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
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THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AUSGLEICH OF 1867: SOME HISTORIANS' VIEWS

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Following the 1848 rebellion in Hungary the kingdom was ruled by military government [from Vienna]. The leaders of the Magyars resorted to passive resistance and by the early 1860's it became clear that some sort of accommodation had to be arrived at. Francis Deák, the venerated leader of the Magyars, thought the time ripe for a new approach towards constitutional government for Hungary. In 1865 he presented to the emperor Francis Joseph a compromise solution, whose most important aspect for the emperor was an assurance of loyalty to the Habsburg House. Deák found in Count Julius Andrassy a disciple who was able to translate the demands of the Magyars into practical political terms. The suggested solution was a dualism based on the creation of two independent and absolutely equal political entities, both loyal to the Habsburg ruler. From this relationship it followed that a single foreign policy and a unified command of the armed forces had to exist; similarly also some financial aspects



Map reprinted from A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918*. New edition, London : Hamish Hamilton, 1949.

had to be shared, such as the cost of the military and diplomatic services, the responsibility for the public debt, currency and external trade relations. The political entity which emerged in 1867 was the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy consisting of two states — the kingdom of Hungary and the “kingdom and countries represented in the Reichsrat”, briefly, the Empire of Austria — which were headed by Francis Joseph, emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. In this latter position he was crowned in Hungary in June 1867. Almost two decades of an absolutist *Interregnum* came to an end.

Following are some views on this constitutional settlement.

A most bitter criticism of the situation in the monarchy was made as early as March 1867 after a Hungarian government under Count Julius Andrassy was set up. The *anonymous* critic who described himself as a “German Austrian” considered the break-up of Austria a European necessity.¹ He hailed Austria’s defeat by Prussia in 1866 as “. . . the day of rebirth for the German nation . . . The exclusion of Austria [from the German Confederation] had been an act of internal and external necessity.”² He argued for the return of the German people of Austria to Germany. Since the people of Bohemia and Moravia were an integral part of the German sphere, having been conquered for centuries, they should follow the Germans of Austria. Hungary wanted complete separation and independence from Austria. The writer expected that Slovaks and Croats would willingly form a new realm with the Magyars. The Polish and Carpatho-Russian parts of the Habsburg realm should go to Russia, the Italian parts to Italy.³ This “German-Austrian” was strongly against any settlement with Hungary which would assure the continued existence of the Habsburg realm.

Adolph Fischhof, a radical liberal German-Austrian historian, in a work published in 1870, was of the opinion that the *Ausgleich* had meant “total victory” for the German element in the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy.⁴ He considered this victory a satisfactory solution. Unlike the “German-Austrian” referred to earlier, Fischhof did not see the need for the Germans of Austria to seek a home in a greater German entity. Fischhof believed that decentralization down to municipal level was the best way to safeguard the cultural rights of the non-German groups. Among the Slav people he considered the Czechs to be the most loyal subjects of the crown.⁵ This did

¹ Anon., *Der Zerfall Oesterreichs*, Leipzig, 1867, p. V.

² *Ibid.*, p. V.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁴ A. Fischhof, *Oesterreich und die Buergerschaft seines Bestandes*, Vienna, 1870, p. 37.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

not prevent him from being convinced of the superiority of the German culture. Fischhof embodied "...the spirit of the nationally moderate liberalism of 1848."⁶

Heinrich Friedjung, another liberal German-Austrian historian, was strongly influenced by his German sentiments towards the compromise.⁷ Looking back over the first decade of the new Dual Monarchy, he was deeply pessimistic for the future of the Germans in Austria. He warned them to be aware of the ever-present threat to the leading position they held, a threat coming from the Czechs, Poles, and "clericals." The decennial negotiations over the common budget were just then taking place and he warned his fellow Germans that they were again giving in to the Hungarians although over the last ten years they should have noticed the bitter fruits of giving in to them. He considered the existence of a Dual Monarchy an insult for Germans and was convinced that the *Ausgleich* was advantageous only to Hungary: "...no honest German can remember without bitter shame how we were cheated."⁸ Austria's defeat in 1866 was not so painful since it was administered by a German people. Friedjung bitterly recalled the compromise with Hungary: "...because we submitted to a people far below us... it amounted in practice that Austria is paying tribute to Hungary."⁹ Friedjung accused the Austrian negotiator, Count von Beust, of having sold out Austria's interests. He accused the Imperial government of having unilaterally decided a matter of common interest without asking the Austrian parliament and he chided the Hungarian statesmen for not caring at all for "honest partnership" whenever advantages were available for their side. He deeply regretted the way the national debt was divided up. Not even the arrangements for the army found favour with Friedjung. It appeared to him that the Hungarian contingents were imbued with the idea of a Hungarian state and "felt half strangers vis-à-vis the other [Austrian] components of the army."¹⁰ The seemingly unfair financial agreement bothered Friedjung. Austria's share of 70% for common expenses seemed outrageous to him. Yet Friedjung admitted the Austrian part of the realm was more advanced and richer. He agreed that "...one part has the greater population, is more advanced educationally, richer in taxation resources, is admittedly the heart of the whole union... but this Austrian bows voluntarily under a people who are barely able to

⁶ R. Kann, *The Multinational Empire, 1848-1918*, New York, 1964, Vol. II, p. 144.

