
Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association Rapport de l'assemblée annuelle de la Société historique du Canada

Report of the Annual Meeting

General Sir Patrick MacDougall the American Civil War and the Defence of Canada

Jay Luvaas

Volume 41, Number 1, 1962

URI: <https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/300598ar>

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7202/300598ar>

[See table of contents](#)

Publisher(s)

The Canadian Historical Association/La Société historique du Canada

ISSN

0317-0594 (print)

1712-9095 (digital)

[Explore this journal](#)

Cite this article

Luvaas, J. (1962). General Sir Patrick MacDougall the American Civil War and the Defence of Canada. *Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association / Rapport de l'assemblée annuelle de la Société historique du Canada*, 41(1), 44–54. <https://doi.org/10.7202/300598ar>

GENERAL SIR PATRICK MacDOUGALL THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE DEFENCE OF CANADA

Jay LUVAAAS
Allegheny College

In 1844 Captain Patrick Leonard MacDougall arrived in Toronto to join his new regiment, the Royal Canadian Rifles. Quite likely he already felt an attachment to the colony, for his father, Sir Duncan MacDougall, had at one time commanded the 79th Cameron Highlanders at Montreal and Quebec. But there is no reason why MacDougall should have anticipated the extent of his future involvement in Canadian affairs, nor could he have foreseen how twenty years' cumulative service in Canada would shape his own military thinking.¹

We know only the broad outline of MacDougall's military career. He served with his regiment in Toronto and Kingston for ten years before returning to England in 1854 as Superintendent of studies at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. The following year he went to the Crimea, where he participated in the expedition to Kertch and later attended Lord Raglan in the trenches during the unsuccessful British assault on the Redan. After the war he resumed his duties at Sandhurst, and for the rest of his active career his sword was used only for ceremonial occasions: his principal weapon was his pen.

MacDougall's concern for the future of Canada had already prompted him to write in 1848 a scarce work entitled *Emigration; its advantages to Great Britain and her colonies together with a detailed plan for the formation of the proposed railway between Halifax and Quebec, by means of colonization*. In 1856 he completed *The Theory of War*, which was translated into French and German, republished in England in 1858 and again in 1862, and was regarded as the foremost military text in the English language until the appearance of Hamley's *Operations of War* in 1866. MacDougall was not yet a theorist, but the Crimean War had convinced him of the need to sharpen the education of the British officer and he hoped to stimulate interest in the theory of war by presenting in one book the basic views expounded in the more unwieldy volumes of Baron Jomini, the Archduke Charles, and Major General Sir William

¹ MacDougall was born August 10, 1819, at Boulogne-sur-Mer, France. He entered the army in 1836, serving briefly with the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, the 79th Cameron Highlanders, and the 36th Infantry of the Line before attending the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, 1840-1842. Robert Hamilton Vetch, "MacDougall", *Dictionary of National Biography: Supplement* (Oxford, 1921-1922), 993-994; *Canadian Illustrated News*, October 26, 1878.

Napier.² *The Theory of War* was followed in 1857 by a pamphlet entitled *The Senior Department of the Royal Military College* in which MacDougall again stressed the need for proper instruction for staff officers and which probably led to his selection as commandant of the Staff College when it was founded later that same year.³ In 1858 MacDougall prepared a critique of the campaigns of Hannibal for the benefit of military students; he also published his lectures on Napoleon and Marlborough in the newly established *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*.⁴

MacDougall relinquished his post at the Staff College in September, 1861. Two months later he found himself suddenly involved once again in Canadian affairs when the *Trent* crisis threatened to explode into war between Great Britain and the United States. Confronted with the urgent need to improvise a strategic plan in the event diplomacy failed, the War Office turned for advice to MacDougall and one or two others who were personally familiar with the type of forces available for the defence of Canada.

