

"The Honest Working Man" and Workers' Control The Experience of Toronto Skilled Workers, 1860-1892

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"THE HONEST WORKINGMAN" AND WORKERS' CONTROL:

*The Experience of Toronto Skilled Workers, 1860-1892**

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*And now Canadian workingmen,
Arise and do your duty;
Behold these massive towers of stone,
In all their wondrous beauty.
Who builds those lovely marble towers,
Who works and makes the plans?
'Tis he who sleepless thinks for hours—
the honest workingman.*

From 'The Toilers' written for
The Ontario Workman, 17 July 1873.

Skilled workers in the nineteenth century exercised far more power than we have previously realized. Well on into the industrial period craftsmen through their trade unions played important roles in community affairs, in the world of politics and especially on the job. In Toronto work places, craftsmen employed their monopoly on skill and experience to dictate terms to their employers in a wide array of areas which, in modern parlance, gave to these late nineteenth century craftsmen a high degree of workers' control of production. In this paper I will describe the practice of three Toronto unions from the 1860's to the early 1890's to illustrate the extent of this power.

* This is a revised version of "Workers' Control and Mechanization: The Experience of Toronto Skilled Workers, 1860-1892", a paper delivered at the McGill Colloquium on "Canadian Society in the Late Nineteenth Century" in January 1975. I would like to thank David Frank, Craig Heron and Bryan Palmer for their comments on that paper. The Dalhousie History Department North American Studies Seminar also gave the earlier version a useful critique.

The three unions under discussion have been chosen to exemplify significant variants of trade union power in Toronto. They include: the relatively little known Coopers International Union, Ontario No. 3, which played an important role in the Nine Hour Movement and the establishment of the Toronto Trades Assembly; the extensively studied International Typographical Union No. 91; and the Iron Molders International Union No. 28, employed in Toronto's heavily capitalized stove, machinery and agricultural implements industry. This great diversity of experience demonstrates that the crafts analyzed here, although each unique, are nevertheless not atypical of other Toronto skilled unions of this period. Other crafts could have been chosen and although the details would differ the overall patterns would remain much the same.

To date most discussion of artisanal resistance to the arrival of industrial capitalism has focussed on the maintenance of pre-industrial work habits, the tenacious hold of ethnic cultural ties, and on the deep suspicion craft workers felt for "the new rules of the game" demanded by the advent of the market economy.¹ This analysis applies to workers undergoing the process of industrialization and will account for the Coopers' early Toronto experience but in studying the history of Toronto moulders and printers we will need other explanations.

David Montgomery has suggested that we must look beyond pre-industrial cultural forms if we are to understand the behaviour of skilled workers in late nineteenth century America. These workers often were "veterans of industrial life" who "had internalized the industrial sense of time, were highly disciplined in both individual and collective behaviour, and regarded both an extensive division of labour and machine production as their natural environment."² This was the world of Toronto moulders; Toronto printers, or rather Toronto compositors, occupied a position somewhere between the experience of the cooper and that of the moulder. The world of moulders and printers certainly drew on old craft traditions but it also transcended them. Although drawing on "residual" cultural categories there was much about their world that was "emergent", if we can borrow the important theoretical distinction drawn by Raymond Williams.³ In the late nineteenth century Toronto skilled workers came to terms with the new industrial society but the terms they arrived at were those of constant resistance and struggle. The successes that they and other workers achieved forced management and government to devise entirely new strategies which have become commonly known as "scientific management" and "progressivism". Those innovations remain however, subjects for other papers; here we will limit ourselves to an analysis of how the workers struggled, often successfully, for control of the work place.⁴

I

The experience of coopers in Toronto and throughout Ontario in the late 1860's and early 1870's provides a classic case of the artisan response to industrial capitalism. Elsewhere I have described the confrontation that occurred between Toronto shoe manufacturers and the Knights of St. Crispin.⁵ Although less dramatic in their response than the Crispins' Luddism, the coopers shared with the shoemakers the unfortunate fate of watching the destruction of their craft by a combination of mechanization, the rise of factory production, the depression of the 1870's, and an all-out employer offensive.

Originally organized on a shop basis, coopers enjoyed all the prerogatives of the skilled artisan. One vivid description of the old time cooper's life style follows:

Early on Saturday morning, the big brewery wagon would drive up to the shop. Several of the coopers would club together, each paying his proper share, and one of them would call out the window to the driver, "Bring me a goose egg", meaning a half-barrel of beer. Then others would buy "Goose Eggs" and there would be a merry time all around Saturday night was a big night for the old time cooper. It meant going out, strolling around town, meeting friends usually at a local saloon, and having a good time generally after a hard week's work. Usually the good time continued over Sunday, so that on the following day he usually was not in the best condition to settle down to the regular day's work. Many coopers used to spend this day sharpening up their tools, carrying in stock, discussing current events and in getting things in shape for the big day of work on the morrow. Thus Blue Monday was something of a tradition with the coopers, and the day was also more or less lost as far as production was concerned. "Can't do much today, but I'll give her hell tomorrow," seemed to be the Monday slogan. But bright and early Tuesday morning "Give her hell" they would, banging away lustily for the rest of the week until Saturday, which was pay day again, and new thoughts of the "Goose Eggs".⁶

However these older artisanal traditions were coming under attack at mid-century from trade unionists as well as efficiency-minded manufacturers. A St. Louis cooper's 1871 letter depicts both the tenacity of the old tradition and the new attitudes of skilled workers:

The shops are paid off every two weeks, on which occasion

one of these shops is sure to celebrate that time-honoured festival, Blue Monday. When Blue Monday falls it usually lasts for three days. And the man who succeeds in working during the continuance of this carnival is a man of strong nerve and indomitable will. Mr. Editor, did you ever hear of Black Monday? Perhaps not. But I tell you wherever Blue Monday is kept, there also is kept Black Monday. The only difference is, Blue Monday is celebrated at the shop, while Black Monday is observed at the cooper's home. The man celebrates Blue Monday, but the wife and family observe Black Monday.⁷

In 1870 craftsmen created the Coopers International Union in order, as the *Chicago Workingman's Advocate* so aptly put it, to avoid the fate of the ship caulkers and ship carpenters, artisanal victims of the new age of iron and steam.⁸ The new union with head-offices in Cleveland was "in many ways the model of a successful organization of skilled mid-nineteenth century American craftsmen."⁹ Its leaders were deeply embedded in the labour reform tradition which found its organizational expression through the National Labor Union in the U.S. In Canada the Cooper's International Vice-President John Hewitt, played an active role in organizing the Toronto Trades Assembly and the Canadian Labor Union, and was one of the major theorists of the nine hour movement of 1872. The C.I.U. created a union structure which provided sick and death benefits, an international strike fund, and a card system for tramping members. Entering Canada in 1870 the union organized 24 branches in the first two years of its existence.¹⁰ In early 1872 on a visit to Chicago John Hewitt announced that "the coopers in Canada were alive and active and increasing their organization rapidly."¹¹ Their decline was to be equally precipitous but let us first examine the basis of their strength.

Coopers, like most skilled workers in the late nineteenth century, can best be described as "autonomous workmen". This term, usefully defined by Benson Soffer, describes workers who possess:

Some significant degree of control over the quantity and quality of the product; the choice and maintenance of equipment; the methods of wage payment and the determination of individual wages and hours; the scheduling and assignment of work; recruitment, hiring, lay-off and transfer; training and promotion of personnel; and other related conditions of work.¹²

A reading of *The Coopers' Journal*, the excellent newspaper of the C.I.U., provides copious evidence that Canadian coopers enjoyed most of these prerogatives.

As was the case with most unions of skilled workers in the nineteenth century wages were not the subject of collective bargaining. The union met together, arrived at the "price" of its labour, informed management of its decision and either accepted the new rate with gratitude or struck if the boss refused. Local unions had no trouble dictating terms in prosperous times as can be seen in the report of the Brantford local of August 1871 which simply notes that they had imposed a new price list and expected no trouble.¹³ In January of 1872 representatives from seven of the fifteen existing Ontario C.I.U. locals met in Toronto to arrive at a province-wide price list.¹⁴ This document imposed not only prices but also called for a maximum ten-hour day province-wide. It dictated prices for 37 different categories of piece work and added a day rate of \$1.75 for work not included on the list.

In addition to assuming control of hours and wages coopers also restricted production especially when work was short. In this way they could spread the work around and also prevent speed-ups or other infringements of their shop-floor control. In the Ontario reports stints are mentioned by locals in St. Catharines, Seaforth, Oshawa and London.¹⁵ This union-dictated, restriction of output was of course the greatest evil in the eyes of the manufacturer. Coopers also struggled to control the methods of production as in this Brantford case:

H.W. Read, a boss cooper of this place, has shown his dirty, mean spirit by discharging three flour bbl. [barrel] makers from his shop; they were making bbls. at nine cts. jointed staves and circled heading. The boss took the jointer boy away, so that the hands had to join their own staves, which they did until noon, when they refused to make any more barrels, unless the staves were jointed for them or they were paid extra. For thus demanding their rights, Boss Read discharged them. . . . But we fear him not, for no respectable cooper will take a berth in his shop under the circumstances.¹⁶

The union also enforced personnel decisions in the shop. The monitor of each shop assured that new workers' union cards were clear if members and that "nons" would abide by the shop rules. "Nons" who refused often found themselves moving on to the next town sooner than anticipated. In Brantford in 1871 for example:

A scab in one of our shops, by the name of David Clawson, made himself very obnoxious to our men by his persistent abuse of the Union. At our last meeting it was ordered that the shop should strike against him, which was accordingly done, the consequence of which was that the mean tool of a

*man tramped and our men were out but half a day.*¹⁷

One year later in Seaforth:

*J. Carter (who was suspended in Jan. 1872) got a berth at Ament's shop . . . The monitor of the shop immediately went to him and asked him to pay up his dues . . . And also that if he did not pay up, either he or they should not work there. [After he refused] the monitor of the shop went to the boss and told him that he must either sack Carter or they would take their tools out of the shop . . . [When he refused] they did instantly.*¹⁸

Equally the coopers controlled admission to the craft and their ritual pledged them to "allow no one to teach a new hand" in order "to control the supply of help."¹⁹ Use of helpers and apprenticeship rules were tightly supervised by the union.²⁰

