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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONS OF FRENCH CANADA WITH THE UNITED STATES

By MASON WADE

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KNOWLEDGE knows no boundaries; and the histories of Canada and the United States are so intricately interwoven that one cannot reasonably be discussed without the other, although, as C. P. Stacey has remarked, "Canadian writers have sometimes bent to the task with laudable determination,"¹ and Americans all too frequently display an appalling ignorance of their neighbour. Therefore it is regrettable that only in recent years has it been generally recognized that both Canadian and American historians are concerned with matters which are not so much national as continental in character, and that they might profit mutually by meeting together to discuss their findings. The annual gatherings at Queen's and St. Lawrence Universities will be resumed after the war, let us hope, and meanwhile the Carnegie series of studies in Canadian-American relations² has paved a way which might well be followed by more historians of both countries. Our nations have achieved through the years a harmonious collaboration without precedent in a world too long torn by outrageous nationalism; and the recounting of how that relationship was achieved is more fitting work for the historian than fanning the dying coals of ancient discords into new flames.

Within the time set aside, only some aspects of a relationship which goes back to the earliest days of New France and New England can be considered. Because French Canada is the most deeply traditionalist section of the New World, mention will be made of some of the earlier relationships which are usually neglected or not as well understood as they might be. In this attempt to present a fairly rounded picture within brief compass, only nominal notice can be given to some points, and only the barest outlines of others indicated. The discussion will be limited largely to Quebec and New England. Being a New Englander, I feel that my region has had a determining effect upon the development of the United States, just as Quebec has had a determining effect upon the development of Canada. That is a theory; it is a fact that Quebec is the core of French Canada and that the majority of the Franco-Americans—a larger group of people of French blood than is found in the whole French overseas empire³—dwell in New England. So I shall leave to those better qualified all but the most passing reference to the relations of French Canada with the United States, outside the field I have outlined.

I.

This subject was thought until recent years by most historians to be confined to the long series of French and Indian Wars, the Quebec Act,

¹C. P. Stacey, *Canada and the British Army, 1846-71* (London, 1936), 17.

²*The Relations of Canada and the United States* (New Haven and Toronto, 1937+), published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 vols.

³Josephat Benoît, *L'Ame franco-américaine* (Montreal, 1935), 232-3.

the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the stormy middle years of the nineteenth century, which ended in the Confederation of the British North American provinces against the threat of a giant neighbour who had achieved unity through a civil war, and showed certain signs of a bumptious willingness to extend the blessings of the American way of life upon the rest of the continent, by force if necessary. Only within the last few years has it been generally realized that two-fifths of the French Canadians live in the United States; and that the continental economic system goes back to the earliest days of New France and New England. The basic factor of geography, which has determined so much history, has also been too long neglected. Only in 1941 was the first detailed examination⁴ made by French Canadians of the political and economic relationship of the two regions. Its most significant conclusions, and some others suggested by it, provide the framework of this paper.

The whole great area stretching from Labrador to Cape Cod was closest to the ports of England and France when those nations were rival maritime powers. It supplied a base for the exploitation of the rich fisheries of the Newfoundland, Nova Scotian, and Georges Banks in an age of faith and abstinence, when the European consumption of fish was far greater than in modern times. This coast was also the gateway to a continental treasure-house of furs, and from 1545 to 1850 the fur trade was one of the basic factors of the North American economy. The French, who came first, after throwing the seeds of settlement in Acadia, chanced upon what Cartier called the "chemin du Canada,"⁵ the "river and the road" of the St. Lawrence River system, which led them to a heroic series of discoveries. They bared the heart of the continent; they traced out the principal waterways and carried the Cross and the *fleur-de-lis* from the Atlantic to the Rockies, from Louisiana to Hudson Bay.⁶ The English spread out upon the Atlantic coastal plain. Barred from the interior by the wall of the Appalachians, they devoted themselves first to agriculture, then to the fisheries and to trade by sea. By 1700 the entire territory between the Appalachians and the Rockies might fairly be called French by right of discovery, if not of development, while only the narrow eastern seaboard strip was English. Then began a long struggle—primarily economic in character—between the two colonies, one of which had too much population for its limited territory, and the other too little for the vast expanses which it claimed. At the opening of the Seven Years' War, two million Anglo-Americans faced seventy-five thousand French Canadians;⁷ that simple fact, plus British sea power, settled the fate of New France. Though the Iroquois, the most powerful savage confederation of the East, generally supported the English, it is true that the French enjoyed the support of by far the greater part of the Indians, whose goodwill—so essential for the fur trade—they had won through a missionary effort which completely dwarfed New England's labours in that field.

⁴G. Lanctôt (ed.), R. Parent, B. Brouillette, J. Bruchesi, G. Robitaille, *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (Montreal, 1941). Hereafter cited as Lanctôt.

⁵J. Cartier, *Bref Récit et succincte narrative de la navigation faite en MDXXXV et MDXXXVI* (Paris, 1863), 16.

⁶A. L. Eno, "French Trails in the United States" (*Franco-American Historical Society*, Lowell, 1940).

⁷Lanctôt, 46-7.

One salient fact that is worth recalling from the complex history of this period is that the French were the first exploiters of the natural resources of the New World, as well as missionaries and explorers, while the English were the first colonizers and farmers, and only later traders by land and sea.⁸ There is little historical truth in the traditional opposition of a spiritual New France to a materialistic New England. Such little French colonization as took place was designed to assure the security of the fur trade, which was operated by monopolies for the sole benefit of the mother country. New France was ruled by Frenchmen from France for the benefit of France. On the other hand, the English colonists had turned their back upon their mother country, and they set about the creation of a New England upon an agricultural foundation which endured until the 1840's. Once that foundation was laid, they established a thriving trade with the West Indies, and even with the French colonies, neglected by a European-minded monarchy. Early in the history of the region, it became evident that geography could not be denied; since Acadia was a natural extension of New England, it became the first battlefield of the French and English in the New World; and it was the first section of New France, along with the outposts of Newfoundland and Hudson Bay, to pass into English hands. The age-old relationship of Boston with Acadia survives today; sometimes it would appear that there are more Maritimers in Massachusetts than at home, and Haligonians still talk of visiting the "Boston States."

After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, France fortified the frontiers which were endangered by the expansion of the swollen population of the English colonies, adopting La Galissonnière's plan of a chain of mutually sustaining forts, stretching from Acadia to Louisiana. The French thus set up, as M. Parent has it, "a Chinese Wall which shut in the English between the sea and the Appalachians."⁹ This was, of course, but the first of many such walls erected to preserve French Canada from outside influences, both good and bad. The English colonists promptly established a set of counter fortifications. Swayed by insistence from the colonies, London saw that the power of France might be broken on American battlefields. Money and men poured across the ocean to the English colonies under the protection of English sea power, already formidable; while France, fighting in Germany against England's continental allies, could spare few men and less money for the struggle in America. Parkman, in *A Half-Century of Conflict* and in *Montcalm and Wolfe*, was the first to show that obscure events in America could affect the course of events in Europe, as those in Europe did that in America. To him the struggle which was settled by the Peace of Paris in 1763 was one between feudal, militant, and Catholic France and democratic, industrial, and Protestant England.¹⁰ Remove the religious terms from this equation, and you might re-state it as the struggle between the past and the future; for feudalism and military government were doomed in North America before the mounting tide of democracy and industry, with which this study will be largely concerned.

That tide soon made itself felt. The English colonies grew rebellious

⁸R. Parent in *ibid.*, 89-90.

