

# Europeans and Amerindians: Some Comparative Aspects of Early Contact

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## Article abstract

Les nations européennes qui tentèrent d'établir un empire dans le nouveau monde partagèrent la même attitude fondamentale même si leurs façons de traiter les Amérindiens ont différé. Toutes et chacune croyaient qu'en tant que nation chrétienne elles avaient un droit d'hégémonie sur les terres et les peuples non-chrétiens, voire même, dans le cas des Amériques, elles considéraient qu'elles n'avaient pas à tenir compte des désirs des autochtones.

Le fait d'établir une suzeraineté supposait, cependant, qu'une entente quelconque s'établisse entre les Européens et les Amérindiens, qu'il s'agisse d'une « conquête » ou d'un « accord » obtenu plus ou moins volontairement. Assez curieusement, on appela ces ententes des « traités ». Certains furent écrits à l'europpéenne, d'autres furent conclus à l'amérindienne et certains empruntèrent aux deux façons. Règle générale, l'Espagne n'eut recours au traité écrit que vers la fin du 18<sup>e</sup> siècle et le Portugal, lui, ne l'utilisa que très rarement. La France préféra presque toujours la manière amérindienne sauf dans les cas où la contrepartie était alliée à d'autres nations européennes. L'Angleterre, de son côté, opta très tôt pour le contrat écrit de même que la Hollande qui fut la première à acheter les terres qu'elle occupait, établissant ainsi un genre de titre de propriété.

Malgré ces diverses façons de faire, les nations européennes restèrent constantes dans leur attitude première et, en aucun temps, n'acceptèrent-elles les Amérindiens en tant que peuples souverains dans la famille des nations ; de même, elles ne les considérèrent jamais comme ayant un statut social correspondant aux leurs. C'est cette attitude, bien plus que la bonté ou la cruauté, qui a profondément affecté la situation de l'Amérindien à mesure que l'Européen s'emparait des Amériques.

# *Europeans and Amerindians: Some Comparative Aspects of Early Contact*<sup>1</sup>

OLIVE PATRICIA DICKASON

Although the European nations which sought to establish empires in the New World left different reputations regarding their treatment of Amerindians, they shared basic attitudes. For instance, the colonizing powers that will be considered in this paper—principally France and Britain, but also Spain and Portugal and, briefly, The Netherlands and Sweden—all believed that as Christian nations they had the right to proclaim their hegemony over non-Christian lands and peoples. Each one of them considered that it was peculiarly endowed to “civilize” Amerindians, although the degree of commitment varied from nation to nation. They all repeatedly expressed concern about the welfare, both spiritual and temporal, of the New World peoples, frequently in the charters and grants by which they claimed suzerainty over vast tracts of land. In spite of this, none of these nations considered it necessary to take into account the wishes of the Amerindians whom they claimed as subjects. As shall be seen, France came the closest to entertaining the political implications of such an idea, not from the point of view of recognizing Amerindian rights, but as a means of circumventing the 1493 papal bulls as well as the power of the Spaniards and Portuguese, and later, of the English. If Amerindians also shared a common reaction, it was that they at first welcomed Europeans and sought, by means of gifts and diplomacy, to make accommodations with them.

Despite these shared attitudes, actual circumstances of early encounters varied so considerably that the record is by no means consistent. This is particularly so in the case of Europeans who acquired reputations ranging from the “black legend” of the Spaniards to the “brotherhood” of the French-Amerindian alliances. It is less evident in the case of Amerindians, who emerged as “savages” in French and English parlance or as the hardly less pejorative “indios” in Spanish and Portuguese.<sup>2</sup> But whatever the label, and whether used to imply bestiality or nobility, Amerindians were not thought of as civilized. In considering early contacts in the light of these reputations, this paper will focus principally on agreements and “treaties”, or perhaps

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1 I would like to thank the Treaties and Historical Research Center, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, for its generous assistance, and Dr. L.H. Thomas and Dr. D.C. Johnson, University of Alberta, for their constructive criticism. The ideas and research are entirely my responsibility.

2 Sometimes Spaniards used the term, “naturales”, or, in the case of cannibal peoples, “indios selvajes”. Portuguese also used the term, “selvagem”. Germans, who reported extensively on the New World even if they did not colonize, most commonly used the term “Indianer”.

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the lack of them, as being relevant to the status Europeans accorded Amerindians. The importance of this status is evident, as for more than three centuries it was used to justify colonization.

According to ideas widespread in western Europe during the Age of Discovery, the universe, as the handiwork of God, was His to dispose of as He saw fit.<sup>3</sup> In the case of Earth, God had expressed this right specifically when He had sent His Son to establish His kingdom here. Christ passed on this authority to Peter, thus establishing the line of succession through which the Popes traced their mandate. The Pope in turn delegated authority to monarchs and princes to rule in the name of Christ and so to spread His Word. Thus, Spain's first reaction upon learning of Columbus' discoveries was to secure papal sanction for her rights of discovery. Mindful of political realities, Pope Alexander VI included Portugal in his division of the right to evangelize in the New World. Not unexpectedly, there was an immediate outcry from excluded Christian monarchs, most vividly expressed by Francis I of France when he asked Spain's ambassador to produce Adam's will in support of Spanish claims.

While European monarchs disputed among themselves about the papal authorization, particularly after the rise of Protestantism, none of them challenged its basic assumption of their right to dominate non-Christians. In their eyes, this was limited only by their power to sustain such a position, whether by military or legal means. In the case of conquest, the issue was clear enough; but where law was concerned, particularly international law as it was developing in Europe at the time, there was ample room for debate.<sup>4</sup> Even as those debates reached proportions that shook sixteenth-century Spain, and in spite of impressive concern that justice be done, few seriously doubted that Christian—and, by implication, European—law did indeed apply to the New World. The famous Laws of Burgos of 1512-13, for instance, were concerned about humane treatment for Amerindians, whose rights in this regard were held to be similar to those of any other *subject* of Spain.<sup>5</sup> The *cédula* of 1555 recognized "las antiguas costumbres indígenas" only in so far as they were not contrary to the Catholic religion and Spanish law.<sup>6</sup> Colonizing powers who appeared

- 3 Wilcomb Washburn, *Red Man's Land/White Man's Law* (New York: Scribner's, 1971), Introduction; M.F. Lindley, *The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law* (New York: Longmans, 1926, Reprint, New York Negro Universities Press, 1969), pp. 124-8; Olive Patricia Dickason, "Renaissance Europe's View of Amerindian Sovereignty and Territoriality", *Plural Societies*, VIII (1977), pp. 97-107.
- 4 Lindley, *Backward Territory*, pp. 129-32; Robert L. Benson, "Canonistic Origins of the Debate on the Lawfulness of the Spanish Conquest", *First Images of America*, Fredi Chiapelli, ed., two volumes (Los Angeles: University of California, 1976), I, pp. 327-34; and Etienne Grisel, "The Beginnings of International Law and General Public Law Doctrine: Francisco de Vitoria's De Indiis Prior", *First Images*, I, pp. 305-25.
- 5 R.D. Hussey, "Document: Text of the Laws of Burgos (1512-1513) Concerning the Treatment of the Indians", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XII (August 1932), pp. 301-26; *Colección documentos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de America y Oceanía*, forty-two volumes (Madrid, 1864-1884), XII, pp. 133-42, (hereinafter referred to as *CDI*); Washburn, *Red Man*, pp. 3-23.
- 6 Silvio A. Zavala, *Instituciones indígenas en la colonia* (Mexico: Instituto nacional indigenista (Memorias #6), 1954), p.62.

on the scene later operated on the same premises; in drawing up their charters claiming New World territories, their concern was for validity in terms of the European law of nations, not in those of Amerindians.