But perhaps more striking even than the presence of workers' control is the pervasiveness of appeals to manliness evidenced throughout the coopers' materials. David Montgomery has argued that this was a crucial component of "the craftsmen's ethical code".²¹ Skilled workers carried themselves with pride and felt themselves to be the equal of their boss. C.I.U. President Martin Foran's novel, *The Other Side*,²² illustrates this theme well. The hero is a proud and respectable workman surrounded by unscrupulous capitalists and unmanly workers who have given up their self-respect in order to carry out the evil tasks of the monopolistic bosses. Foran in discussing his didactic novel claimed that:

*The main incidents of this story are founded upon "notorious fact", so notorious that anyone wishing it can be furnished with irrefragable, incontestable proofs in support of all the charges made against the typical employer. Revelation; that working men have been—because being trade unionists—discharged, photographed on street corners, driven from their homes, hounded like convicted felons, prevented from obtaining work elsewhere, arrested at the beck of employers, thrown into loathsome prisons on ex parte evidence, or held to bail in sums beyond their reach by subsidized, prejudiced, bigoted dispensers of injustice, & in every mean dishonourable manner imaginable, inhumanly victimized and made to feel that public opinion, law & justice were Utopian "unreal mockeries" except to men of position and money . . .*²³

Canadian coopers saw "manliness" as the keystone of their struggle and for them honour and pride were sacrosanct. "Owls" or "nons"

who broke pledges or violated oaths were less than men:

At our last monthly meeting, the name of George Morrow was erased from our books, it having been proven beyond a shadow of doubt that he had violated his obligation by making known the business of our meetings to his boss. This thing Morrow, for I cannot call him a man, has never been of any use to us, he has not only betrayed us, but degraded himself in the estimation of every good man in our community.²⁴

The Hamilton corresponding secretary went on to describe Morrow as a "compromise between man and beast."²⁵

The traditions of autonomous work and the culture which grew from it made the coopers men to be reckoned with. Yet if the rise of the C.I.U. was rapid its decline was even more precipitous.

By late 1873 only seventeen locals remained and by 1875 this number had plummeted to approximately five.²⁶ The Canadian case was in no way unique and from a peak membership of over 8000 in 1872 the union's total membership had declined to 1500 by 1876. In that year *The Coopers' Journal* suspended publication.

This disastrous decline was related both to the depression of the mid-1870's and to a concerted employers' assault on the trade. The best account of the coopers' demise describes the displacement of the hand cooper by machines in the Standard Oil works in New York and Cleveland. These cities, which contained the largest concentrations of coopers in North America, saw an epic struggle as Standard Oil moved to crush the C.I.U., the one remaining obstacle in its path to modernization and total monopoly.²⁷

A similar process took place in Ontario. Coopering began to break out of its artisanal mold in the late 1860's in Ontario when the need for well-made, tight oil barrels in Western Ontario led the London firm of R.W. and A. Burrows to introduce stave making and stave dressing machinery.²⁸ Until then the entire process had been performed by hand. This innovation was adopted by larger cooperages in the province such as those at distilleries in Windsor and Toronto. These three shops, Burrows', Walker's and Gooderham's, also differed from the old-time cooper's shop due to their larger size; they resembled small manufactories far more than artisans' shops. Gooderham, for example, employed forty coopers in Toronto while the next biggest Toronto shop in 1871 held only seven.²⁹

Although creating some problems for the C.I.U. these early machines did not abolish the need for skilled workers. Skill and knowledge were still important components of barrel making. Thus as late as 1871, Martin Foran was taking consolation in the cooper's skill:

Many of our members place far too much significance on machinery as a substitute for their labour. I have given the subject much thought and consideration, and am unable to see any serious cause for apprehension in barrel machinery. . . . Ours is a trade that cannot be reduced to the thumbrule of unfailing uniformity. To make a general marketable piece of work, of any kind peculiar to our trade, it requires tact, judgement and discrimination on the part of the maker . . . when the friends of barrel machinery succeed in inventing a thinking machine they will succeed in making a success.³⁰

Within two years of this statement Standard Oil's version of "a thinking machine" was a complete success.

The process was less revolutionary in Ontario but the effects of increased mechanization can be seen in the reports of the Toronto local. Gooderham's defeated the union between 1870,³¹ when hours and wages were dictated by the workers and C.I.U. President Martin Foran acclaimed "Gooderman's [sic] shop as without exception the finest cooper shop [he had] ever seen",³² and late 1872 when John Hewitt reported that the shop:

contained the most inveterate set of owls to be found on this continent and the few good men we have there, not being able to control the shop, have concluded to sacrifice their principles and work on for whatever price the great Gooderham chooses to pay.³³

At its peak strength in March of 1872 the Toronto local had had complete control over the trade.³⁴ The ability of the coopers to dictate terms was seriously undermined elsewhere in Ontario by the advent of machinery. In 1874 the Seaforth local noted that the installation of two barrel machines would throw a great number of coopers out of work.³⁵ Six months later they reported their failure to control the machines due to non-union coopers taking their jobs at low rates.³⁶ By the 1880's the struggle was over; the cooper's craft was dead. In 1887 a Windsor cooper argued before the Labour Commission that machinery had "killed the trade" and that there no longer was "a man in the world who would send his son to be a cooper."³⁷

The power that coopers had possessed as artisans they tried to adapt to the industrial age. Old models of the trade practices of independent craftsmen were transformed into union rules and struggled over with new style bosses. However one base of their power was disappearing rapidly in the 1870's as technological innovation stripped them of "their monopoly of particular technical and managerial skills".³⁸

Yet we should always be careful in positing technological change as the crucial factor for other workers, as we shall see here, were more successful than the coopers. A Seaforth cooper, P. Klinkhammer, recognized this only too clearly:

The men here have much to say about the barrel machine. The machine is not to blame. If the union men had been supported by the nons last fall and the latter had not taken the berths vacated by the union men and worked at 4 cents the machine would not be making barrels now.³⁸

Their one real hope was to ally with other workers as Klinkhammer suggested. Their important role in the U.S. National Labor Union and the Toronto Trades Assembly, the Canadian Labour Union, and the Nine Hour Movement were steps in the right direction, but craft particularism remained very strong in the 1870's. However unionism did not disappear totally from the barrel factory with the demise of the C.I.U. Like the shoemakers, the coopers learned from their experience. Toronto coopers retained an independent union after the demise of the C.I.U. and were successful in raising their rates in the spring of 1882.⁴⁰ The next year they participated in attempts to create a new International.⁴¹ In 1886 the Toronto local joined the Knights of Labor as "Energy Assembly", LA 5742.⁴² This path was followed by many other coopers' locals throughout Canada and the U.S.

II

Workshop control traditions were extremely strong in foundry work. Late nineteenth century moulders displayed all the characteristics that Soffer and Montgomery identify as typical of "autonomous workmen". Two things distinguish them from the coopers. First is their impressive success in tenaciously maintaining these traditions on into the twentieth century. Second was their presence from the start of this period at the centre of the industrial capitalist world. Moulders were not artisans working in small shops reminiscent of pre-industrial society. In Toronto, Hamilton and throughout Ontario, moulders worked in the important stove, machinery and agricultural implements industries. These firms, among the largest in nineteenth century Ontario, led Canadian industry in attempting to fix prices and later to create multi-plant firms. Not surprisingly, these companies were also continually in the forefront of managerial innovations regarding labour.

Moulders in Toronto were first organized into a local union in 1857.⁴³ This local joined the Iron Molders International Union, organized in 1859, some time in 1860.⁴⁴ The International made clear its position on questions of shop floor control from its inception. The

original constitution claimed for the union the power "to determine the customs and usages in regard to all matters pertaining to the craft."⁴⁵ This gave the union control over the price of the moulders' labour. In stove shops, the union shop committee would meet and discuss the price to charge for moulding new patterns as the boss brought them in. The committee would meet with the boss or foreman and arrive at a mutually acceptable overall price for the whole stove but as there were always a number of pieces involved in the assembly of any stove the committee would then decide amongst itself how to split this price among its members working on the different castings. This "board price" once established was considered to be almost non-negotiable and these prices very quickly became recognized as part of the established customs and usages that were the union's sole prerogative. This price was not the only source of the moulders' wages for there was a second element termed the "percentage" which was a supplement paid in addition to the piece rate. This percentage was negotiable and wage conflicts in the industry generally revolved around the "percentage" for very few bosses made the mistake of trying to challenge the "board price".⁴⁶

This was one considerable area of strength for the union but there were others. The shop committee also dictated the "set" or "set day's work" which was the number of pieces that a member was allowed to produce in one day. Thus production control was also taken out of the boss' hands. It was of course in the union's self-interest to "set" a reasonable amount of work which an average craftsman could perform. Craft pride would dictate against "setting" too low, but equally craft strength could prevent any attempt at a speed-up.⁴⁷ Peterborough moulders enforced the "set" and brought charges against members who "rushed up work".⁴⁸ Generally part of each local's rules, the "set" was made a part of the International Constitution at the 1886 convention in London: "Resolved that all molders working at piece work be not allowed to make over \$3.50 a day." In 1888 this was struck from the Constitution and was again left to the discretion of each local. Canadian locals continued to enforce this control over production. In Peterborough, in June 1891 "Brother Burns brought a charge against Brother Donovan for earning over \$3 a day."⁴⁹

An additional area in which the union dictated terms was hiring. Members who made the mistake of applying to the foreman instead of to the shop committee were often fined.⁵⁰ In one such case in Toronto moulders directly recruited by stove manufacturer Edward Gurney were casually turned away by the shop committee whom they had been directed to by the workers after asking for the foreman.⁵¹ The number of apprentices allowed in a shop was also set by the union. The Peter-

borough local in 1889 refused to allow "Mr. Brooks to bring in any more apprentices" and in 1891 reasserted that the union would "allow no more than the regular number of apprentices, one for every shop and one to any eight moulders."⁵² The union also controlled the use of "bucks" or "berkshires" (unskilled labourers). When used they were traditionally paid directly by the moulder out of his wages and thus were employed by the craftsman not the employer. Later when bosses tried to use "bucks" to perform some of the work customarily performed by moulders, the latter did all in their power to prevent it.⁵³ This was the greatest area of contention with Toronto employers. Finally the union struggled to impose a closed shop on its employers and refused to work with non-union moulders. Thus in the moulding industry large areas of control in the setting of price, productivity and hiring resided with the union.

