the supranational effects of globalization. For some, economic globalization is closely linked with the long history of capitalism,⁴ and thus should generate, in this new stage of development, global counter-hegemonic forces or a global civil society.⁵ Others consider the fight against globalization, or for another form of globalization, as a potential opportunity structure for national collective actors to use the trans-nationalization of their actions to make future national gains.⁶ In the other camp, analysts are less interested in the global level of protest per se and more in the impact of globalization at the national or even local level.⁷ Most of the research focuses on the changing national framework of protest accompanying the emergence of the economic globalization phenomenon and problematic.⁸ In particular, some really interesting empirical work has demonstrated how previous national framework of protest have had an impact (or a path-dependant effect) on the way the framework will become global for dominant collective actors.⁹ From another perspective, but in the same family of national research, some recent work has begun to build a genealogy of globalization for some case studies.¹⁰ This explains the particular conditions prevailing in the society (in terms of social forces and the relationships between them and in terms of ideas and interests) before, during, and after the globalization of national protest.

This paper addresses this second camp of the literature and proposes two new elements. First, we suggest the need for increased formalization of the field of globalization studies at the national level and, second, the need to address the question of the state, which has been largely absent from the studies regarding this subject. In our view, globalization is a new space and a new issue of social protest, constantly in progress. According to analysis in the tradition of Bourdieu, it is possible to dissect empirical reality using the notion of field. A field is "a structured space

that includes various positions, the properties of which depend on their position within this space and can be analyzed independent of the characteristics of their occupants.”¹¹ In other words, the political field will have a given form for a given society and is characterized by a collection of positions that are relatively fixed within the structural relations in which they are involved. Furthermore, their variability is due not to the characteristics of individuals, but rather to the particular structure of the field. The notion of political space that we propose is much more open than that of field as proposed by Bourdieu. We regard political space as spaces not pre-existent and fixed, but in perpetual construction as a result of the struggles of various actors. That said, from Bourdieu’s approach we retain the idea that a political space is a process of the structuring of the positions of actors in relation to a given issue, as well as the idea that certain positions can potentially be structurally determined, even if this probability is never fixed in times. In particular, political spaces involve an “unequal structure of representation”¹² linked to the position of actors within the system of production, with the interests of capital generally occupying a privileged place in this structure.¹³ But, inequality must always remain an empirical question, with social actors having the ability to make themselves “autonomous” from the sphere of production, and bring into the public space (and within the state) other issues that, at certain times, can supplant capitalist concerns.¹⁴

Furthermore, the political spaces that we refer to are not the same as “sectors” of public policy, as conceptualised within the literature concerning networks,¹⁵ as they can emerge from outside the “normal” frame of public action. The outside signifies, at the same time, a different level of action (the global level) as well as those terrains that are not part of the “regular” or traditional register of public action (for example, environmental issues). In other words, political spaces are the terrain of political action that may not be linked to any sectors of public policy and that may be linked with several of them. Differing from conceptualizations that make use of the notion of governance or multi-level governance, a political space can be found in a “state” of non-governance or only partial governance. Thus, a political issue can constitute a “space” from the moment where collective actors (state or non-state, institutional or non-institutional) seize, appropriate, and enter into relations revolving around the issue. The state, public authorities, or international organizations can, at a given moment in the process of the construction and structuring of a space, become key actors; however, they are not necessary conditions to the emergence of this space. Within this perspective, political spaces can contain different levels of action (often political issues of the first order) that are relatively institutionalized, and can be global or regional.¹⁶ The level here being the extent and scope of the action, and not the level of decision-making to which the action is addressed.¹⁷

Political spaces are, at the same time, discursive places where interests are built, ideas are exchanged, and new normative frames of actions are imposed, as the “framed analysis” has begun to demonstrate.¹⁸ From Seattle to Porto Alegre, something has happened in the world’s streets.¹⁹ Social forces everywhere have developed numerous discourses concerning globalization, relating to its negative effects (the anti-globalization perspective), its status as the last chance of defeating the capitalist hegemony (the counter-globalization perspective), or the need to propose an alternative globalization. Globalization, as an issue, is involved in a multiplicity of discourses. A large variety of actors are working to give specific meanings to what globalization is or is not. These actors, although sharing some common minimal social representations, disagree on other issues. In this sense, globalization is the issue through which several discourses are built.

In this paper, we wish to study the links between this new space and the issue of national social protest in two cases, France and Canada,²⁰ during the last ten years. Comparison is used as a research strategy.²¹ Canada and France are two contrasted cases. In one case we have a federation, in the other case a centralized state; one is embedded in the North American context, the other in the European one. On the other hand, they also share some common trends, especially concerning our subject, globalization. In the two cases, economic integration is an important element of national political life, and Canadian traditional dependency upon the United States²² is somehow comparable to the constraint (and opportunity) European political integration posed on France. Contrasting these two cases, that are confronting a similar globalization “objective” story, but that are two very “different systems design,”²³ is a research strategy that put emphasis on differences and factors explaining them. Empirically, the research is based on textual analysis as well as some interviews with social actors in France and Canada, intervening in the field of globalization in the year 2001.²⁴

We observe in Part II the way in which globalization has served as the main element of integration of social protest in Canada, especially through the re-definition of Canadian nationalism. In the case of France, in part III, the picture is less clear, but it appears that globalization is an issue that occupies a space, and has accentuated the division of social forces on the left of the political spectrum. In the final section, we consider the main elements of differentiating the two cases, namely, the specific relationships of each national state with national social movements. While in Canada, during the period under analysis, the state was fairly reluctant to engage with social movements. In France, the state demonstrated a certain degree of openness towards social actors and their discourses. In that respect, the relationship between state and collective actors on the terrain of globalization appears crucial to explaining the differences between the spaces of globalization and the way these spaces are structured.