Obviously, then, a claim of suzerainty had to be announced in such a way that other European powers would recognize it. The usual practice was to set up a cross or pillar with the royal coat of arms of the pre-empting nation. However, other signs were also accepted, as Captain James Cook did when he found an iron kettle, beads, and coins that had been left behind by Vitus Bering in his 1743 explorations of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.<sup>7</sup> Such a title was considered transferrable, as when in 1880 Britain transferred its claimed title over the Arctic Archipelago to Canada.<sup>8</sup> But much depended upon the circumstances of each case and the feeling soon developed that an assertion of sovereignty had to be followed within a reasonable time by effective occupation.<sup>9</sup>

Not only was there never any serious question of consulting the peoples over whom such jurisdictions were being asserted, but in some cases claims of sovereignty were to be held valid even when the natives concerned had been misled as to the significance of what had taken place. Sooner or later, of course, if effective occupation was to proceed, Amerindians had to be brought around to accepting what had been done. This could be accomplished by force in varying degrees up to and including conquest or, alternatively, by agreements arrived at more or less voluntarily. These were usually called "treaties", even though Europeans did not acknowledge that Amerindians possessed sovereignty, whether they were citizens of the city-states of Mexico, Central America, or Peru, or hunting nomads of the north. Treaties could be written in the European manner, or unwritten and entered into by means of ceremonials and gift exchanges in the Amerindian manner, or perhaps by a combination of the two.

In their first encounters on the Caribbean Islands, Spaniards often did not conquer so much as take over Amerindians, imposing conditions or requirements. They dictated terms which the islanders more or less fulfilled, depending upon circumstances and what was asked. In the case of a tribute of gold demanded by Columbus, the original amounts set had to be drastically cut as they did not realistically accord with either the amount of the metal available nor with Amerindians' capacities to mine what was there.<sup>10</sup> Tribute took various forms, such as the cassava and other foods which the residents of the Higüey peninsula and the island of Saona off Española provided for Spanish ships. In this case, the provision of food seems to have been a condition agreed to in a "peace treaty", which was exceptional

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7 Arthur S. Keller, Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Frederick J. Mann, *Creation of Rights of Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts 1400-1800* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, Reprint, AMS Press, 1967), p. 144.

8 Gordon Smith, *Territorial Sovereignty in the Canadian North: A Historical Outline of the Problem* (Ottawa: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1963), pp. 3-5.

9 Lindley, *Backward Territory*, pp. 139-59.

10 Luis Aznar, "Las etapas iniciales de la legislación sobre indias", *Cuadernos americanos*, XLI (September-October 1948), p.176; Carl Ortwin Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 88-91.

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at this stage of Spanish-Amerindian relations. It has been suggested that the natives were hoping by this means to avoid *repartimiento*, which the Spaniards had already introduced.<sup>11</sup> In any event, the interlude of the "treaty" was brief. Spanish exactions, abetted by European-introduced diseases, were followed by depopulation of the islands, even as the Spaniards themselves admitted the need for conserving Amerindians, if only as a source of labour.<sup>12</sup>

On the mainland, where they encountered city-states, the Spaniards of necessity proceeded largely by conquest, a process which in some areas, such as that of the Petén in Guatemala, was to continue until the latter part of the seventeenth century. By the time they had reduced the Mayas of the Yucatán in the late 1540s, Spaniards were using previously established native practices as guides in establishing tribute. Even so, their exactions were nearly always heavier, and often considerably so.<sup>13</sup> The gesture of Moctezuma in seeking to obtain better conditions for his people by acknowledging vassalage to Charles V of Spain in 1519<sup>14</sup> did not produce the desired result, as Hernán Cortés was in Mexico without official sanction and so the Spanish Crown was not disposed to recognize concessions or special arrangements he had made in the field. Ironically enough, such consideration did not deter Philip II in 1577 from stressing the "voluntary" nature of Moctezuma's acquiescence in justifying the legality of Spain's position in the New World.

Cortés' invaluable allies, the Tlaxcalans, to their sorrow also discovered the ambivalence with which the Spanish Crown regarded the greatest of its New World conquistadors. Their substantial assistance toward realizing the spectacular achievements of Cortés were all too easily brushed aside once the Spaniards had the upper hand. Promises made during the forging of the alliance were later interpreted in the narrowest sense, if they were honoured at all. At one point, the Tlaxcalans found themselves being assessed for tribute at the same rate as the defeated Aztecs. It took several delegations across the Atlantic and much negotiation with the Spanish Crown to win such concessions as exemption from tribute, or the right to wear Spanish clothing and a sword. Other allies, such as the Coatzacoalcos, did not have even that

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11 Sauer, *Spanish Main*, pp. 148-9. *Repartimiento* was partly based upon medieval European practices. Cf. Robert S. Chamberlain, "Castilian Background of *Repartimiento-Encomienda*", *Contributions to American Anthropology and History* (Washington, D.C., 1939), pp. 19-66.

12 Sauer, *Spanish Main*, pp. 155-60. See also Benjamin Keen, "The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities", *Hispanic American Historical Review* XLIX (November 1969), pp. 703-19.

13 Robert S. Chamberlain, *The Pre-Conquest Tribute and Service System of the Maya as Preparation for the Spanish Repartimiento-Encomienda in Yucatan* (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1951), p. 30; Silvio A. Zavala, *Instituciones Jurídicas en la Conquista de America* (Madrid: Imprenta Helénica, 1935), p. 3; *CDI*, II, pp. 33-5 and IV, pp. 440-62.

14 Bernal Diaz, *The Conquest of New Spain*, J.M. Cohen, trans., (London: Penguin, 1963, Reprint, 1967), pp. 263-65. An even more formal submission signed by the Inca Titu Cusi at Vilcabamba, Peru, 24 August 1566, and ratified by King Philip, 2 January 1569, also failed to turn the tide of the Spanish conquest. Cf. John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (New York: Harcourt, 1970), p. 313 ff.

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much success: they were not mentioned in the negotiations.<sup>15</sup> Some of the Tlaxcalans eventually made a better deal for themselves by acceding to a Spanish request for entering into a new arrangement, this time with full official sanction, by which they agreed to establish villages as buffers between Spanish settlements and hostile nomads of the north. This was done by a written and signed agreement in 1591, with royal assurance that the terms would be adhered to.<sup>16</sup> The project was successful and later other sedentary Amerindian groups followed the Tlaxcalans' example.

The usual Spanish stance was the hard-line position vis-à-vis the infidel: if Amerindians refused to accept the faith, they forfeited their rights, including those of property.<sup>17</sup> If they accepted Christianity, they automatically placed themselves under Spanish jurisdiction without any other formalities being necessary.<sup>18</sup> Such facile legalisms were counteracted to some extent by the strong theological tradition that only voluntary conversions could be considered truly valid. While Spain can hardly be said to have consulted Amerindians in establishing her hegemony over them, in spite of the *requerimiento* which ostensibly gave them a choice in the matter, nevertheless her concern that this be done with "justice" led to public debates and consultations unmatched in the history of world empires.<sup>19</sup>

Apart from such preoccupations, it was not until they encountered the nomadic tribes of northern Mexico—the "Chichimecs"—that Spaniards found it necessary to seriously modify their procedures. This became important when they discovered the silver mines of Zacatecas in the 1540s. The nomads of the region, who had shown the Spaniards where the silver was to be found, were more difficult to subdue than had been the sedentary peoples of the islands or the city-states of the mainland. Consequently, the Spaniards soon found that the cost of military protection for their lines of communication was becoming prohibitively high. So they offered food and clothing, even grants of land and freedom from tribute and other forms of taxation, in return for the peace that was necessary to develop the mines. This type of diplomacy,

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15 Zavala, *Instituciones indígenas*, pp. 62-7. A different view is given by Charles Gibson, *Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952) pp. 159-69.