The extent of the control that the union established was neither won nor maintained without constant struggle. Manufacturers used every device in their power to break the moulders' shop floor control. In 1866 the newly founded employers' association in the industry passed a resolution to

*proceed at once to introduce into our shops all the apprentices or helpers we deem advisable and that we will not allow any union committees in our shops, and that we will in every way possible free our shops of all dictation or interference on the part of our employees.*⁵⁴

The "Great Lock-out of 1866" that followed the employer's posting of the above "obnoxious notice" which extended into Canada, culminated in a costly victory for the union. Canadian stove manufacturers also organized and were active in the 1870's in fixing prices, advocating increased protection and most significantly in pressing a concerted effort to deal the union a smashing defeat.⁵⁵ In this they too failed.

In the Toronto moulding industry, the union's claim to control was the central issue. Strikes were fought at least fourteen times in the years between the founding of Local No. 28 and 1895.⁵⁶ The moulders engaged in the major strikes to resist demands by the manufacturers that the customs and usages of the craft be sacrificed. Thus in 1867 McGee demanded that he be allowed to hire as many apprentices as he wished;⁵⁷ in 1870 Gurney tried to force his moulders to work with "bucks";⁵⁸ in 1890 both Gurney and Massey offered their moulders a choice of either a substantive cut in the previously unchallenged board price or accept "bucks";⁵⁹ in 1892 Gurney demanded that his moulders not only accept a reduction on the percentage rate but also commit themselves to this rate for a year, a new scheme to prevent their raising the "percentage" as soon as the economic climate changed.⁶⁰ The

same battles were to be fought yet again in 1903-1904.⁶¹

These strikes were not minor struggles in the history of the Toronto working class. In the general employers' offensive of the late sixties and early seventies to counter the emergence of a strong and newly self-confident working class movement the boss moulders used various techniques in their attempt to defeat the union. In this period they resorted most often to coercion, falling back on outmoded statutes and the power of the law. The frequently cited case of George Brown and the Toronto printers of 1872 was preceded in Toronto by numerous uses of the courts by stove manufacturers. In 1867 McGee charged six Buffalo moulders with deserting his employment. Recruited by his foreman for a one-year term they quit work when they discovered that they were being used as scabs. The magistrate claimed he was being lenient due to the implicit deception used and fined them only \$6.00 each.⁶² Two apprentices who left McGee's before their terms were up because of the union blacklist of the shop were not so lucky. They received fifteen days in jail for deserting his employment.⁶³ Three years later Gurney, a large Toronto and Hamilton stove manufacturer, made use of the courts to fight the union in a slightly different way. He had two union members charged with conspiracy and assault for trying to prevent scabs from filling his shop after he turned out the union men for refusing to work with "bucks" and a large number of apprentices. After the men were found guilty the Toronto Grand Jury commented that:

*It is with sincere regret that the Grand Jury have had before them . . . two persons charged with assault and conspiracy acting under the regulations of an association known as the Molders Union and they feel it their duty to mark in the most emphatic terms their disapproval of such societies being introduced into our new country calculated as they are to interfere with capital and labour, cramp our infant manufactures and deprive the subject of his civil liberty . . .*⁶⁴

During another strike that same summer Beard charged ten of his apprentices with "unlawfully confederating to desert his service with the intent to injure the firm in their business." Their real offence had been seeking a wage increase and then using the traditional moulders' weapon of restricting their output to enforce their demand. On their last day on the job they all did the same limited amount of work. They were found guilty.⁶⁵ Nevertheless the founders' tactics failed. The victory that the moulders won here was especially sweet given the force brought to bear against them. This victory was quite clearly contingent on their monopoly of skill and their ability to control the

labour market. Thus it was reported that Gurney was forced to resort to employing moulders such as "John Cowie who quit one job to go scabbing in Gurney's shop where he had never worked in before, simply because he was of so little account they would never hire him—circumstances sometimes make strange companions."⁶⁶ The union "defied anyone to produce such a lot of molders as were in Gurney".⁶⁷ But if the victory over Gurney was pleasing that over Beard was valued even more highly:

*It appears that for a year or two past, Beard and Co. of Toronto, have been running an independent scab shop refusing to be "dictated to by the Union as they felt competent to conduct their business in their own way." . . . They found that reliable men were all union men, they found that the sober men were all union men, and what was of more importance, they found that all the good molders were union men and they were obliged to take the off-scourings of creation, all the drunken scallawags and botch workmen, that found their way to Toronto . . . Their scab foreman was not equal to the situation and they found that their trade was fast leaving them and to save themselves from utter ruin the nauseous dose had to be swallowed . . .*⁶⁸

The 1880's saw the maturing of the system of industrial relations that was only emerging in the 1860's and 1870's. The foundrymen mounted no challenges to the basic rights of the union in 1880's and only the percentage came under consideration. In 1880 moulders sought and gained a 10% increase but when the economy turned in late 1883 they were forced to accept a 20% reduction. In 1886 they won a 12.5% advance but in 1887 their request for a 10% increase was resisted by Gurney and after a nine-week strike a compromise 5% advance was accepted. In early 1887 the Ontario branches of the I.M.I.U. came together to form a District Union. The thirteen Ontario locals with over 1000 members were brought together to organize more efficiently and to run joint strikes more effectively.⁶⁹ In 1887 for example the Hamilton moulders' strike against Gurney spread to Toronto when Gurney locked out his moulders there. Later in 1890 moulders at the Massey Hamilton plant refused to mould while their Toronto brothers were locked out. But perhaps the major example of these cross-industry strikes was the Bridge and Beach Strike of 1887 in the U.S. In March of that year moulders struck the Bridge and Beach Manufacturing Co. in St. Louis with the sanction of the International. Immediately the new Stove Founders National Defense Association attempted to manufacture the required patterns for the Company. Their moulders in turn refused to work on the patterns from the struck foundry. This process

spread until at its height almost 5000 moulders were locked out in fifteen centres. Finally in June, the Defense Association called the patterns in and supplied the St. Louis company with a force of non-union moulders and work resumed as before at the other shops. Both sides claimed victory but most important was that each side had demonstrated to the other their respective strength and staying power. Almost immediately after the end of this strike negotiations were commenced which were to lead to the establishment of national conciliation in the industry through conferences of the contending parties.⁷⁰

The Canadian industry did not take part in these conferences nor did conciliation apply to the machinery moulding branches of the trade. Until these industry-wide agreements in stove foundries the strength of the moulders depended entirely on their skill and control of the work process and their ability through their union to maintain this and to exercise some degree of control over the labour market. This labour market control was of great importance and has been admirably discussed before with reference to the moulders.⁷¹ The importance of the union card to the moulder has been summarized: "...within the jurisdiction of his own local a union card was a man's citizenship paper; in the jurisdiction of other locals it was his passport."⁷²

The early 1890's saw a new employer offensive in Hamilton and Toronto as Gurney and Massey both attempted to smash the moulders' continuing power in their plants. The Gurney strike which commenced in February 1890 lasted an amazing sixteen months before local 28 ended it. The Massey strike covered ten months from October 1890 to July 1891.⁷³ In both cases the companies pursued a similar strategy. They shut down their moulding shops, ostensibly for repairs and, after a considerable lapse of time, called in the shop committees and asked them to accept either a sizeable reduction or work with "bucks".⁷⁴ In both cases the moulders refused for "union rules did not permit 'bucks' and the men thought they saw in it their eventual displacement by these labourers and a menace to their trade."⁷⁵ Both Gurney and Massey claimed that they could no longer afford union rates and compete successfully but the moulders suspected "a long conceived plan in the attempt at a reduction".⁷⁶ In each case management and labour settled down for a protracted struggle. David Black, the secretary of local 28, wrote after five months on strike:

*Our fight with Gurney still continues and bids fair to last quite a while longer. we succeed very well in relieving him of his good men, but he has plenty of money and it will take hard fighting and time to beat him.*⁷⁷

The Toronto local spared no expense or risk in this struggle and a number of their members were arrested and tried for intimidating scabs.⁷⁹ In September the local issued an appeal "To the Canadian Public" which explained they had been locked out "because they refused to make their work cheaper than for any other employer in the same line in the city; and thus assist them to destroy their competitors and monopolize the Canadian market at our expense." The public was called on to buy only union made goods since

*By this means our victory over monopoly will be assured; our right to organize and obtain fair wages for our labour will be vindicated; while the superior quality of your purchase will amply repay your preference.*⁷⁹

The union lost both these struggles but the cost to capital was also high. Gurney, in early 1891, when his victory seemed sure brayed triumphantly that "the only change resulting from the strike is that he now controlled his shop." However when he continued to claim that things were excellent, the *Globe* reporter noted that, faced with the open incredulity of the union representatives present, Gurney modified his statement mentioning "that of course the whole year had not been as smooth." The key in these struggles in the early 1890's was control. As capital entered a new stage where it recognized the necessity of supervising more closely the process of production it had to confront and defeat its "autonomous workmen". This gives Gurney's parting chortle added significance:

*The men must work for someone else until they come to one of my proposals. I do not think (with a smile) that there is any likelihood of my going to local union 28 and asking them to come and take control of my foundry.*⁸⁰

Gurney's last laugh was too precipitous however for the I.M.I.U. came back strong in Toronto in the late 1890's and a new wave of struggle broke over the foundry business in 1902-1904.⁸¹ It is not the purpose of this paper to detail that struggle but it is important to emphasize that the power of the moulders was not broken in the struggles of 1890-1892. Gurney and Massey delivered only a partial defeat and the moulders came back strong. J.H. Barnett, Toronto I.M.I.U. secretary, described one 1903 struggle:

*Just after adjourning the meeting this afternoon the foreman of the Inglis shop, R. Goods, came to the hall and informed us that he had discharged all the scabs in his shop and that he wanted the union men in on Monday, that the firm was tired of the scabs and was willing to give the nine hours . . .*⁸²

One year later in yet another struggle with Toronto foundrymen now supported by the National Foundry Association, Barnett wrote again of the continued monopoly on skill that the moulders enjoyed:

They are having greater losses in the foundry now than when they first started. They have been trying to make a big condenser and can't make it. They have started the old St. Lawrence shop with some of the old country moulders who refused to work with Ersig, the NFA foreman up in the new shop. Jas Gillmore and Fred McGill is instruction [sic] them but ain't doing any better.⁸³

Iron moulders then, unlike coopers, maintained a high degree of work place control on into the twentieth century. This was primarily due to their strong organization but was also partially contingent on the slowness with which technology replaced their skill. Machines for moulding were experimented with in the mid-1880's but were an extremely expensive failure.⁸⁴ Massey imported its first machines in 1889.⁸⁵ Thus, unlike the coopers and shoemakers, the moulders had time to perfect their organization before their major contest with machinery.