MacDougall submitted his thoughts "On the Prospect of War with the United States" early in December, 1861. In his opinion the key to the successful defence of Canada was in the hands of whichever nation controlled the Great Lakes. Five years earlier he had privately called the attention of the Secretary of State for War "to the paramount importance of England being supreme on the lakes"; now he maintained that if Britain could gain control of the Great Lakes "two thirds of the troops . . . required for the defence of Western Canada could be spared to reinforce the line of the St. Lawrence". Estimating the number of troops available in the event of war at 75,000 volunteers and 8,000 regulars, MacDougall evidently believed that Canada could be defended with the aid of entrenched positions at strategic locations and utilization of the telegraph and railroad to enable rapid concentration at threatened points. He assumed naturally that the Royal Navy would provide indirect aid by destroying the Union fleet and menacing the major cities along the eastern seaboard. He was even hopeful that the British would be able to invade Maine, which would enable them to reinforce the army in Canada more rapidly and might divert a significant portion of any army the Americans could assemble for an invasion of Canada. And if the

² Lieut. Col. P. L. MacDougall, *The Theory of War illustrated by numerous examples from Military History* (3rd ed., London, 1856), VIII-IX.

³ Vetch, "MacDougall", 993; Major A. R. Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College* (London, 1927), 91-110.

⁴ MacDougall, *The Campaigns of Hannibal arranged and critically considered, written expressly for the use of students of Military History* (London, 1858); "On Napoleon's Campaign in Italy in 1796", *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*. III (1859), 195-207; "The Military Character of the great Duke of Marlborough", *ibid.*, 257-270.

Americans chose to advance on Montreal through Vermont, their strategic flank would be seriously threatened by a British army in Maine.⁵

In most respects MacDougall's proposals for the defence of Canada do not differ appreciably from those suggested a few days later by Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Inspector General of Fortifications and one of the best strategists in the army. Burgoyne likewise advocated an invasion of Maine if at all possible, and both professed to believe that given "sufficient troops, a system of fortifications and command of the lakes", the British could defend Canada successfully. Unfortunately none of these conditions had been established at the time of the *Trent* crisis, and by the time reinforcements could be rushed to North America the threat of imminent war was over.⁶

As a soldier MacDougall did not feel competent to suggest precisely how command of the Great Lakes might be secured: he knew only that this was fundamental to the successful defence of Canada. But his earlier experience in Canada did inspire a definite and farsighted proposal for increasing the efficiency of the volunteer militia. Instead of keeping the British regulars intact and treating the militia as a separate force—a mistake that the expanding Union army already had committed—MacDougall suggested that a regiment of volunteer militia should be attached to every regiment of regulars. If this were done, he predicted, "in a very few weeks" the volunteers "would not be much inferior to regulars in manoeuvring". He also urged that drill sergeants be sent immediately from England and that regular officers and those living on half-pay in Canada should provide the leadership for the volunteer regiments. Manifestly this could not be achieved in time to meet the immediate crisis, but it is interesting to note that an organization quite similar in principle to this enabled Canada to mobilize sufficient forces on short notice to meet the Fenian invasions in 1866 and 1870.⁷

MacDougall's activities during the next three years remain something of a mystery. We know that he visited Canada in 1862, but in what capacity the sketch in the *Dictionary of National Biography* does not make clear. That he continued to show concern over the military situation in North America is indicated by the fact that while on board

⁵ MacDougall, "On the Prospect of War with the United States", National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, Sir George Cornwall Lewis Papers, Harpton Court for the defence of Canada submitted by MacDougall and Sir John Fox Burgoyne Papers 2943. I am indebted to Professor Bourne for calling attention to the schemes and for kindly providing transcripts from the Lewis Papers. For a penetrating analysis of the military problems connected with the defence of Canada, see Kenneth Bourne, "British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862", *English Historical Review*, LXXVI (October, 1961), 600-632.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 610; Burgoyne, "Thoughts on War with the United States, as regards operations by the land forces", Lewis Papers 2984.