16 Philip Wayne Powell, *Soldiers, Indians and Silver* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952), pp. 193-6.

17 James J. Carney, "Early Spanish Imperialism", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XIX (1939), p. 144. This is the Ostiensian position, named after its distinguished proponent, Henry of Susa, Cardinal of Ostia (d. 1271). It forms the ideological basis for the influential work by jurist Juan de Solorzaño y Pereira, *Política Indiana*, two volumes, (Madrid, 1629-1639).

18 Zavala, *Instituciones Jurídicas*, p. 3.

19 Cf. Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). The *requerimiento* was a proclamation drawn up in 1509 to be announced to Amerindians to give them an opportunity to peacefully accept Spanish domination. It explained Christian political theory and called upon the Amerindians to abjure their faith and accept Christianity and allegiance to the Spanish Crown. If they did not do so immediately, the Spaniards felt free to attack. The *requerimiento* was used for the first time in Darien in 1514. It was also used in Mexico, Peru, and in what is now the United States. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-6; and William Christie Macleod, *The American Indian Frontier* (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1968), pp. 71-6.

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so similar to that later used by the French in New France, became the general practice along the northern frontier of New Spain toward the end of the 1580s.<sup>20</sup> By the time the Spaniards established themselves in what was to become the southern United States, gift-giving had become a recognized part of their frontier policy. In the 1730s, their annual appropriations at St. Augustine, Florida, for such purposes was the equivalent of about fifteen thousand dollars.<sup>21</sup>

While this kind of accommodation was usually referred to as a "treaty", it was not in the form of a written and signed document. Spaniards do not appear to have done that with frontier tribes until toward the end of the eighteenth century, when they signed a mutual assistance pact with the Creeks at Pensacola in West Florida in 1784 and another one three weeks later with the Alibamos, Chickasaws and Choctaws at Mobile.<sup>22</sup> Apparently the Spaniards were trying to counter English-American influence by using English-American tactics—a new twist for their empiricism in the deepening twilight of Spain's New World power.

The Portuguese, like the French, first came into contact with hunting and gathering Amerindians whose cooperation was needed, at least initially, in order to establish trade in brazilwood.<sup>23</sup> This commerce was organized on the basis of barter, with the Amerindians cutting and preparing the wood in exchange for trade goods, an arrangement similar to that of the fur trade that was to develop later in the north. As also in the case of the French later in New France, the exigencies of this trade, with its emphasis upon cooperation, could result in more adaptation to Amerindian ways than missionaries found acceptable.<sup>24</sup> In the case of Brazil, the missionaries worried too soon, for this situation quickly altered as the voluntary labour of the brazilwood trade was transformed into the forced labour demanded by the burgeoning sugar plantations. As the need for labour became dominant and the once-cooperative Amerindians found themselves enslaved, missionaries had a new complaint: "...the greatest impediments to conversion arise from the Portuguese. These have no zeal for the salvation of the Indians ... but consider them savages."<sup>25</sup> But officially, the Portuguese saw their

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20 Adolphe F.A. Bandelier and Fanny F. Bandelier, comps., *Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Viscaya and Approaches Thereto, to 1773*, Charles Wilson Hackett, ed., three volumes, (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1923-1937), I, pp. 155-6; II, pp. 42-3, 119-21, 125-35, 139, 143, 213-5; Powell, *Soldiers*, pp. 204-6; Wigberto Jiménez Moreno, *Estudios de Historia Colonial* (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropología y Historia, 1958), p. 35.

21 William C. Sturtevant, "Spanish-Indian Relations in Southeastern North America", *Ethnohistory*, IX (Winter 1962), p. 72. Sturtevant uses the figure of \$6,000 for the equivalent amount at his time of writing: I have further revised the figure in acknowledgment of inflation since then.

22 Sturtevant, "Spanish-Indian Relations", pp. 73-4; Charles Gibson, "Conquest, Capitulation, and Indian Treaties", *American Historical Review*, LXXXIII (February 1978), pp. 14-5.

23 *Caesalpinia echinata*. Cf. John Hemming, *Red Gold, The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians* (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 8-9. also Alexander Marchant, *From Barter to Slavery* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), pp. 20-40.

24 Hemming, *Red Gold*, p. 108.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

mission in Brazil as that of "turning savages into men, and men into Christians, and Christians persevering in the faith."<sup>26</sup>

Whether bent on conversion or enslavement, or perhaps both, the Portuguese did not doubt, any more than had the Spaniards, their right to establish themselves unilaterally in territories they considered theirs by European arrangement. By 1534 João III was dividing the 2,500 miles of coastal Brazil into fourteen captaincies, which included powers to enslave Amerindians and to send a certain number annually to Portugal free of tax.<sup>27</sup> Although the Portuguese were to make sporadic attempts to suppress Amerindian slavery before finally doing so in 1748 (slavery in general was not abolished in Brazil until 1888), they did not mitigate slavery as such, as the Spaniards attempted with their *repartimiento-encomienda* system of forced labour. As for the Portuguese colonists, they spent their mental energies rationalizing their slaving expeditions as "just wars" against cannibalism and other evils. While the need for cooperation and even adaptation to Amerindian ways continued in certain areas, colonists for the most part supported the view that "if we subsequently make use of them (Amerindians) for our tillage and husbandry, we do them no injustice; for this is done as much to support them and their children as to support us and ours."<sup>28</sup> The Jesuits were the principal opponents of slavery in the Portuguese colonies,<sup>29</sup> yet their record is not entirely clear and later they were accused, along with the Franciscans, of cooperating with the slave trade.<sup>30</sup> Although they gained a reputation of being the champions of the Amerindians, they could—and eventually did—advocate the use of "the sword and rod of iron" in order to "compel them to come in", in the words of the Gospel of St. Luke.<sup>31</sup> There is no need to belabor the contrast between such attitudes and the soul-searching of Spaniards on the role of freedom in conversion, which admittedly led to some strained interpretations of the word "voluntary". Not surprisingly, both Portuguese and Spanish colonial administrations in the Americas met with considerable native resistance, not to mention uprisings and rebellions.<sup>32</sup>

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26 Charles Ralph Boxer, *Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1525* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 88.

27 Mathias C. Kieman, "The Indian Policy of Portugal in America, with Special Reference to the Old State of Maranhão, 1500-1755", *The Americas*, V (July 1949), p. 154; Hemming, *Red Gold*, p. 69.

28 Boxer, *Race Relations*, p. 95; Marchant, *Barter*, pp. 48-9. See also Robert Southey, *History of Brazil*, three volumes, (London, 1822, Reprint, New York, Burt Franklin: 1971), III, p. 368. The situation was ironic in that the *bandeiras*, as the slaving expeditions were called, were often led by mixed bloods and included large numbers of "domesticated" Amerindians.

29 Boxer, *Race Relations*, p. 92. See also Kieman, "Indian Policy", pp. 142, 149.

30 Gilberto Freyre, *Masters and Slaves*, Samuel Putnam, trans., (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1956), p. 173. As late as 1741, Pope Benedict XIV issued a bull against enslaving Amerindians. This was one of several; the first had been issued in 1537 by Pope Paul III.

31 Boxer, *Race Relations*, p. 92, Freyre, *Masters and Slaves*, p. 163; Hemming, *Red Gold*, p. 106.

32 María Teresa Huerta, *Rebeliones indígenas de la época colonial* (Mexico: I.N.A.H., Departamento de Investigaciones Históricas, 1976); Hemming, *Red Gold*, *passim*.