⁹*Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁰F. Parkman, *The Pioneers of France in the New World* (Boston, 1865), preface.

under economic restraints placed upon them by the mother country, whose military might had just removed the chief threat to their existence by the first great feat of combined operations.¹¹ They demanded a political and economic freedom which no colony had previously enjoyed, while the Albany and New York merchants who had hastened to Montreal to take over the French fur trade and other enterprises, soon came into conflict with the very military authorities who had invited their coming.¹² Opposition to military authority and antipathy to Catholics were the chief American influences felt by French Canada at this period, according to General Murray and Colonel Burton. His Majesty's old subjects displayed a growing and "strong Bias to Republican Principles"¹³ in Carlton's eyes; and Cramahé regretted that they had adopted "American Ideas in regard to Taxation."¹⁴ Acting on the opinion of Murray and Carlton that the new subjects were the best assurance of the survival of British power in North America, London saw fit to pass in 1774 the Quebec Act, which virtually established the Catholic Church as the Church of Canada; granted to the French their Civil Law, to the virtual exclusion of the English Common Law; and by restoring Labrador to Canada, re-established the northern economy.¹⁵ This Act, which is so closely connected with the American Revolution that consideration of one without the other has been described by Buxton as "*Hamlet* without the prince,"¹⁶ was a red rag to the colonial bull, already goaded into exasperation by repressive trade ordinances. The anti-"Popish" frenzy, which had reached its height in the American Colonies during the French and Indian Wars (which often took on the air of religious crusades, though they were really trade wars), exploded once more.¹⁷ In an "Address to the People of Great Britain" on October 21, 1774, the first Congress of the English colonies protested against this "worst of laws," which established a "religion that has deluged our island in blood, and dispersed impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder, and rebellion through every part of the world."¹⁸ Three days later the same body adopted a "Letter Addressed to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec," which sought to convince the French Canadians that their true interest lay in uniting with the English colonies in a struggle for liberty, representative government, and freedom from economic persecution.¹⁹ This letter was spread through the province by the Montreal merchants, British by origin but American by conviction, sentiment, or interest. It was followed up by other appeals, and by the agitation of such agents as John Brown. The French Canadians, a people just emerging from a feudal economy, got a lesson in revolutionary politics and laissez-faire economics,

¹¹E. W. McInnis, *The Unguarded Frontier* (New York, 1942), 41-2.

¹²A. L. Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec* (Minneapolis, 1933), 102-27.

¹³A. Shortt and Arthur Doughty (eds.), *Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791* (Ottawa, 1907), Carleton to Shelburne, Dec. 24, 1767, 201-3; cited Lanctôt, 96.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Cramahé to Dartmouth, July 15, 1774, 353; *ibid.*, 96.

¹⁵D. G. Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850* (New Haven, 1937); R. Coupland, *The Quebec Act* (Oxford, 1925).

¹⁶G. Buxton, *L'Influence de la révolution américaine sur le développement constitutionnel du Canada, 1774-1791* (Paris, 1929), 1.

¹⁷Sister Mary Augustina, *American Opinion of Roman Catholicism in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1936), 395.

¹⁸*Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774*, 88; cited Lanctôt, 98.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 105-13; *ibid.*, 98.

for Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* appeared almost simultaneously with the Quebec Act and the American Revolution.²⁰ The new gospel of the *Bostonnais* caught the fancy of the masses, who did not welcome a return to the old system of feudal dues; while it was violently opposed by the *élite*, who were secured in their own position by the Quebec Act. The *élite* made capital of the double-faced attitude of the Congress, which had denounced Catholicism in England and praised freedom of conscience in Quebec. More influential than words, however, were the melodramatic capture of Ticonderoga in May 1775 by Ethan Allen, and Benedict Arnold's subsequent seizure of Crown Point and St. Johns. As Carillon, Fort Frédéric, and St-Jean, these bastions of the old invasion route were all too well known in Canada, and their fall did much to increase American influence.

There was much searching of hearts in Canada over the question thus raised. Carlton called out the militia, after urging Bishop Briand to summon them to arms, which that prelate did with all the more willingness, since England had just granted "l'usage de nos lois, le libre exercice de notre religion, et les privilèges et avantages des sujets britanniques."²¹ Threatened on the one hand by his spiritual leaders with the refusal of the sacraments, if he refused to meet the obligation of defending his country; and urged on the other to throw off the burdens of seigneurial tenure, "les fers de l'esclavage qu'on a tant pris de soin à polir," in the words of Congress' "Letter" of May 1775,²² and to join with the English colonies in the defence of the common liberty against British oppression, the French Canadian was undecided where to cast his lot. Noting that the majority of the old subjects at Montreal refused to enroll, he likewise refused, affirming a right of neutrality in what must have seemed an Anglo-Saxon family quarrel to a very newly British people. The contagion of Americanism was evidenced, however, in the fact that one of the chief objections to mobilization was an unwillingness to serve under the seigneurs, and another, the popular disapproval of the active part taken by the clergy in the British interest. It was remarked by good Catholic habitants that Mgr. Briand's proper role was to make priests rather than militiamen.²³

Meanwhile James Livingston, an American merchant of Chambly, circularized the militia captains with word that the Americans would abolish the tithe and the seigneurial dues re-established by the Quebec Act; and Ethan Allen launched a rhetorical bombardment in favour of French-Canadian neutrality. An American army under Schuyler and Montgomery came down Lake Champlain and established itself at Isle-aux-Noix in September 1775. One minority group of the French-Canadian masses was loyalist, another *congressiste* or *bostonnois*, while the majority tried to preserve a neutrality²⁴ whose bias was influenced by the shifting fortunes

²⁰The Quebec Act went into effect on May 1, 1775; John Brown was exceedingly active in Montreal at this time; and Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, virtually completed four years before, was published in 1776 (Creighton, *Commercial Empire*, 56).

²¹*Mandements, lettres pastorales et circulaires des évêques de Québec* (Québec, 1888), II, 22 mai, 1775, 264-5; cited Lanctôt, 103.

²²Archives de Lotbinière, "Lettre du Congrès Général aux Canadiens, 1775, Mai ou Juin." Cf. *Journals of Congress*, May 29, 1775, 39; cited Lanctôt, 104. Abbé Louis de Lotbinière, a former Recollect, was chaplain of Livingston's French-Canadian regiment in the following year.

²³Lanctôt, 103.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 105.

of the contending parties. The French Canadians were a people worn out by a century of border warfare against heavy odds, and by the long effort to explore a continent and carry on a continental trade with a minimum of man power. They had become deeply attached to their land, and wished to dwell on it undisturbed by war.

Even the bellicose character of the *congressistes* was subject to sudden change, as Ethan Allen found at Longue Pointe, at the cost of three years' imprisonment, when he brashly attacked Montreal on September 25, 1775, with thirty Americans, and eighty Canadians. After a sharp skirmish with thirty British soldiers, some eighty to one hundred British volunteers (including Guy Johnson's Tory rangers from the Mohawk) and a hundred and twenty Canadians, the hero of Ticonderoga, the "Notorious New Hampshire Incendiary" as Governor Tryon called him, was forced to surrender with the thirty-one men who had not run in order that they might fight another day.²⁵ The ardour of the Loyalists was equally uncertain. Carleton, the friend of the French Canadians, who had written: "I think there is nothing to fear from them while we are in a state of prosperity, and nothing to hope for while in distress,"²⁶ fled to Quebec on November 12; and Montreal capitulated to Montgomery the following day. The residents accepted the union offered by their brothers of the colonies, with "même loix, même prérogatives, contribution par proportion, union sincère, paix permanente."²⁷ Montgomery, already busy about the raising of a second French-Canadian regiment (one had been enlisted under Livingston while the army was at St. Johns), judged the French Canadians much as Carleton had done: they "will be our friends as long as we are able to maintain our ground."²⁸ Up to the walls of Quebec in November, the American invasion of 1775 was a triumphal progress for Montgomery; while Arnold, after losing nearly half of his command in the rigorous journey up the Kennebec and down the Chaudière, was welcomed and provisioned by the villagers of the Beauce, when his men emerged from their epic battle with the wilderness.²⁹

The defeat of Montgomery and Arnold's joint New Year's Eve assault on Quebec started the decline of American prestige. In it the leaders were lost; Montgomery was killed and Arnold seriously wounded; and their successor General David Wooster's one success was a political one, when in February 1776 he ordered the holding of elections by the parish assemblies, in order that the holders of royal commissions might be replaced by those with Congressional authority. This introduced into Quebec the new idea of the people's right to choose its own chiefs, and the move was exceedingly well received throughout the province. The idea thus planted was to bear fruit in later years. The tide of French-Canadian opinion really turned against the invaders when cash ran out and the Americans resorted

²⁵J. H. Smith, *Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony*, I, 381-94; E. Allen's *Narrative of the Capture of Ticonderoga and of His Captivity and Treatment by the British* (Burlington, 1849), 12-13.

²⁶Carleton, cited in Chester Martin, *Empire and Commonwealth*, (Oxford, 1929), 140.

²⁷Sanguinet, "Journal," in Verreau, *Invasion du Canada* (Montreal, 1873), 80-5; cited Lanctôt, 107.

²⁸*American Archives* (Washington, 1840), 4, III, Montgomery to Schuyler, Nov. 19, 1775, 1681-2-3; cited Lanctôt, 107.