Moulders also developed an early understanding of the need for solidarity with their unskilled co-workers. Thus, when the Knights of Labor struck the huge Massey works in Toronto in 1886, moulders left the job in their support. Peterborough I.M.I.U. local no. 191 also co-operated with the Lindsay Knights of Labor.⁸⁶

III

The workers' control enjoyed by Toronto moulders, and their struggle to retain it, was more than equalled by the experiences of Toronto printers. The printers' control of the shop floor demonstrates extremely well early union power. In the 1890's the President of the Toronto local of the I.T.U. insisted:

The work of the composing room is our business. To no one else can we depute it. It is absolutely ours. The talk of running another man's business will not hold. It is ours; we learned it and must control it.⁸⁷

Unionism among the Toronto Printers owed much to the customs and traditions of the craft. Organized first in 1832 the Society lapsed in 1836 but was refounded in 1844 to resist a new Toronto employer's departure from the "settled usages of the trade".⁸⁸ In 1845, when forced again to fight the initiatives taken by George Brown, the printers issued a circular to the Toronto public demanding only "to maintain that which is considered by all the respectable proprietors as a fair and

just reward, for our labour and toil—"the labourer is worthy of his hire".⁸⁹ Here the tenacity of preindustrial notions of traditional wages can be seen. Customary usage dictated wages—not any abstract notion of what the market might bear. Employers as well as workers had to learn the new rules of a market economy and the disruptions caused by the Browns' arrival in the Toronto printing trades in the 1840's, suggest that until then wages had been "largely a customary and not a market calculation".⁹⁰

The printers possessed a strong tradition of craft pride and identification. In their 1845 statement to the Toronto public they resolved "to maintain by all legitimate means in their power their just rights and privileges as one of the most important and useful groups in the industrious community."⁹¹

Members of the "art preservative", they saw themselves as the main carriers of rationalism and the enlightenment. No trade dinner or ball, and these were frequent, was complete without a set of toasts to the printers' patron, Benjamin Franklin, and to Gutenberg and other famous printers. Franklin replaced the older European craft tradition of saints and his rationalism fitted very well with the printers' disdain for other societies who had recourse to secret signs and fiery oaths. The printers prided themselves on the fact that:

*initiation ceremonies, melo-dramatic oaths, passwords, signs, grips, etc., though advocated by many worthy representatives, and repeatedly considered by the national union, never found a place in the national or subordinate constitutions.*⁹²

The printers saw their craft as crucial in maintaining all that was best in the western literary tradition. As one printer toasted in an 1849 Anniversary Dinner: "To the art of printing—under whose powerful influence the mind of fallen and degraded man is raised from nature up to nature's God."⁹³ Thus printer's shop committees were "chapels" and the shop steward was "the father of the chapel". This pride in craft was manifested time and time again throughout the nineteenth century.

In 1869 the executive recommended the initiation of a reading room and library:

*where the members of the craft can have access in leisure hours for the enjoyment of study and mental recreation and where may be ever within their reach increasing facilities for the acquisition of whatever in our art it may be of advantage to know.... It is a laudable endeavour to support one's calling which two centuries ago was deemed the most honourable of all professions....*⁹⁴

The union seal depicted a printing press with light emanating from all around it.⁹⁵

The Toronto printers had a strong sense of the history of their craft and their union. They were particularly proud of being the oldest Toronto union and parts of their frequent fêtes were often spent on these themes. The 1888 picnic programme, for example, contained original histories of both the art of printing and of the Toronto Typographical Union.⁹⁶ All these traditions were put to use by the printers and they brought the craft lore together in stirring addresses invoking custom in the struggle against oppression:

Fellow-workingmen, knights of the stick and rule, preservers of "the art preservative",—ye whose honourable calling is to make forever imperishable the noblest, truest, and most sublime thoughts of the statesman, the philosopher, and the poet,—to you is committed the mightiest agent for good or ill which has yet been pressed into the service of humanity. The printing press, the power mightier than kings, more powerful than armies, armaments, or navies, which shall yet overthrow ignorance and oppression and emancipate labour, is your slave. Without your consent, without the untiring labour of your skillful fingers and busy brain, this mighty giant, with his million tongued voices speeding on wings of steam all over this broad earth of ours, would be dumb. Shorn of his strength which your skill imparts, his throbbing sides and iron sinews might pant and strain in vain; no voice or cry of his or your oppressors could ever reach or be heard among men. Realizing this my friends it is easy to determine our proper station in the grand struggle that is now in progress all over the civilized world, the effort of the masses to throw off oppression's yoke.... We belong in the front rank, at the head of this column. Since the discovery of printing humanity has made great progress and already we see the dawn of the coming day when light and knowledge shall illuminate all lands and men shall no longer oppress his fellow-man.⁹⁷

Central to the power of the International Typographical Union was the extent to which each local maintained its control over production. The composing room was the preserve of the printer. Management's only representative there, the foreman, was a union member and subject to the discipline of his brothers. This was true in Toronto from the inception of the T.T.U. and was very important because the union also demanded that all hiring be done through the foreman.⁹⁸ In 1858 the I.T.U. convention had ruled that:

*The foreman of an office is the proper person to whom application should be made for employment; and it is enjoined upon subordinate unions that they disapprove of any other mode of application.*⁹⁹

The new I.T.U. constitution of 1867 fined members who applied for jobs to anyone other than the foreman. Four years later this control was reasserted but foremen were also warned:

*It is the opinion of your humble servant that the foreman of an office belongs to the union under which he works and the union does not belong to the foreman...and that no foreman has the right to discharge a regular hand...on any other ground than that of shortness of work or wilfull neglect of duty....*¹⁰⁰

In an extraordinary 1873 case the I.T.U. ruled that the Ottawa local was correct to strike against J.C. Boyce, the proprietor of *The Citizen*, when he took over operation of his own composing room. Only if Boyce submitted a clear card from the London (Eng.) Trades Society would he "be allowed to work under the jurisdiction of the Ottawa Union".¹⁰¹

This effective union control of the hiring practice was augmented by the role the foreman played in enforcing the printer's right to divide work. In newspaper offices each regular employee had a "sit" and with this place came the right to choose a replacement any time the regular wanted time off. Although not technically employed by the regular printer that was actually what the practice amounted to. In Toronto the *Mail* paid the money to the regular who then paid the subs from his salary.¹⁰² When bosses tried to regulate this custom by utilizing "sub-lists" which delineated the substitutes from whom regulars were forced to choose, the International roundly condemned the practice and refused to allow locals to co-operate with it.¹⁰³ The union claimed ever more interest in the hiring process. In 1888 a resolution was introduced at the I.T.U. convention "that would have placed the regulation of hiring and discharging of employees entirely in the hands of the local unions."¹⁰⁴ In 1890 "the priority law" was passed by which the grounds upon which foremen could discharge were even more tightly circumscribed. Only incompetency, violation of rules, neglect of duty or decrease of labour force were acceptable causes for firing and on discharge a member was entitled to a written statement of cause. In addition the final part of the law ruled that "subs" in an office had priority when positions became available.¹⁰⁵ The power of the union then, in controlling the selection of printers, was almost total.

The union also retained a strong position in bargaining. The union would first arrive at an approved scale of prices unilaterally and would

then take it to the employers.¹⁰⁶ Some negotiation was possible but much of the scale was regarded as non-negotiable. For example after the strike of 1872 for the nine hour day never again were hours subject to consideration; having been won once they were off limits for further discussion.¹⁰⁷ The scale was a complex document divided into three major sections: time work; piece work, news and magazines; and piece work, books. Time work was not the traditional method of payment in the printing industry but throughout the late nineteenth century more and more job shops adopted it. However the time rate was closely tied to the piece rate. In Toronto where the piece rate was 33 1/3 cents per 1000 ems, the time rate was 33 1/3 cents an hour—the general assumption being that a hand compositor averaged 1000 ems an hour. In newspaper offices the usual method of payment was by the piece which in the compositor's case was measured by the area of type that he composed and expressed in "ems". Printers were thus paid per 1000 ems of matter. There were a number of areas of conflict implicit in this type of payment. Rates were set for the newspaper as a whole but special rates were set for material classified as difficult such as foreign languages or tables or even for illegible copy.¹⁰⁸ As the century progressed more and more newspaper work consisted of advertising which contained far more blank space than regular material. This copy became known as "fat" matter and was the most lucrative for the printer. The printers insisted that rates were set for the paper as a whole thus retaining the higher rate for fat matter as well. The traditional way of distributing the material was that all copy was hung on the "hook" as it arrived in the composing room and the compositors picked it up in order thus insuring an even distribution of the "fat." Bosses began to object to this and tried to create "departments" by which specific printers did the special composing. This the union resisted strenuously and forbade locals from accepting "departments". They offered, as a compromise, to allow members to bid for the "fat" matter. The successful bidder who gained the ads then paid back to the union the amount of his bid, usually a percent of his earnings, which was then used to buy things in common for all the printers, to hire a person to clean everybody's type or was distributed equally among the members.¹⁰⁹ The Toronto local however resisted all employer incursions in this area. Toronto employers certainly tried. In 1882 the *Mail* offered its printers an advance but in return demanded the return of the ads. Instead the new scale of 1883 reiterated that "where weekly and piece hands are employed the piece hands shall have their proportionate share of 'fat' matter."¹¹⁰ Seven years later another new scale still insisted that "compositors on newspapers were entitled to equal distribution of any 'phat'."¹¹¹ The complexity of the Toronto printer's scale is suggested by the 39 sec-

tions of the 1883 and 35 sections of the 1890 contracts.¹¹² All this led one managerial strategist named DeVinne, who was later to play a major role in the United Typothetae, to moan that "It is the composition room that is the great sink-hole. It is in type and the wages of compositors that the profits of the house are lost."¹¹³