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It was in territory claimed by the Portuguese—Brazil—that the French first established commercial relationships with Amerindians. As was to be expected, the Portuguese considered it interloping. Francis I sought to partly neutralize this by persuading Pope Clement VII in 1533 to redefine the bulls, so that they would apply only to lands already discovered. Politically, this was too little and too late: Spain and Portugal had already made their claims and were prepared to back them up with the considerable forces at their disposal. The French could, and did, demand to know why they, a Catholic people, were being excluded from the task of evangelizing in these new lands, extensive enough for fifty Christian kings.<sup>33</sup> Such oratorical passion was all very well, but in the meantime more practical measures were needed in the field. These were already being developed in Brazil, where the trade in brazilwood was lucrative enough to strongly reinforce France's international aspirations. Hardly had this been realized, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, than the French were initiating relations with the Brazilian natives, learning their languages, and adapting to local custom where necessary to cement the bonds of alliances.<sup>34</sup> Because of the papal exclusion, they did not at this point maintain missionaries in the field. Instead, they concentrated on developing and extending those practices that were to so upset the Jesuits when they would witness them among the Portuguese.

These techniques early took their classic form: to send boys and young men to live with Amerindians who were either prospective trading partners or potentially useful for colonization; within a few years these "interpreters", who had in effect been schooled at the expense of their Amerindian hosts, were able to act as intermediaries.<sup>35</sup> Members of ships' crews also learned native languages; in 1550, Rouen, the French centre for Brazilian trade, was able to call in 250 sailors and interpreters to supplement fifty Tupinambá who had been brought over to present a Brazilian tableau on the occasion of the entry of Henry II and his wife, Catherine de' Medici, into that city. This was easily the most elaborate of such royal civic entries in France during the sixteenth century, giving rise to a body of literature that is still growing.<sup>36</sup> It was a flamboyant testament to France's commercial finesse in Brazil: evidences of the prosperity that the brazilwood trade brought to Rouen can be seen to this day in the city's elaborate public buildings of the period, and "Fêtes Brâsiliennes" continue to be occasionally held.

These considerable successes in commerce and Amerindian diplomacy embol-

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33 André Thevet, *La Cosmographie Universelle*, two volumes, (Paris Guillaume Chaudière, 1575), p. 965.

34 Johann von Staden, *Histoire d'un pays situé dans le nouveau monde, nommé Amérique . . .* (Marbourg, 1557. Reprint, Paris: Bertrand, 1837), p. 151.

35 The Portuguese, who had at first left adult convicts and other undesirables among Amerindians for this purpose, began sending boys in 1550, apparently following the French example. (Hemming, *Red Gold*, p. 103n.).

36 Among other works: *C'est la deduction du somptueux ordre plaisant, spectacles et magnifiques theatres dresses et exhibes par les citoyens de Rouen . . .* (Rouen: Robert le Hoy et Jehan dictz du Gord, 1551); Ferdinand-Jean Denis, ed., *Une Fête Brâsilienne célébrée à Rouen en 1550* (Paris: Techener, 1850); Louis Merval, *L'Entrée de Henri II, roi de France, à Rouen, au mois d'octobre 1550* (Rouen: Boissel, 1868); and Suzanne Boorsch, "America in Festival Presentations", *First Images*, I, pp. 503-15.

dened the French to try one step further and to establish a colony near present-day Rio de Janeiro. This was the most important of several attempts in various parts of Brazil that had been undertaken privately but this one in 1555 had royal support. It was the plan of Nicolas Durand de Villegaignon. In spite of much bravado, marked by great flourishes of rhetoric, the project suffered from incoherence of purpose and inadequate planning. For one thing, Villegaignon did not apply the lessons that had long since been learned by traders in dealing with Brazilians. Instead, he antagonized and lost the interpreters who had provided a vital link with his native allies. That simplified matters for the Portuguese when they found out where "La France Antarctique" was; in 1560 Mem de Sá, the governor of Brazil, had little difficulty in destroying the settlement. But traders were not so easily tracked down in the vast *sertão*, particularly when they were in alliance with the two most powerful tribes, the Tupinambá and the Potiguar, and so the French continued their commercial activities.

Determined to gain a more permanent foothold than such trade alone could achieve, France made another major attempt in 1612 to colonize, this time on the island near the mouth of the Amazon they called Maragnan (in Portuguese, Maranhão). The French, under Daniel de La Touche de La Ravardière, proclaimed their sovereignty by planting a cross, taking pains to persuade the natives of the region to participate in the ceremonies, on the grounds that the cross signified the alliance of the Tupinambá and the French. The terms of this alliance, according to the French account, involved the promise of the Tupinambá "à quitter leur mauvaïse façon de vivre, & principalement de ne plus manger de chair humaine." By this time using missionaries (Capuchins), the French told the Tupinambá that since God had now sent His word it behooved them to do as the French said; the French for their part would never abandon them, but would die for their preservation. They exhorted the Tupinambá to "deffendre la croix avec leurs vies."<sup>37</sup>

La Ravardière, mindful of the fate of the Villegaignon colony, was concerned that this proclamation of sovereignty, even with Amerindian support, would not be sufficient in the face of solidly entrenched Portuguese claims. Accordingly, he persuaded the Tupinambá to send six delegates to Paris, where they would make a formal submission to Louis XIII, ask him to extend his protection to the people of Maragnan, and incidentally, to be baptized. Of the six selected to make the trip, three survived long enough to go through the ceremonies, which were spectacular even by Parisian standards. For their baptism, the Tupinambá were dressed in white taffeta, wore floral coronets, and carried white lillies. The King and Queen Regent acted as godparents. Paris, used to the strange and the exotic, went wild. As pageantry, the episode was easily as successful as Henry II's entry into Rouen; as a political manoeuvre, it failed to permanently establish the French as a colonial presence in Brazil. What it did do was to proclaim, with all the considerable ostentation the French court had at its command, the assertion that France had as much right as any other Catholic power to go forth and evangelize. And it did add a dimension to the slowly growing reputation of the French for being New World diplomats *par excellence*.

37 Claude [d'Abbeville], *Histoire de la Mission des Pères Capucins en l'Isle de Maragnan et terres circonvoisines*, (Paris: Francois Huby, 1619, Facsimile, Graz, Austria, Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1963), pp. 72v; 87v-9; 159v-60v.

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While the French slipped into this role with comparative ease, it was not achieved without some hard lessons. Earlier, along the St. Lawrence, Jacques Cartier had not been so diplomatic with the Stadaconans and their consequent hostility had done much to defeat the attempts of Cartier and Jean-François La Rocque de Roberval to establish a colony. Cartier had made a preliminary move in 1534 by erecting the usual cross, this time in the Gaspé, proclaiming French sovereignty. When a headman (probably Donnacona) objected, Cartier reassured him by saying that the cross was to serve simply as a landmark and guide post for ships coming into harbor.<sup>38</sup> The second time Cartier erected a cross was in 1536 near the village of Stadacona. It was reported to be thirty-five feet tall and to have carried the inscription, *Franciscus Primus, Dei Gratia Francorum Rex, Regnat* (Long live Francis I, By God's grace King of France).<sup>39</sup> Not only were the natives not invited to participate in either of these ceremonies, but Cartier in each case had subsequently kidnapped Stadaconans, taking them to France to train as interpreters and also to present to the King. His purpose was for the French monarch to hear at first hand the potentialities of that part of the New World for colonization. There is no record of Donnacona making a formal submission to Francis I, although it would have been within established practice even at that early date. The French may not have considered it necessary to make much of such a gesture, if it occurred, as Spain was not actively interested in the northern regions and France had good reason to believe she was too occupied in New Spain to defend her claimed title to lands that reportedly had been assessed as "il capa di nada." Thus assured, the French proceeded to move into the St. Lawrence with very much the same attitude as the Spaniards and Portuguese had done down south. The result was disaster, and an expensive one at that, for the French, while they did not have European rivals to contend with, faced an unknown enemy: climate. Thus along the St. Lawrence, where survival depended upon more than simply moving in and taking over, they were to realize the necessity of coming to terms with the Amerindians.<sup>40</sup> In two widely separated areas, and for totally different reasons, the French found themselves cultivating Amerindian cooperation and alliances as a necessary aspect of their colonization projects.