²⁹Smith, *Our Struggle*, I, 598-607.

to requisition or to payment in paper, which soon became inflated. Quebec remembered all too well the exactions of Bigot's régime, and the still unpaid French paper which was the mother country's legacy to its orphaned child. It also remembered that sea power had been decisive in 1759 and 1760; and since the invaders had been unable to take Quebec by storm, the French Canadians argued that they would be driven out in the spring, when the opening of the St. Lawrence brought British ships and reinforcements. The Congress realized the seriousness of the situation and sent three Commissioners, Benjamin Franklin, Charles Carroll, and Samuel Chase, to Montreal.³⁰ They were accompanied by the French-educated Jesuit, Father John Carroll (later the first American Catholic Bishop), and by the printer of Congress' "Letter to the Inhabitants" of 1774, Fleury Mesplet. Mesplet's press, intended to propagate American ideas in French, was two years later to give birth to the *Gazette littéraire de Montréal*, the French precursor of later French-Canadian journalism—an infant destined to a vigorous and sometimes boisterous manhood.³¹ But the Commission, hampered by the delays which occasionally make one despair of democratic procedure, only reached Montreal on April 29, while the British reinforcements reached Quebec on May 6, 1775. Father Carroll was not well received by the inflexibly royalist French-Canadian clergy; and Mesplet's press was not ready for business until the Commissioners and the Army had retired southward with some precipitation. The father of French-Canadian journalism passed the latter part of June and the first part of July in jail as an American sympathizer, a true portent of his future and that of many French-Canadian editors for half a century.³² General Thomas' retreat from Quebec to Deschambault has been described, with justice tinged with a touch of malice, as a "wild chase."³³ The American army of amateur soldiers, who had a healthy respect for British regulars, was rotten with smallpox, lacked both provisions and credit, and was dwindling away from the desertion of men who had volunteered for a quick and easy conquest which had not eventuated after nine months' hard service. The Americans evacuated Sorel on June 14, 1776; Montreal on June 15; Chambly on June 17, and St. Johns on June 18, retiring to Ticonderoga with 150 *congressistes* of Hazen's and Livingston's commands, who constituted the second notable exodus of French Canadians to the United States, the first being the Acadians in 1755.

The enforcement of the Militia Laws of 1777 has been termed by the historian of the Canadian Army the basis of the later dislike of the French Canadians for compulsory military service.³⁴ In 1778 Carlton was only able to raise three hundred militiamen for Burgoyne's invasion force. He realized "how unwilling they were to engage in the affair."³⁵ Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga raised once more the spectre of American invasion; and significantly enough, the articles of capitulation permitted Canadian prisoners to return home, simply on their promise not to serve again. Congress

³⁰C. Carroll, *Journal during his Visit to Canada in 1776* (Baltimore, 1845).

³¹S. Marion, *Les Lettres canadiennes d'autrefois*, II (Ottawa, 1940), 12-4.

³²R. W. McLachlan, "Fleury Mesplet, the First Printer of Montreal" (*Transactions of Royal Society of Canada*, XII, 1906, sect. 2, 197-309).

³³Burt, *Old Province*, 233.

³⁴Stacey, *Canada and the British Army*, 9.

³⁵Public Archives of Canada, Series Q, 13, Carleton to Burgoyne, May 29, 1777, 222; cited Lanctôt, 117.

had not yet despaired of the "Fourteenth Colony"; for the Articles of Confederation of 1777 stipulated that Canada could "be admitted into and entitled to all the advantages of this union."³⁶ With the French alliance of February 1778, a plan of invasion under Lafayette was bruited; and the project was not dropped until the close of hostilities in the summer of 1782. After 1779, however, invasion was more of a French than an American cause in Canadian eyes. Admiral D'Estaing's manifesto to his "compatriotes de l'Amérique Septentrionale" was aimed at this sentiment: "Vous êtes nés Français; vous n'avez pu cesser le l'être."³⁷ Canada profited by division among her enemies, for first Washington opposed an enterprise which might restore Canada to a France whose ally Spain controlled Louisiana; then France had no desire to see the United States become self-sufficient and all-powerful on the continent.³⁸

I have dwelt so long upon this topic because the older French-Canadian historians³⁹ have made so much of how their people leaped to arms under the flag of their new rulers; while a modern writer has judged that "aucun événement n'a peut-être, directement ou indirectement, exercé autant d'influence sur le Québec que la révolution américaine."⁴⁰ The Revolution settled the fate of French feudalism and absolutism. It caused a split between the *élite* and the masses which had important results. It was a potent lesson in political rights; and from this period onward, democracy and liberty were forces in the French-Canadian mentality. One of the immediate aftermaths of the Revolution was the introduction into Quebec of seven thousand American Loyalists or Tories—Loyalist at least by profession, but undoubtedly the only loyalty of many was to good farm-land. Their number amounted to a tenth of the French Canadians; and their resourceful energy made them more of a force than their number indicates. Their coming cinched Wolfe's victory; Canada was not to be French, but French and British. It also caused the virtual repeal of the Quebec Act, the granting of the elements of representative government, and the division of British North America into Upper (English) and Lower (French) Canada in 1791. That terminology has long been dropped; but much bitterness in Quebec could have been avoided if the psychological attitudes appropriate to it had also disappeared. After the Treaty of Paris in 1783, American influence on French Canada became indirect; it had begun to shift from the political field to the economic, though the shift was not completed until Confederation.

Haldimand, Hamilton, and Holland agree in the verdict that after the Revolution the Canadians were "much tinged with Yankey politics," as Holland wrote to Roberts on November 9, 1785.⁴¹ Fox realized this fact in arguing, in support of the concessions of the Act of 1791, that "The inhabitants [of Canada] must feel that their situation is not inferior to that of their neighbors."⁴² American political influence was kept alive by the devious operations of Ira Allen, Ethan's wily brother, who in 1797 was captured by His Majesty's Navy in the English Channel, aboard a vessel

³⁶*Journals of Congress*, 1777, 924; cited Lanctôt, 117.

³⁷Smith, *Our Struggle*, II, 539.

³⁸McInnis, *The Unguarded Frontier*, 65-6.

³⁹Notably Garneau and Chapais.

⁴⁰Lanctôt, 121-2.

⁴¹PAC, C.O. 42, vol. 17, Holland to Roberts, Nov. 9, 1785; cited Lanctôt, 126.

⁴²*Parliamentary History of England*, 28, 1379; cited Lanctôt, 127.

inappropriately called the *Olive Branch*, which was laden with twenty thousand muskets destined for French-Canadian use in case Citoyen Genêt succeeded in his efforts to bring the French Revolution to Canada. The leadership of the "Frenchified"⁴³ Allens over the Green Mountain Boys had made Vermont a fertile field for Genêt's operations. But this *opéra comique* plotting stood no chance against the Canadian clergy's vigorous denunciations of the French Revolution. The remarkably rapid shift of French-Canadian opinion from a strong inclination toward France to full-hearted support of Great Britain was evidenced by celebrations in Quebec of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and even more notably by French-Canadian contributions to the British war chest.⁴⁴

Another American influence of a more lasting and sounder sort was the settlement after 1792 of the Eastern Townships, then a forest barrier between Quebec and New England, through which the first coach route connecting Boston and Quebec did not run until 1811. This pioneering was the work of American immigrants, invited by the British authorities when French and English alike refused to settle in this rich but wild region. The Americans played a major role in developing what has become one of the great agricultural and industrial regions of the province. The old tradition of border warfare gradually gave way to a new tradition of neighbourliness, evidenced in a Stanstead tavern in 1842, as the youthful Parkman reported with surprise, by the singing of "America" with the stanzas of the republican song and the addition to each of the refrain of "God Save the Queen."⁴⁵

The new economic relationship grew with the swelling of the Champlain-Richelieu trade, in which the exports of New England benefited by colonial preference until the Huskisson Laws of 1822 came into force. The American Embargo Act of 1807 could not stop this natural development; the subsequent contraband traffic amounted to more than the previous legal trade.⁴⁶ In 1811 the activities of American and French agents, trying to incite the French Canadians against Britain in an atmosphere of impending conflict, failed when Prevost's concessions ensured the latter's loyalty. For all the glorification by national-minded historians of the French-Canadian part in the War of 1812, most of that conflict was fought in Upper Canada. The nine thousand Americans in the Townships supplied six battalions to the British Army; but New England, which was opposed to the war and even threatened secession because of it, supplied two-thirds of that army's supplies.⁴⁷ Though Joseph Bouchette makes much of the "insatiable desire for gain"⁴⁸ of the Americans, it was the American South and West that forced the war, and their aim was a blow at Britain, not annexation of Canada. Jackson's "military promenade" turned into a seesaw struggle, of which the patriotic pride of Canadian and American historians has made too much. (It has also supplied us with two entirely different wars.) As

⁴³Allen's *Narrative*, 49.