So far we have spoken entirely of only one branch of printing—the compositors. Until the middle of the century in the cities and until much later in small shops, a printer ran the press as well as composing. With the rise of power presses, the pressman's role became more and more complex and increasingly the old time printer who did both jobs disappeared and new specialists took over. By 1869 the Toronto local had special piece rates for pressmen and the job definition of the compositor prevented him from performing press work. The pressmen's new consciousness led the I.T.U. to begin to charter Pressmen's locals separately in 1873 and ten years later the Toronto Pressmen set up their own local. Disputes with Local 91 however led them to join the new International Printing Pressmen's Union in 1889. This splintering of the printing crafts caused many problems but the pressmen as an equally skilled group carried with them the traditions of printers' unionism. Time was spent at meetings, for example, in designing outfits for the various marches and parades that were so much a part of working class life in Toronto in the 1880's.¹¹⁴

Although the major focus of this paper is the skilled worker's power on the job one cannot discuss the Toronto printers without alluding also to their political strength in the city, in provincial and even in national politics. They provided the Toronto working class community and movement with important leadership. It was natural for these literate, working class intellectuals to play key political roles but the extent of their dominance is striking nevertheless. Although not the initiators of the Toronto Trades Assembly (this honour belongs to John Hewitt of the Coopers International Union) they did play an important part in this organization and in the Canadian Labour Union. In the 1880's they helped found the Toronto Trades and Labor Council after the meeting of the I.T.U. in Toronto in 1881 and later were quite active in the meetings of the Trades and Labor Congress. Moreover of the six labour papers published in Toronto between 1872 and 1892 three of them were published and edited by printers—*The Ontario Workman* under J.S. Williams, J.C. McMillan, and David Sleeth, all prominent members of Local 91; *The Trade Union Advocate/Wage Worker* of Eugene Donavon; and D.J. O'Donoghue's *Labor Record*. Other members of Local 91 also enjoyed prominent careers in labour reform—John Armstrong, a former International President of the I.T.U. (1878-9) was appointed to Macdonald's Royal Commission on

the Relations of Labour and Capital in 1886; D.J. O'Donoghue, prominent as an MPP, leading Canadian Knight of Labor and later collector of labour statistics for the Ontario Bureau of Industries; E.F. Clarke, arrested in 1872 and later Mayor of Toronto, MPP and MP; and W.B. Prescott, International President of the I.T.U. from 1891-1898. This was just one generation of Local 91's membership: the next was to include two mayors of Toronto and a senator.¹¹⁵

Local 91's political role stemmed from its union activities. Toronto printers, for example, had little use for George Brown's brand of Liberalism. As early as 1845 they had noted the irony implicit in his labour relations policies:

*A person from the neighbouring Republic commenced business here and has ever since been unremitting in his Liberal endeavour to reduce as low as possible that justly considered fair and equitable rate of remuneration due to the humble operatives.*¹¹⁶

His "Liberal" endeavours were to lead him into conflict with the printers time and time again culminating in the Printer's Strike for the nine hour day in 1872.¹¹⁷ Brown's use of antiquated British laws against combination to arrest the leaders of the I.T.U. was turned against him by Macdonald's passage of the Trade Union Act. The Tories controlled Toronto working class politics for a number of years following, until D.J. O'Donoghue, the Knights of Labor, and the legislative responsiveness of the Mowat Ontario government started a swing towards the Liberals.

The political expertise of the printers had of course grown throughout their various struggles and the tactics perfected in 1872 were used again in the 1880's. Thus when John Ross Robertson's *Telegram* came under union attack in 1882 the union first turned to the boycott to bring pressure on the owner. They decided that in this way they could expose

*the treatment which union printers have received at the hands of JRR for many years past, and the manner in which that gentleman (?) invariably casts aspersions upon the union mechanics of this city generally through the columns of his vasculating [sic] paper.*¹¹⁸

John Armstrong and D.J. O'Donoghue were appointed to visit the merchants who advertised in the *Telegram* and convince them to place their ads elsewhere. The next year when I.T.U. No. 91 passed a new scale of prices they struck the *Telegram* pulling most of the compositors out on strike. They then received the endorsement of the whole Toronto Trades and Labor Council for the boycott and late in

March held a mass meeting at which speeches were delivered by most of the prominent Toronto labour leaders pledging support for Local 91.¹¹⁹

The strikes the following year against the *Mail* and the *Globe* were even more eventful and suggestive of the printers' political acumen. The papers united with other Toronto publishers and print shops to demand a 10% reduction on the printers' wages and gave only a week for consideration. The printers refused and struck. The union was successful in forcing job offices and smaller papers to withdraw the reduction but the *Globe* and the *Mail* held out. The *Globe* insisted that it had never become a union shop because "the boss needed absolute control in a newspaper office".¹²⁰ The morning papers after a hard fight won the reduction to 30 cents per 1000 ems down from 33 1/3 cents but their victory was short lived. In 1885 the *Globe* reversed its position of a year before and the political game of the 1870's by becoming a union shop for the first time. This left only the Tory *Mail* holding out against the typos. The *Mail* succumbed in February of 1886 and became a union shop, withdrawing the iron-clad contract that it had adopted after the troubles in 1884.

What tactics had the I.T.U. used to win these long-range victories after their apparent defeat in 1884? The printers had employed their usual measures against the papers. They first withdrew all their members from the shops and when they failed to prevent the shops' filling up with the much despised "country-mice", non-union printers from small towns, they turned to the boycott and mass demonstrations of workingmen.¹²¹ But this time they also requested all workingmen to boycott any candidates supported by the *Mail* in the municipal election campaigns of the winter of 1885-6.¹²² Local 91 passed a resolution: "That this union will oppose to its utmost any candidate for municipal honours who may be supported by the *Mail* newspaper."¹²³ The following weeks saw union after union endorse the I.T.U. motion and also saw a number of Tory ward heelers running for cover and abandoning the *Mail*. The union issued a circular exposing its dealings with the *Mail* since 1872 and then placed advertisements in the Toronto papers in January of 1886 strongly attacking Manning, the *Mail's* candidate for Mayor:

*Resolved that this union consider Mr. Manning a nominee of the Mail, he having advertised in that paper . . . and having been editorially supported by it, particularly so on Saturday morning January 2; and therefore we call on all workingmen and those in sympathy with organized labour to VOTE AGAINST MANNING, THE NOMINEE OF THE MAIL.*¹²⁴

The same Local 91 meeting also decided to blacklist aldermanic candidates who had not broken with the *Mail* and decided to issue 10,000 circulars denouncing Manning and these candidates. After Howland's stunning election as mayor, widely regarded as a working class victory, the I.T.U. issued this statement:

To the Trades and Labour organizations of Toronto—Fellow unionists: Toronto Typographical Union No. 91 takes this opportunity of thanking the labour organizations of this city and their friends who so nobly supported us at the polls in our effort to defeat the Mail. To the workingmen of Toronto who have had the honour and manhood to rise above party ties in the cause of labour, the heartiest thanks of the 300 members of the TTU are due At a time when we needed your assistance you have shown that the mottoe of our union 'United to support not combined to injure' is the guiding stone of the honest toiler everywhere...¹²⁵

This electoral defeat led to the *Mail's* total reversal in February, 1886 when it surrendered to the Union. Local 91 had had to prove its strength at the polls however for as early as 1884 leading Tory printers had warned Macdonald of the possible repercussions of the *Mail's* adventure. J.S. Williams had written in August, 1884:

Not only will the matter complained of [Mail lock-out] alienate a very large proportion of the working men who have hitherto nobly supported the party, but it places a barrier in the way of any prominent or representative workingman actively working or speaking in the future.

Moreover he predicted that the *Mail's* reactionary policies could cost the Tories two to three seats in Toronto and perhaps seats in other urban centres as well. E.F. Clarke, a prominent politician and member of local 91, wrote to the same effect:

A reduction of wages at a week's notice and a refusal of the Mail to leave the settlement of the question to arbitration will alienate the sympathies of a large number of workingmen who have hitherto supported the Conservative cause, and will weaken the influence of the journal with the masses

A non-working class Tory politico wrote that the labour friends of the party were now in an impossible position since they "cannot support the party that treats them so shabbily" and expressed the fear that the loss of the whole Toronto Trades and Labor Council might result in electoral defeat in the city.¹²⁶ Nevertheless these warnings were ig-

nored until the humiliating defeats of January 1886. Then the party rushed in to settle the matter once and for all. Harry Piper, a Tory ward heeler, wrote to Macdonald in February to inform him that the I.T.U.-*Mail* fight "had of late assumed a very serious aspect" since a number of old party workers had clearly transferred their allegiance in the election. As a result he arranged a meeting with John Armstrong, a Tory leader of Local 91 who had lost his own job at the *Mail* during the strike. Piper convinced Armstrong that "the Union was *killing our Party* and the Grits were reaping the benefit of the trouble and using *our own friends*." Armstrong promised to help if the iron-clad was removed. Piper then arranged with the manager and directors of the *Mail* that the document be ceremoniously burned before the printers and Armstrong agreed to have the union lift the boycott.¹²⁷ Thus the seeming defeat of the summer of 1884 had been translated by political means into a striking victory for local 91. Neither the *Globe* nor the *Mail* were to cause the union difficulty again in the late nineteenth century.

Similar tactics were employed successfully against J.H. Maclean of the *World* in 1888 when he tried to defeat the union's control of "fat" matter. The struggle was precipitated by a fight over the price to be paid for an advertisement that was inserted twice. The union rule was that if the advertisement was run in an identical manner then the compositor was only paid once but that if any changes were made the compositor was paid again for the whole advertisement. The foreman supported the printers' case but the Macleans, after paying the money owed, locked out the union. The I.T.U. then reiterated its position on "fat" matter:

*Only by the getting of the advertisements and other "fat" matter are the men able to make anything like living wages, and this fact is recognized by all fair-minded employers as well as the men.*¹²⁸

In late July after filling his shop with "country-mice" Maclean sought an injunction against the I.T.U.'s boycott of the *World*. It was granted on an interim basis and then made permanent in mid-August.¹²⁹ The injunction did not solve Maclean's problems:

*The World is in sore straits as a result of the law compelling union men not to buy it or patronize merchants who advertise therein. Internal storms are of such common occurrence that a couple of weeks ago the vermin employed there went out on strike even but returned to the nest again.*¹³⁰

A few months later Maclean again sought to make his paper a union shop. Again the political dimensions of the settlement are clear. W.B.