That said, it must be admitted that in those areas where neither politics nor climate demanded such cooperation, the French could, and did, behave otherwise. This was true after they had obtained a foothold in the West Indies, as in Guadeloupe where they joined with the English against the Amerindians, and on the mainland in Louisiana where they destroyed the Natchez between 1729 and 1731.

Later, as Britain replaced Spain as France's principal rival in the New World, the French continued bringing Amerindians to France, not so much to make formal submissions, although that remained a factor, but to cement New World alliances. The rationale was that the visitors would be so impressed with France's power and glory that upon returning home they would convince their fellow tribesmen that it would be

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38 Henry Percival Biggar, ed., *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier* (Ottawa: Publications of the Public Archives of Canada #11, 1924), pp. 64-7.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 225.

40 It was during Cartier's second voyage, 1535-1536, that Amerindians taught the French how to cure scurvy. (Biggar, *Voyages*, p. 213.)

to their advantage to ally themselves with France. This illustrated how important Amerindian alliances had become to the French, particularly along the St. Lawrence and in the Ohio Valley. Similarly, Amerindian boys and girls were sent overseas to be educated, in the belief that a few years of such influences would so transform them that upon returning home they would be able to do the same thing for their fellows and make them into a new breed of Frenchmen.<sup>41</sup> Neither idea produced the desired results. By the time of Louis XV, such visits were discouraged as being too expensive for their achievements.<sup>42</sup> But in the meantime, the English had picked up the idea, at least to the extent of bringing over Amerindian leaders. Thus Sir William Alexander's Scots at Port Royal in 1630 arranged for a local headman to visit England with his wife and son to ask the English monarch for protection against the French.<sup>43</sup> The most publicized of such visits was that of the "Four Kings" who in 1710 were sent by the English colonies to the court of Queen Anne to focus attention on their demands for military support against the French.<sup>44</sup>

France, for all her suppleness in dealing with Amerindians, resembled her European rivals in never doubting her right to unilaterally pre-empt lands not already under Christian control; nor did she entertain the idea of aboriginal rights. No great debates on that subject occurred in France, as they had in Spain. Native alliances, ceremonially entered into and observed in the Amerindian manner, were useful tools for the peaceful occupation of lands already claimed by royal charter and they were indispensable for the fur trade (as they had first been in the case of brazilwood) and in colonial wars. Rarely did the French sign peace treaties. In their view, such documents were not only ineffective, as they did not have the same significance for Amerindians as they had for Europeans but, more seriously, they contained the seeds of a dangerous ambiguity, as in European law they could be regarded as implicitly recognizing Amerindian sovereignty, a risk the French were not eager to take, at least not with their own allies. Thus, in New France, the only Amerindian treaties the French signed were with the Iroquois, who were allies of the English and whom the English claimed as subjects.

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- 41 This had earlier been tried by Spaniards. For one example, in 1526 the Governor of Española was instructed to send twelve intelligent children of leading Amerindians to be educated in Spain. The idea was that when they returned to their homelands they would "civilize" their countrymen. *Colección de documentos inéditos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de ultramar*, twenty-five volumes, (Madrid, 1885-1932), I., p. 354. See also Pietro Martire d'Anghiera's account of Francisco Chicora in *De Orbe Novo*, Francis A. MacNutt, trans., two volumes, (New York: Putnam's 1912), II, p. 258; concerning Dutch efforts see Hemming, *Red Gold*, p. 288. The Portuguese, while concerned about educating Amerindians in Brazil, apparently did little about sending them to Portugal for the purpose.
- 42 One of the best publicized of the latter-day visits occurred in 1725 when a delegation of Mississippi Amerindians called on Louis XV to urge that France honour its alliance commitments. "An Indian Delegation in France, 1725", Richard N. Ellis and Charlie R. Steen, eds., *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, LXVII (1974), pp. 385-405.
- 43 Sir William Alexander, *Sir William Alexander and American Colonization* (Boston: Prince Society, 1873), p. 66.
- 44 Richmond P. Bond, *Queen Anne's American Kings* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). An exhibition, "The Four Indian Kings", was held at the Public Archives of Canada in 1977.

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As they avoided ambiguity in one direction, the French became ensnarled in it in another. Were the allies subjects of the French king? The military situation of New France made it difficult for the French to overtly insist that they were. Also, ambiguity could be useful in negotiations with the English; the French frequently denied responsibility for the acts of their allies on the grounds that they were free agents. As Spanish officials observed, visiting Louisbourg:

These natives, whom the French term savages, were not absolutely subjects of the King of France, nor entirely independent of him. They acknowledged him lord of the country, but without any alteration in their way of living; or submitting themselves to his laws; and so far were they from paying any tribute, that they received annually from the King of France a quantity of apparel, gunpowder and muskets, brandy and several kinds of tools, in order to keep them quiet and attached to the French interest: and this has also been the political practice of that crown with regard to the savages of Canada.<sup>45</sup>

The Spanish visitors, perhaps in the light of their country's experience with the Chichimecs, had discerned the dilemma. The continuing colonial wars prevented New France from ever clearly resolving the issue.

The English, no less than the French, had been excluded from the New World by the papal division. Although this did not at first involve English national pride to the same extent as it had done that of France, it may have encouraged a tendency that was already in evidence among English explorers: to concentrate on the Far North. As climatic conditions discouraged European settlement in those regions, English relations with the Inuit were minimal, and even those were generally hostile. But in one case natives from Newfoundland, clothed in skins and eating raw meat, were brought to the court of Henry VII, and later seem to have experienced an extraordinarily successful assimilation:

... of which three men, two of them were seen in the kings court at Westminster two years after clothed like Englishmen, and could not be discerned from Englishmen.<sup>46</sup>

By the time the English became involved in situations that demanded permanent relationships with Amerindians, they had also experienced failure at establishing colonies, for example, St. John's, Newfoundland, 1583; Roanoke Island, 1585-87; Wiapoco, Guiana, 1604. For nearly a century, they had had the opportunity of observing the performance of the Spaniards. The "black legend" had had plenty of time to percolate through Europe<sup>47</sup> and the English did not doubt, any more than had the French, that they would be ever so much more successful than the Spanish in dealing with the peoples of the New World:

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45 Jorge Juan y Antonio d'Ulloa, *A Voyage to South America* . . . , Johan Adams, trans., two volumes, (London, 1806), II, pp. 376-7. The question of the status of France's Amerindian allies has been examined by W. J. Eccles in *The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760* (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), pp. 77-9.

46 John Stow, *Annales, or a General Chronicle of England* . . . , continued by Edmund Howes, (London: Richard Meighen, 1631), pp. 483-4.