⁷ MacDougall, "On the Prospect of War with the United States".

ship he wrote two pamphlets which subsequently were published: *Forts versus Ships* and *Defence of Canadian Lakes and its influence on the General Defence of Canada*. We know, too, that he returned to Canada early in 1865 as Adjutant General of Militia, but there is no evidence to indicate where he had been during the intervening years. The mystery deepens when we read that during this period MacDougall prepared a two volume biography of his father-in-law, Napier, the celebrated historian of the Peninsular War, but that the work actually was published over the signature of H. A. Bruce (later Lord Aberdare), who had married another of Napier's daughters. Bruce explained that his editorial services were required because the author had written the book from overseas. Rereading the volumes in the twilight of his own career, Lord Wolseley suggests another reason why MacDougall had preferred to remain anonymous: MacDougall's name, he wrote to Lady Wolseley, "was not a good one when the book was written". Perhaps it should be pointed out that most of what we know about Napier comes from MacDougall who, in addition to the biography, was also responsible for the obituary that had appeared in the *Times* and two favorable reviews of his own book.⁸

In Canada MacDougall also availed himself of the opportunity to study the Civil War campaigns which, according to Wolseley, were followed by British soldiers with "breathless interest and excitement".⁹ Today the conflict emerges as the first of the modern wars; the first great war waged by modern democratic states with the products of the industrial revolution; the first in which steam and iron were used by both sides to transport and supply huge armies over vast areas. It also represents a prophetic departure in tactics, for the traditional formations used in Europe could not be adapted to requirements in America, where relatively untrained troops, many of them armed with rifles of unprecedented range and accuracy, grappled with each other over rough and often thickly wooded terrain. European soldiers at first did not know what to make of this strange conflict: only after military observers had returned with technical information in 1862 and 1863 was it possible for the professional soldier to appreciate the clumsy efforts of the improvised armies and comprehend the real meaning of the transformation in tactics.

⁸ Vetch, "MacDougall", 993; Lord Monck to the Right Hon. E. Cardwell, June 14, 1866, quoted in Capt. John A. Macdonald, *Troublous Times in Canada: a History of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870* (Toronto, 1910), 134-137; Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, Field Marshal Sir Garnet Wolseley Papers, Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, April 17, 1894.

⁹ Wolseley, "An English View of the Civil War", *North American Review*, CXLIX (September, 1889), 725. For the reactions of English observers and military students of the Civil War, see R. A. Preston, "Military Lessons of the American Civil War: the Influence of Observers from the British Army in Canada on Training in the British Army", *Army Quarterly*, LXV (January, 1953), 229-237; Jay Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance* (Chicago, 1959), 14-51, 100-119.

When MacDougall completed the manuscript for his *Modern Warfare as Influenced by Modern Artillery* in the summer of 1863, he became the first European soldier to incorporate many of the lessons of the Civil War into a military text. Much of the book was still based on examples from Napier's classic *History of the War in the Peninsula*, but wherever possible MacDougall tried to analyse the experience of the American armies, even though "the conclusions of one day" were "often overthrown by the events of the next".¹⁰

From the confusing and often contradictory accounts of Civil War battles one hard fact could be deduced: modern firepower had forced a momentous change in tactics. The breech-loader, quick and simple to load, had doubled the firepower of infantry, and MacDougall ridiculed the arguments of those who, like the Confederate General Robert E. Lee, objected to this new weapon on the ground that it would cause soldiers to consume ammunition "in a reckless and aimless manner under the excitement of battle". Discipline would prevent this, he argued: the only legitimate question was whether firing should be "more in volleys by word of command and less by independent files".¹¹

