Abstracts
Sommaire
L'auteur soulève le problème du syndicalisme minoritaire. D'un point de vue strictement académique, il oppose pluralisme syndical et syndicalisme majoritaire. Après une anayse de la législation québécoise sur ce point, il souligne les principales faiblesses du système actuel en matière de représentation ouvrière au niveau local, ainsi que leurs conséquences pour la démocratie syndicale et l'exercice du droit d'association. Puis, en se basant principalement sur l'expérience européenne, l'auteur propose l'adoption du pluralisme syndical comme moyen de réaliser une plus grande démocratie sociale.
Summary
Labor pluralism is based upon the freedom of workers to combine is association of their own choosing, to maintain, withdraw or change their support toward a particular organization. Essentially, the concept of labor pluralism infers that different associations are competing to represent a unit of workers and to act on its behalf. Where there is no such competition, like between unions with different jurisdictional rights, we simply deal with labor plurality. Labor pluralism may be considered at three levels: the first refers to rival union confederations; the second implies union federations claiming the same jurisdictional rights; the third involves many unions competing at the local plant or the work place.
This third level is at the base of labor democracy and labor pluralism at other levels. This is why the present analysis bears upon its application in the Province of Quebec. The Labour Relations Act (1944) provides us with a starting framework. Some select committees, appointed in 1943 to study this question, proposed almost unanimously a system of multiple unions representation at the local level. But, following the Wagner Act (U.S.), the law built up a system of single union certification. In order to reduce industrial strike and to insure the right of association, only one bargaining agent was to be recognized, and the employer was bound to deal with the union comprising the absolute majority of his employees. The law allows therefore a monopolistic power to the union that has been granted the exclusive right of collective representation. Consequently, a certain number of non-functional implications to labor democracy has to be deduced and pointed out.
In spite of minor concessions to the principle of labour pluralism, the law puts a restrain upon the workers' free choice of a union which conforms to their convictions, for the association choosen by the majority is the sole collective agent. The minority is compelled to work under the conditions imposed by the majority, and sometimes, to join the ranks of the union recognized. On the other hand, because of the union security clauses and the no-raiding pacts, it is becoming gradually more and more difficult for the workers to throw out the union that has once been legally recognized. The capacity of union members to withdraw from membership is restricted. Under a closed shop agreement, this capacity is almost non-existent, since the atempt to join a new association involves a possible lost of the job, a risk that most workers are not ready to take.
This situation leads to a gradual shift of power and control from the workers to the labor leaders and to a possible substitution of the institutional goals and ends to those of the workers. It may also lead, under certain circumstances, to corruption, racketeerism and collusion. Finally, it makes possible an unfair competition which favors big and powerful unions against smaller ones.
Moreover, many countries have adopted the system of labor pluralism. Their experiences are conclusive. The weaknesses previously enumerated have been minor problems in these countries. Union rivalries seem to have been kept to a minimum and powerful labor movements have developped throughout the years.
This is why, as a concluding remark, it is submitted that labor pluralism is workable in our system of industrial relations as a mean to achieve a greater social democracy.