If we follow the work of Tarrow, the very nature of the political system explains the degree of openness or vulnerability to mobilization. With regard to equivalent mobilizations, political contexts raise or diminish the opportunity of success for social movements. Nevertheless, the state is not yet considered a full player, as it functions solely as the target of demands.²⁵ Instead of the concept of “structure of political opportunity,” we propose the need to consider the “unequal structure of representation” that reflects the inequalities of social forces. Mahon first developed the concept that “inside the state, the structure of representation is unequal with one hegemonic class and subordinate classes that have a ‘room’ inside the state but a pre-defined room.”²⁶ While Mahon speaks only of interests inside the state, we can easily transpose this idea to the political system: at any moment in a given political system, there is a pre-determined hierarchy of legitimate representation (even if this structure is always open to change). Within this perspective, the state is influenced by collective action, but also influences it. Even if there is no clear border between state and civil society, a continuum of positions inside the political system exists, and it is possible to reveal this continuum for a better understanding of actors’ structured relations. In Mahon’s term, the structure of representation, while dynamic and subject to change, is not fluid. We adopt a slightly more open position where the question of actors’ structured relationships remains an empirical question. In this scenario, those generally excluded from the structure of representation had always the possibility to access the State. We demonstrate, in part III, that in the case of Canada, during the period considered (1993-2003), the state was reluctant to address social protest; meanwhile in France the state became progressively open to social protest. Differences in the “structure of representation” influenced the manner in which globalization interacted with national social forces and determined, in part, which forms globalization had taken.

Canada: Globalization of national framework of protest

The globalization of the national framework of protest implies that all actors involved in this space recognize the existence of a more or less coherent global level of action. At this level, each party is posed as interdependent. Furthermore, the scale of actions changes, becoming more trans-national. In the Canadian case, at the federal level, between 1993 and 2003, a double process occurred. On one side, we observe a redefinition of the problematic of Canadian sovereignty through a global perspective within actors’ discourses, corresponding to the three elements presented; and, on the other side, we observe a reframing of the subordination problematic beyond traditional employment relationships. This double process works as a significant factor in the integration of separate social movements in Canada and the opening of new avenues for a political alternative to emerge on the left side of the political spectrum.

Redefinition of Canadian sovereignty in a global perspective

We do not wish to imply that free trade or economic globalization has created new forms of national social protest, but rather we argue that this new field of action has aided the crystallization of social protest in English Canada. It is only in this area that it has been possible for social actors to redefine their struggles in a common direction.

In Canada, the question of (economic) globalization was born in the field of trade with its powerful neighbour, the United States. Until the 1970s the issue of free trade was not posed in terms of the dependence or independence of the Canadian economy with regard to the American economy. Trade with the US was negotiated sector by sector, and neither the federal state nor unions questioned the rising global dependence of the Canadian economy that resulted from these local decisions.²⁷ Between 1975 and 1990, the question of trade became central.

During the Shamrock Summit in March 1985 in Quebec, the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and the prime minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney, officially launched trade negotiations between the two countries.²⁸ The first free trade agreement was ratified in 1988. During a period of three years, the Canadian society was sharply divided on the question. First of all, the economic context was difficult during these years; the 1981 and 1982 years of recession were particularly severe. The question of the best economic strategy for Canada was polarized around the free trade argument. As soon as 1985, the report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development prospects for Canada (the Macdonald Commission) recommended to sign a free trade agreement between economic partners. Following these recommendations, the Canadian government decided that the country should not pursue its industrial strategy of development, but on the contrary, should regulate the economy less.²⁹

These controversial political choices served as a catalyst for the mobilization against free trade that emerged at the end of the 1980s. Involving unions and diverse social movements, with political parties remaining divided on the issue, the common mobilization did not erase the sharp differences in the positions of the actors towards the issue of free trade. However, no actor was able to exit the nationalist and protectionist perspectives they had inherited.

More precisely, the “short story” of the globalization of social protest begins with the formation of the Pro-Canada Network (which later became the Action Canada network), during the state-level negotiations surrounding the free trade agreement (FTA), that later became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).³⁰ The Network became particularly publicized during the 1988 federal elections campaign. Formed in 1987, the Network was a grouping of divergent interests (trade unionists, environmentalists, religious groups, women’s groups, groups representing those

receiving social assistance benefits, aboriginal groups, farmers, cultural groups, students and senior citizens).³¹ Joining this vast movement were several nationalist economists.³² For our purposes, we have to mention the Edmonton editor Mel Hurtig, founder of the Council of Canadians (January 1985)³³ and the Centre of Policy Alternatives. The Network was made up of 35 organizations, including the Council, and had a membership numbering in the millions. The coalition, due to the disparity of interests that were present, cultivated an ambivalence regarding the motives of its opposition to free trade. Within the Network, the more conservative nationalist tendency, economically sympathetic to free trade but strongly appreciative of the problem of national sovereignty and identity, rubbed shoulders with the more progressive tendency that opposed free trade in the name of the distinct social character of the Canadian welfare state. The synthesis of these two positions, although partially contradictory, occurred within the struggle to safeguard Canada as nation distinct from the United States, one that was both more generous and more concerned with the well being of its population. As Bashevkin has noted, the majority of the groups implicated, independent of their political orientations, believed in the distinct character of Canada and the necessity to conserve its economic sovereignty.³⁴ English-Canadian left nationalism perceived the contestation of free trade as a fight against the potential Americanization of Canada.³⁵

For political parties, the 1988 federal elections should neither be framed by the free trade debate, nor by the free trade treaty into preparation. At the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Conservative Party in power tried to impose another agenda.³⁶ For the Liberal Party of Canada, free trade was also highly controversial. The “Trudeau’s camp” was in favour of the Treaty, while the “Turner’s camp” was against it, denouncing the potential danger it represented for state autonomy.³⁷ Four weeks before election day, Turner’s camp succeeded to impose the free trade agenda on the electoral campaign, without being able to win the election.

While the results of the 1988 federal election proved sobering to nationalist and social activist groups across Canada, the Action Canada Network could be considered a creative response to the defection of political parties on the subject of free trade (especially the inability of the New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP), the only electorally viable left party in the country, who never managed to articulate a clear position during the period).³⁸ Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Network has declined as a defensive national coalition. The negotiations of NAFTA (that extended the Canada-U.S. treaty to include Mexico) represented a turning point in the story of the emergence of globalization as a political space. In 1994, the opposition against NAFTA crystallized around chapter 11 of the agreement, which gave private firms the right to payments for “damages” resulting from government measures deemed obstructive to their activities. The ensemble of social actors mobilized to denounce the potentially harmful consequences of this aspect of NAFTA on environmental legislation, subsidies for certain sectors of the economy (in Canada, for instance, the battle over soft-wood lumber continues presently) and at the same time, theoretically, employment regulations.³⁹ Although still centred on the defence of national interests, the opposition to NAFTA has promoted, since the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a globalization of struggles and claims at the continental level.