The effect of improved firearms and the new rifled artillery was to give an enormous advantage to the defence. Infantry in the future would have to advance in extended order to offer the smallest target possible and it would have to move swiftly through the fire zone; cavalry would find its role in battle diminishing, "for its only power lies in the offensive" and there would be little opportunity for cavalry to charge infantry armed with modern weapons. MacDougall did not share the enthusiasm of his friend Colonel G. T. Denison, a Canadian militia officer, for mounted infantry; but at the same time he realized that increased firepower would no longer permit the massed assaults of Seydlitz and Murat in which dense formations of horsemen had charged knee to knee into evaporating infantry formations.¹² Pointing to the great battles of the Civil War, MacDougall observed "that no open positions have yet been successfully attacked; the assailants have always been repulsed, though in several cases very superior in numbers". So great, in fact, was the advantage given to the defence by modern artillery that MacDougall predicted that even offensive warfare "must in future consist in taking up such positions as shall oblige the enemy to attack, on account of the deadly fire to which

¹⁰ MacDougall, *Modern Warfare as Influenced by Modern Artillery* (London, 1864), 11. Part of this work was written in the fall of 1862; the entire manuscript was completed early in the summer of 1863. *Ibid.*, vii, 28 n.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 428-430. Lee's aversion to the breech-loader is mentioned in Lieut.-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, *The Campaign of Fredericksburg, November-December, 1862: A Tactical Study for Officers* (3rd ed., Aldershot, n.d.), 131. Henderson notes that Lee was "speaking of troops whose standard of discipline was not a high one . . ."

¹² MacDougall, *Modern Warfare*, 135-136, 414. See also Colonel G. T. Denison, *Modern Cavalry: Its Organization, Armament, and Employment in War* (London, 1868), 30-31, 73-75.

troops advancing to the attack of a position over open ground are now exposed . . ." The battle of the future would be decided "principally by artillery", and there would be increasingly less combat at close range. And if this were so, MacDougall argued, then the difference between volunteers and regulars would diminish accordingly. When the outcome of battles had depended upon discipline and the speed with which soldiers could reload and move from one formation to another, volunteers manifestly were inferior to trained infantry of the line. But in a strong defensive position, armed with breech-loaders and supported by modern artillery, there was no reason why volunteers should not be nearly as effective as regular troops. In any event, "The attack of such a position must either partake of the nature of a siege . . . or it must be made by night . . ."

As for siege warfare, developments during the Civil War indicated a more striking departure still from practices in the Peninsular War. MacDougall conceded

. . . that at an enormous cost a fortress may be so protected that to break it will be impossible. On the other hand, any town may with certainty be destroyed by shells from a great distance, and this fact destroys the utility of many of the strongest European fortresses. No town will ever again be surrounded by a fortified enceinte; and the important places will be protected by a series of detached forts, mounting the heaviest ordnance, and of area so contracted as to present a small mark for shells . . . In short, entrenched camps will take the place of regular fortresses. It seems not improbable that in future warfare the blockade will supersede the regular siege, and that history will be spared the recital of the appalling slaughter of a Badajos or San Sebastian.¹³

No European soldier in 1864 perceived more clearly than MacDougall the changing nature of warfare, and none was more clearly influenced by the American Civil War. As late as 1856 MacDougall had asserted that "the modern improvement in small arms renders it probable that the fire of the infantry will in future form the most important element in the decision of a battle"; in 1864 he predicted that artillery would be the determining factor. In *The Theory of War* MacDougall had stated that "no formation of infantry can resist the shock of horses ridden . . . in earnest"; in *Modern War as influenced by Modern Artillery* he insisted that firepower had nearly destroyed cavalry as an offensive arm in battle. After Sebastapol he had observed that "the Russian earthworks were so knocked about by our fire that our soldiers could mount them without the aid of scaling ladders . . . if these works had been provided with deep ditches and masonry revetments . . . it never would have been taken by assault"; after Vicksburg he placed his faith in entrenched camps rather than regular fortifications.¹⁴ When the time

¹³ MacDougall, *Modern Warfare*, 13-17, 414-431, *passim*.

