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Sylvain DELCOMMINETTE, *Platon. Philèbe. Introduction, traduction et commentaire*. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin (coll. "Les Dialogues de Platon"), 2022, 472 p.

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cusses the assertions by Jülicher¹ and McArthur,² that the apparatus was to be dismissed as inconsequential. And so, the thinking continued until very recently when scholars began to give more credence to its *use*, specifically furnishing new textual applications and new strategies of reading and comprehending the Gospels. Eusebius' novel innovation of employing a table of contents and categories, transformed the apparatus into a textual map. He introduced a set of numerical tables highlighting parallel texts. We know from agricultural handbooks, medical anthologies, multilingual and astronomical tables, etc., that contents and columnar tables did not originate with Eusebius. What was unique to him is the assembly of a new text from the textual reserve at hand to reconfigure the Gospels. Coogan argues that Eusebius did not just reiterate the commentaries of Origen, Tatian and others, but configured the gospel into patterns of reading "based on echo, allusion, and narrative parallel" (p. 174). Eusebius did not proceed with the aim of addressing inconsistencies nor to assemble a historical chronology to the Gospels; history was not the underpinning of the apparatus. The result is enabling theological trajectories and new approaches to the Gospel texts for today's readers. Coogan cannot overstate the impact of the apparatus in exegesis, liturgy, art, etc., and the significance of the fourfold Gospel. He demonstrates how textual mechanics bisect reading application to extract further knowledge. Texts invite use. To fully appreciate textuality of the late ancient Mediterranean, an integrative approach to reception, usage, and reading is required. Reception theory is key as he delves into how readers in various regions and throughout the centuries experienced a fourfold Gospel; significantly, the ninth century Syriac biblical scholar bar Kepha's description of Eusebius' collecting the four books and ordering them into one, all the while taking nothing away nor adding to the content of the evangelists' writing (p. 177).³

Coogan points out the ascription to Eusebius by bar Kepha of having physically constructed the fourfold Gospel into one was an overreach since the task of merging all four Gospels was already taking place during Eusebius' lifetime. He suggests the three ancient Ethiopian Gospels of Abba Gärima did get it right — that Eusebius should be counted among the evangelists.

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Sylvain DELCOMMINETTE, **Platon. Philèbe. Introduction, traduction et commentaire.** Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin (coll. "Les Dialogues de Platon"), 2022, 472 p.

This volume is the third to appear in Vrin's new collection, "Les Dialogues de Platon," which has so far issued volumes on the *Politicus* (2018), *Menexenus* (2019), *Philebus* (2022), and *Sophist* (2022). Each "livre de poche" in the series presents a Platonic work in a new translation, with facing Greek text, followed by a substantial commentary that traces the lines of thought and argument across the entire work. Delcomminette's translation of the *Philebus* is lively and idiomatic without sacrificing accuracy. His commentary invites us to read this notoriously difficult dialogue as an intricately constructed exercise of Platonic dialectic.

The task of finding unity in the *Philebus* has challenged commentators since antiquity. While Socrates' stated goal in the dialogue is to establish two anti-hedonist theses (that pleasure is not the good, and that knowledge is superior to pleasure in the contribution it makes to a happy life) long

1. A. JÜLICHER, *An Introduction to the New Testament*, London, Smith and Elder, 1904, p. 588.

2. H.K. MCARTHUR, "The Eusebian Sections and Canons," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 27 (1965), p. 256.

3. For commentary on Mt, Mk, Lk, Acts, Cath.Epp., Apoc., see J.-B. CHABOT, J. SEDLACEK, *Dionysii bar Salibi commentarii in evangelia I*, vol. 1 (2 vol.), Leipzig, Otto Harrassowitz, 1906.

stretches of the dialogue address neither of these questions directly and pose substantial interpretive challenges on their own. For example, the “divine method” discussed at length early in the work (14c-19e) is recognizable as the “dialectical” method of collection and division invoked in other Platonic dialogues ; yet, it hardly seems to be the method by which Socrates establishes the anti-hedonist conclusions in the *Philebus*. Indeed, Socrates explicitly sets the divine method aside (20a-b) when he gives his opening argument that pleasure is not the good. We might suppose he has returned to the method in the extended discussion of pleasure that is the dialogue’s center of gravity (31b-55c) ; however, the various “divisions” of pleasure that he there proposes are hard to construe as support for his targeted anti-hedonist conclusions.