The October 1993 election and the Liberal Party’s subsequent implementation of NAFTA forced groups in Canada to re-evaluate the near decade-long commitment to the opposition of free trade.⁴⁰ From 1993 to 1997, we can observe a retreat from larger national campaign mobilization to more disparate challenges in the social, economic, and cultural realms. This situation could quite easily be explained by context: provincial fight-back struggles against social services cutbacks have left many social groups across Canada with little energy or resources for joint pan-Canadian mobilizations.⁴¹ This period of time also corresponds with tremendous cuts in the financing of social groups from the federal government, changes that have destabilized many organizations and forced them to redirect their actions in order to survive.⁴² Furthermore, the announced Americanization of Canada did not really occur, despite free trade and despite global international crises such as that of September 11, 2001. The fear that free trade with the hegemonic neighbour provoke at the end of the 1980s now translates into something other than a defensive response.

Since 1997 and 1998, we can see a revival of social protest on the issue of trade. And this time the frame has changed.

Instead of a sustainable coalition (like the Action Canada Network), we find more sporadic coalitions organized for specific events (the G8 meetings, FTAA events, the World March of Women and the Canadian March of Women, and People Summit of the Americas). These are organized by national, local, and trans-national groups, even if the groups involved in these coalitions are almost always the same. The Pro-Canada network today (whose name changed to the Solidarity Network in 1999) includes more than 45 national groups and provincial coalitions; however, it now serves more as a facilitator of communication between groups.⁴³ The main collective actors engaged in the fight against NAFTA and the FTAA are Common Frontiers (who brought together unions and other social groups in English Canada) and the Continental Social Alliance (who operate at the continental level and of which Common Frontiers is a coordinating member).⁴⁴ The creation of Common Frontiers resulted from the desire to construct a solidarity project between Canada and Mexico concerning the FTAA. This initiative, launched initially by a group of trade unionists and workers in Toronto, progressively transformed into a solid continental coalition, gaining the support of the Canadian Labour Congress in the middle of the 1990s. Today, Common Frontiers is a coalition of Canadian groups whose claims

involve issues encompassing the whole of the Americas. They aim to create solidarity beyond national borders (Common Frontiers, online, www.web.net/comfront/).

Compared to the end of the eighties, enemies have changed. Instead of the US, multinational corporations and international organizations, such as the International Monetary Funds, have become the main targets of protests. Of course, to defend Canadian values against market globalization is still an argument that prevails, and Maude Barlow, the President of the Council of Canadians, one of the most important actors opposing neo-liberal globalization today, remains a Canadian Left Nationalist.⁴⁵ But, it is no longer the Americanization of the country that is fought against, but the “marketization” of it (even if this process is facilitated by the domination of America). Canada is no longer alone in this fight, and fighting for Canada is also fighting for other countries. Global protest transforms the anti-Americanism in Canada into a broader movement that situates itself within the international economy.⁴⁶ This redefinition of nationalism in a global perspective also allows coalition building with non-English speaking actors, especially in Quebec. In this respect, the mobilization that occurred all over the country around the Quebec Summit in April 2001 should be considered as a new phenomenon (CommenTerre, 2002; CLAC, 2002; Clarke, 2002).⁴⁷

Reframing of the subordination problematic outside traditional work relationships

While in the past “class differences were never a strong line of cleavage [in Canada] and the parties which claimed to be representative of workers seldom gained strong support from that constituency.”⁴⁸ Today the question of subordination refers to more than capitalist relationships between workers and business owners or relationships between women and men inside the nuclear family. Subordination is being re-conceptualised and re-shaped in the context of global interdependence.

Beyond all the subtleties and differences that may exist between the groups we met that are fighting for another globalization, it is possible to extract a common set of coherent values. First, they view the world as divided into two sides. On one side are virtuous and democratic civic politics; on the other, are corrupt antidemocratic market forces. Within this framework, one class is not oppressed by another, but rather global solidarity is proposed. This solidarity is not only constructed between unions or the poor, but also between all of those who consider themselves affected by neo-liberal globalization. The focus is not only on poverty, but also on the environment, on fair production, and on food safety. In well-off Canadian society, each act of consumption by a citizen has an impact on the exploitation and subordination of somebody elsewhere. With the globalization of protest, it is possible to differently articulate the question of subordination, as subordination does not pass through a single social relationship (work) but through the necessary co-existence of conflicting individual identities (consumers, workers, citizens of a country, and world consciousness).

This reframing of subordination-domination relationships is not self-evident for all social actors. It is a constituent characteristic of social movement discourses; however, for more traditional social actors, like unions or leftist women’s groups, it is a delicate situation.⁴⁹ For Penny Richmond, from the Canadian Labour Congress, these elements are both profoundly disturbing and very stimulating for unions.⁵⁰ In addition, the necessary revisiting of left ideology that accompanies this challenges left political parties in Canada. Thus, the New Democratic Party (NDP) has gone through a period of turbulence since the beginning of the 1990s. For many of the groups involved in the anti-globalization fight, the NDP died in 1988, with the discussions on the American free trade agreement (the position of the NDP was never clear). In 1993, when the party officially committed itself to the FTAA, it was buried. For Peter Bleyer, of the Council of Canadians, the very existence of the NDP at the federal level could be interpreted as a brake to the possibility of finding a political voice for social protest around the globalization issue.⁵¹ For other observers it is precisely the incapacity of the NDP to be a transmission point for social protests that allowed the re-awakening of left social forces all over the country.⁵² In that perspective, the new and more progressive leadership of the NDP since 2003 could be the result of this rebuilding process. Whatever the precise role of the NDP is in the building of a new integrated social protest, the possibility of rebuilding the political left on a field other than that of class struggle appears more open in Canada today than it was during the 1990s. Globalization, as a political space, appears to be a very good candidate in that respect. Perhaps this probability is higher also because in the country class struggles did not form the basis of left parties.