⁷ H. Friedjung, *Der Ausgleich mit Ungarn*, Leipzig, 1877.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

maintain themselves financially . . .”¹¹ Friedjung believed that the future of the realm was in doubt. He regretted that the best men now withdrew from public life and no young men were anxious to enter into a political career since,

any body in public life is accused of the meanest of motives for his actions. No political party is willing to risk the consequences to say plainly what is wrong with state and society . . . The trouble is simply that we don't know anymore to which state we belong . . . we are unsure of ourselves and have no country anymore. There was no Austro-Hungarian citizenship anymore. Now there are only Austrian citizens and Hungarian citizens.¹²

Friedjung offered only one solution: complete separation, an independent Austria and an independent Hungary without any areas in common.

Count Friedrich von Beust, a native of Saxony, at first Minister for Foreign Affairs and then President of the Ministry, had negotiated the compromise in 1867 with his Hungarian opposite, Count Andrassy. Two decades later Beust published his memoirs.¹³ By then retired, he attempted to show himself in the best possible light.

Beust disclaimed to have been the inventor or even the originator of the *Ausgleich* and of Dualism, but was convinced that without him these events would have been a long time coming. He recalled that in a speech from the throne on December 14, 1865, and in his rescript of March 3, 1866, Francis Joseph had recognized that the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713 was the common ground for the relationship of the various component parts of the Habsburg empire, including Hungary. The emperor also had recognized that the domestic administration of Hungary was independent from the other countries of the Habsburg realm. Beust then speaking in the *Reichsrat*, asserted that the compromise with Hungary was necessary to assure Austria's position in international affairs, including her financial credit worthiness.¹⁴ This was not an unimportant matter for a realm continually tottering on the brink of financial ruin.

To Beust the agreement with Hungary was but one aspect of a renewal of the Habsburg realm which unfortunately did not come about. Two years after the conclusion of the compromise, he confided to Baron Henry de Worms, a member of the British House of Commons that his object had been,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹³ F. v. Beust, *Aus dreiviertel Jahrhunderten Erinnerungen und Aufzeichnungen*, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1887 (a slightly edited English edition, *Memoirs*, was published in London in 1887).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

to carry out a bloodless revolution to show the various elements of this great empire [Habsburg] that it is to the benefit of each of them to act in harmony . . . that no constitution can permanently exist unless every portion of the state is represented in it. But to this I have made one exception. Hungary is an ancient monarchy, more ancient than Austria proper . . . Its race and language are entirely different from those of the other peoples which constitute the monarchy; its territorial area is larger than theirs; its population, though less by six million than the remainder of the empire, is much larger than that of any of the nationalities comprising it. Its people are powerful, brave, united and, notwithstanding 1848, loyal . . . I have endeavoured to give Hungary not a new position with regard to the Austrian Empire but to secure her in the one she has occupied . . . The leading principles of my plan are not the creation of a new kingdom and of a new constitution but the resuscitation of an old monarchy; not the separation . . . but the drawing together of the two component parts.¹⁵

That Beust was quite aware of a nationality problem was evidenced by his excuses with regard to the Czechs. He denied that the case for a kingdom of Bohemia was a valid one. Beust's explanation was that other rulers than the Habsburg, had been kings of Bohemia in the past. Furthermore, a kingdom of Bohemia would have been justified for only 50% of its population. The German group comprising almost half of the rest could not possibly be placed under a Slav monarchy since the Germans "... represented in a far higher degree the intelligence and manufacturing industry of the whole of Bohemia."¹⁶ Beust emphatically denied that there was any parallel between the case of the Magyars and that of the Czechs. Although their complaints were as valid as those of the Magyars, far more Czechs entered the imperial service.¹⁷

After the coronation of Francis Joseph in Budapest the king (emperor) remarked to Beust that no Austrian minister had ever been so cordially received in Hungary as he had been. The king expressed his great delight at that.¹⁸ The despondency of some of the German subjects in Austria, many of whom were Liberals, appear less unreasonable since Beust made no secret that he regarded the appointment of a government there with similar constitutional powers to those granted to the Hungarian government as *very premature*.¹⁹ The leader of the Liberals in the Austrian Parliament, Herbst, was one of the severest critics of Beust and his work. The relationship with Hungary was initially good and the first meeting of the parliamentary delegations from Budapest and Vienna were described by

¹⁵ Beust, *Memoirs*, pp. xxiv, xxv.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xxv.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Beust as a "... sort of parliamentary honeymoon... debates were conducted very impartially and progressed satisfactorily."²⁰

In 1897, a Magyar nobleman, *Count Julius Andrassy*, son of Beust's opposite number during the eventful days, defended the *Ausgleich*.²¹ The compromise in force now for three decades was analyzed by him along three lines: (a) from the point of view of power politics, (b) how it preserved the rights of Hungary, (c) how it affected the exercise of these rights. He frankly admitted that his country needed a permanent alliance and this alliance for geographical reasons and the dictates of modern times could be only with Austria. While it had been possible in the past for a single state to defy several, more powerful, enemies, the devastating power of modern weapons would give a decisive advantage to a great power. Count Andrassy also took Russia into consideration when evaluating Hungary's need for accommodation within the Habsburg realm. Because of her size and vast natural resources, because of her pan-Slavic policy, Russia provided a permanent threat to Hungary. A Hungary standing alone would be a permanent invitation for the Russian giant.²²

The advocates of separation in Hungary were warned by him that the break-up of the Dual Monarchy would mean for Hungary the end of her statehood, indeed it would herald the end of the Hungarian nation. The various nationalities comprising the Austrian half would find homes with their German, Italian, Polish and South-Slav cousins, the Magyars had nowhere to go. But he thought that the Germans of Austria would not feel happy to take orders from Berlin, nor would the Czechs find Russia a less oppressive master, and the same would apply to the Poles.²³

He was not insensitive to the unhappiness of the Germans under the new arrangement. He admitted that the German element had recently lost much of its privileged position and had become a stepchild of the government. Twenty years after Friedjung's Cassandra cries, Andrassy felt that it was high time to reassure the German Austrians and to provide them with a position they deserved because of their high culture and their merits. He warned that radical animosities would have to be reduced otherwise the German element would feel that the Habsburg realm had ceased to provide a base to fulfill their destiny. Andrassy believed that a German hegemony

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 67.