Prescott, the President of Local 91, wrote John A. Macdonald and sought his intervention with Maclean to insure that the *World* came around. Prescott pointed out that "the cheap labour policies of the *World* antagonized organized labour."¹³¹ Perhaps one reason that Maclean and the *World* felt the pressure was the Local had quickly found a way to circumvent the injunction by promoting union papers rather than naming those boycotted. They continued to use this technique especially in a political context. In the municipal campaigns of 1891-2 for example, they issued the following circular:

*Having been informed that you are seeking municipal honours, we desire to call your attention to the fact that there are a few printing and publishing houses in this city who do not employ union labour, and we, believing it would be to your advantage to patronize only those who do employ such, request you to place your patronage and advertising in union offices only, as we can assure you that from past experience, your chances of election are greater by so doing.*¹³²

The circular then listed the dailies that were union shops which by 1891 included all but the *Telegram* which was shortly to enter the fold. In March, 1892 the T.T.U. also began the use of the union label.¹³³ Thus the power of the Toronto printers continued to grow throughout the late nineteenth century and a larger proportion of Toronto printers were unionised in the early 1890's than had been at any previous date.¹³⁴

The initial encounter with mechanization served to strengthen their position. Until the invention of linotype and monotype machines in the late 1880's, typesetting had remained unchanged from the sixteenth century.¹³⁵ In Toronto the *News* introduced the Rogers typograph machine in 1892 and offered the printer-operators 14 cents/1000 ems. The I.T.U. had recommended in 1888 "that subordinate unions . . . take speedy action looking to their [linotype machines] recognition and regulation, endeavouring everywhere to secure their operation by union men upon a scale of wages which shall secure compensation equal to that paid hand compositors."¹³⁶ This was amended in 1889¹³⁷ to demand that in all union offices only practical printers could run the machines and that the rates on the machines would be governed by the local unions.¹³⁸ In Toronto the union's right to control the operation of the machine was not challenged initially and their *Typographical Journal* correspondent reported in March of 1892 "that so far we have not suffered from their use". However that summer the *News*, appealing to the craft custom of piece rates, refused to pay operators by the day. After a seven week strike the union won its

demand that the printers be paid by time. They were to receive \$12.00 a week for six weeks while learning the machine operation and then \$14.00 after they demonstrated their competency which was set at 2000 ems per hour or 100,000 ems per week. This settlement brought the union not only control of the machine and the wage style it sought but also implicitly recognized the printers' right to limit production since the rate of competency set was far below the actual capabilities of the machine which were estimated to be anywhere from 3-8 times as fast as hand composition.¹³⁸ The International was also concerned to prevent any proliferation of speed-ups with the new machine and ruled that "no member shall be allowed to accept work . . . where a task, stint, or deadline is imposed by the employer on operators of typesetting devices."¹⁴⁰ The union later successfully resisted any attempts by employers to speed up work totals. The victory over the *News* and the union's previous success with Robertson's *Telegram* also brought Local 91 control of all Toronto newspapers for the first time in its history.¹⁴¹ The printers had learned their lessons well. They left the century not only with their traditions intact but also with their power actually augmented. They had met the machine and triumphed.¹⁴²

IV

What ramifications did shop floor power have in terms of how workers thought about their society, how it was changing and their own role in it? David Montgomery has argued that the major impact of this early workers' control was the skilled workers' growing awareness that the key institution for the transformation of society was the trade union.¹⁴³ From their understanding that they, through their unions, controlled production, it was a relatively easy step to the belief that all the capitalist brought to the process was capital. Thus an alternative source of capital would transform the society ending the inequities of capitalist production and creating the producer's society that they all dreamed of. This ideology looked to co-operation administered through the trade union as the major agent of change. All the unions we have discussed favoured co-operation.

John Monteith, President of Toronto I.M.I.U. Local 28, wrote *Fincher's Trades Review* in 1863 to describe the work of Canada West members in discussing and investigating co-operation. A union moulders' committee had contacted Rochdale and now recommended both producers and consumers co-ops to their local unions. They sought co-operation because "our present organization does not accomplish what we want. That is to take us from under the hand of our employers and place us on an equal footing."¹⁴⁴ Co-operation of course would accomplish this very end. Five years later another To-

ronto moulder complained that "We are but little better off than our forefathers who were serfs to the feudal barons. We are serfs to the capitalists of the present day . . ." His solution:

*Let the next convention create a co-op fund to be devoted entirely to co-operation. . . . We have been co-operating all our lives, but it has been to make someone else rich. We have been the busy bees in the hives while the drones have run away with the honey and left us to slave in the day of adversity. . . . Day after day the wealth of the land is concentrating in the hands of a few persons. The little streams of wealth created and put in motion by the hard hands of labour gravitate into one vast reservoir, out of which but a few individuals drink from golden cups; while labour, poor, degraded and despised labour, must live in unhealthy hovels and feed upon scanty, unhealthy food from rusty dishes. . . .*¹⁴⁵

The I.M.I.U. founded as many as twenty co-operative foundries in the 1860's.¹⁴⁶

Toronto printers started three co-operative newspapers. At the height of the nine hour struggle in 1872 *The Ontario Workman* was started as a co-operative venture as was D.J. O'Donoghue's *Labor Record* of 1886. In 1892 during the strike at the *News* a group of printers banded together and founded the *Star*.¹⁴⁷ *The Ontario Workman* operated as a co-op paper for only six months and the *Labor Record* and the *Star* each lasted about a year. Capital for the *Star* was raised from the T.T.U. and T.T.L.C. They initially used the presses of the *World* since W.F. Maclean offered them his facilities in return for 51% of the operation. This "Paper for the People" enjoyed quick success in winning the readership of the *News* which had from its inception in 1882 posed as the paper for Toronto workers.¹⁴⁸ Riordan, the owner of the *News*, attempted to buy the operation and Maclean tried to merge it with the *World* but the printers refused both offers and instead bought a press. However they failed to make a go of it and the paper suspended publication in June of 1893. It was continued after its purchase as a pro-labour paper but control had passed out of the printers' hands.¹⁴⁹

Machinists and blacksmiths in Toronto organized a co-operative foundry early in 1872 after losing a strike at the Soho works.¹⁵⁰ Six years later Toronto cigar makers established the Toronto Co-operative Cigar Manufactory Association. Here, as with the moulders in the 1860's, the push for co-operation came as a logical extension of their knowledge of the trade and their refusal to accept management's reduction of wages. Alf Jury, a Toronto tailor and labour reformer, de-

nounced "the wage system as a modified form of slavery" and demonstrated that there could be "no fraternal feeling between capital and labour" at a cigar makers' strike meeting that year. Jury then cited production statistics to repudiate the employers' claims that the reduction was necessary. A number of bosses who had agreed to pay union rates supported this assertion. Jury's logical solution was the great aim of working class struggle: "to do away with the capitalists while using the capital ourselves"—the establishment of a co-operative factory.¹⁵¹ An association was founded, shares were issued, a charter was obtained and the factory opened for business in March 1879. About a year later the Toronto local of the C.M.I.U. reported that the co-operative was "progressing finely" and "doing a good trade".¹⁵² Stratford cigar makers also founded a co-operative factory in 1886 which was owned by the Knights of Labor and run under C.M.I.U. rules. It employed between 20 and 30 men and produced a brand known as "The Little Knight".¹⁵³ Toronto Bakers Assembly LA 3499 also set up a co-operative bakery which lasted about two years in the mid-1880's.¹⁵⁴

The successes or failures of these co-operative ventures are of less importance than the ideological assumptions on which they were based. Often originated only in crisis situations, they, nevertheless, flowed directly from the shop floor experience of skilled workers and the practices of their unions in struggling to control production. It was a relatively easy step from there to envisioning a system that was free of the boss who did so very little. A Chatham moulder wrote in 1864:

*This then shows both classes in their just relations towards each other—the capitalist and the mechanic; the one, the mechanic is the moving power—the capitalist bearing about the same relation to him that the cart does to the horse which draws it—differing in this respect, that the mechanic makes the capitalist and the horse does not make the cart; the capitalist without the mechanic being about as useful as the cart without the horse. The capitalist no doubt at times increases the sphere of usefulness of the mechanic; so does the cart that of the horse, and enables him to do more for his owner than otherwise he could do; but deprive him of it, and there is little that he can do with it that he could not accomplish without it. In short the workingman is the cause the capitalist the effect.*¹⁵⁵

The syntax may be confused but the moulder's meaning comes through clearly. In 1882 at the time of a Toronto carpenters' strike, during discussion of a co-operative planing mill, a reporter asked union leader Thomas Moor if the carpenters had the requisite skills. Moor's response was simple but profound: "If the men can manage a mill and

make it a success for their employers, surely they can do the same thing for an institution in which they have an interest."¹⁵⁶

Co-operation was one extension of workers' control, socialism was to be another.¹⁵⁷ Capital, however, also began to respond to the challenges raised by the growing tradition of workers' control. F.W. Taylor, capital's main work place ideologue, understood very well the power of the "autonomous workman":

*Now, in the best of the ordinary types of management, the managers recognize the fact that the 500 or 1000 workmen, included in the 20 or 30 trades, who are under them, possess this mass of traditional knowledge, a large part of which is not in the possession of management . . . The foremen and superintendents know, better than anyone else, that their own knowledge and personal skill falls far short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all the workmen under them.*¹⁵⁸

Taylor also reminisced at length about his first job experience in a machine shop of the Midvale Steel Company in the late 1870's:

*As was usual then, and in fact as is still usual in most of the shops in this country [1912], the shop was really run by the workmen, and not by the bosses. The workmen together had carefully planned just how fast each job should be done, and they had set a pace for each machine throughout the shop, which was limited to about one-third of a good day's work. Every new workman who came into the shop was told at once by the other men exactly how much of each kind of work he was to do, and unless he obeyed these instructions he was sure before long to be driven out of the place by the men.*¹⁵⁹

After his appointment as foreman Taylor set out to increase production. He fired some of the men, lowered others' wages, hired "green" hands, lowered the piece rate—in general engaged in what he described as a "war". His limited success in this "bitter struggle" he attributed to not being of working class origin. His middle class status enabled him to convince management that worker sabotage, not the speed-up, was responsible for a sudden rash of machine breakdowns.¹⁶⁰

The new popularity of Taylor and the other proponents of "scientific management" in the early twentieth century, was indicative of capital's new attempt to rationalize production.¹⁶¹ This, combined with the rise of the large corporation, the rapid growth of multi-plant firms, and the ever-increasing extension of labour-saving machinery, challenged directly not only workers' control traditions but also the

very existence of the labour movement.