A prominent strategy in Delcomminette’s approach to solving these and other interpretive problems is his proposal that there are two different directions in which the “divine method” of dialectic may be deployed. In the canonical case of an established science, a single genus is divided sequentially into its species and subspecies, and then into the manifold particulars that fall under them. We may call this the downward direction (from one/definite to many/indefinite). In cases of inquiry, by contrast, the genus (e.g., pleasure or goodness) is under investigation and its nature contested — and so a practitioner of dialectic is proceeding in the reverse direction (“à l’inverse”), starting with manifold particulars and proceeding upward towards the single genus, whose nature it seeks to elucidate. This is the direction in which the divine method is proceeding in most of the *Philebus*, according to Delcomminette.

When Socrates distinguishes between true and false pleasures and between pure and impure pleasures, his point, according to Delcomminette, is not to demarcate the species and subspecies into which the genus pleasure will be divided (in the downward application of the method). The significance of these “divisions”, as elucidated by Socrates, is rather that, once Protarchus has accepted them, he is committed, on hedonist grounds, to agreeing that not all pleasures are good — a crucial premise he refused to concede in his opening skirmish with Socrates (13a-c) — and that pleasure is integrally involved with and subordinate to cognition. These commitments, Delcomminette proposes, entail the two theses that Socrates has set out to prove, and so the “division” of pleasure in the *Philebus* amounts to a successful dialectical argument (*à l’inverse*) for its anti-hedonist agenda.

More broadly, Delcomminette proposes, the considerations about goodness deployed across the dialogue serve to elucidate the nature of the good itself. He invites us to read the *Philebus* as a whole as a dialectical inquiry into the nature of the good ; its starting point is the “eudaimonist” conception of goodness (as what is complete, sufficient, and choiceworthy) invoked early in the dialogue and its culmination is the “formal” conception of the good (as what is measured, beautiful, and true) articulated at the dialogue’s end. On this reading, the *Philebus* depicts a dialectical argument that ascends to a grasp of the form of the Good — in contrast with the *Republic*, where Socrates is only able to describe it by analogy (505d-e).

In defense of this ambitious interpretive narrative, Delcomminette takes a stand on a wide range of interpretive and doctrinal questions, from the nature of Platonic forms (neither transcendent metaphysical entities nor universals, he maintains) to the relation of the *Philebus* to other dialogues. On the latter front, Delcomminette is strongly unitarian, urging us to read the *Philebus* as the summit of Plato’s theorizing about forms and dialectical method as presented in the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*, and as presupposing the treatment of cognition in the *Theaetetus*. These are positions that Delcomminette has defended at greater length in his mammoth study (696 pages long), deceptively titled *Le Philèbe de Platon : introduction à l’agathologie platonicienne* (Brill, 2006). One virtue of the present volume is that the much briefer commentary it offers (at 180 pocket-sized pages) can serve as a reader’s “gateway” to that magisterial study ; or it can stand on its

own for readers approaching the *Philebus* for the first time. In any case, one need not be fully persuaded of Delcomminette's broader interpretive narrative in order to appreciate the many astute observations, clarifications, and helpful suggestions in the present volume. The reader will find within its covers everything they need for a serious and intellectually engaging study of the *Philebus*.

Susan Sauvé MEYER
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Pierre-Luc DESJARDINS, **Devenir le Fils. Physique et noétique chez Maître Eckhart**. Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf (coll. « Patrimoines »), 2023, 314 p.