²¹ J. Andrassy, *Ungarns Ausgleich mit Oesterreich vom Jahre 1867*, Leipzig, 1897.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-47.

even in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy was not possible anymore, but German interests should be safeguarded. The accord of 1867 was fully justified since it served a mutual need.²⁴

Since no war had occurred between 1867 and 1897 which had threatened the Habsburg realm, Andrassy was unable to answer the question whether the agreement provided a safeguard for Hungary militarily. But he believed that Hungary had become part of a major power and had been given back her European position. Neither the unfortunate revolution of 1848 nor subsequent absolutism could achieve what the freely agreed compromise had accomplished. As for the Habsburgs, their unhappy situation following the defeats in 1859 and 1866, was reversed with the compromise and the monarchy had gained strength and prestige after 1867.²⁵

While the agreement had preserved and maintained Hungary's national identity, he admitted that the Czechs and Croats had failed to maintain their constitutional sovereignty. Andrassy airily dismissed their misfortune since "this was the normal law of life: Croats were destined by geography and political circumstances to be with Hungary, the Czechs with Austria."²⁶

Despite his satisfaction with the compromise, Andrassy was worried about the future. An impartial assessment convinced him that while it was in the best interest of Hungary to maintain the compromise, the peoples in the other half of the Dual Monarchy would regard it only as a starting point for future changes. The Hungarians on the other hand saw it as a final solution and could not allow changes even in minor aspects except in a most dire extremity.²⁷

A far more pessimistic view of the compromise was taken in 1905 by the French historian, *Louis Eisenmann*.²⁸ The very title *Die Zersetzung des ungarischen Ausgleiches vom Jahre 1867* is indicative of his critical view. Seeds for the eventual break-up of the agreement were present at its inception. It was not arrived at by two equals: on the one side was the ruler, on the other the Hungarian nation while the Austrian half of the new Dual Monarchy had the agreement imposed upon them. Because Hungary had successfully resisted the centralizing attempts from Vienna the crown had to compromise. The other national groups had succumbed to

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 144-156.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-177.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 332-340.

²⁸ L. Eisenmann, "Die Zersetzung des ungarischen Ausgleiches vom Jahre 1867," *Oesterreichische Rundschau* xxiii (April 1905) pp. 435-451.

Vienna's rule and their aspiration could therefore be ignored during the negotiations by the crown. Eisenmann saw the reason for this weakness in the too successful applications of a gerrymandered electoral system which set the racial groups at each others' throats with the result that no unity was possible. Hungary, on the other hand, presented a united front and her leaders knew what they wanted.

The crown's foreign policy appeared to Eisenmann to be an important factor in the nature of the agreement. With the impending conflict with Prussia before him the emperor wanted to appease the strongest disrupting force in the realm. After the defeat at Sadowa, the desire for revenge made the conclusion of such an agreement still desirable. Yet any such attempts to defy Prussia had been made impossible by the events of 1871. Eisenmann argued that the ulterior motives for that agreement were, therefore, not applicable any more. On the Hungarian side, too, original motives did not anymore apply. Before Sadowa parts of the Habsburg realm – though not Hungary – were part of the German Confederation. The Magyars feared that successful centralization by Vienna would not only deprive Hungary of her identity in the Habsburg realm but swallow her up in the vast orbit of a German realm, however loosely knit. Yet the defeat of Austria and her exclusion from Germany made this anxiety non-existent. Eisenmann criticized the *Ausgleich* as being based on erroneous foundations which thus weakened it. He noted also that the long-term aims of the two parties differed: to the Hungarians its main importance lay in the field of domestic policies, while the emperor was considering it as a prop for his foreign policy embracing the whole realm.

Eisenmann believed that the ultimate aim of the Hungarians was for complete separatism even if they agreed to certain "common areas" by reason of necessity. He noted that Deák and Andrassy had insisted that the ministers in charge of these common areas: foreign affairs, defence and financial matters, must not hold any ministerial appointments in either part of the realm. Similarly, the two parliamentary delegations which were to meet every ten years to deliberate these common areas, had to discuss these matters and to vote on them apart from each other and were not allowed any joint sessions. But this emphasis on equality and separatism was not followed logically in all fields: Austria bore 70% of the common burdens while Hungary contributed only 30%. Eisenmann noted this as a source for trouble. But the crown was so anxious to preserve the historic diplomatic and military indivisibility of the realm that it was prepared to pay the price to Hungary for this.