⁴⁴PAC, Series Q, 83, Souscription volontaire, 152-5; cited Lanctôt, 129.

⁴⁵Massachusetts Historical Society, Parkman Papers, Journal of 1842; quoted M. Wade, *Francis Parkman* (New York, 1942), 60.

⁴⁶Lanctôt, 134.

⁴⁷PAC, Series Q, 128-1, Prevost to Bathurst, Montreal, Aug. 27, 1814, 185-6; cited Lanctôt, 138.

⁴⁸J. Bouchette, *A Topographical Description of the Province of Lower Canada* (London, 1815), 180.

far as Quebec was concerned, there were only two campaigns. In 1812 Dearborn advanced on Montreal from Plattsburg. He halted at the border when warlike enthusiasm waned among his followers, and returned to his base with his homesick army after an utterly bloodless four days' campaign. In 1813 Hampton actually advanced within fifteen miles of the St. Lawrence with four thousand men; but a night attack by eight hundred Canadians, including DeSalaberry's immortalized *Voltigeurs* (the first French-Canadian regulars), was sufficient to make him renounce the conquest of Canada. One wonders where Bouchette found the "depraved ferocity"⁴⁹ of which he accuses the American forces. The fact is that the eastern boundary was becoming stabilized; and the two adjoining populations had too much in common to make good enemies. From this period onward, the political struggle yielded almost entirely to the play of economic forces back and forth across the border.

French Canada and the United States had developed some close links. Immigration into the Townships, interrupted by the war, resumed apace, so that by 1821 the population there, almost entirely of American origin, was twenty thousand. More French Canadians were drifting south into Vermont and New York. The fur trade, largely taken over by Scots from the French in 1763,⁵⁰ was now divided between Canada and the United States, with John Jacob Astor involved simultaneously in a little land speculation with Sir John Johnson in the Townships, involving two million acres,⁵¹ and in breaking the monopoly of the North-Westerners on the Pacific Coast by the foundation of Astoria. The fur trade was now financed and directed by Anglo-Saxons, but it was manned by French Canadians; and the American West is dotted with the names of Chouteau, Cerré, Pratte, Cabanné, Dorion, Papin, and other less well known French trappers and traders. With the decline of the fur trade, the St. Louis French largely controlled the Western Division of Astor's American Fur Company, the greatest single organization of the trade in the American West. *Voyageurs* and *coureurs de bois* guided Lewis and Clark, Wilson Hunt, and many other American pioneers of the West. John Charles Frémont, the "Pathfinder" who was so fortunately married to the daughter of the expansionist Senator Thomas Hart Benton, was of French-Canadian stock; and when Francis Parkman went West in 1846 to study primitive Indian civilization, before setting about writing his history of *France and England in the New World*, his guide and friend was Henry Chatillon, his *engagé*, one Deslauriers.⁵² The old French-Canadian *coureur de bois* strain now began to flow into the channel of missionary effort, which swelled as trade passed into Anglo-Saxon hands; and the onetime rule of the Bishop of Quebec over the interior of North America was transformed into French missions under American sees. Illinois and Detroit now depended upon Baltimore rather than Quebec; but they were manned by missionaries of French blood, some of them priests who had found their presence in Canada unwell-

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 613.

⁵⁰Wayne E. Stevens, "Organization of the British Fur Trade, 1760-1800," (*Missouri Valley Historical Review*, III, 1916-7, 186); cited by B. Brouillette in *Lacôté*, 147.

⁵¹Unpublished researches of A. J. H. Richardson in the Montreal Court House records.

⁵²M. Wade (ed.), *Francis Parkman's The Oregon Trail* (New York, 1943), intro.

come after active sympathizing with the Americans in 1775.⁵³ Oregon was set up as a diocese in 1846 under Bishop François-Norbert Blanchet, who with the Abbé Demers had been the first Catholic missionary in the region. On the other hand the Abbé Jean Holmes, who was of Vermont origin, was the greatest preacher of the 1840's in Quebec and the developer of the province's libraries, while his sister, Mère Ste-Croix, was Superior of the Quebec Ursulines.⁵⁴ With the years, the French contribution to the life of the Catholic Church in North America grew larger and larger, and in this unanticipated form the dream of the pioneers of New France was realized.

The Rebellion of 1837-8 once more brought American political influences to bear upon Canadian life, but these influences were working through both French- and English-Canadian popular leaders. Louis-Joseph Papineau was a great admirer of the American political system, but so was William Lyon Mackenzie whose *Sketches of Canada and the United States* (1833) was reprinted in a Richelieu paper, *L'Echo du Pays*, with the addition of extracts from Thomas Jefferson's writings for good measure.⁵⁵ Papineau, in his struggle for representative government, found that "Tous les loix, et tous les journeaux des plantations de la nouvelle Angleterre, devenaient les textes et les autorités qui expliquent notre demande."⁵⁶ As early as 1823, in a remarkable talk with Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, he had maintained his admiration for American institutions and the ideas they represented, while Bathurst foresaw the development of Canada as an independent nation.⁵⁷ Papineau had hoped to achieve republican institutions for Canada within the British framework, but as the bitter struggle went on in the Assembly against arbitrary government and military rule, he inclined more and more toward annexation. This brought about his split with his great friend John Neilson, who considered such views as nothing short of high treason. The Ninety-Two Resolutions of 1834, which were Papineau's ideas formulated by Auguste-Norbert Morin and Elzéar Bédard, clearly show the influence of the American Bill of Rights; while the *Fils de Liberté* of Montreal and Quebec as clearly owe their origin to the Sons of Liberty of the American Revolution. Their goal was to "émanciper notre pays de toute autorité humaine, si ce n'était celle de la démocratie."⁵⁸ Holland's "tinge of Yankey politics" had become a permanent dye.

At St-Ours on May 7, 1837, Papineau pointed that "de l'autre côté de la ligne 45me étaient nos amis et nos alliés naturels."⁵⁹ The *Patriotes* hoped for American assistance, but such as was given was largely verbal. After 1827 the American press was generally sympathetic to the popular movement in Canada, with such influential magazines as the *North American Review* and the *Democratic Review* thus exercising the anti-pathy felt for Great Britain as a result of two wars and of the Maine, New

⁵³Brouillette in Lanctôt, 174-6.

⁵⁴P.-J.-O. Chauveau, "L'Abbé Jean Holmes et ses conférences de Notre-Dame" (reprinted from *L'Opinion Publique*; Quebec, 1876).

⁵⁵J. Bruchesi in Lanctôt, 189.

⁵⁶Archives of the Province of Quebec, Fonds Papineau, XI, 530, Papineau au Dr. Nancrède, 1838.

⁵⁷L.-J. Papineau, "Histoire de l'insurrection," in A.-D. DeCelles, *Papineau* (Montreal, 1905), 214-16.

⁵⁸Bruchesi in Lanctôt, 193.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 194.

Hampshire, and Vermont boundary dispute, finally settled by the Ashburton Treaty in 1842. But Gosford, writing to Glenelg on May 25, 1837, testified that the American "better classes and the authorities"⁶⁰ disapproved of the Rebellion. Despite the sympathies of Maine, Vermont, and New York, which underwent the same agricultural economic crisis at this period as Lower and Upper Canada, a benevolent neutrality was the ruling attitude of the Americans towards the *Patriotes*. American egalitarian sympathies were easily enlisted for the struggle of the Canadian masses to achieve self-government in a conflict in which only the clergy, merchants, and *haute bourgeoisie* sided with the British government.⁶¹ The French Ambassador, M. de Pontbois, detected a certain extension of Manifest Destiny sentiment to Canada as well as to Texas and California,⁶² but this observation does not seem to have too solid a foundation. An American public which had long rejoiced in glorious reminiscences of the Revolution in Fourth of July addresses naturally felt a kinship for a Papineau who liked to cite the remark of an English parliamentarian: "Oui, si le même sang coulait dans les veines [des Canadiens] que celui qui a produit les Washington, les Franklin, les Jefferson, il vous chasseraient de leur pays comme vous avez été justement chassés des anciennes colonies."⁶³ But active American participation in the struggle in Lower Canada did not go much further than the action of the good ladies of Swanton, Vermont, who made a flag which was carried by Robert Shore Milnes Bouchette's ill-starred invasion of December 6, 1837. Papineau, Nelson, Brown, Dr. Côté, and Dr. O'Callaghan were hospitably received when they fled across the border after the collapse of the insurrection along the Richelieu in November 1837.⁶⁴ Some of the northern Vermont villages offered supplies to the exiles, as well as meeting halls, and served as bases for the fruitless border raids which Papineau disapproved of as idle "troublutions." But Papineau's own negotiations with New York politicians came to naught; and he retired to the more congenial company of Louis Blanc and the English Philosophical Radicals in Paris. The Hunter's Lodges (*Les Frères Chasseurs*) which were first organized in Vermont—then teeming with religious, philosophical, economic, and political radicalism—soon shifted their centre to the Middle West, where their success was much greater in enlisting American support—not that, however, of the best elements of society.⁶⁵ Van Buren protested to Lord Durham's son-in-law and envoy, Colonel Grey, when his government was accused of favouring the insurrection for its own purposes, that he judged the talk of annexation opposed to the best interests of the United States. This opinion was vigorously supported by Poinsett, the Secretary for War; and Charles

⁶⁰PAC, Rapports des années 1901 et 1902, Gosford to Glenelg, May 25, 1837; cited Bruchesi in Lanctôt, 200.