In the case of Canada, globalization was an issue and a space worked at the beginning of the 1990s as a factor of integration for quite disparate social protest. Even if at the end of the period this integration is open to dispute, the transformation of Canadian nationalism into the defence of values (shared by other people in other countries and places) opens the opportunity to build new forms of protest. While coalition building continues to occur mainly at the national level, these coalitions are increasingly pan-Canadian, rather than only Quebec-based or English Canada-based, and they address the global problematic. In France, a different process seems to be at work: the trans-nationalization of social forces corresponds to an increased division of actors.

France: Trans-nationalization of national social forces and sharper division of actors

Unlike what we observed in Canada, globalization (as a new space and a new issue of protest) was not directly linked

to free trade and has had a more ambiguous history than in Canada. Progressively incorporated into national struggles organized more by sector, the emergence of globalization has produced some degree of trans-nationalization for only some social forces. Very sharp cleavages remain between social actors regarding the globalization issue, even if there is a quasi-consensus among actors in terms of a reluctance towards (economic) globalization, even among actors situated on the right of the political spectrum.

The non-consensual origins of globalization as a political space

There exists an “official” story that today is called “alterna-globalization” (or the fight for another globalization), which in France is shared by certain analysts⁵³ and the majority of the social actors involved in the issue.⁵⁴ This story began during the strikes of November and December 1995 that shook the country and forced the government of the period, led by Prime Minister Alain Juppé, to rethink its version of reform of the French social protection system. These strikes played the role of the catalyst for French social forces and permitted the subsequent development of a large trans-nationalization of social movements. According to other analysts, anti- and alterna-globalization discourses were present prior to the mythical date of 1995. Furthermore, alterna-globalization, as a category of collective action, found its origins and influences elsewhere. According to Contamin, the premises for this passion for the fight against globalization are found within the extreme left (and in particular the political parties of the extreme left), as well as certain intellectuals and journalists⁵⁵. Agrikoliansky states that it was during the 1980s, with the emergence in France of a mobilization for the elimination of third-world debt, that one could find the background for the story of alterna-globalization.⁵⁶ Beyond these divergent interpretations, what can we retain?

1) In contrast to Canada, in France there was no sole theme behind the mobilization (free trade), but many points of entry into the space of globalization because of the way public action and social protest are organized sector by sector.

2) The European integration did not play as a catalyst for social protest against globalization during the 1980s and 1990s, as free trade did in Canada. The building of Europe is predominantly seen (by political as well as social actors) as a way of sustaining the alternatives to neo liberal globalization.⁵⁷

3) As noted by Agrikoliansky, the configuration of actors that today prevails in alterna-globalization struggles is, as in Canada, characterized by eclecticism. But this is a particularly “new” element in the French context (if, as his analysis proposes, the mobilizations of the 1980s were the precursors to the current mobilizations).

4) In contrast with the Canadian story, (extreme) political parties did not play only the role of defender of economic globalization, but were (and still are, although in a less visible form) principal actors in the struggle against globalization.

In order to provide a more precise insight into the ambiguous relations in the space of globalization in France, we will focus on one “sector” in particular: the collective action of the unemployed, whom we see as existing at the edge of many worlds.

Progressive trans-nationalization of sectoral social forces: the case of the movement against unemployment

Since the middle of the 1980s, there emerged social actors from within a context of high unemployment who wished to speak for the voiceless. Those voiceless, the unemployed, had been forgotten by rapid economic change.⁵⁸ These movements were the basis of what became known as “the social movement of December 1995” or “the Left of the left.”⁵⁹ The movement against unemployment is comprised of three main organizations: the Mouvement national des chômeurs et des précaires (MNCP); the Association pour l’emploi et la solidarité des chômeurs et des travailleurs précaires (APEIS), and the Collectifs Agir contre le chômage (AC!). One of the French unions, the Confédération générale des travailleurs (CGT), also has a special committee on unemployment, CGT-chômeurs.⁶⁰

If, at the beginning of the 1990s, these actors could be considered as an isolated phenomenon, today they belong to the core of social protest. From March 1994 to the successful mobilization of the winter of 1997 and 1998, the movements against unemployment, despite the division of organizations, progressively reached the stage of a unified protest around some key common claims: the reduction of the duration of work, urgent measures for all unemployed people, and a guarantee of a minimum wages for all.⁶¹ Moreover, during the large strikes of December 1995, they were fully acknowledged as mainstream actors, like unions. Today, along with the Mouvements des sans (the “without movements,” including the homeless and people without legal status or documentation), they constitute a potential oppositional force in France.⁶²

These mobilizations of unemployed people, outside traditional forms of workers’ representation, are also an attempt to create new solidarities with the employed. From the right to work and the defence of “work -as -we -used -to - know -it” (tasks that were performed by unions), movements against unemployment promote the adoption of an unconditional minimum wage for all (worker or not) at the level of the actual minimum wage for workers. In the longer run, they aim to eradicate precarious jobs, as well as the exploitation of workers, by conferring the right to refuse a

job to all citizens. In the short run, this proposition is considered an answer to the situation of urgency and material needs of most unemployed people and precarious workers.⁶³ This position was a central element for the unity of the movement at the national level, and also a frame that supported its trans-nationalization, at least at the European level.⁶⁴ On the other hand, it was also a significant source of conflict with more traditional actors like the CGT and the French Communist Party who retained a defensive position related to work.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, organic relationships with some alternative unions (like the SUD) existed, and they managed to build an overall solidarity with two of the traditional unions (CGT and Force Ouvrière, FO).⁶⁶

Increasingly, the solidarity promoted by movements against unemployment reaches beyond national borders. Not only do movements like AC! and APEIS sustain close links with associations such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transaction for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC)⁶⁷ (the most important movement in France against neo-liberal globalization), but all the movements have European counterparts in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium. Here, we can observe a true trans-nationalization of social forces that began with the creation of a European organization, the 1996 European March Against Unemployment. Progressively, at Nice Summit (2000), in Québec (2001), in Genova (2001), alliances were enlarged to include the European Farmer Co-ordination and actions against neo-liberal globalization. This trans-national coalition acted against European Union economic and social orientations. The long-term aim was to build a European social movement capable of proposing a viable alternative to the neo-liberal agenda (an idea also pursued by some French intellectuals during the period, such as Pierre Bourdieu with his association Raisons D'Agir!). It is in the name of world citizens that they claimed the right to speak and the right to actively participate to the decision-making process.