Another incongruous aspect of the agreement was that the Hungarians reserved to themselves the right to agree to the commercial and customs unity only for ten-year periods. Constitutionally it was quite feasible that the diplomats of the realm represented abroad one political entity while the consular and trade officials of the ruler might have to represent two entirely separate, indeed competing, states. He thought that all safeguards for Hungary's sovereignty sprang from a wrong appreciation on the part of Deák and Andrassy of the strength of their opponents, because in 1867 the crown and the western half of the realm had looked very strong. Yet after 1875 the Hungarian government ruthlessly and successfully pursued the Magyarisation of the country without interference from the crown. The compromise as such allowed Hungary more and more to develop as a modern closely knit national state. Liberal intellectuals from the professions, trade and industry enthusiastically supported this growth.²⁹ According to Eisenmann no demand seemed too high for these new nationalists, no success gained too insignificant to be ignored; every loophole in the compromise was used to advance Hungary's case, and every device of interpretation was used to promote their cause. In consequence, Eisenmann believed that the spirit of the 1867 agreement would become completely eroded, and the common areas would be gradually reduced until two entirely separate states had emerged. The only reason why this process was retarded was the lack of financial strength on the part of Hungary to provide for defence costs on her own. Yet it did not seem to Eisenmann that the institution of the monarchy was in danger. He believed that it would depend on the strength of the western part of the realm just how far and how strong the shrewd Hungarian politicians would press their claims. It would, however, be necessary that a united and parliamentary Hungary be faced by an equally united and constitutionally governed western part. That, however, was not the case.

In 1907 a German writer, *Friedrich von Gaertner*, was also critical of the compromise.³⁰ He noted that far-reaching concessions were made by the emperor with one stroke and out of his free will. The people of Transylvania who were Germans and Rumanians were handed over to the Magyars, and so were the border regions with Turkey, largely inhabited by Germans. The ancient struggle between the Magyars and the Croats was solved in favour of the former.

²⁹ Compare the evolution of the German Liberals from 1848 to 1866 when nationalism had overgrown true liberalism.

³⁰ F. v. Gaertner, "Der oesterreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich", *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vol. xxv, Tuebingen, 1907, part I pp. 52-147, part II pp. 338-444.

Gaertner was convinced that the Magyars got the better deal throughout. He noted that the constitutional aspects of the compromise were "curiously vague." The agreement was between the king of Hungary and his Hungarian subjects since Austria as a constitutional body did not exist. Gaertner noted that matters of customs and excise were not considered by the Hungarians as being contained in the Pragmatic Sanction; hence they were not unalterable although, for the time being, they were one of the "common areas" of the compromise. He had no doubt that the ultimate aim of the Hungarians was for complete separatism. To that end they were making clever use of the decennial negotiations at which they seemed to rally their forces to obtain still more concessions. As in the end the ruler would be the only link between two independent states, Gaertner wondered how this would work out in practice. If a common interest in economic and financial affairs was absent how could a common policy in foreign affairs be conducted by the ruler. Conditions since 1867 had changed so much that Dualism had become untenable as too many other national groups remain unrecognized.

The importance of foreign policy for the quick conclusion of the agreement was noted by this author too. After Sadowa the Magyars were given even more favourable conditions than were suggested in 1865, the sole reason being the emperor's and Beust's desire for revenge.³¹ Gaertner agreed with Andrassy's views that there could be no place for an independent foreign policy by Hungary, a fact Deák had realised when making his offer in 1865. Gaertner showed sympathy for the anguish of many Germans and for their claim that they had been "solid". He thought that a complete impartial and objective account was impossible, one could only in all fairness say that both parts derived benefits that outweighed the disadvantages. But it would be difficult to ignore Andrassy's remarks of January 16, 1869 when he answered his critics in Hungary: "At present we contribute to the common expenditure 30% and we have as many rights and privileges as those who pay 70%."³²

Gaertner believed that the Germans in Austria, mostly Liberals, had received the constitutional guarantees they had demanded. Like the Magyars, they had been most anxious to restrict the power of the court and of the military clique; Magyars and Germans were inclined towards centralism within their own sphere; both valued legal considerations more than the satisfaction of real political needs.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 60 n. 12 (A paper presented at the A.H.A. meeting in December 1966 attempted to demolish the generally held view of Beust's intentions).

³² *Ibid.*, p. 62 n. 16.

Gaertner was particularly critical of the then leading groups in Hungary whom he accused of being "... neither honest, nor dualistic, nor bourgeois, nor democratic, but an oligarchy with parliamentary fancies."³³

Gaertner's analysis is, apart from other considerations, valuable for his penetrating presentation of the complicated financial and economic aspects of the compromise as they come to the fore during the decennial negotiations.

From across the Channel came in 1907 an analysis by *Archibald Colquhoun*.³⁴ He thought that the emperor considered Russia's advance and the growth of Pan-Slavism a threat to the Austrian supremacy in Central Europe. In consequence, the Slav element in the realm was the one most distrusted by the crown. Beust was blamed for handing over the once so faithful Croats to the Magyars in order to reduce Austrian responsibilities. The compromise bitterly disappointed the Czechs as it failed to gain for their lands what it had given to Hungary. Equally disappointed were the South Slavs; only the Poles compromised with Beust and gave him their votes because they were allowed to dominate their Ruthenian minority; they also obtained use of the Polish language in the upper schools, law courts and public office. Colquhoun believed that if Beust's intentions of 1867 had been honestly carried out, many of the Czech's demands would have been fulfilled: rights of all citizens before the law, inviolability of domicile, right of association, freedom of conscience, equality of races, inviolability of nationality and language, and equality of their language in administration, schools and public life. One of the main reasons why these hopes remained unfulfilled was the electoral system which refused to accept the principle of one man one vote. Hence a German majority was assured even in predominantly Slav areas. In Bohemia, for example, the Germans held a majority until 1879. As Gaertner and Eisenmann had done, Colquhoun blamed Beust's ambitions in foreign affairs for the failure at home.