¹⁴ MacDougall, *Theory of War*, 41-43, 114, 239.

came to analyse the tactical lessons of the Franco-Prussian war, MacDougall could see no evidence to upset his predictions based upon his tactical deductions of the American Civil War.¹⁵

MacDougall's experiences as Adjutant General of Militia in Canada from 1865 to 1869 also influenced his military thinking and may even have helped to guide British military policy in the 1870's. In the wake of the *Trent* crisis some emergency measures had been taken to improve the quality of the militia,¹⁶ but as late as 1864 there were complaints that "not one single company has been organized, or received even the miserable six days' drill which is the maximum *permitted*". Despite four years' warning there was not a single battalion of organized militia in all Canada ready to take the field: it would take six weeks at least, one critic estimated, to assemble an adequate defensive force, and this at a time when the United States had just become a military power.¹⁷

MacDougall faced the task in 1865 of shaping the Canadian militia into an efficient military organization, and according to Wolseley he was admirably equipped for the job. Wolseley described the new Adjutant General as a "very able, highly educated" soldier who

... was gifted with the most charming, the most fascinating manner towards all men — by no means a poor recommendation for any one who has to get on well with politicians... our Canadian comrades had not then become aware of the fact that, since our war with Russia, a new army school had arisen amongst us, by whom the study of their profession, both as a science and an art, was recognized as all important.

No man knew better than General MacDougall the difference... between the educated officer and the ordinary amateur in uniform, and the best of the Canadian Militia soon came to recognize their new commandant's military worth, and the value of the new system he introduced.¹⁸

The heart of MacDougall's new system was the forming of independent companies into battalions. Defects in the existing structure had been revealed in March 1866, when it became necessary to call out 10,000 of the Volunteer Force to guard the frontier against a threatened invasion by the Fenians. Within twenty-four hours 14,000 volunteer militia had

¹⁵ MacDougall, *Modern Infantry Tactics* (London, 1873), *passim*.

¹⁶ In 1863 two militia acts were passed, one to facilitate the mobilization of the Sedentary Militia (comprising all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 60), and another to increase the size of the volunteer Active Militia which had been established in 1855 to provide a force equipped and trained to deal with a sudden emergency. See George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers 1604-1954: the Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto, 1954), 209-216.

¹⁷ Sir Richard John Cartwright, *Remarks on the Militia of Canada* (Kingston, 1864), 607. The historical development of the Canadian militia is treated in C. F. Hamilton, "Defence, 1812-1912", in Adam Shortt and Arthur Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces* (Toronto, 1914), VII, 379-460; and Colonel Walker Powell, "The Militia System of Canada", in J. Castell Hopkins, ed., *Canada: An Encyclopaedia of the Country* (Toronto, 1898), IV, 415-422.

¹⁸ Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life* (Westminster, 1903), II, 230-231.

responded, and an even larger force was mobilized again in June when the Fenians actually raided the frontier. MacDougall was pleased with both the number and the quality of the volunteers who had been mustered into service on these occasions: what was lacking, he discovered, was an effective organization. Most volunteers belonged to isolated companies drawn from the rural areas, and it had been necessary to form these into provisional battalions and to improvise a staff for each "in a hurry, and at an obvious disadvantage."¹⁹

MacDougall tried to avoid this confusion in the future by organizing all companies into permanent battalions and, wherever possible, assigning to each a county designation and permanent headquarters. His localization of the militia was an immediate success. Battalion adjutants reported that the new organization was "a source of strength", an aid "to unity of action and equipment", and "of great benefit, imparting a true *esprit de corps* . . . and far greater efficiency into the force of each County". In Wolseley's experience the battalions varied in efficiency "in direct proportion to the number of old army officers, and of those who had graduated at the Military Schools" in each.²⁰ The military schools had been established by MacDougall the previous year at every military station where there were regular troops. The most promising graduates had been "drilled and given some practical knowledge of military duties" by Wolseley at the La Prairie camp near Montreal: in Wolseley's estimation, "they made excellent officers".²¹