⁶¹C. D. Allin and G. M. Jones, *Annexation, Preferential Trade; and Reciprocity* (Toronto, 1911), 374-84.

⁶²R. de Roquebrune, "M. de Pontois et la rebellion des Canadiens français" (*Nova Francia*, April-Aug., 1928; III, no. 4, 238-49; no. 5, 273-8; no. 6, 362-71; cited Bruchesi in Lanctôt, 197-8).

⁶³Bruchesi in Lanctôt, 194.

⁶⁴N. Storey, "Papineau in Exile" (*Canadian Historical Review*, X, March, 1929, 43-52).

⁶⁵I. Caron, "Une Société secrète dans le Bas Canada en 1838; l'Association des Frères Chasseurs" (*Transactions of Royal Society of Canada*, 1926, series 3, XX, sect. 1, 17-34).

Buller, writing to John Stuart Mill on October 13, 1838, was able to say that one of Durham's achievements was that he "re-established peace and goodwill with the U.S., and rooted out from that people all sympathy with Canadian rebellion."⁶⁶

But even though Papineau's cause was lost, his influence was still felt in Canada, where the people, like the French people with regard to Napoleon, still felt that "il reparaitra à l'occasion."⁶⁷ His view of the United States was echoed by Alexis de Toqueville's *Democracy in America* (1840), a book which carried weight in Canada as relations with France grew closer once more. When Papineau returned from Paris in 1845, stuffed with the ideas of the French revolutionaries of 1848, he was supported by the *Rouges* and the new founded *Instituts Canadiens*, anticlerical in tone and radical in politics, who felt that annexation to the United States was inevitable, considering how French Canada groaned under the unworkable union of 1840 and a prolonged economic depression. The exodus of French Canadians to the United States first took on notable proportions in this decade.⁶⁸

The seeming inevitability of annexation was equally evident to English Quebecers at this period, when the rise of a free-trade policy in England destroyed the protection under which they had long flourished. Lord Elgin, on his arrival in 1849, found annexation sentiment general among the commercial classes in Montreal.⁶⁹ The *Montreal Gazette* supported annexation on April 26, 1849, as an alternative to French domination in an empire which offered no preference to protect the colonial trade. The positions of the two races had evolved so much that Elgin considered the encouragement of French-Canadian nationalism as the best guarantee against annexation; and affirmed his belief that if the habitants' "religion, their customs, their habits, their prepossessions, their prejudices if you will," were respected, "who will venture to say that the last hand which waves the British flag on American ground may not be that of a French Canadian."⁷⁰ Elgin's opinion was soon born out by the annexation manifesto of October, 1849, with its bare sprinkling of French names among more than a thousand signatures. There was, however, a vigorous French-Canadian annexation society at Montreal led by A.-A. Dorion, which echoed the sentiments pronounced by Louis-Antoine Dessaulles before the *Institut Canadien*. More prosperous Quebec was less interested, though it had a similar society. Papineau called annexation the "Cause du progrès, de la civilisation, de la démocratie, et de la liberté," in a letter read at a 1849 meeting at St-Edouard-de-Huntington in the Townships;⁷¹ but Richard Cobden in England also saw the necessity of giving the Canadians "a liberty and an independence similar to that enjoyed by the United States."⁷² Despite sympathetic resolutions by the New York and Vermont legislatures, the United States was not really interested in the movement.

⁶⁶PAC, Charles Buller to J. S. Mill, Oct. 13, 1838.

⁶⁷Storey, "Papineau."

⁶⁸M. L. Hansen and J. B. Brebner, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples* (New Haven, 1940), 123-32.

⁶⁹Allin and Jones, *Annexation*, 22-3.

⁷⁰Sir A. G. Doughty (ed.), *Elgin-Grey Papers*, I (Ottawa, 1937), Elgin to Grey, May 4, 1848, 149-50.

⁷¹Bruchesi in *Lancôt*, 219.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 221.

The *New York Herald* wrote that "No part of the Canadian population had a right to American sympathies, and less than all others, those who, disloyal in 1849, were ultra-loyal and the warmest partisans of the British Connection in 1837."⁷³

The annexation issue continued to be a feature of Canadian-American relations until 1866, when the repudiation of Elgin's Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 favoured the development of an east-west national economy rather than a north-south continental one. Meanwhile the *Rouges* under A.-A. Dorion, deeply influenced by the thought of Louis Blanc as interpreted by Papineau, had also lost the struggle against the *Bleus* under Cartier, who were backed with all the influence of the clergy.

The Civil War lessened the prestige of the United States in the French-Canadian mind, though at the outset Quebec favoured the North. A French version of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* circulated widely, and general sentiment was anti-slavery.⁷⁴ Many French Canadians joined the Northern army; some out of conviction; others under economic pressure took advantage of the high bounties paid for substitutes under the curious draft laws of the time. In 1861 the *Trent* affair caused a patriotic wave to sweep Canada, and "this feeling was not least in evidence in French Canada, where the Roman Catholic clergy were active in encouraging their parishioners to generous exertion."⁷⁵ The later raid on St. Albans, Vermont, by Southern agents operating from Quebec, and the freeing of the participants after their arrest upon their return to Canada, awoke a wave of resentment in the Northern press. The consequent war talk caused Henry Adams to write from London, where he was serving in the American Legation: "This Canadian business is suddenly found to be serious, and the prospect of Sherman marching down the St. Lawrence and Farragut sailing up it, doesn't just seem agreeable."⁷⁶ The irritation caused by this incident helped to kill annexationist sentiment and to further the plans of the Fathers of Confederation. The growing military power of the North and its new industrial strength were distrusted by many others besides George Etienne Cartier, who was convinced that democracy was not the ideal régime for the French Canadians, "monarchistes par la religion, par les coutumes, et les souvenirs du passé."⁷⁷ He brought about the support by French Canada of the project of Confederation; and with that great step in Canadian development, American political influence in Canada came to an end. It was definitely settled that the continent was to be divided between two powers, and not to be a political entity.

II

The nature of the relations of French Canada with the United States since Confederation might be summed up as fascinated admiration of American progress and prosperity—sometimes going as far as a revival of the annexationist sentiment of 1837-54 among isolated representatives of the *élite*—and distrust of the threat which that way of life implied to the

⁷³*Ibid.*, 221.

⁷⁴F. Landon, "Canadian Opinion of Southern Secession, 1860-1" (*Canadian Historical Review*, Sept., 1920, I, no. 3, 255-67).

⁷⁵Stacey, *Canada and the British Army*, 123.

⁷⁶W. Ford (ed.), *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-65*, II, to C. F. Adams, Jr., Dec. 30, 1864, 238-9; cited Stacey, *Canada and the British Army*, 163-4.

⁷⁷Bruchesi in *Lancôt*, 228.

survival of the French Canadians as a separate national group with a different culture in an overwhelmingly "Anglo-Saxon" North America.⁷⁸ A distinction should be made between the attitude of the clergy and *élite*, who generally opposed extension of American influence, and the enormous prestige of the United States with the masses. This attitude is well illustrated in Edouard Montpetit's survey of the subject.⁷⁹

Political annexationism in Quebec, which rested chiefly upon the hope of achieving fuller prosperity and fuller protection of its cherished rights under the American than the British system, died with the rise of Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party. Quebec became an undeniable power in the affairs of Canada, and could look to her own protection and prosperity. Commercial union, more appropriate to an age less interested in political than economic ambitions, was an English-Canadian idea, agitated in the 1880's in opposition to Sir John Macdonald's national economic policy by Goldwin Smith, that English eccentric who first developed the essentially American destiny of Canada⁸⁰ in his very brilliant writings and lectures from the heart of Tory Toronto, and by Erastus Wiman, a Canadian who had made a fortune in the United States. It was Wiman who inspired Honoré Mercier's discourse of 1893 in favour of annexation, which contained strange words to come from the mouth of the only French-Canadian politician since Confederation who achieved the uniting of his people—briefly—in a national or racial party, the very development which Elgin had dreaded as the end of Canada. Mercier pointed out that Quebec would benefit materially and spiritually by annexation, for prejudices of race and religion would be suppressed by immersion in the great American melting-pot.