Colquhoun thought that the greater solidarity of the Hungarians made them the predominant partner. This became particularly evident in the delegations which met at ten-year intervals. While the Hungarians were elected by their parliament without restrictions and presented a compact body, the Austrian delegations were taken from each province in due proportion of groups. They were, therefore, deeply divided on all questions of race and party. Colquhoun noted,

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³⁴ A. R. Colquhoun. *The Whirlpool of Europe: Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs*, London, 1907, pp. 83-86 and 305, 306.

too, the Magyar power of organization for political purposes. Despite their many and deep disagreements, all members in the Hungarian parliament were solidly united where Magyar rights were at stake. Hence any differences at home were unimportant for the Hungarians as far as the *Ausgleich* was concerned.

Richard Charmatz was a liberal, pre-World War I Austrian historian.³⁵ As other historians before him, Charmatz saw financial matters and the desire for revenge on Prussia important reasons for the compromise. With Sadowa the Greater-German-policy was buried and a dualism was established. Only outwardly appearing as an entity, the new realm really consisted of two independent states with three top level governments: for Hungary, for Austria, and for the affairs common to both. Unlike other writers, Charmatz did not think that the compromise could not be changed. It was: "an unlimited, progressive compromise... from which arose the need to occasionally renewed compromises in economic and financial matters."³⁶ He did not deny that there were complaints in Austria over the excessive financial burden or over the proportioning of the national debt and admitted that the share of contribution was "unfair." The *Reichsrat* had accepted the compromise out of loyalty to the crown and not because it liked it. The gradual increase in protective duties was demanded by a mainly agricultural Hungary and more advantageous to her than to Austria. The wrangling over the quota distributions ended in victory for Hungary despite protracted negotiations. Charmatz thought that the compromise was viewed with growing dissatisfaction by both sides and demands for a complete separation were made increasingly. Yet nothing happened in the end since "... nobody wanted to upset the already ramshackled edifice of 1867."³⁷

By 1888 the Hungarians had demanded their own army. The regulation that officers' examinations were in the German language only, greatly irritated Magyar nationalists. But a compromise patched matters over for another ten years. As noted by Colquhoun in 1907, Charmatz credited the Hungarians with great skill and success in the negotiations of 1898 while the Austrian government lacked negotiating skill. Particularly galling to him was the equal share in administration of the Austro-Hungarian Bank achieved by the Hungarians despite contributing only 30% of the financial burden. He believed that Hungary had greatly increased her ability to pay. Charmatz quoted the *Neue Freie Presse* which called this new agreement "not

³⁵ R. Charmatz, *Oesterreichs innere Geschichte von 1848 bis 1907*, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1911/12.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

a compromise but a tribute to maintain a system of dualism which is for Hungary at least as important as for us." ³⁸

Closer to the outbreak of WWI was *Wickham Steed's* history of the Habsburg Monarchy. ³⁹ The author was rather critical of the Dual Monarchy as it appeared by 1913 and called it "the land of improbabilities." Steed believed that Francis Joseph was so eager for revenge on Prussia and was so touched by Deák's moderation despite Austria's defeat that Hungary's demands were accepted without much quibbling. Steed considered the Dual system

not as an agreement conducted by two contracting parties after mature consideration of the internal issues it was to regulate, but rather a snap decision hurriedly taken for dynastic reasons under pressure of events abroad. ⁴⁰

Steed mentioned the possibility of a mental reservation on the part of the emperor to revise the agreement again after the hoped-for defeat of Prussia. Hence he listened too much to Beust who was also bent on revenge. Unfortunately for these hopes the German victory in 1871 stabilized the *Ausgleich*.

Steed considered the Hungarian Statute XII of 1867 which contained the agreement to be "vague and involved in language." The Austrian Statute of December 21, 1867, introducing the agreement for the other half of the realm was more precisely expressed but the Hungarians did not regard it as a guide to interpret any obscurities of which they made the best use. The contradictory provisions in the Hungarian Statute dealing with army matters were a particular source of friction and misunderstandings. Steed contended that the departure of Andrassy after 1879 from the government marked the beginning of progressively critical attitudes both in Hungary and Austria. Basically, the nature of dualism and its original defects made it an "... oscillating and fluctuating structure, singularly open to attack." ⁴¹ It was contrary to the interests of the non-Magyar and non-German elements of the realm, and in consequence ultimately inimical to the crown too.

The last pre-war comments examined came from *Paul Louis Leger's* book written in 1895 but brought up to date and translated by Professor W. E. Lingelbach of the University of Pennsylvania in 1913. ⁴² Leger (Lingelbach) stated that the Magyar nation was the only nation completely contained in the Habsburg realm and

³⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II p. 128.

³⁹ H. W. Steed, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, London, 1913.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴² P. L. Leger, *L'Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, ed. & translated by W. E. Lingelbach, New York, 1913.

from that group did the realm receive its national power. This was a source of strength. The author goes so far as to suggest that by 1913 the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy was really that of the kingdom of Hungary. He, too, saw Beust's attempts as partly dictated by foreign policy aims but he also believed that Beust hoped to gain the support of the Magyars in his own fight against other nationalities. Hence domestic considerations were important to him too. The author was critical of the suppression and Magyarization of other national groups, an evil which the *Ausgleich* made possible in Hungary. Because of the dominant position of the Germans and Magyars in their respective halves such an agreement suited either side.