MacDougall's system of organization, which had made it possible to assemble masses of volunteers "within a few hours . . . on any given point over a line of more than 1,000 miles", proved equal to the task of resisting the Fenian invasions, but MacDougall believed that if necessary it should also be capable of waging regular warfare with the United States. To this end he organized the entire volunteer force into brigades in the fall of 1866: seven field brigades were created, each comprising one battalion of regulars and three of militia, to serve as the advanced guard of the Canadian army. The remaining militia battalions were organized into brigades by districts, to be employed in time of emergency guarding strategic points along the frontier and the various lines of communication and supply. MacDougall also recommended the establishment of depots in each district to accommodate the 100,000 men he

¹⁹ Only the Volunteer companies from the principal cities had been formed into battalions by March, 1866. Canada. Department of Militia and Defence, *Report on the State of the Militia of the Province of Canada, for the year 1867* (Ottawa, 1868), 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 15, 18, 29, 34, 105; *Report for the year 1866* (Ottawa, 1866), 16-21; Lt. Col. Davis, *The Canadian Militia: Its Organization and present condition* (Caledonia, Ont., 1873), 5; Wolseley, *Story of a Soldier's Life*, II, 147-148.

²¹ Wolseley, *Story of a Soldier's Life*, II, 147-148.

believed would be available in the event of war, each depot to be protected by entrenched camps where the fighting population might rally.²²

The amalgamation of militia battalions with the regulars had much the same effect in Canada in 1866 as a similar policy had had in France in 1793, when the newly raised battalions of volunteers and conscripts had been attached to old regiments of the line in the proportion of two to one. A few years after MacDougall had returned to England, a militia officer explained why his system had worked so well:

...the Volunteer Militia had models to guide them, and derived proportionate advantage from their superior knowledge. Moreover, the Regular officers in command, took all pains to create a healthy feeling of emulation whenever their Regiments and the Volunteers were brigaded together, and the prestige of victory was in the confidence felt by the men, as long as they knew they were to fight alongside the Regulars. Look at the moveable columns of Colonel MacDougall. Why, they were ready to go anywhere, and try to do anything, although there was only a wing of a Regular Regiment, and a couple of guns to each brigade. They knew that they would be properly led, that they were under the command of professional soldiers, and would have the advice and assistance of men whose trade was war.

When the decision was made in 1871 to withdraw British troops from North America, one underlying cause for concern was the fear that the militia would deteriorate without the support of the regulars: where, it was asked, are the officers and men needed to give proper seasoning to the militia.²³

MacDougall returned to England in 1869, where he soon became involved in the far-reaching army reforms associated with the name of the new Secretary of State for War, Mr. Edward Cardwell. Significantly, he was named chairman of the influential "localization committee" which worked out the basic scheme ultimately adopted for the localization and fusion of regular, reserve and auxiliary forces in England.

The possible influence of events in Canada since 1866 upon the Cardwell Reforms has never been fully explored. Although essentially English in origin and designed to correct evils peculiar to the British army, these reforms bear a superficial resemblance to practices in the German army, particularly some features of the newly adopted short service and enlistment on a territorial basis.²⁴ But a good case can be

²² *Report for the Year 1866*, 24-25; *Report on the State of the Militia for 1867*, 12-13. MacDougall's views on the defence of Canada after the Civil War had ended are found in his unsigned article entitled "Canada: the Fenian Raid and the Colonial Office", *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, CVIII (1870), 493-508.

²³ *Ibid.*, 497-499; Davis, *Canadian Militia*, 11. For a general treatment of the problem see C. P. Stacey, "Britain's Withdrawal from North America, 1864-1871", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXVI (1955), 185-198.