In the construction of this opposition, the movements against unemployment are more visible on the "ground." They are characterized by direct action, promoting the illegal occupation of strategic places, using civil disobedience in certain situations (public transportation, for example) and placing the emphasis on spectacular actions in order to obtain the attention of the media. They are specialized in the systematic denunciation of the abuse of the system, and associations such as ATTAC serve as more of a leader in the intellectual aspect of the work, proposing alternatives and above all, providing meanings for the fight. In European and international demonstrations, the national state is not the sole target of claims: global institutions, international corporations, even neo-liberal ideology are identified as enemies to fight against.⁶⁸

The increasing visibility of the trans-nationalization of social forces and the increasing integration into national actors' discourses accompanied a sharper division of national social protest.

Division of national social protest

Contrary to the Canadian case, the French map of social protest remained highly fragmented during the period. In this sense, globalization did not serve as a factor of integration. Two elements should be stressed: first, the retention of the traditional division between the fields of action of unemployment and exclusion; and second, the manner in which the emergence of new forms of social protest accentuated the divisions between social actors.

The terrain of poverty (as a generic term) has for a long time been separated into two camps in France. During the period under review, on one side the fight against unemployment developed, and on the other side, the fight against social exclusion spread. Even where actors attempted to build some bridges between the two, these attempts were not completely successful.

The movements against unemployment benefited largely from the trans-nationalization of forces and from the problematic that we just described (that the spreading of the European movement against unemployment was concomitant with the development of national movements). Thus in this case, the boomerang effect, described by Tarrow, worked.⁶⁹ For Christophe Aguitton, first involved with AC!, the mobilization at the European level served to globalize claims in terms of rights (the right to work and the right to have a wage).⁷⁰ Although movements against unemployment remained fragile, they were able to obtain certain access to the state and make certain gains, in part, because of this European visibility. For example, in 1998 they were formally recognized by the state and for the first time invited to the consultation table (against the opposition of some Unions). They also obtained substantial material gains through the adoption of the Fonds d'urgence social, and some gains with respect to the law against social exclusions; finally, some small improvements in terms of financial revalorization of social minima were obtained.⁷¹ Furthermore, with regard to discourses, the globalization of claims served to give a second life to the movements that were destabilized by the reduction of unemployment at the end of the 1990s and disoriented by their previous success.⁷²

With regard to social exclusion, the focus of the period was the fight for a law preventing various forms of social exclusion. After a very chaotic process, the Loi de prévention et de lutte contre les exclusions was finally adopted in 1998. The social movements that pushed for this law were composed of coalitions of NGOs (such as the network ALERTE): movements against unemployment, movements against social exclusion, a national coordination of people without documentation, the national organization of women, associations such as Act Up, and some alternative

unions.⁷³ The formation of small bridges was possible with more mainstream unions, except the CGT who supported the mobilization from the beginning. Although all the groups were working in the same direction (the adoption of the law), the differences within the coalitions proved too stark for the coalitions to survive after the parliamentary process. In 2000, when the law was evaluated for the first time, strong divergences between actors appeared.⁷⁴ In particular, movements against unemployment refused the “management of exclusion” proposed by the law and prefer the claim for social and political rights for all.⁷⁵

In that field of battle, some trans-nationalization of forces occurred between large NGOs, (Médecins du Monde, ATD-Quart Monde), but no substantial supranational links were created for more grassroots movements. At the European level, the Amsterdam Treaty (June 1997) marked the formal recognition of the fight against poverty and exclusion as a European mandate. Since 2001, every two years national states have had to present a national plan directed towards the reduction of exclusion. In this process, some trans-national links between European social actors have been created, especially around the European network of associations devoted to the fight against poverty and social exclusion (REALPES)⁷⁶ and the European anti-poverty network (EAPN). For the moment, these networks act more as social partners with the European Commission than as a real oppositional force, similar to the trans-national actions against unemployment. Moreover, these more institutionalized actors are seen as overly compromised by the system and too close to private charity or social assistance by more radical national actors fighting on the unemployment and globalization fields. Nevertheless, French NGOs, and especially confessional ones, could also be considered central elements in the building of alterna-globalization as a legitimate political space.⁷⁷ But this is another story.

The partial trans-nationalization of some social forces and issues was also followed by a deepening of the divisions between national social actors.

The strikes of December 1995 were followed by a new line of demarcation between the main unions in France. Before the strikes, the CGT, FO, and the Confédération française des travailleurs (CFDT) were generally unified and formed a common front against business organizations (the Conseil du patronat français that became the Mouvement des entreprises de France (MEDEF)). After December 1995, the CGT and FO dissociated themselves from the CFDT, who refused to legitimate unemployment movements and new unions, such as SUD.⁷⁸ MEDEF found a new interlocutor in the CFDT for the promotion of its project of reforms, named the project of Refondation sociale. For several observers, it is this new distance between the CFDT and the other unions that has opened the possibility of reform of the social security system in France.⁷⁹

Finally, the political left were (and still are) very divided on the question of the significance and the legitimacy of these new forms of social protest. Between 1995 and 1998, the French Communist Party (PCF) acted as the “privileged speaker” of the excluded; it claimed a monopoly of representation of the poorest and presented itself as the best medium for the associations fighting on the field of exclusion.⁸⁰ On the other side, the PCF was less favourable to unemployed movements because they continued to consider the unemployed as workers without jobs (and in that sense, the representation by the workers party or by traditional unions should be sufficient) (PCF, 2001). During the same period, and more so following its election in 1997, the Socialist Party (PS) adopted the position of the ostrich.⁸¹ Even though strong dissidence within the party existed previous to the presidential election in 2002, the main position between 1997 and 2002 was to ignore extreme left movements and the potential dangers they represented for the party. The socialist government also adopted an ambiguous position towards alterna-globalization movements.⁸² The Green Party, because of its origins and its discourses, should have “naturally” been the party of recent social protest.⁸³ It was one of the first parties to support ATTAC, and it has always recognized the unemployment movement as a legitimate actor. The Green Party was also actively implicated in the “without movement.” However, the Green Party, while very popular inside the educated middle-class, is much less so with the people they pretend be the voice of.