One consequence not mentioned by other writers appeared to Leger to be the freeing of Austria from the "clerical and ultramontaine yoke suffered since 1855."⁴³ It meant a modification of the marriage laws and trial by jury. There were also useful military reforms. He admitted, however, that the non-German people of the realm were little helped by such measures. Only the German and Magyar people profited.⁴⁴

Turning now to comments written after 1914. A Magyar, *Gyula Szekfü*, published a history of Hungary in 1918, the last year of the monarchy's existence.⁴⁵ Significantly it is entitled the *State of Hungary*. To him the "... *Ausgleich* reconciled the demands for a separate Hungarian state and the state system of Central Europe."⁴⁶ What "reconciliation" meant in practical details was left open to interpretation. In part, Szekfü echoed the views of that anonymous "German-Austrian" of 1867. An independent Hungarian state was necessary to complement the Central European system of a unified Germany but Szekfü also envisaged a separate Austria freed from its Italian entanglements. He believed that the compromise was the organic fulfillment of a long evolution and no other solution was possible. He gladly noted that any centralization attempts by Vienna were finally laid to rest and the agreement was "... a great historic success for Hungary."⁴⁷ He denounced those in either half of the realm who would tinker with the agreement. Only loyal support was possible since no other solution was feasible.

Yet Szekfü looking back over half a century did not deny that there had arisen some problems since 1867. Memories of past times

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 402 (note Friedjung's fear of "clericalism").

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

⁴⁵ G. Szekfü, *Der Staat Ungarn*, Stuttgart, 1918.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

lingered on — in Austria to the days when she was a great German-Italian power, in Hungary to the glorious, if bitter, days of the republic of Kossuth. Two aspects which were detrimental to a happy continuation of the agreement were the rift that seemed to widen between the two halves on the occasions of the decennial negotiations. Worse still, no widespread feelings of a true and real friendship for Austria had as yet developed in Hungary, even after half a century.

Conditions had changed too. Szekfü believed that the bourgeois — liberal ideas of the nineteenth century which had been the foundations for the *Ausgleich* in 1867 were now widely questioned. What seemed the best solution then might not stand the test of time in a rapidly changing world. He admitted that neither Austria nor Hungary could solve entirely the problems of their national minorities. Szekfü doubted that, because of historical developments, the landed gentry in Hungary or the growing middle class in that country were really able to face the forces of modern finance-capitalism. The national culture of the country rested now on two comparatively weak economic sections, the German urbanites and the Magyar gentry. Yet it was the broad mass of Hungarian peasants who were the true bearers of the Hungarian national state.⁴⁸

Horváth, another Hungarian historian, looked at the *Ausgleich* in 1922, after the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy when his country was left truncated and alone in a hostile Central Europe.⁴⁹

He, too, noted the emperor's willingness to come to terms with Hungary when Deák reaffirmed the loyalty of the Hungarians after Sadowa. Horváth believed that it was of particular importance that Deák had assured the emperor that Hungarians did not wish to take the direction of foreign affairs into their hands. Horváth thought that Deák had made a basic error when he assumed that the hereditary provinces of the Habsburgs were a historic and political unit, and that "... the Habsburg realm was a state as perfect as France or England."⁵⁰ The attempt to forge such a kind of state was made only after Austria's defeat by Prussia and it proved a dismal failure. Yet both Deák and Andrassy thought of Austria as a German state comparable to Hungary as a Magyar state. Attempts to arrange a coronation for Francis Joseph at Prague caused great anxiety in Hungary. It was argued in Budapest that the compromise was between two states — which it was not — and Hungarians now feared that such a coronation would be the end of the other partner. When Andrassy replaced Beust in 1871, this was the end of any

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 194, 195.

⁴⁹ B. Horváth, *Modern Hungary 1660-1920*, Budapest, 1922.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

attempts to change fundamentally the composition of the realm. Andrassy feared that if Austria would be transferred into a Slav state it would be dominated by a vast Slavic Eastern Europe which in turn would be subject to the growing ambitions of Russia.⁵¹

Horvath, somewhat inconsistently, regretted the assumption of the Foreign Ministry by Andrassy since the Hungarian leader had had to give up his influential position in Hungary. He complained that Andrassy placed an inferior office, the Foreign Ministry of the Dual Monarchy, above a superior one, the premiership of Hungary. He alleged that Foreign Affairs were not really a true "common ministry" because it pursued purely Austrian interests.⁵² This assertion was not shared by other historians. Horvath himself admitted that Andrassy's acceptance of the Foreign Ministry preserved the compromise and averted the danger of Austria being turned into a Slav dominated state.

Some changes in the compromise seemed desirable to Horvath who blamed the weakness of successive governments for their failure to "... adapt the compromise to the needs of modern times."⁵³ He did not share the view of others who thought that the agreement was more advantageous to Hungary than to Austria. He argued that it gave Austria an enhanced position on the diplomatic stage of Europe which she had lost in 1866. He also thought that Austria got this at a bargain price since all she did was to restore the ancient constitution of Hungary. Hungary's position, on the other hand, was weakened since she came under the evil influence of the federal tendencies that prevailed in Austria among the many nations there.⁵⁴

Horvath was also critical of the arrangements for the common army, since it was commanded by a purely German-Austrian General Staff. He saw the spectre of a new "super state" arising ruled by the crown, the army and the foreign ministry. The case in point was the acquisition of the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Turkey in 1908. These territories were ruled directly from Vienna and not incorporated into either half of the realm. To Horvath, the greatest threat to the compromise came from Germany, because Berlin looked to Vienna and its German ruling class rather than to the Dual Monarchy as such. To the planners of global policy in Berlin the domestic problems of Germany's only ally were a nuisance and an embarrassment. When the demand for increased numbers of recruits in 1903 brought about the fall of the Hungarian government

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

Horváth blamed Germany for this demand. Similarly he saw the sinister arm of the "superstate" in Vienna revealed when the Hungarian parliament was dissolved with military force in February 1906.⁵⁵ He accused the military leaders of being interested only in a territorial entity comprising the whole of the Habsburg realm, a somewhat fatuous reproach in view of their duties.