Toronto workers, who had struggled throughout the late nineteenth century for shop floor control, were about to face new, more virulent battles. The custom of workers' control, widely regarded as a right, had become deeply embedded in working class culture. The fight, initially to maintain and later to extend this control, became the major locus of class struggle in the opening decades of the twentieth century.

Thus even in the cases where craft unions abandoned the traditional practices of the "autonomous workman" in return for concessions or out of weakness, the leadership could not always assure management that the membership would follow union dictates. As one investigator noted about the foundry business:

*The customs of the trade . . . do not always vanish with the omission of any recognition of "the standard day's work" in wage agreements. Nor can it be expected that the entire membership of an organization will at once respond to the removal of limitations on output by a national convention of that organization. Trade customs, shop practices, grow; they become as much a part of the man as his skill as a molder . . .*¹⁶²

Written in 1904 these cautions were as true of other skilled workers as they were of moulders. Customs of control, established by struggle, would not vanish; they had to be vanquished by persistent management assault.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See Herbert Gutman, "Class, Status and the Gilded Age Radical: A Reconsideration" in Gutman and Kealey (eds.) *Many Past: Readings in American Social History*, Vol. 2, (Englewood Cliffs 1973), pp. 125-151 and his "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919", *American Historical Review*, 78 (1973), pp. 531-588; see also E.J. Hobsbawm, "Custom, Wages and Work-load", in *Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour*, (London 1964), pp. 344-370.

² David Montgomery, "Workers' Control of Machine Production in the Nineteenth Century", *Labor History*, forthcoming. See also his "Trade Union Practice and the Origins of Syndicalist Theory in the United States", unpublished paper and his "The 'New Unionism' and the Transformation of Workers' Consciousness in America, 1909-1922", *Journal of Social History*, 7 (1974), pp. 509-529. All these are part of Montgomery's ongoing study, tentatively titled *The Rise and Fall of the House of Labor, 1880-1920*.

³ Raymond Williams, "Base and Super-structure in Marxist Cultural Theory", *New Left Review*, 82 (Nov.-Dec. 1973), pp. 3-16. For an application of these categories to U.S. working class history see Leon Fink, "Class Conflict and Class Consciousness in the Gilded Age: The Figure and the Phantom", *Radical History Review*, (Winter 1975).

⁴ On scientific management in the U.S. see Milton Nadworny, *Scientific Management and the Unions*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1955); Katherine Stone, "The Origin of Job Structures in the Steel Industry", *Radical America*, 7 (1973), pp. 19-66 and Bryan Palmer, "Class, Conception and Class Conflict: The Thrust for Efficiency, Managerial Views of Labor and the Working Class Rebellion, 1903-1922", *The Review of Radical Political Economics*, 7 (1975), pp. 31-49. For Canada see Bradley Rubin, "Mackenzie King and the Writing of Canada's (Anti)Labour Laws", *Canadian Dimensions*, 8 (Jan. 1972); Michael Piva, "The Decline of the Trade Union Movement in Toronto, 1900-1915", unpubl. paper, CHA, 1975; and Craig Heron and Bryan Palmer, "Through the Prism of the Strike: The Contours and Context of Industrial Unrest in Southern Ontario, 1901-1914", forthcoming.

⁵ Gregory S. Kealey, "Artisans Respond to Industrialism: Shoemakers, Shoe Factories and the Knights of St. Crispin in Toronto", *Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers*, (1973), pp. 137-157.

⁶ Franklin E. Coyne, *The Development of the Cooperage Industry in the United States, 1620-1940*, (Chicago 1940), p. 24.

⁷ *Coopers' Journal* [henceforth *CJ*] May 1871, pp. 210-211.

⁸ *Chicago Workingman's Advocate*, March 19, 1870.

⁹ H.G. Gutman, "The Labor Policies of the Large Corporation in the Gilded Age: the Case of the Standard Oil Company", unpublished paper, October 1966, p.10.

¹⁰ Organizational data is drawn from *CJ*, 1870-1875; *Coopers' International Union of North America, Proceedings*, 1871 and 1873; and *Coopers' International Union of North America, Executive Department, Names and Addresses of the Cor[responding] Secretaries of all the Unions*, (Cleveland 1873).

¹¹ *Workingman's Advocate*, Jan. 20, 1872.

¹² Benson Soffer, "A Theory of Trade Union Development: The Role of the Autonomous Workman", *Labor History*, 1 (1960), p. 141.

¹³ *CJ*, August 1871, p. 319.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, April 1872, p. 254 and *Coopers' International Union of North America, Executive Board, Price List*, (Cleveland 1872), pp. 32-33.

¹⁵ *CJ*, October 1872, p. 633; March 1873, pp.133-134; June 1873, p. 278.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 1872, p. 566.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, June 1871, p. 248.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, June 1872, p. 373.

¹⁹ *Coopers' Ritual*, (Cleveland 1870), pp. 8-9.

²⁰ *CJ*, May 1871, p. 211.

²¹ Montgomery, "Workers' Control of Machine Production", pp. 7-9.

²² Martin Foran, *The Other Side: A Social Study Based on Fact*, (Washington 1886). The novel originally appeared in serial form in *CJ* commencing in December 1871 and was reprinted in the *Ontario Workman* in 1872.

²³ *CJ*, July 1872, pp. 426-429.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, March 1871, p. 153.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.* and *Proceedings*.

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²⁷ Gutman, "Standard Oil".

²⁸ H.B. Small, *The Products and Manufactures of the New Dominion*, (Ottawa 1868), pp. 139-141. For a good description of hand production see T.A. Meister, *The Apple Barrel Industry in Nova Scotia*, (Nova Scotia Museum, Halifax n.d.).

²⁹ For Gooderham's see *CJ*, Oct.-Nov. 1870, p. 25; July 1871, p. 268; April 1872, p. 235; August 1872, p. 500; September 1872, p. 566; December 1872, p. 741; March 1873, p. 133; *Toronto Mail*, April 23, 1872. For Walker's see *CJ*, January 1872, pp. 47-48. For other Toronto shops see Canada, *Census*, 1871, Industrial Mss.

³⁰ C.I.U., *Proceedings*, 1871.

³¹ *CJ*, Oct.-Nov. 1870, p. 25.

³² *Ibid.*, July 1871, p. 268.

³³ *Ibid.*, December 1872, p. 741.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, March 1872, p. 182.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, December 1874.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, June 1875.

³⁷ Greg Kealey (ed.), *Canada Investigates Industrialism*, (Toronto 1973), pp. 113-116.

³⁸ B. Soffer, "The 'Autonomous Workman'", p. 148.

³⁹ *CJ*, June 1875.

⁴⁰ *Globe*, April 15, 24, 1882.

⁴¹ *Iron Molders' Journal*, August 1883.

⁴² G.S. Kealey, "The Knights of Labor in Toronto", unpublished paper, 1974.

⁴³ Paul C. Appleton, "The Sunshine and the Shades: Labour Activism in Central Canada, 1850-1860", unpubl. M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1974.

⁴⁴ The best work on the Iron Molders International Union [henceforth I.M.I.U.] in Canada is C.B. Williams, "Canadian-American Trade Union Relations: A Study of the Development of Binational Unionism", unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Cornell, 1964, chs. 3-4. Although limited in scope the discussion of the Union is insightful.

⁴⁵ I.M.I.U., *Constitution*, 1859 as cited in Williams, "Canadian-American", p. 105.

⁴⁶ The discussion of wages in the industry is drawn from John P. Frey and John R. Commons, "Conciliation in the Stove Industry", *Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor*, 62 (1906), pp. 124-196, especially pp. 125-130 and Frank T. Stockton, *The International Molders Union of North America*, (Baltimore 1921).

⁴⁷ Carroll D. Wright, "Regulation and Restriction of Output", *Eleventh Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, (Washington 1904), pp. 149-185.

⁴⁸ Peterborough Iron Moulders International Union, No. 191, *Minutes*, September 4, 1882, in Gainey Collection, Trent University Archives [henceforth *Minutes no. 191*].

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, June 19, 1891.

⁵⁰ Jonathan Grossman, *William Sylvis, Pioneer of American Labor*, (N.Y. 1945), p. 153.

⁵¹ *Globe*, January 21, 1871.

⁵² *Minutes no. 191*, February 8, 1889; May 15, 1891.

⁵³ Frey and Commons, "Conciliation", pp. 126-127, 176; Stockton, *International Molders Union*, pp. 170-183.

⁵⁴ Williams, "Canadian-American", pp. 120.

⁵⁵ *Iron Molders Journal*, August-December 1874; February 1876; May 1876.

⁵⁶ Strike date drawn from Toronto press, 1867-1892 and from *Iron Molders Journal*, 1864-1895 and I.M.I.U., *Proceedings*, 1864-1895.

⁵⁷ *Globe*, March 22, April 3, 1867.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, December 21, 23, 27, 1870; January 20, 1871. I.M.I.U., *Proceedings*, 1872.

⁵⁹ *Globe*, May 24, June 2, September 26, 1890; January 10, 1891; Massey Clipping Files, Vol. 1, 1886-1891, Massey Archives, Toronto. I.M.I.U., *Proceedings*, 1890.

⁶⁰ I.M.I.U., *Proceedings*, 1895.

⁶¹ See especially J.H. Barnett to John Robertson, Toronto, August 20, 1903 and May 30, 1904 in I.M.I.U. no. 191, *Correspondence*, Gainey Collection [henceforth *Correspondence* no. 191].

⁶² *Globe*, March 22, 1867.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, April 3, 1867.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, January 20, 1871. See also December 21, 23, 27, 1870; April 21, 1871.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, July 15, 18, November 18, 1871; For the moulders' response to these legal initiatives see *Iron Molders Journal*, January 31, 1871.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, February 28, 1871. For other similar cases see *IMJ*, September 30, 1871; December 31, 1870.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, September 30, 1871.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, December 31, 1871.

⁶⁹ *Globe*, January 8, 1887; January 6, 1888; *Canadian Labor Reformer*, January 8, 1887.

⁷⁰ Frey and Commons, *Conciliation*, pp.104-147.

⁷¹ Williams, "Canadian-American", *passim*.

⁷² Grossman, *Sylvia*, p. 110.

⁷³ Ontario Bureau of Industry, *Annual Report*, 1892; I.M.I.U., *Proceedings*, 1892-1895.

⁷⁴ *Globe*, February 27, 1890; August 22, 1890; September 26, 1890; October 3, 1890; January 10, 1891; *News*, August 25, 1890; *Monetary Times*, October 31, 1890.