Pierre-Luc Desjardins propose une relecture de l'œuvre eckhartienne à l'aune de l'aristotélisme. S'autorisant du champ lexical du Thuringien, il développe une « interprétation (méta-)physicaliste » de la naissance du Fils dans l'âme (p. 25). Cette thèse s'organise en six chapitres. I) Le couple mouvement-achèvement y sert d'axe principal pour présenter la transformation (*trans-formatio*) de l'homme à l'image de Dieu (chap. I : « [Méta-]Physique biblique »). Tandis que la *Lex vetus* concerne le mouvement, l'Évangile, identifié à la *Lex nova*, concerne le repos auquel tout homme est finalement destiné. L'A. conçoit cette dynamique à l'aide du rapport entre « serviteur » (*servus*), auquel il consacre deux chapitres (II. « Étiologie et ontologie », III. « Désir et repos »), et « fils » (*filius*), qui est le thème des trois derniers chapitres (IV. « Détachement et *lex amoris* », V. « Expression et sujétion », VI. « La génération de l'image »). II) P.-L. Desjardins met en lumière l'« absolutisme ontologique » de la pensée eckhartienne (p. 73, 98) : les créatures sont tendues du néant (*terminus a quo*) vers l'être (*terminus ad quem*). Il y montre, de manière heureuse, combien le repos, qu'il soit de Dieu ou de l'âme en lui, « doit se penser comme incluant l'action [...], mais excluant le mouvement » (p. 100). Étiologie et ontologie vont précisément de pair, car c'est par l'action (vertueuse) que l'homme transite de son état de serviteur à celui de fils. III) Or, qui dit action, dit aussi passion. Ce n'est nullement par un volontarisme, mais en laissant Dieu opérer en lui, que l'homme peut devenir semblable à son terme. Le couple actif-passif assume l'opposition supérieur-inférieur proposée dès le prologue de *l'opus tripartitum* (p. 130). C'est en attirant l'étant vers sa fin que l'agent rend le patient capable de lui (*capax dei*). Ainsi, le désir, encore marqué par la souffrance et l'inquiétude, est-il dépassé vers l'amour, où règnent la joie et le repos (p. 143). Ce passage est exemplifié par le paradigme du juste et de la justice. IV) Identifiant l'*Abgeschiedenheit* et l'*humilitas* (p. 172), l'A. présente le détachement comme l'aboutissement de la vertu morale, puisqu'il permet l'amour du prochain en Dieu. Remplaçant ainsi le rôle que joue la justice chez Aristote (p. 188), cette *puritas vertutum* est celle de *l'homme noble* qui laisse tomber le monde extérieur pour Dieu. On en arrive ainsi au cœur de la pensée eckhartienne : la relation intime du Père et du Fils, comme lieu de destination humaine. V) L'A. relit l'union de l'engendrant et de l'engendré en termes aristotéliens : « Acte et puissance dans la nature reflètent pour Eckhart l'actif et le passif primordiaux que sont le Père et le Fils » (p. 205). C'est sur cette base qu'il pense la notion d'image en lien avec la béatitude. Le Thuringien articule la génération du Fils, image du Père, et la création, « d'après l'image de Dieu » (*ad imaginem dei*). La béatitude se conçoit alors comme une « abstraction » de tout mouvement pour ne laisser subsister que l'image de Dieu imprimée dans l'homme (p. 232). Elle se présente comme un « pâti » où l'âme se rend entièrement réceptive à l'acte divin (p. 242). Le terme *subiectum* y est interprété dans le sens d'une « sujétion » ou « soumission » de l'âme à Dieu. VI) P.-L. Desjardins se concentre enfin sur le couple *alteratio-generatio* : l'altération est le « changement préparatoire » pour arriver à la génération où toute privation est évacuée (p. 256). L'homme y passe de l'état de serviteur à celui de fils. L'A. souligne combien « le schéma 'dynamico-énergétique' structurant l'union à Dieu en tant qu'elle se laisse penser comme union en