In 1926 *Joseph Redlich*, imperial Austria's last head of government, drew attention to the reception of the *Ausgleich* in 1867.⁵⁶ The rescript that announced the appointment of Count Andrassy's government had been greeted with joyful jubilation in Budapest. The speedy conclusion of the agreement even surprised the negotiators; what had seemed unsurmountable difficulties only yesterday had vanished today. But in Vienna there was no jubilation:

Leading members of the higher bureaucracy, senior army officers and the higher German nobility... were deeply hurt in their most sacred feelings. It was said for many years to come that only a foreigner could accomplish such cutting up of the living body of the venerable realm.⁵⁷

It seemed to Redlich, however, that many who had so gloomily predicted the early break-up of the realm and the *Anschluss* with Germany "settled down surprisingly quickly to Beust and his politics."⁵⁸

One of the byproducts of the compromise, according to Redlich, was the need in Austria to win the votes of the Poles. Indeed it had become an axiom of Austrian domestic policies from then until the death of Francis Joseph in 1916 that the Poles should be trusty supporters of any government in Vienna. In consequence, Poles ceased to support the Czechs and South Slavs and the Ruthenians were sacrificed to the Poles.⁵⁹

Redlich most severely criticized the manner in which financial matters were to be dealt with according to the compromise. Endless and bitter wrangling was the result. Like Szekfü before him, Redlich saw a great weakness in the fact that neither in Austria nor in Hungary had the agreement become really popular. Austrians saw an underserved great success for the Magyars because of the ineptness of the emperor and his ministers, while the mass of the Hungarians felt that it put the end to their hopes for complete inde-

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁵⁶ J. Redlich, *Des Oesterreichische Staats und Reichsproblem*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1926.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 834.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 834.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 619, 620.

pendence. A basic fault of the agreement was, moreover, its rigidity which did not allow any change in the relationships with the national groups. While any evolution of the non-Magyar and non-German people was made impossible, few on either side attempted to remove these barriers.⁶⁰

Oscar Jászi, a Magyar historian living in the United States, regretted that the compromise did not allow for a "true constitutional life" in either half of the realm.⁶¹ While in the western half government was based on a purely artificial German majority rule, the masses of the nationalities and labouring classes in Hungary never enjoyed a reasonable share in political rights even at the municipal level. It was a dualistic system agreed upon between the emperor and the feudal class in Hungary. Jászi noted that the German upper bourgeoisie accepted the agreement "with serious hesitation" and only because it gave them control of the Slav majority. The latter were deeply disappointed and "the emigration of the Slav souls from the monarchy began early." Jászi pointed out that the French became keenly interested of the Czechs from now on, not so much because they cared for the Hussite background of the Czechs but the French feared that the German-Magyar dualism would become a strong support for German imperialism. Although a Magyar himself, Jászi strongly criticized the Magyarization policy in Hungary after 1867.

There can be no doubt that the weakest nation of Austria enjoyed in a real life more rights and privileges than the strongest non-Magyar nation in Hungary.⁶²

Apprehension over the compromise in the Austrian half of the realm were considered fully justified by the author since the *Ausgleich* contained "the germs of unavoidable crisis." The agreement was born in a spirit of mutual distrust and was the result of an emergency situation. The new constitutional law was "very vague, very uncertain and very loosely defined."⁶³ Jászi thought that the economic arrangements undermined and discredited the Dualism even more than the vagueness of the wording in the agreement. Separatism in Hungary was increasing and public opinion in Hungary wanted to discontinue the common economic policy of the realm. The Slavs continued to hate the compromise and even the German liberals progressively disliked it.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 670.

⁶¹ O. Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, Chicago, 1929, pp. 108, 109.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

Harrison Thomson writing in the United States in 1953 believed that the granting of autonomy to Hungary in 1867 gave the Habsburg monarchy another chance to make a fundamental change in its internal policy.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, the Magyar aristocracy exercised an oppressive rule over the Slavs, while the attitude of the Austrian governments showed the Czechs that they could hope for little. An attempt was made by Vienna in 1870 to give the minorities some rights, but the Magyars feared that the Dualism, so favourable for them, would be disturbed by an arrangement with the Czechs. They objected "vociferously to any liberalization" and Vienna bowed to their wishes.

Julius Miskolczy, a Hungarian, partly criticized the agreement.⁶⁵ Looking at it with a mid-twentieth century mind he noted that any large scale planning was made impossible by the ten-year terms for the customs and trade agreements. He referred to a term coined after 1867 that the Habsburg realm was "a monarchy on notice" but believed that this was not quite fair. The monarchy had proven quite durable and the crucial years 1914-1918 proved the strength of the realm. He disagreed with those who argued that complete separation was really the ultimate aim of the Hungarians. He showed that Hungary had accepted everything required for her for defence in a joint cause. He admitted that beyond that she had accepted nothing. Her first and most important aim was to avoid her dissolution in a centralized and unified realm. He also rejected the reproach that it was the *Ausgleich* and Hungary's attitude which prevented federalization in the Austrian half which he agreed was necessary.⁶⁶ Despite great mistakes against the national minorities in Hungary, great improvements had come about for them too after 1867. The unfairness of the 70%-30% formula for sharing common expenses was more apparent than real. He argued that not even an absolute regime could have squeezed out more of Hungary and the arrangement correspond with the economic capacity of Hungary. In 1867 any federal ideas for the realm were utterly impractical and impossible. "For the dynasty the compromise was not only the best but the only solution."⁶⁷ It was a tragic fact that many on either side regarded the agreement with great suspicion; in Hungary only the more enlightened were satisfied. The mass of the Hungarian people never forgave the mass executions after the 1848 rebellion. Yet in 1914 the Hungarians loyally supported the crown if only because they had realised that their fate was inextricably bound up with that of the realm as a whole.