It might be observed that whenever annexationism has cropped out in Canadian-American relations since 1837, it has been largely a rhetorical club used by English or French Canadians against the other racial group, whenever relations between the two races reached a crisis, or the economic position of either group became too uncomfortable. In the early difficult years after Confederation, Papineau and Hector Fabre used this club to strengthen the French-Canadian position.

Though the hope of re-establishing contact with the enormous group of French Canadians (350,000 by 1890) who left Canada for the United States in this period of vast industrial expansion in New England and depression in Quebec⁸¹ made an argument for the annexationists, this argument was rejected in Mgr. Fabre's *mandement* of February 15, 1891, on the grounds of the greater threat to "notre langue, notre nationalité, et par-dessus tout, notre sainte religion."⁸² The threat to *la survivance française* was the burden of the arguments of Joseph Tassé, Thomas Chapais, and L.-J. Desjardins against both annexation and commercial union. The election of Laurier to the prime ministership of Canada in 1896, and his holding of that office until 1911, eliminated annexationism from the French-Canadian mind. Henri Bourassa, a great Canadian nationalist as well as a great French-Canadian one, called the Quebeckers

⁷⁸E. de Nevers, *L'Ame Américaine* (Paris, 1900).

⁷⁹Edouard Montpetit, *Reflets d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1941).

⁸⁰Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (London, 1891).

⁸¹Allen R. Foley, "From French Canadian to Franco-American, 1650-1935" (unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 1939).

⁸²*Mandements, lettres pastorales, circulaires et autres documents* (Montreal, 1893), 71-3; cited Lanctôt, 272.

the "staunchest and most constant opponents of annexation" early in the new century.⁸³ Despite the racial feeling bred by the anti-French Ontario school legislation of 1912 and the war-time friction between the races, Sir Lomer Gouin re-affirmed the French-Canadian faith in Confederation in 1919; and in the depths of the 1929 depression (which hit Quebec even harder than the United States) Premier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau of Quebec called annexationism suicidal for the French Canadians, maintaining his belief that a system which had not preserved Maine and Vermont from hard times could do no better for Quebec. Nevertheless, the 350,000 Franco-Americans of 1890 had grown to 750,000 by 1930.⁸⁴ The 1941 symposium of *L'Action Nationale* on the question of annexationism⁸⁵ (raised once more, presumably, by friction between the races in time of crisis) was summed up in the conclusion of André Laurendeau that "nous ne devons pas désirer l'annexion" and that "nous vivrons, si nous sommes de vivants," although annexation in the minds of the contributors to the *enquête* involved a choice between "la mort par immersion et la mort par inanition. De toutes manières, c'en est fini de la prépondérance française sur les rives du Saint-Laurent."⁸⁶ Today English- and French-Canadian nationalists alike join in stressing the importance of the cultivation of close Canadian relations—cultural, economic, and diplomatic—with the Latin-American nations against the continental dominance of the United States. When a Colonel McCormick blithely suggests, on paper supplied by Quebec, that Canada become the forty-ninth state, the French-Canadian press rejects the suggestion with considerable vigour; and the eighty-eight-year-old Albert Bushnell Hart's suggestion of post-war annexation was summarily dismissed by *Le Devoir* in February 1943, with the comment that the French-Canadian ideal was "to live in a free country on a friendly basis with Great Britain and France, closely co-operating with the United States in the defense of North America and its natural resources."⁸⁷ It remains true, however, that the thought of annexation still lingers in the back of the Canadian mind as a possibility, while it has long been dismissed from the American consciousness.

The chief reason for this survival is the simple fact that 3,500,000 French Canadians live in close proximity to 140,000,000 Americans. They feel the economic and cultural power of the United States perhaps more strongly than other sections of Canada, which are less conscious of the foreignness of American influence.⁸⁸ The ten American businesses that established branch plants in Quebec in 1879, to avoid Macdonald's protectionist tariff, had grown by 1887 to twenty-five. The geographical economy was too powerful to yield to a political economy. The peak of this economic penetration of Quebec by the United States was reached in 1934, when there were 394 American businesses operating in Quebec, and one-third of Quebec's industrial capital of three billions was American.

American unions entered Canada long after American capital. Although trade unions were introduced by English immigrants in 1827 in Quebec,

⁸³H. Bourassa, *The Spectre of Annexation* (Montreal, 1911), 10-11; cited Lancôt, 274.

⁸⁴Foley, "From French Canadian to Franco-American."

⁸⁵"L'Annexionisme" (*L'Action Nationale*, XVIII, no. 6, June 1941).

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 534-6.

⁸⁷*Le Devoir*, Feb., 1943.

⁸⁸Cf. H. F. Angus, *Canada and Her Great Neighbor* (Toronto, 1938).

they were declared illegal by the state and were opposed by both public and employers. Not until 1865, with the foundation of the first branch of an American union, the Typographers, did the problem which is now of considerable concern to Quebec start to arise. The shoemakers organized in 1870, and in the following year the outlawing of unions was abolished. In 1880 the Knights of Labor brought a wave of union organization upon Quebec; and in 1885 Mgr. Taschereau urged Catholic workers to break with this group. In the following year the Knights, after modifications of their constitution, were cleared by the American hierarchy; and by 1890 they had forty branches in Canada with 16,000 members. The American Federation of Labor succeeded in supplanting the Knights during the following decade. In 1902 Quebec workers, for the most part, affiliated themselves with the A.F. of L. groups which in 1908 formed the Canadian Federation of Labour, and in 1901 the first Catholic syndicate was founded in the shoe industry at Quebec. Strongly backed by the Church and by the provincial government, the French and Catholic syndicate movement grew as labour organization grew, but did not supplant the international unions, which had greater strength in bargaining with businesses which were largely national or international, rather than provincial, in character. The struggle between the syndicates and the internationals has been resumed with new vigour and bitterness since wartime industrialization has swollen the working classes of Quebec. The best recent treatment of this stormy question is by a Franco-American Catholic sociologist, Dr. Percy A. Robert, who discusses the possibility of "A Pact for Canadian Labor?"⁸⁹

Ever since Confederation, the Quebec government has consistently encouraged the entry of American capital into the province. Not until 1901 was the first opposition to this process heard from Errol Bouchette, whose cry of "Emparons-nous de l'industrie" has since been echoed with increasing vigour by a French-Canadian nationalism which only became economically minded after 1920. The current denunciations of foreign capital, trusts, and unions in *Relations* and *L'Action Nationale*⁹⁰ are symptomatic of the gradual adoption of the economic point of view by the *élite* of a most politically-minded people. Perhaps the best comment on this long process of economic penetration is that written in 1928 by the leading French-Canadian banker, M. Beaudry Leman; "La menace la plus sérieuse n'est pas celle qui pénètre sous forme de capital argent, mais celle qui est représentée par le capital moral et intellectuel d'hommes mieux préparés que nous à tirer parti des richesses naturelles."⁹¹ Quebec has acted on this view by establishing the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales and a wide range of other trade, technical, and commercial schools throughout the province, and by supporting the agricultural and fisheries schools affiliated with the French universities of Montreal and Quebec. These universities have also adapted their scientific faculties so that more emphasis is placed on application of theoretical knowledge than formerly, and so that the standards of a long-neglected field of knowledge have been

⁸⁹*The Canadian Register* (Montreal), October 2, 1943.

⁹⁰*Relations*, Montreal monthly published by the Jesuits of the Ecole Sociale Populaire, since 1940. *L'Action Nationale*, Montreal nationalist monthly published since 1933. Successor of *L'Action (canadienne-) française* (1917-28).

⁹¹Beaudry Leman, "Les Canadiens-Français et le milieu américain" (*La Revue trimestrielle*, Sept. 1928, 273-5; cited Lanctôt, 285).

raised to the European and American levels. Some far-sighted American companies have displayed a willingness to acquire as much French-Canadian technical and administrative personnel as can be obtained, an attitude which has taken some of the force from the nationalist attack on "foreign exploitation of our natural resources." The more moderate groups recognize the contribution that America has made to the development of Quebec's economic structure.