47 Cf. William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971).

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And as for our supplanting the savages, we have no such intent; our intrusion into their possessions shall tend to their great good and no way to their hurt, unless, as unbridled beasts, they procure it to themselves. We propose to proclaim and make it known to them all, by some public interpretation, that our coming thither is to plant ourselves in their country, yet not to supplant and root them out but to bring them from their base condition to a far better.<sup>48</sup>

Apparently not realized were the latent contradictions between such aspirations and the terms of the royal charters, such as those of King James in 1606 and 1609, by which the English monarch assumed absolute sovereignty over vast stretches of New World lands, without recognition of any prior Amerindian title. In the words of a contemporary versifier:

The land full rich, the people easily wunne,  
Whose gains shalbe the knowledge of our faith  
And ours such riches as the country hath.<sup>49</sup>

William Symonds, preaching in 1609 at Whitechapel, in the presence of the Adventurers and Planters for Virginia, took his text from Genesis 12:1-3:

... for the Lord had said unto Abram, get thee out of thy Country, and from thy Kindred, and from thy father's house, unto the land that I will shew thee. And I will make thee a great nation, and will blesse thee and make thy name great, and thou shall be a blessing.<sup>50</sup>

Symonds interpreted this as a divine injunction to the English people to go forth and colonize the New World. It was a message that had long been a theme of Richard Hakluyt, the great English compiler of voyage accounts that are such a valuable source of information today.

The English shared the prevalent European assumption that the New World was something of a Promised Land, overflowing with riches. Were not its inhabitants able to procure their food with little labor—and did they not live to a ripe old age? This was the idyllic side of the popular stereotype of Amerindians, who on the obverse were seen as ranging the land like “wilde beests”. As such, they were not to be offended, if it could be avoided.<sup>51</sup> Colonists were advised to select special representatives from among their numbers to trade for corn from the natives, “and this you must do before that they perceive you mean to plant among them, for not being sure how your own seed corn will prosper the first year, to avoid the danger of famine, use and endeavor to store yourselves of the country corn.”<sup>52</sup>

As this makes evident, the circumstances of the first English-Amerindian relations varied considerably from those of the Spanish, Portuguese, or French. At the

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48 Louis B. Wright, *English Colonization of North America* (London: Arnold, 1968), p. 29.

49 Keith Glenn, “Captain John Smith and the Indians”, *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LII (October 1944), pp. 231-2.

50 Alexander Brown, *The Genesis of the United States*, two volumes, (Boston, 1880, Reprint, New York: Russel & Russell, 1964), I, p. 287.

51 Capt. John Smith, *Works, 1608-1631*, Edward Arber, ed., (Westminster: Constable, 1895), p. xxxv.

52 Smith, *Works*, pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Brown, *Genesis*, I, p. 83.

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risk of oversimplification, it could be said that the English came neither as conquerors, as Spaniards had, nor as trader-slavers, as Portuguese had, nor as traders, as the French had; neither did they at first stress evangelization to the extent of the other three nations.<sup>53</sup> Rather, they came as farmers, seeking to establish agriculturally-based colonies in regions where Amerindians had long since made similar establishments. The result was that the rivalry that quickly manifested itself focused primarily on the control of land.

The caution with which the English set about gaining a foothold in Virginia is witnessed in the instructions of the Virginia Company in 1606, which warned the colonists:

...you must in no case suffer any of the inhabitants of the country to inhabit between you and the sea coast; for you cannot carry yourselves so towards them, but they will grow discontented with your habitation, and be ready to guide and assist any nation that shall come to invade you.<sup>54</sup>

Further:

...how weary soever your soldiers be, let them never trust the country people with the carriage of their weapons; for if they run away from you with your shott, which they only fear, they will easily kill them all with their arrows. And whensoever any of yours shoots before them, be sure they may be chosen out of your best marksmen; for if they see your learners miss what they aim at, they will think the weapon not so terrible, and thereby will be bould to assault you.<sup>55</sup>

Despite the lengths to which the English were prepared to go to avoid hostilities, Amerindians became uneasily aware of their interest in their land: "But yet the Savages murmured at our planting in their Countre", wrote George Percy in 1607, "whereupon this *werowance* made answere againe very wisely of a Savage, Why should you bee offended of them as long as they hurt you not, nor take anything away by force. They take but a little waste ground, which doth you nor any of us any good."<sup>56</sup>

The English, no less than the French, dissembled as to the significance of the crosses they set up announcing territorial claims. On one such occasion, a worried Amerindian was reported cheered when "our Captayne told him that the two Armes of the Crosse signified king *Powatah* and himselfe, the fastening of it in the myddest was their united Leaug, and the shoute the reverence he Dyd to Pawatah."<sup>57</sup> The two groups parted amidst a show of great good feelings, the one pleased with a presumed new alliance, the other with the conviction of having established its suzerainty over the region. The similarity to Cartier's actions in the Gaspé two-thirds of a century earlier is obvious.

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53 John Eliot, "the Apostle to the Indians" in New England, 1631-1690, was the most outstanding English missionary during the seventeenth century. The original English impetus to send over missionaries with the Virginia settlers had been all but halted by the uprising of 1622.

54 Smith, *Works*, p. xxxiv.

55 *Ibid.*, p. xxxvi.

56 *Ibid.*, p. lxix.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. xlvi-xlvii.

While such ceremonies may have satisfied, at least to some extent, the exigencies of international law, their ambiguities did little to bring Amerindians to an acknowledgement of European suzerainty. In the case of Virginia, negotiations were opened in 1608 by the English inviting Powhatan to come to Jamestown to receive gifts, including a copper crown, from King James, as well as to join the English in an expedition against a mutual enemy. The English reasoning was that Powhatan, in accepting the crown and the alliance against an enemy, would by those very actions have acknowledged the suzerainty of James I, whether or not he was aware of such implications. The wily Powhatan was not so easily tricked, however, and he replied, "If your king have sent me presents, I also am a king, and this is my land. 8 daies I will stay to receive them. Your father is to come to me, not I to him."<sup>58</sup> The English had no alternative but to comply and so, with some inconvenience, they transported the royal gifts a distance of some hundred miles by water and did their best to arrange a setting that they considered appropriate for a coronation. English ritual demanded that Powhatan kneel to receive the crown. Not only was such a gesture—not to mention such a ceremonial—foreign to Amerindians, but Powhatan seemed to have had some inkling as to what was up. He accepted some of the gifts willingly enough, but was reluctant to have a scarlet cloak placed upon his shoulders; and he would not kneel to receive the crown. According to Smith's account, "At last, by leaning hard on his shoulders, he a little stooped and Newport (the leader of the English) put the Crowne on his head; when, by the warning of a pistoll, the boates were prepared with such a volley of shot that the King start(ed) in a horrible feare, till he saw all was well."<sup>59</sup> Powhatan's reaction to these honours was to present "his old shoes and mantle", which apparently he had been wearing, to Captain Christopher Newport. This could have been negative reciprocity, indicating disdain or at the very least superiority over the recipient. Such an interpretation fits with what is known of Powhatan's character.<sup>60</sup> Whatever the intention, it is not known how the gifts were received, or even if they were forwarded to James. In any event, the ceremony came nowhere near to rivalling the gala submission of the Tupinambá in Paris.

The Pilgrims, too, resorted to ceremony when they thought the occasion required it, as when Governor John Carver met with Massasoit, the Wampanoag "king", in 1620 to negotiate a treaty.<sup>61</sup> Although the original text has been lost, contemporary accounts agree as to the main points.<sup>62</sup> They reveal that the Pilgrims' principal concerns at that time were for the safety of the colony: Massasoit promised not to harm the English and to punish those of his people who did; and each side promised to help the other if "unjustly" attacked. According to one of these versions, Massasoit was assured that "King James would esteeme of him as his friend and Alie."<sup>63</sup> The

58 *Ibid.*, pp. 124-5.

59 *Ibid.*

60 Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 116-7.

61 *Journal of the English Plantation at Plimouth* (London, 1622, Facsimile, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966), pp. 36-7, (hereinafter cited as *Mour's Relation*). William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation*, Harvey Wish, ed., (New York: Capricorn, 1962), p. 73.

62 *Mour's Relation*, p. 37; *Of Plymouth Plantation*, p. 73.