More generally, as was evident during the municipal election in France in 2001, it is the partisan left that is in crisis in France. Traditional left parties are not working anymore. The Green party is not a leftist party that is able to answer the preoccupations of more traditional workers, and the most successful list (on the left side) was comprised of those who labelled themselves “citizens lists,” such as the list motivé-e-s in Toulouse (which split in 2003). While the defeat of the PS at the presidential election in 2002 is complex, it revealed the crisis of the left that is directly linked with the emergence of these new forms of protest. Some actors taking over globalization issues and space, others refusing to address them; but also, the space of globalization itself is being divided by old French social and political divisions.

In Canada globalization, as a new space and a new issue of protest, was used as an integrating factor by national progressive social actors. In France, globalization was followed by some degree of trans-nationalization of social forces in some sectors, but sharp division remained at the national level between progressive forces. In order to partially explain the differences observed, in the final section of the paper we consider the unequal structure of representation at work in each country.

A key issue: the unequal structure of representation

Within our analysis, one option would have been to emphasize the similarities between the two countries, such as the common characteristics of the new actors fighting for global justice, either nationally or trans-nationally. In the recent literature, the organizational characteristics of movements are said to contain the following elements: working largely through networks (more or less formal), favouring direct democracy in the decision-taking process within decentralized structures, and promoting and implementing non-hierarchical modes of organization.⁸⁴ We also know quite well that anti-, counter-, and alterna-globalization movements endorse multi-organizational belongings and concerns, and civil disobedience and illegal actions constitute a “normal” element of the repertoire of actions.⁸⁵ Finally, one of the effective elements of these movements is their comfort with the use of media power, particularly evident during spectacular direct actions.⁸⁶ However, beyond these elements, the marginal position of these movements in the political process and their supposed position of autonomy in relation to institutionalized politics,⁸⁷ require a deeper analysis of their relationships to the national state that they continue to be confronted by. This is precisely what the concept of unequal structure of representation, previously described, allows.

In the case of Canada, the structure of representation dramatically shifted during the period considered. The very existence of a state reluctant to engage with extra-parliamentary representation at the beginning of the period (1993) has encouraged the radicalization of progressive social forces, who were then able (within this oppositional position) to re-build a certain unity around the globalization problematic (1995). At the end of the period (since 2000), the federal government seems to adopt a slightly different position, especially towards social groups, but the impact of this change (which remains largely rhetorical) is not yet clear.

The Canadian federal state has officially supported and recognized social actors since 1942, with levels of support increasing until the end of the 1980s.⁸⁸ In this respect, the political space occupied by social groups and social movements was historically important in Canada, and could be considered as a traditional element of the structure of representation. This particular trend changed dramatically in 1993. The previous valorization of the representational role of civil society actors was progressively transformed into representation of “particular interests” at the federal level.⁸⁹ Since the middle of the 1980s, the political space for social movements, both within the state and within the political process, has been seriously damaged. One of the primary examples of this transformation is the place occupied by, and permitted to, the women’s movement.⁹⁰ Not only did the movement lose its direct access to the state with the abolition of the Council of the Status of Women in the middle of the 1990s, but it became identified more as a “special interest” and was pushed outside the political game.⁹¹

The exclusionary nature of the “political opportunity structure” was marked not only by the changes in terms of access to the state or to state resources (by changing financing mechanisms), but also by the exclusion of ideas, what Brodie calls “restructuring discourse”.⁹² The de-legitimization of intermediate representation or of extra-parliamentary representation was also an attack on unions. During the 1990s, unions adopted a defensive mode, fighting more to preserve their very existence than seeking to extend new workers’ rights.⁹³ This important shift in the federal Canadian structure of representation also emerged at the moment when the federal government decided to radically transform the way Canadian social protection was organized.

More or less excluded from the political process, and confronted with severe cutbacks in the financing of essential social programs, unions and social movements progressively radicalized their positions and turned their actions first toward local and urgent problematic (poverty, housing, homelessness). This first period of exit from the state was thus also a period of rebuilding in terms of the balance of power with the state. When the framework of protest progressively changed to become more global,⁹⁴ around the mid-1990s, unions and social groups were not unified (even if they had an experience of working together on the trade agenda). But they were ready to enter a process of reunification around the globalization problematic because their point of departure was situated, for most of them, outside the state. In the case of Canada, this conflicted nature of the relationships among unions, social groups, and the federal state has served as a motor for the building of the globalization political space and explains, in part, the integration role played by the globalization building process. In the last part of the period studied (around 2000), the federal government changed its pro-continental free trade business agenda to a more complex rhetoric that presents Canada as the potential leader in the defence of “globalization with a human face.”⁹⁵ Since 1998, the federal government also developed a “community development” orientation that is supposed to formalize more its relationships with the community sector and be more inclusive of (some) social groups.⁹⁶ The combining of these two changes (one is mostly rhetorical and the second one is well applied through new structures⁹⁷) may have an impact on the balance of power inside the social protest movements we are considering, breaking the fragile consensus among actors concerning the need to fight for “a better world.” But is far too early to conclude on that point.

In the case of France, the political context is quite different. Following the big demonstrations of November and December 1995, the Socialist Party came to power in 1997 and progressively opened state institutions towards new social movement representation and claims. Nevertheless, the level of satisfaction towards the Jospin government was low inside progressive social forces (and especially what have been called “la gauche de la gauche”) only three years after he came to power.