Opposition to American influence in the cultural domain is much deeper. Before turning to this thorny topic, it might be well to mention in passing that M. Bourassa's charge that the *maudit Yankey* is responsible for such evils as exist in Quebec's political system hardly holds water, for much the same customs may be found in France and in England, and Quebec takes politics a good deal harder than the United States has taken them since the early days of the last century. On the other hand, M. Bourassa's dictum that the Monroe doctrine is a Canadian policy, and the best defence of the country, was borne out by the French-Canadian members of the House of Commons in commenting on President Roosevelt's 1936 declaration that the United States stood ready to defend its neighbours, and by subsequent events, including the growing sentiment for Canadian membership in the Pan-American Union.

Culturally French Canada and the United States are connected to a degree somewhat better appreciated south of the border than in Quebec. Quebec contents itself with maintaining loose cultural connections with the two-fifths of its blood which can be found in the United States, concentrated chiefly in New England, where once Yankee cities of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Maine are now definitely Franco-American. But interest among these people in Quebec is not as strong as Quebec's interest in them, with the exception of some of the Franco-American *élite*, who complain about lack of attention from the province.⁹² This group as a whole, however, has been a powerful tie between Canada and the United States, with its participation in both cultures; and it is to be hoped that the keen interest in French Canada on the part of Americans in the last two decades may be echoed by a fuller appreciation of the United States by the French Canadians, whose determination to preserve their way of life against unconscious assaults by a more powerful civilization sometimes blinds them to the better points of that culture. It is unfortunately true that the worst elements of a culture are those which spread most easily abroad. For instance, the picture of the American civilization which emerges from *La Revue Dominicaine's* inquest on *Notre Américanisation*⁹³ has a nightmare quality to the American who does not know French Canada at first hand. After fourteen months of Quebec life, its observations and conclusions seem to me less fantastic than they did at first. So-called American influences, which might perhaps better be labelled the effects of industrialization—which is a world-wide process of our time—have produced a serious dislocation of the traditional Quebec social structure, which has not yet evolved a substitute for the old patriarchal rural order. Everett Hughes' *French Canada in Transition*⁹⁴ is an admirable study of this process, and little can be added here to his observations. The

⁹²Benoit, *L'Ame franco-américaine*.

⁹³*Notre Américanisation*, enquête de *La Revue Dominicaine* (Montreal, 1937).

⁹⁴Everett C. Hughes, *French Canada in Transition* (Chicago, 1943).

influence in this process of Americanization of the tourist, of whom Professor Benjamin Silliman in 1819 might be said to be the pioneer—with his observation that “Quebec, at least for an American, is certainly a very peculiar place”⁹⁵—was already important in the 1850’s, when Thoreau visited Quebec with 1,500 fellow travellers and remarked—with the now traditional irreverence—that what he got by going to Canada was a cold. He also was appalled by the amount of spruce wax which the Montrealers chewed.⁹⁶ The influence of the American tourist subsequently became stronger and stronger; and the floodgates opened in 1928 with the coming of two million tourists a year. It is not generally recognized in the United States or Canada that this American tourist movement is paralleled to some extent by the movement of Quebecers to New England in the summer, and to Boston, New York, and Florida, in the winter.

Sports have also done much to unify the continent. After 1890 baseball supplanted the national sport of Canada, lacrosse, which now seems chiefly to be played in the United States. Bowling has taken the place of the snowshoe clubs of old, while hockey and skiing are common North American madnesses. The French-Canadian press has adapted itself more and more to the American pattern, though a few notable journals of opinion hold out against the tide and recall to the American observer the days of vigorous personal journalism, recorded in Mark Twain’s “The Spirit of the Tennessee Press.” With Latin verve the French Canadian of Montreal has fallen upon the tabloid, which was brought to its most lurid development in the *New York Daily Graphic* by a Franco-American, Emile Gauvreau. The press services operate on a continental basis which has its effect on the development of a common continental opinion, although in today’s war news the Canadians always spearhead the advances in the Canadian press, while the Americans always seem to be carrying the burden of the war in the American papers. More and more French magazines are adopting an American *format*, while the American magazines which circulate most widely in Quebec are the cheapest and most lurid, not the so-called “quality group” magazines. The American theatre drove out the French theatre in Montreal before the development of sound movies in 1929 aggravated a problem already grave since 1910, when American films with French legends thrust the American mentality upon Quebec. It is the sensational Hollywood films which have the greatest appeal to Quebec, while the more serious artistic efforts are rejected by those who mourn the war-time absence of French pictures characterized by an *esprit français*. The radio, which supplanted the phonograph in popular appeal about 1930, largely operates as an Anglo-American influence, though the French programmes originating in Quebec are followed with interest in New England. Here again the cultural truism operates: what penetrates most widely in Quebec is the manufactured humour and music of the mass-consumption programmes, while few listeners follow the wealth of symphonic and operatic music and the educational programmes offered by the American stations. French Canada’s Radio-Collège, however, is probably more influential than any similar American effort. American advertising has laid its resourceful and often unpleasant hand upon Quebec, with an undoubted

⁹⁵Benjamin Silliman, *A Tour to Quebec in the Autumn of 1819* (London, 1822), 110.

⁹⁶Henry David Thoreau, *A Yankee in Canada* (Boston, 1866), 1, 17.

Americanizing effect on the French-Canadian mentality. But these influences are continental, and French Canada has resisted them better than English Canada. A reaction, calling for the re-Frenchifying of Quebec, has begun in recent years, to the vast approval of Americans who like the sense of foreignness they get in coming to Quebec and the escape from the sometimes appalling sameness of American civilization.

From literature, which is perhaps the best index to the cultural history of a people, certain suggestive conclusions may be drawn. There are more American connections with French-Canadian literature than nationalist teaching indicates. Philippe de Sales La Terrière's highly entertaining *Mémoires* are a record of American influence in the period between the American Revolution and the Papineau Rebellion. Garneau, whose life-work was inspired by an echo of Lord Durham's remark that the French Canadians were a people without a history or a literature, was the first historian of New France to relate its history to that of the United States. He attached more importance to the American influence than many later historians, whose years of study in Paris have made them more French than Canadian. The Abbé Casgrain, who continued Garneau's work and who certainly was French-Canadian in his outlook, was the great friend and collaborator of Francis Parkman, who brought French-Canadian history to the notice of the English-speaking world. The injustice of some French-Canadian attacks on American culture is evidenced by what befell Parkman, who played an unquestioned role in immortalizing for the English-speaking world the rich and colourful history of New France. If Parkman did not comprehend "the glorious destiny of the French-Canadian people," as the zealot journalist Jules-Paul Tardivel bitterly complained in launching a savage attack on the historian in 1878,⁹⁷ it was not for lack of knowledge or of authoritative advice. Parkman was in close and friendly correspondence with Garneau, G.-B. Faribault, the Abbé Faillon, D.-B. Viger, Père Félix Martin, Papineau, the Abbé Laverdière, Pierre Chauveau, Dr. Hubert La Rue, J.-C. Taché, Antoine Gérin-Lajoie, J.-G. Barthe, Louis P. Turcotte, Arthur Buies, Faucher de St. Maurice, the Abbé Bois, N.-E. Dionne, Edmund Lareau, and Joseph Marmette. He even relieved the misery of Octave Crémazie, the first national poet, by employing him for copying work in Paris.⁹⁸ But the name of Parkman is still sullied in the minds of French Canadians who have never read him, but vaguely recall the mud-slinging of an intransigent newspaperman who was more Catholic than the Seminary of Quebec and more French Canadian than the Abbé Casgrain. It is amusing to note that Tardivel's mother was an American; that he was brought up in the United States; and that even after he became the self-constituted pillar of Quebec journalism, he could not write correct French, as Pierre-Georges Roy's comments in the Quebec Archives' copy of *L'Anglicisme; voilà l'ennemi!* bear witness.⁹⁹

Much of the French-Canadian opposition to American cultural influences is based upon an emotional conviction, similar to Tardivel's, that a materialistic America can never understand a spiritual-minded French Canada. This theory, reinforced by various carefully built Chinese Walls, ignores a number of facts. Pamphile Lemay was inspired by Longfellow, whose *Evangeline* he translated, to write his greatest work, *Les Vengeances*.

⁹⁷J.-P. Tardivel, *Mélanges*, première série, I (Montreal, 1887), 337-51.

⁹⁸Massachusetts Historical Society, Parkman Papers.

⁹⁹J.-P. Tardivel, *L'Anglicisme: voilà l'ennemi!* (Quebec, 1880).