⁷⁵ *Globe*, January 10, 1891.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, August 22, 1890.

⁷⁷ David Black to F. W. Parkes, Peterborough, June 29, 1890, *Correspondence*, no. 191.

⁷⁸ *Globe*, May 24, June 2, 1890.

⁷⁹ "To the Canadian Public", Toronto, September 1, 1890, *Correspondence*, no. 191.

⁸⁰ *Globe*, January 10, 1891. Encouraged by his temporary victory in Toronto Gurney attacked his Hamilton moulders the next year. For this bitter struggle see I.M.I.U., *Proceedings*, 1895; Fred Walters to F.W. Parkes, Peterborough, March 20, 1892; Executive Board I.M.I.U., "Circular letter", March 3, 1892; Hamilton I.M.I.U. Local No. 26, "Labor Struggle against Capital", March 28, 1892. The last three items are in *Correspondence*, no. 191.

⁸¹ For general material on the employee offensive see works cited in note 4, *supra*.

⁸² J.H. Barnett to John Robertson, Jr., Peterborough, August 20, 1903, *Correspondence*, no. 191.

⁸³ Barnett to Robertson, May 30, 1904, *ibid.*

⁸⁴ Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labour-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester*, (Madison 1967), ch. 1.

⁸⁵ Massey Account Books, Massey Archives, Toronto. For the best discussion of technological innovation in the moulding industry see James Cooke Mills, *Searchlights on Some American Industries*, (Chicago 1911), ch. 7.

⁸⁶ For Massey Strike see Kealey, "Knights of Labor", pp. 23-27; for Peterborough-Lindsay connection see *Minutes no. 191*, 1886-1887. Ozanne, *A Century*, provides similar evidence of co-operation between Chicago moulders and the Knights.

⁸⁷ From William Powell's address to the fifty-first annual convention of the I.T.U. Cited in Wayne Roberts, "The Last Artisans: Toronto Printers, 1896-1914", in Kealey and Warrian (eds.), *Essays in Working Class History*, (Toronto 1976).

⁸⁸ Toronto Typographical Union, *Minutes*, March 5, 1845. [henceforth T.T.U., *Minutes*].

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, July 2, 1845.

⁹⁰ Hobsbawm, "Custom, Wages and Work-load", p. 347. See also Sally Zerker, "The Development of Collective Bargaining in the Toronto Printing Industry in the Nineteenth Century", *Industrial Relations*, 30 (1975), pp. 83-97.

⁹¹ T.T.U., *Minutes*, July 2, 1845.

⁹² George E. McNeill, *The Labor Movement*, (Boston 1887), p. 185.

⁹³ T.T.U., *Minutes*, March 7, 1849.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, January 1869.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, June 6, 1891.

⁹⁶ *Globe*, July 27, 1888. The extensive historical interests of printers are also evidenced by two early official I.T.U. histories: John McVicar, *Origins and Progress of the Typographical Union, 1850-1891*, (Lansing, Mich. 1891) and George A. Tracey, *History of the Typographical Union*, (Indianapolis 1913).

⁹⁷ International Typographical Union, [henceforth I.T.U.] *Proceedings*, 1881, p. 46.

⁹⁸ Carroll Wright, "Restriction of Output", pp. 88-91.

⁹⁹ National Typographical Union, *Proceedings*, 1858, pp. 45-46.

¹⁰⁰ I.T.U., *Proceedings*, 1871, p. 47.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 1873 and Elizabeth Baker, *Printers and Technology: A History of the Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union*, (New York 1957), p. 215.

¹⁰² *Globe*, July 21, 1884.

¹⁰³ George A. Barnett, "The Printers: A Study in American Trade Unionism", *American Economic Association Quarterly*, 3rd series, X (1909), esp. pp. 218-221.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-242 and *Typographical Journal*, July 15, 1890.

¹⁰⁶ Zerker, "Development of Collective Bargaining", pp. 84-88.

¹⁰⁷ Sally Zerker, "George Brown and the Printers' Union", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 10, 1 (1975) p. 47.

¹⁰⁸ A humorous example of the last was the Vancouver "cap 'I' strike" of 1889. The printers struck the *World* for two days when management refused to pay for corrections in faulty copy. See George Bartley, *An Outline History of Typographical Union, no. 226, Vancouver, B.C., 1887-1938*, (Vancouver 1938), p. 8.

¹⁰⁹ Barnett, "The Printers", pp. 108-142, and Sally Zerker, "A History of

the Toronto Typographical Union", unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1972, pp. 1-14.

¹¹⁰ T.T.U., "Scale of Prices" in *Minutes*, March 17, 1883.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, December 20, 1890.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, March 17, 1883; December 6, 20, 1890; March 28, December 5, 1891.

¹¹³ Baker, *Printers and Technology*, p. 69. For a discussion of the historical roots of I.T.U. strength and for contemporary twentieth century examples see S.M. Lipset, M.A. Trow, J.S. Coleman, *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the I.T.U.*, (Glencoe, Ill, 1956), ch. 2.

¹¹⁴ Toronto Printing Pressmen's Union, No. 10, [henceforth T.P.P.U.] *Minutes*, March 1883-December 1890, P.A.C. and Baker, *Printers and Technology*, *passim*.

¹¹⁵ Roberts, "Toronto Printers" and Ross Harkness, *J.E. Atkinson of the Star*, (Toronto 1963), p. 28.

¹¹⁶ T.T.U., *Minutes*, July 2, 1845.

¹¹⁷ Zerker, "George Brown", *passim* and for greater detail on T.T.U. struggles in the 1850's see Appleton, "The Sunshine and the Shade", pp. 103-116.

¹¹⁸ T.T.U., *Minutes*, June 3, 1882.

¹¹⁹ *Globe*, March 21, 23, 30, 1882.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, July 5, 1884.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, July 5, 6, 21, 22, 1884 and I.T.U., *Proceedings*, 1885, 1886.

¹²² T.P.P.U., *Minutes*, December 11, 1885.

¹²³ *Globe*, December 8, 11, 15, 16, 19, 22, 1885.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, January 4, 1886. Emphasis in original.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, January 5, 1886.

¹²⁶ J.S. Williams to John A. Macdonald, Toronto, August 4, 1884, pp. 196352-55; E.F. Clarke to Macdonald, Toronto, August 5, 1884, pp. 196358-60; John Small to Macdonald, Toronto, August 5, 1884, pp. 196369-70. *Macdonald Papers*, P.A.C.

¹²⁷ Harry Piper to Macdonald, February 2, February 3, 1886, pp. 205474-6, *Macdonald Papers*.

¹²⁸ *Globe*, July 18, 1888.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, July 26, 27, August 8, 15, 1888.

¹³⁰ *Typographical Journal*, September 15, 1889.

¹³¹ W.B. Prescott to Macdonald, Toronto, May 5, 1890, p. 241968, *Macdonald Papers*.

¹³² T.T.U., *Minutes*, December 5, 1891.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, March 5, 1892.

¹³⁴ Zerker, "A History", ch. 3.

¹³⁵ For the best discussion of the effects of mechanization on printers see George E. Barnett, "The Introduction of the Linotype", *Yale Review*, (Nov. 1904) 251-273. A good summary of all the literature on printers and mechanization is Harry Kalber and Carl Schlesinger, *Union Printers and Controlled Automation*, (N.Y. 1967), especially ch. 1.

¹³⁶ I.T.U., *Proceedings*, 1888 and Barnett, "The Printers", p. 197.

¹³⁷ I.T.U., *Proceedings*, 1889. For the struggle in New York which set the continental pattern see Kalber and Schlesinger, *Union Printers*, ch. 1.

¹³⁸ I.T.U., *Proceedings*, 1891.

¹³⁹ For a similar success in Vancouver see Bartley, *Outline History*, p. 12.

¹⁴⁰ I.T.U., *Proceedings*, 1893.

¹⁴¹ Zerker, "A History", pp. 160-165; 202-207; Harkness, *Atkinson*, pp. 25-26; Barnett, "The Printers", ch. 11 and Wright, "Restriction of Output", pp. 35-55.

¹⁴² For the English response to typesetting machines see Ellic Howe (ed.) *The London Compositor*, (London 1947), ch. 19. For an excellent autobiographical account of an Edwardian British compositor which illustrates many of the themes discussed here see John Burnett (ed.), *The Annals of Labour: Autobiographies of British Working Class People 1820-1920*, (London 1974), pp. 330-340.

¹⁴³ David Montgomery, "Trade Union Practice", pp. 16-25.

¹⁴⁴ *Fincher's Trades Review*, August 15, 1863.

¹⁴⁵ *Iron Molders Journal*, February 1868.

¹⁴⁶ James C. Sylvis, *The Life, Speeches, Labors and Essays of William H. Sylvis*, (Philadelphia 1872), p. 390.

¹⁴⁷ For similar events in Vancouver see Bartley, *Outline History*, p. 11. There, during a strike in 1892, the printers founded *The New World*.

¹⁴⁸ Russel Hann, "Brainworkers and the Knights of Labor: E.E. Shepard, Phillips Thompson and the *Toronto News*", in Kealey and Warrian (eds.) *Essays*.

¹⁴⁹ Harkness, *Atkinson*, pp. 25-47.

¹⁵⁰ *Machinists and Blacksmiths' Journal*, December 1871, p. 451; January 1872, p. 486.

¹⁵¹ *Globe*, October 30, November 5, 18, 27, December 14, 1878.

¹⁵² *Cigar Makers Journal*, March 1879; April 1880.

¹⁵³ *Palladium of Labor*, May 29, July 3, 10, 1886.

¹⁵⁴ *Globe*, January 30, 31, February 5, 8, 22, 25, 28, March 17, April 28, May 9, 15, 1884; see also *Journal of United Labor*, Oct. 25, 1885.

¹⁵⁵ *Fincher's Trades Review*, April 23, 1864.

¹⁵⁶ *Globe*, April 5, 1882.

¹⁵⁷ David Frank, "Class Conflict in the Coal Industry: Cape Breton 1922", in Kealey and Warrian (eds.), *Essays*.

¹⁵⁸ F.W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, (New York 1967), p. 32. For a brilliant discussion of modern management strategies see Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, (N.Y. 1974).

¹⁵⁹ Taylor, *Principles*, p. 49.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁶¹ Palmer, "Class, Conception and Conflict", pp. 31-33.

¹⁶² Wright, "Restriction of Output", p. 174.