Traditionally seen as an almost neo-corporatist state,⁹⁸ the French unequal structure of representation was partially modified between 1995 and 2002. Not only is the beginning of this period characterized by a new openness of the dominant political discourses toward social groups claims (sometimes against unions positions), but this openness was also followed by formal recognition of these actors inside institutions. In 1998, movements against unemployment were officially invited to participate in the renewal process of the UNEDIC convention. Furthermore, they obtained a permanent seat inside the administrative council at the Agence nationale pour l'emploi (ANPE), the French public employment services agency. Moreover, the 1998 law against exclusion was in large part the government response to years of pressure from social protest. Even if these gains remain fragile, and even if the state continues to favour largely traditional unions, the French situation clearly contrasts with the Canadian example.

This formal recognition has created a new sort of problem for groups that build themselves in an oppositional context rather than a context of partnership with the state. Thus, movements against unemployment disagree on the function of political representation they should adopt.⁹⁹ The permanent seat obtained at the ANPE is often empty, due to the lack of consensus that exists concerning their role within institutions. The manner in which the state re-defines its claims in terms of citizenship and better access to services creates an unbalanced situation inside these radical groups. To their militant base, this new position within the political process may appear as means of deserting their initial role, which was significantly distanced from the promotion of co-operation with and within the state. The openness of the decision-making process in relation to movements also factored in the disunion between groups, and sometimes served as a brake to the durability of their life. Following the 1997 presidential election, when the PS came to power, it became more difficult for social movements and unions to maintain the same level of activity after 1995 general strikes. Faced with a government that had implemented the 35 hour work week, that had adopted the law against exclusion, that had created thousands of jobs with the *emploi-jeunes* measure,¹⁰⁰ and being in a context of reduced unemployment, movements against unemployment were (at least at the national level) highly destabilised. In contrast with its predecessor, the Jospin government worked more in concert with civil society. While the differences, in terms of real policies adopted, are not entirely clear between the right and the left, the manner in which reforms were conducted was different.¹⁰¹

Facing both a "soft" government with quite a progressive agenda, and a business organization that wished to remake its image through its *Refondation sociale* project, unions increasingly disagreed on the behavioural line to follow. Other social movements partially recovered their autonomy from the state and from political organizations through the contestation process at the end of the period, in a large part thanks to the globalization issue and European building process. Nevertheless, extreme left parties remained closely linked with the emerging protest for another globalization, even if it is now through individual militants and not through institutional cooperation between the two worlds. Here too the space and issue offered by globalization was a means to re-build radical protest on a new terrain. However, the divisions among national actors remained very high, in a large part because of the problematical relationships they have with the state.

Finally, the very space of globalization in France is structured differently than its Canadian counterpart and could explain some of the differences observed. Being anti- or for another globalization in France is not a rare position. All the actors, including economic interests actors and extreme rights parties or groups have something to say against globalization. In contrast to Canada, in France there exists a consensus against economic globalization seen as imposed from the exterior and by, in particular, the United States. It is not very difficult to mobilize the population at large against American hegemony, political, economic, or cultural.¹⁰² By contrast, actors' positions differentiated increasingly with regard to European construction. Thus, the conservative opponents of globalization have also had a tendency to oppose the construction of a united Europe, which they judge to be overly liberal and dangerous to the preservation of national identity. The more progressive opponents hoped to be able to make the construction of a European Union a tool for achieving a "different globalization" or, at least, a rampart against the Americanization of European societies, as well as a rampart against populist reflexes, always very present in Europe.

The political and social actors seem less divided than the Canadian ones on the question of neo-liberal economic globalization. However, as the political space of globalization was not constructed on the same foundations, and because the configuration of relations between the actors, and between the actors and the state are dissimilar in the two cases, the forms of the political space are today divergent. As we have seen, in France the divisions at the heart of the alterna-movement are more persistent. In the same way, globalization as a constructed space has not had the same impact on the national configuration of relations between actors.

Conclusion

Globalization, defined as a space and an issue, follow divergent tracks in Canada and France during the 1990s. In Canada, the fight against globalization and free trade was an efficient tool for the integration of progressive social forces at the Canadian scale, with Quebec history becoming increasingly convergent with the English-Canadian ones. In France, we have noticed a progressive autonomy of national social protest from traditional left political actors (including political parties and unions) on the issue of globalization, but high tensions remain inside the movement itself. Beyond the differences between the two cases, due in large part to the variations in the unequal structure of

representation and in the different history of the space building in each country, globalization seems to represent a heavy challenge for the political left within the two countries.

If the issue of globalization aided the emergence of new forms of social protest, the undetermined problematic and the large subjects that it involves do not favour the construction of movements with a strong coherence among the various positions adopted. For an individual, the fight against globalization renders possible the condition of being a member of a national party, a sporadic supporter of a specific coalition, and an active militant within a radical national social movement, without the need for a global congruence between these different affiliations. In this sense, globalization is also a process of autonomy of the individual from the organization, and left parties are not used to such moving political borders. One of the main consequences of the emergence of the globalization political space is precisely to change the framework of the debates and the way actors name who they are, what they want, and in the name of what. In this respect, globalization, as a political space, is always an open process.

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- 30 See Jeffrey Ayres, "From National to Popular Sovereignty? The Evolving Globalization of Protest Activity in Canada," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 16, (Fall 1997): 107-124. This story is not only the "short" one, it is also the official narrative that the dominant literature in the field presents. We could also have presented alternate narratives around the World March of Women or the implication of international solidarity organizations in the fight against neo liberal world. The point here is to show that in Canada an "official" story of the movement exists, quite linear and shared by the most important actors.
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52 Neil Bradford, "Renewing Social Democracy? Beyond the Third way," *Studies in Political Economy* 67, (Spring 2002): 145-161.

53 Geoffrey Pleyers, "Le modèle français : 1995-2000," in Michel Wieviorka, dir., *Un autre monde...Contestations, dérives et surprises dans l'antimondialisation*, (Paris : Balland, 2003) : 141-154; Bérroux, Sophie, Mouraix, René et Michel Vakaloukis, *Le mouvement social en France* (Paris : La Dispute, 1998), and Isabelle Sommier, *Les nouveaux mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation* (Paris : Flammarion, 2001).

54 Jean-Gabriel Contamin, "Les mobilisations altermondialistes avant les mobilisations altermondialistes : réflexions autour de l'alignement des cadres d'interprétation," Paper presented at the Colloque "Les mobilisations altermondialistes," 3-5 December, Paris: 2003.