Olivar Asselin, the greatest French-Canadian journalist, served an apprenticeship of seven years on Franco-American papers; and for all his conscious opposition to American cultural influences, was deeply impregnated by them. The best critic of French-Canadian literature, Louis Dantin, is a Franco-American, as is one of French Canada's finest poets, Rosaire Dion-Levèsque, who has been deeply influenced by the extremely American Walt Whitman. Paul Morin's exotic verse runs parallel to much American and English verse of the same period. The novels and plays of Robert Choquette, Jean-Charles Harvey, and Harry Bernard show strong American influences. In fact the whole great *terroir* movement is a French-Canadian counterpart of the regionalism which has developed so widely in American literature of this century. But all these facts and many others are commonly ignored by the asserters of the uniqueness of French-Canadian civilization. The difficulty is that a cherished and carefully nurtured theory does not recognize the existence of certain inescapable geographical and historical facts. The French Canadians and the other North Americans have lived for more than three centuries upon a common continent; they have been shaped by the same geographic and climatic forces; through the years they have acted and reacted upon one another, so that each carries some mark of the other; and each is recognized as foreign by Europeans. In short, they are different sorts of the American whom Whitman hymned in his *Song of Myself*, so magnificently translated by Dion-Levèsque:

Faisant partie de la Grande Nation des Nations dont la plus infime est
 autant que la plus grande;
 Habitant du Midi aussi bien que du Nord; je vis sur les plantations;
 Yanki, je fais mon chemin, prêt au commerce, avec des membres qui
 sont les plus souples qui soient sur terre, et les plus résistants aussi;
 Kentuckien, je traverse la vallée de l'Elkhorn, avec mes jambières en
 peau de daim;
 Je suis un Louisianais ou un Georgien;
 Je suis un batelier sur les lacs et dans les baies ou le long des côtes;
 je suis natif de l'Indiana, du Wisconsin, de l'Ohio;
 Je suis à mon aise sur mes raquettes dans les solitudes neigeuses du
 Canada; à mon aise dans la brousse, ou avec les pêcheurs sur les
 côtes de Terre-Neuve;
 A mon aise parmi la flotte des brise-glaces, allant avec les autres et
 louvoyant;
 A mon aise dans les montagnes du Vermont, ou dans les forêts du
 Maine, ou sur un ranch du Texas;
 Camarade des Californiens, camarade des libres gars du Nord-Ouest
 (aimant leurs vastes carrures);
 Camarade des raftsmen et des charbonniers; camarade de tous ceux
 qui échangent des poignées de mains et vous invitent à boire et à
 manger;
 Ecolier auprès des simples; maître parmi les penseurs; novice à ses
 débuts et qui pourtant possède l'expérience d'innombrables saisons;
 Je suis un fermier, un mécanicien, un artiste, un homme du monde,
 un marin, un quaker,
 Un prisonnier, un aventurier, un voyou, un avocat, un médecin, un
 prêtre.
 Je résiste à tout mieux qu'à ma propre diversité.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰Rosaire Dion-Lévèsque, *Walt Whitman* (Montreal, 1933), 60-2.

DISCUSSION

Professor Brouillette stated that he preferred the opinions of outsiders such as Hughes, Miner, Siegfried, and Wade rather than those of French Canadians on such matters as were discussed in this paper. He declared, however, that it was hard to know just what an "American influence" was. More systematic surveys of social and cultural life were needed. Casual observations were not satisfactory even though sympathetic. He said that the settlers of the Eastern Townships were mostly Irish or plain Englishmen rather than Americans, to which *Mr. Wade* replied that Americans had to profess loyalism at time of entry. *Professor Brouillette* objected to the citing of the founding of the *Ecole des hautes études commerciales* as an example of American influence; he said it was founded to meet the needs of the time.

Major Lanctot commended *Mr. Wade* upon his broad and sympathetic paper, but felt that he had used French-Canadian material too exclusively. *Major Lanctot* would have liked *Mr. Wade* to evaluate the American reaction to the French Canadians. He pointed out the favourable seaboard position of the American colonies, their short lines of communication, and the English alliance with the Iroquois which gave them strength in the fur trade. The French had too many missionaries and not enough settlers. This may have saved many dusky Indians for the other world but it lost Canada for the French.

He said that the seigneurs were not the leaders of the French-Canadian militia. A seigneur might even have to serve under his own "habitant." He cited Bishop Briand's remark that the French Canadians who served in the American forces were "scum of the country," and pointed out that *Mr. Wade* does not mention the strong French-Canadian help which was the decisive factor which turned the scale in favour of Great Britain. Also during the British war against revolutionary France, the French-Canadian clergy and citizens actually gave money to the British cause, not merely talk. This shows the real extent of their patriotism and feeling. Only after 1783 did the English and Scots, who had greater financial resources, take over the fur trade.

Mr. Wade's paper he felt to be too analytical and not drawn together in conclusion. The real secret of French-Canadian policy was to be found in the determination to safeguard their culture. In this respect the French Canadians would probably choose preservation of their language in competition with their faith should they be forced to choose between them.

He affirmed that the only real American political influence upon French Canada was to be found at the time of the American Revolution. The American propaganda campaign at that time was admirably carried out so that even remote villages were talking about liberty, the rights of man, etc., after that campaign. The merchants helped this campaign as, at that time, they could all speak French. The French Canadians admire American business technique and methods, and are trying to regain ground lost during the time when classical education dominated. The similarities of social and cultural life are not so much the result of American influence as a reflection of the way of life which is common to all North America. He cited attitudes toward marriage and divorce, and birth-control as examples of French-Canadian rejection of American influence. He said French

Canadians want to be free to choose from amongst "American goods," as some are good and others are of a "different quality." Finally, he insisted upon the determination of the French Canadians "to survive."

M. Nadeau congratulated Mr. Wade on the extent and thoroughness of his work. He asked him to define American civilization in a few words in order to make clear what can be called American influence in Quebec. He said we have missed the fact that Lafontaine played a large part in helping French Canadians to adjust themselves to constitutional development, and that in this process Lafontaine was deeply influenced by the American Bill of Rights. He advised further study of this point. He suggested we must distinguish between the country and the city in the study of American influences. He proposed that French Canadians go to the United States and make similar studies there of American culture.

Professor Adair pointed out that the Eastern Townships were almost entirely an extension of the United States. He based his statements upon careful census studies made by one of his students. These settlers were Irish in name only. They came from the United States and had little to do with the United Kingdom. They were often brought in as contract labour, or they crossed the line without permission. This movement of people was not really a Loyalist move but a northward thrust of population comparable to the push to the west.

Professor Rothney stated that the southern section of the Eastern Townships had originally been settled mainly by Americans who came to get good land, but that in the northern section especially, many settlers were brought in directly from the British Isles. French Canadians came later but had penetrated throughout the area by 1850. He suggested that if Papineau were ever cheered in the Eastern Townships, it must have been near the United States border. The only electoral victory ever obtained by the Annexationist Party was in the County of Sherbrooke, then much larger than it is today, and their votes came mainly from the southern part of the district. He would like to hear the influence of Franco-Americans who return to Canada discussed. He cited the comparative frequency of their appearance in proportion to other French Canadians in movements such as the C.C.F. as an example. He said pro-Pan-American feeling in French Canada was more pro-Latin America than pro-United States. Most French-Canadian nationalists strongly favour Pan-Americanism.

Professor Sage indicated that Mr. Wade was in error in saying that Astor broke into a Hudson's Bay Company monopoly on the Pacific coast as the Hudson's Bay Company was not there when he arrived.

Mr. Wade replied to the several comments that he was aware of having neglected Iroquois culture but that this was necessary because of lack of space. He believed the Albany traders to have been largely Scots who came to Montreal and took over the administration of the fur trade, including that of the West. *Major Lanctot* suggested that Mr. Wade examine the contracts of the period. *Mr. Wade* went on to say that Canadian-American civilization cannot be defined in so short a time but that roughly it means a common continental state of mind, a way of life dominant in English-speaking America, of which industrialization and urban life are predominant characteristics. The main problems of French Canada today are the results of the extension of industrialization and urbanization to that area. The

urban population in French Canada is now 60 to 65 per cent and growing fast. He thought M. Nadeau's suggestion for French Canadians to study French-Canadian influence in the United States a good one, and cited two examples of this actually occurring, financed by the Guggenheim and Rockefeller Foundations.

He stated that the Eastern Townships were certainly not all settled by Tory Americans—the desire for land, intensified by the occupation of most of the good land in New England, was the real reason for the coming of most settlers. Many St. Francis Indians went to Dartmouth College which was founded as an Indian missionary institution. A “branch” of the college was even established on the St. Francis Reserve.