²⁴ Army manoeuvres were instituted in the British army in 1871, and even the Prussian *Pickelhaube* replaced the French *kepi* as standard headdress in most British Regiments. Sir George Arthur, *From Wellington to Wavell* (London, 1942),

made for the argument that the localization of the British army came not from Prussia, but instead had its roots in MacDougall's reforms of the Canadian militia in 1866. Two of the five members of the MacDougall committee — Wolseley and of course himself — were fresh from Canada, where they had seen convincing proof that localization had greatly facilitated mobilization and that brigading regulars with the militia had quickly converted the latter into useful soldiers. According to MacDougall, militia thus brigaded had "learned more in a week than others, not able to partake of the same advantages, did in a month".²⁵

What evidence is there that MacDougall and Wolseley were more influenced by what they had seen in Canada than what they had read about Prussia? Their writings testify that neither had been blinded — as had so many in the British army — by the dazzling Prussian victory over France in 1870. Wolseley was later to advise British officers to "copy the Germans as regards work and leave their clothes and their methods alone", while MacDougall repeatedly protested that German tactics in 1870 were being overrated and that it was unwise to attempt to reproduce the German military system in England because of the fundamental difference in the institutions of the two nations.²⁶ It is likely that both resisted the impulse in 1871 to imitate the Germans, whereas both had faith in the type of organization they recently had fashioned in Canada. MacDougall frequently mentioned the Canadian militia in his later writings. By this time, too, MacDougall was able to synthesize his tactical deductions of the Civil War and his experiences with the Canadian militia, for if modern firepower had diminished the difference between regular troops and reserves wherever entrenchments and artillery could be employed, this gap had been narrowed further by combining both elements in a single brigade.

MacDougall was rewarded for his contribution to the localization scheme by being appointed first director of the Intelligence Department when it was established in 1873. In 1878 he returned to Canada for a final tour of duty, this time as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in British North America. The five years spent in this capacity fall beyond the scope of this paper, but it is interesting and perhaps significant to note that in 1878 he was called to administer the Government during the time Canada was without a Governor General. He also apparently was

72; General Sir Robert Biddulph, *Lord Cardwell at the War Office* (London, 1904), 189, 212-213; James Laver, *British Military Uniforms* (London, 1948), 21.

²⁵ MacDougall, *The Army and its Reserves* (London, 1869), 20; Wolseley, *Story of a Soldier's Life*, II, 159, 174.

²⁶ Luvaas, *Military Legacy*, 115-117; MacDougall, *Modern Infantry Tactics, passim*; *The Army and its Reserves*, 1-5; "The Mobilization of the Army, and National Defence", *Blackwoods*, CXX (1876), 520; "On the proposal to change the Organization of our Field Battalions from 8 to 4 Companies", 8 March 1877, War Office, Confidential Papers 0768; National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, Blackwood Papers, MacDougall to John Blackwood, August 10, 1870.

one of the first in Canada to view the Empire as a partnership of nations with respect to defence. Much has been made of the Canadian offer of troops for the Nile Expedition in 1885, but there was a precedent which seems to have been generally overlooked: in 1879, when relations between Great Britain and Russia were strained as a result of the Russo-Turkish war, MacDougall had made a similar offer. According to the testimony of Sir John A. Macdonald before the Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad, it had been MacDougall's hope "to organize a military reserve force of 10,000 men for general service — not Colonial service merely, but for service in any part of the world". The offer was not accepted for the men never were actually needed, but the significant fact is that the offer was presented.²⁷

MacDougall returned to England in 1883 and two years later he retired from active military service. He died in 1894 after an illness so prolonged and painful that his old friend Wolseley wrote to his wife in anguish: "Oh, how I wish I could be killed in action! I have a horror of dying in bed."²⁸

MacDougall was an administrator rather than a man of action, a thoughtful student of war who apparently preferred to work silently in the shadows. He rendered lasting services to the British army as well as the Canadian militia, yet he is a virtual stranger to both countries today. History has somehow allowed MacDougall to slip quietly out of sight.

²⁷ Vetch, "MacDougall", 994; Alice R. Stewart, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Imperial Defence Commission of 1879", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXV (1854), 133-134; *Canadian Illustrated News*, October 26, 1878. I am indebted to Professor R. A. Preston for bringing this source to my attention.

²⁸ Wolseley papers. Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, December 9, 1894.