55 Ibidem.

56 Éric Agrilolanski, "De l'anticolonialisme à l'altermondialisme: généalogie(s) d'un nouveau cadre d'action collective," Paper presented at the Colloque Les mobilisations altermondialistes, 3-5 December, Paris: 2003.

57 The current debates over the Constitution of Europe in France are not part of this narrative.

58 Didier Demazière, "Des chômeurs sans représentation collective: une fatalité?" *Problèmes économiques* 2, no. 509 (February 1997): 20-25 and Jean-René Pendaries, "Les mouvements des chômeurs et des précaires : contradictions et enjeux" 78, (1995): 3-10.

59 Marcos Ancelovici, "Organizing against Globalization: The Case of ATTAC in France," *Politics and Society* 30, no. 3 (2002): 427-464.

60 The story of the movements against unemployment begins in the 1980s related to the changes affecting the organization that manages the payment of unemployment insurance (UNEDIC). During the 1980s, no real unity exists between these movements, and no real successes in terms of mobilization were gained. At the beginning of the 1990s, the complete reform of the UNEDIC was followed by the creation of AC! in 1993. All organizations have strong links with left or extreme left parties and some of their founding leaders were old union members.

61 Collective interview at the Association Agir contre le chômage (AC!), Paris and Lyon, April 2001; Collective interview at the Mouvement national des chômeurs et des précaires (MNCP), Paris, April 2001; Association pour l'emploi et la solidarité des chômeurs et des précaires (APEIS), Paris, collective interview, April 2001; interview with a member of the CGT-chômeurs, Paris, April 2001.

62 Even the main organization of business in France increasingly takes these actors seriously (MEDEF, 2001).

63 AC-info, electronic bulletin from 1995 to 2003, available on the web: www.ac.eu.org.

64 Collective interview at the Association Agir contre le chômage (AC!), Paris and Lyon, April 2001; Collective interview at the Mouvement national des chômeurs et des précaires (MNCP), Paris, April 2001; Association pour l'emploi et la solidarité des chômeurs et des précaires (APEIS), Paris, collective interview, April 2001; interview with a member of the CGT-chômeurs, Paris, April 2001.

65 Interview with a member of the CGT-chômeurs, Paris, April 2001; Collective interview at the Parti Communiste Français (PCF), Bureau départemental de l'Isère, April 2001. See also Ariane Chemin, et Jérôme Fenoglio, "Les syndicats et les partis restent éloignés des chômeurs," *Le Monde*, 13 November 1996.

66 Syndicat SUD-PTT, Toulouse, collective interview, July 2001.

67 ATTAC was created in 1998.

68 "From Porto Alegre to Davos, from the insecurity of work to the employment of the undocumented, it is all of us together that must struggle...The project is global, and we must globalize our struggles and maintain solidarity in the face of the repression of our movements, amplifying the resistance." (Bulletin, AC! Rhône Info, n. 8, February 2001) Translated from the original French publication.

69 Sidney Tarrow, "The New Transnational Contention: Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms," Presentation at the Panel on "Social Movements and Transnational Social Movements," American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, August 31st, 2002.

70 Christophe Aguitton, Conference on "Mouvements sociaux et gauche politique," Université du Québec à Montréal, October 2002.

71 Conseil supérieur de l'emploi, des revenus et des coûts (CERC), *Minima sociaux: entre protection et insertion* (Paris: La Documentation française, 2000), p. 73-51 and Belorgey, Jean-Michel, "Minima sociaux, revenus d'activité, précarité," *Rapport du Commissariat Général du Plan* (Paris : La Documentation française, 2000).

72 Collective interview at the Association Agir contre le chômage (AC!), Paris and Lyon, April 2001; Collective interview at the Mouvement national des chômeurs et des précaires (MNCP), Paris, April 2001.

73 Daniel Druésne, "Un pacte contre l'exclusion," *Union Sociale* 76, (November 1994): 4-7.

74 Interview with Communication Director, Association ATD-Quart Monde, Paris April 2001.

75 Collective interview at the Association Agir contre le chômage (AC!), Paris and Lyon, April 2001 ; Collective interview at the Mouvement national des chômeurs et des précaires (MNCP), Paris, April 2001.

76 The REALPES is composed of 25 organizations dealing with social exclusion, including ATD-Quart Monde, the Red Cross, the European network against unemployment. This network is financed by 90% by the European Commission.

- 77 Éric Agrilolanski. "De l'anticolonialisme à l'altermondialisme: généalogie(s) d'un nouveau cadre d'action collective," Paper presented at the Colloque Les mobilisations altermondialistes, Paris: 2003.
- 78 Syndicat SUD-PTT, Toulouse, collective interview, July 2001.
- 79 Bruno Palier, "Gouverner le changement des politiques de protection sociale," Communication at the Department of Political Science, University of Montreal, February 2003.
- 80 See the debates during the discussion of the law, at the National Assembly.
- 81 Interview with a member of Parti Socialiste (PS), Grenoble, youth initiative, April 2001.
- 82 Laurent Olivier, "Le PS et l'altermondialisme. Enjeux d'une réappropriation partisane ambiguë," Paper presented at the Colloque Les mobilisations altermondialistes, Paris: 2003.
- 83 Interview with the main leader of the Parti des Verts, Bureau régionale Sud-Ouest, July 2001.
- 84 Sidney Tarrow, "The New Transnational Contention: Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms" and Isabelle Sommier, *Les nouveaux mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation*.
- 85 Nicola Yeates, "The 'Anti-Globalization' movement and its implications for social policy," *Social Policy Review* 14 (2002): 127-150.
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- 88 Susan D. Phillips, "How Ottawa Blends: Shifting Government Relationships with Interest Groups," in Frances Abele, ed., *How Ottawa Spends: The Politics of Fragmentation, 1991-1992* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991): 183-228 and Leslie A. Pal, *Interests of state: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).
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- 92 Janine Brodie, "Restructuring and the Politics of Marginalization".
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- 99 Collective interview at the Association Agir contre le chômage (AC!), Paris and Lyon, April 2001.