63 *Mour's Relation*, p. 37.

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sagamore approved and his followers applauded. The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Pilgrims were misleading Massasoit, for they did not consider that the Wampanoag, any more than any other Amerindian people, formed a body politic with the sovereignty requisite for them to be fully fledged allies.

That this was indeed so is confirmed by the record. In the case of Massasoit, the Pilgrim Fathers were careful to follow up the original agreement a few months later with a visit to Packanokik, Massasoit's town, to participate in lengthy ceremonials, including gift exchanges, that confirmed the pact. This compliance to Amerindian ways brought valuable rewards: Massasoit appears to have agreed that he was "King James, his man" and that his land belonged to the English monarch.<sup>64</sup> Since "subject" in the European sense was not an Amerindian concept, it can be reasonably doubted that Massasoit understood the European view of his acknowledgement. But for all that, in English eyes he had become a subject rather than an ally, although the Wampanoag in practice retained some independence until 1671.<sup>65</sup>

The Pilgrim Fathers were all the more cautious and compliant to Amerindian ways in the beginning because they had no charter and hoped to legalize their position by means of Amerindian agreements and "treaties", somewhat as the French had sought to do in Brazil.<sup>66</sup> Where the English were armed with charters, as in Virginia and the Massachusetts Bay Colony, less accommodation was evident. Later, as the developing rivalry with France in the New World placed a premium on Amerindian alliances, the English leaned more heavily on native forms of diplomacy. This was particularly so in the case of the Five Nations, whose diplomatic ceremonials have come to be considered classic for the frontier.<sup>67</sup> As for written treaties between English and Amerindians, the earliest text that has survived is that of the agreement of the New England Federation with the Narragansetts and Niantics, August 28, 1645. It was a peace treaty.<sup>68</sup>

Even as they were making such efforts at doing better than the Spaniards in dealing with Amerindians, the English had soon resorted to tactics that were not dissimilar. In the view of Captain John Smith, such hopes had been unrealistic to begin with: "The Salvages being acquainted, that by command from England we durst not hurt them, were much emboldened."<sup>69</sup> Eventually, in 1607-1608,

... their insolencies did force me to break our Commission and instructions: cause Powhatan (to) fly the Countrey, and take the King of Pemeonke Prisoner; and also to keep the King of Paspahagh (Jamestown) in shackles, and put his men to double tasks in chaines, till nine and thirty of their Kinges paied in contribution, and the offending Salvages sent to James towne to punish at our owne discretion.<sup>70</sup>

Smith by this time had appointed "Protectors" to collect tribute from the Amerin-

64 *Ibid.*, pp. 44-5.

65 Jennings, *Invasion*, p. 131.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 238. Also Chapter 8.

67 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

68 For different views of the agreement, see Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontier* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), pp. 169-70; and Jennings, *Invasion*, pp. 267-9.

69 Smith, *Works*, p. 611.

70 *Ibid.*

dians; in the eyes of the latter, these officials were the worst enemies.<sup>71</sup> To make matters worse, neither the Protectors nor the payment of tribute saved Amerindians from the depredations of the colonists who "tormented those poor soules by stealing their corne, robbing their gardens, beating them, breaking their houses and keeping some prisoners."<sup>72</sup>

Since the English could not, or would not, keep their colonists in line, the Amerindians "desired pardon if hereafter they defended themselves",<sup>73</sup> and attempted in 1622 to drive out their tormentors. Smith lost whatever sympathy he had had for the natives and by 1624 was asking for a garrison "to suppress the salvages."<sup>74</sup> The Spanish example, instead of indicating what to avoid, was by now illustrating to Smith what could be done. The Spaniards, although outnumbered by Amerindians by about sixty to one, had still managed to subdue them. In Virginia, the numbers of Amerindians were so few and so dispersed "it were nothing in a short time to bring them to labour and obedience."<sup>75</sup>

The irony of all this was that it left the English open to charges of being even more cruel than the Spaniards in their treatment of Amerindians, on the grounds that, whereas both of the European nations fought bloody wars and imposed harsh terms on the defeated, the Spaniards incorporated the survivors into colonial society, albeit usually in the lower echelons, whereas the English excluded them.<sup>76</sup>

Although there had been those among the English who from a very early period had advocated securing their right to be in America by purchasing titles to land from Amerindians, the most famous of whom was Roger Williams,<sup>77</sup> it remained for the Dutch to rationalize this procedure as a means of taking possession and colonizing. The papal division had by this time become in effect a dead letter, particularly as the Spaniards had agreed, in the Treaty of Vervins, 1598, not to molest the French in the New World north of "la ligne d'amitié" drawn west from above the Canary Islands. When the Dutch, in their search for the elusive North West Passage to the Orient, sailed up the Hudson River in 1609, they took possession by right of discovery, although the general region had been twice claimed, first by the French and then by the English. But as neither of these claims had been followed up with establishments, the Dutch moved to take the initiative in exploiting the rich prospects of the region's fur trade. Their awareness of the vulnerability of their position was heightened by their

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71 *Ibid.*, p. 483.

72 *Ibid.*, p. 482.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 483.

74 *Ibid.*, p. 619.

75 *Ibid.*, p. 956; Glenn, "Captain John Smith", p. 235.

76 Glenn, "Captain John Smith", p. 236; Freyre, *Masters and Slaves*, p. 163; James Axtell, "The English Impact on Indian Culture in Colonial America", a paper given at the 1978 Newberry Library Conference, sponsored by the Society of Colonial Wars (scheduled for publication in vol. 7, *Conference Papers*), p. 30.

77 Perry Miller claims that Roger Williams first purchased land from Amerindians and then sought a charter, not as protection against the latter, but against "rapacious English neighbors." See his *Roger Williams; His Contribution to the American Tradition* (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 51.

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difficulties in Brazil, where they were seeking to establish themselves in the face of Portuguese claims. So, rather than relying solely on charter rights along the Hudson, they chose the less grandiose but eminently more practical means of persuading Amerindians to sign, in their manner, written deeds attesting to land transfers in favor of the Dutch. As such occasions were marked by the presentation of gifts in exchange for the land, in European law they could be called "purchases". The prototype was the purchase in 1623 of Manhattan Island by Peter Minuit of the Dutch West Indian Company. Three years later this policy was officially launched with the observation that "such contracts upon other occasions may be very useful to the Company."<sup>78</sup> Faced with these deeds when they challenged the Dutch presence in 1632, the English at first reacted by denying Amerindian possessory right and thus the ability to transfer title. But that they were impressed by Dutch logic is witnessed by the fact that the first known written English deed dates from 1633, although they were to claim earlier purchases.<sup>79</sup> Similarly, when the Swedes established a short-lived colony in Delaware in 1638, they were careful to follow the Dutch example. The French, however, made no concessions in this regard; as far as they were concerned, title to all lands claimed by France stemmed from her King who could, and did, instruct officials not to disturb Amerindians on their lands, but who never considered that they had a title to be extinguished.

The business-like approach of the Dutch did not assure that they would get along notably better with Amerindians than their colonial rivals. In fact, they shared the same basic attitudes of the other European powers in America: "... we are seated here in the midst of thousands of Indians and barbarians, from whom is to be experienced neither peace nor pity", an official wrote plaintively in 1650.<sup>80</sup> As their fellow colonizing powers had done, the Dutch adjusted their attitudes to some extent according to the circumstances. On the one hand, when settlers' cattle trampled Mohawk corn fields and the irate Iroquois reacted by killing the animals, nothing was done because of the importance of the Mohawk in trade. On the other hand, Dutch exactions and behavior toward less important tribes provoked the confrontations known as Kieft's War (1640-45) and the Esopus Wars (1655-60, 1663-64).<sup>81</sup> There were also difficulties in reaching an understanding as to the exact nature of land transfers—neither the Dutch nor the Amerindians fully understood each other and both were capable of compounding the problem by indulging in sharp practices, although it was the latter who usually lost out. It was about this time, or slightly earlier, that the Mohawk were able to capitalize on trade rivalry between the Dutch and English to

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78 A. J. F. van Laer, *Documents Relating to New Netherland, 1624-1626* (San Marino, Calif: Huntington Library, 1924), pp. 51-2, cited in Jennings, *Invasion*, p. 132; Macleod, *Indian Frontier*, pp. 194-7.

79 Jennings, *Invasion*, p. 133; Macleod, *Indian Frontier*, pp. 194-7; Wilcomb Washburn, *The Indian in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 82-3.

80 E. B. O'Callaghan and J. R. Brodhead, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, (hereinafter *NYCD*), fifteen volumes, (Albany: Weed Parsons, 1853-1857), I, p. 210.

81 Allen W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960, Reissued, Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971), pp. 60-84; 138-74.

obtain sufficient guns to alter the balance of power between eastern Amerindian peoples.

Because the Swedes' tenure as colonizers was so brief—they were eliminated by the Dutch in 1655, who in turn were decisively defeated by the English in 1664—Sweden made little impact in the field of Amerindian-European relations. The insecurity of the Swedes' position assured that they cooperated more closely with Amerindians than either the English or the Dutch; later, their descendants would count among their numbers some of the leading interpreters on the American frontier.<sup>82</sup>

The complex interplay of relationships that was the inevitable consequence of the European colonization of the Americas was shot through with ironies and contradictions. The Spaniards came as conquerors, but worried whether their actions were justified on moral or legal grounds. They institutionalized Amerindian forced labour in *repartimiento-encomienda* that stopped just short of slavery, yet they thrashed out the question of Amerindian rights on a scale that far surpassed that of any other European nation in the Americas. Both the Portuguese and the French came as traders and stayed, as the case might be, in Brazil, in the West Indies, and in Louisiana to develop plantation economies based on slavery, but in New France the French founded their hegemony on a system of alliances, which made concessions politically and socially, but not legally, such as on territorial rights. By these alliances, the French sought to identify Amerindian goals with their own, a manoeuvre which received its most vivid expression in the bringing of New World delegates to the French court to formally make their submissions. But the ploy turned out not to be worth the expense and trouble as France's European rivals refused to be convinced and the Amerindian delegates revealed an ability to use these occasions for their own ends, rather than those of France. The English came to farm, but found they had to conquer in order to stay. The business-like Dutch, minor colonizers in North America and principally interested in trade, made a major impact by legitimizing their intrusion vis-à-vis both Amerindians and the English by means of land purchases, carefully recorded in formally drawn-up deeds. It was a procedure which came the closest to recognizing Amerindian possessory territorial rights.

Whatever the form that interaction took, the motives remained constant: Europeans sought to establish hegemony and Amerindians looked for trading and military alliances and, later, for the maintenance of their independence. The form itself varied considerably, according to the circumstances and the inclinations of the participants. In general, the Portuguese proceeded verbally, although important peace treaties could be written and signed in the European manner, particularly if colonial rivalry was involved as in the case of the treaty with the Potiguar, allies of the French, signed with solemn ceremony at Paraíba in 1599.<sup>83</sup> The French also favoured verbal arrangements and were careful about ratifying them with ceremonies that Amerindians recognized as being appropriate, such as speeches, feasting, and gift exchanges. Such

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82 Adolph B. Benson and Naboth Hedin, *Americans from Sweden* (Philadelphia: Lipincott, 1950), pp. 21-41; *NYCD* II, p. 241, Memorial on the Swedish title; and VIII, pp. 585-609, Report of the Amsterdam Chamber of the West India Company.

83 Hemming, *Red Gold*, p. 171.

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alliances had to be periodically renewed in order to maintain their validity. The variety of the Spanish experience is reflected in the types of accommodations that the Spaniards reached; however, apart from the special cases of the border settlements during the last decade of the sixteenth century and the treaty with Inca Titu Cusi, their agreements and "treaties" did not take written form until toward the end of the eighteenth century, when they faced the necessity of countering American practices in this regard. These practices had been inherited from the English, who from a very early period had sought to formalize their treaties in written form. At first these were mainly in the nature of peace treaties and mutual assistance pacts, but they quickly became instruments for obtaining Amerindian acknowledgment of subjection to the English crown. Once the Dutch began to produce deeds attesting to their land titles, the English began to do likewise, as well as becoming more precise about incorporating land concessions in their treaties. In the end the English came to look upon treaties mainly as vehicles for land transfers.

Throughout all these dealings, Amerindians were hampered by the fact that Europeans never accepted them as sovereign members of the "Family of Nations": neither did they accord them equality in social status.<sup>84</sup> Thus the basic issue in early European-Amerindian relations is not the kindness or cruelty or even the good intentions of the protagonists, but the status each side accorded the other. As they became dominant, Europeans set the tone. The effects of their attitudes have carried through into our contemporary world, profoundly influencing the position of Amerindians in Canada as well as elsewhere in the Americas.

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84 A group of English gentlemen in Middleton, Connecticut, in 1767 confessed that "they could never respect an Indian, Christian or no Christian, so as to put him on a level with white people on any account, especially to eat at the same table." (David Crosby to Eleanor Wheelock, 4 November 1767, Wheelock MSS 767604.1, cited by Axtell, "English Impact", p. 30.) The French, while not quite so categorical, nevertheless did not accept Amerindians as equals. An illustration was the reaction of the surgeon Dierville, when a chief in Acadia addressed him as "Brother". He observed, "I did not consider him as such, except in Jesus Christ." Sieur de Dierville, *Relations of the Voyage to Port Royal in Acadia on New France* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933), pp. 150-1.

## Résumé

Les nations européennes qui tentèrent d'établir un empire dans le nouveau monde partagèrent la même attitude fondamentale même si leurs façons de traiter les Amérindiens ont différé. Toutes et chacune croyaient qu'en tant que nation chrétienne elles avaient un droit d'hégémonie sur les terres et les peuples non-chrétiens, voire même, dans le cas des Amériques, elles considéraient qu'elles n'avaient pas à tenir compte des désirs des autochtones.

Le fait d'établir une suzeraineté supposait, cependant, qu'une entente quelconque s'établisse entre les Européens et les Amérindiens, qu'il s'agisse d'une "conquête" ou d'un "accord" obtenu plus ou moins volontairement. Assez curieusement, on appela ces ententes des "traités". Certains furent écrits à l'europpéenne, d'autres

furent conclus à l'amérindienne et certains empruntèrent aux deux façons. Règle générale, l'Espagne n'eut recours au traité écrit que vers la fin du 18<sup>e</sup> siècle et le Portugal, lui, ne l'utilisa que très rarement. La France préféra presque toujours la manière amérindienne sauf dans les cas où la contrepartie était alliée à d'autres nations européennes. L'Angleterre, de son côté, opta très tôt pour le contrat écrit de même que la Hollande qui fut la première à acheter les terres qu'elle occupait, établissant ainsi un genre de titre de propriété.

Malgré ces diverses façons de faire, les nations européennes restèrent constantes dans leur attitude première et, en aucun temps, n'acceptèrent-elles les Amérindiens en tant que peuples souverains dans la famille des nations; de même, elles ne les considérèrent jamais comme ayant un statut social correspondant aux leurs. C'est cette attitude, bien plus que la bonté ou la cruauté, qui a profondément affecté la situation de l'Amérindien à mesure que l'Européen s'emparait des Amériques.