⁶⁴ S. H. Thomson, *Czechoslovakia in European History*, Princeton, 1953.

⁶⁵ J. Miskolczy, *Ungarn in der Habsburg Monarchie*, Munich, 1959.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 139.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

Denis Sinor, a Hungarian writing in England, defended the agreement even if it left many problems unsolved.⁶⁸ It gave Hungary independence which she had not enjoyed since 1526. He made the unusual assertion that Hungarians, almost mischievously, enjoyed making difficulties for the Austrians but regretted that the long years of peace were not used as well as they might have been. There was a return to feudalism rather than a progress towards democracy. Futile constitutional squabbles and obstruction to constructive policies were accompanied by grandiose patriotic rhetorical outbursts that beclouded the Hungarian mind. He blamed the Magyar nobility for most evils; they had lost their privileges but would not cange; they occupied and used the Civil Service as compensation for their inability to hold their own in a growing and modern economy. The peasants were kept from voting by an adverse franchise, only one in twenty Hungarians had the franchise.

Erich Zoellner is one of the younger Austrian historians whose references to the *Ausgleich* might be noted.⁶⁹ He believed that Austria's exclusion from Germany made the solution of the Hungarian problem most urgent. Beust was credited by Zoellner for having negotiated "not without skill," an admission not often heard from Vienna. Any counter manoeuvres by the Slavs were doomed from Francis Joseph agreed to negotiate. As others before him, Zoellner criticized the provision that Hungary bore only 30% responsibility financially while she had equal responsibility overall. Zoellner thought Hungary was the stronger element because of her simpler domestic situation and feeling of a historic past. He reminded his readers that an Austrian coat of arms was introduced only in 1915.⁷⁰

Hugo Hantsch published his recent historical work a year after Zoellner.⁷¹ He too stressed the impact of foreign affairs. The defeat of Sadowa made an absolutely governed Austria impossible and a complete change of the internal structure of the monarchy was inevitable. Hantsch praised Deák's moderation in arguing that Hungary should forgo some elements of sovereignty for the sake of the greater entity. For Hantsch is was an "overblown sense of nationalism" in Hungary that endangered unity. He was also critical of the provision for decennial negotiations because it introduced an element of uncertainty and, by implication, admitted the separate entity for Hungary. Hantsch saw the not-so-equal position of the Austrian realm by 1911 indicated in the way government institutions were designated. For example, the common affairs were referred to

⁶⁸ D. Sinor, *History of Hungary*, London, 1959.

⁶⁹ E. Zoellner, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, Vienna, 1961.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁷¹ H. Hantsch, *Die Geschichte Oesterreichs*, 2 vols. Vienna, 1962.

as *Kaiserlich-Koeniglich*; but all purely Austrian matters were also called K and K, while all Hungarian matters were referred to as *Koeniglich* (royal). In this evolution of terminology Hantsch saw the growing tendency toward Hungary's separatism.⁷² He deplored the "obvious preponderance" of the Hungarian half which to him was not justified at all. It was solely due to the single-minded will of the Magyars and the compactness of their territories vis-à-vis the diverse parts of the Austrian half. He, too, admitted that in 1867 nothing better could have been worked out, but criticized the rigidity of the compromise. He put some blame on the emperor for resisting changes. Francis Joseph had sacrificed a considerable part of his powers after long struggles and was now stubbornly determined to preserve what remained and to resist any further break-up. Though it had been asserted by others that Hungary was not really concerned with foreign affairs, Hantsch was of the opinion that eventually Hungary had largely determined the easterly direction of foreign policy. The fact that a strong Liberal regime had come to power in an independent Hungary was seen by Hantsch as partially responsible for the weak opposition of German Liberals in the Austrian half of the realm. A truly absolutist regime was now impossible in Austria too and, therefore, the compromise was accepted by them although they had initially defended the entity of the realm.

Hantsch noted the disappointment of the Slav people and remarked upon the pointed departure of Frantisek Palacky, the Czech leader, to Moscow in 1867. Yet in 1872 Palacky was apprehensive of Russian advances towards a universal Slav monarchy: "... in it I see unspeakable misery, a misfortune without limits and bounds."⁷³

Hantsch credited the *Ausgleich* to have brought great economic advances in the realm. Educational matters, too, improved. While in 1867 some 66% of army recruits were illiterate, this figure was down to 39% four years later. Yet it must be noted that progress was not even. By 1881 the most westerly part of Austria had an illiteracy rate of only 3.2% while the Croats and Slovenes under Hungarian rule were still 73% illiterate.

Professor Macartney of Oxford blamed Andrassy who as foreign minister in 1871 had made any reorganization of the realm impossible.⁷⁴ He too believed that after 1867 Hungary was in a more favourable position than she had ever been. The fact that the common Foreign Minister was alternatively a Hungarian assured

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 379.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁷⁴ C. A. Macartney, *Hungary, a short History*, Edinburgh, 1962, p. 178.

Hungarian interests a place in foreign affairs. Macartney regretted that long lingering suspicions obscured for Hungarians the real advantages gained. A new point made by him was the suggestion that the unfortunate provisions for the financial and economic matters did not arise from sinister designs on the part of Deák and Andrassy but because they had no concept of these complicated matters. The provisions for the retention of the German language in the army irked Hungarians greatly despite the fact that the Hungarian reserves, equivalent of a militia, used the Magyar language. On the whole, Macartney saw more benefits for Hungary arising out of the compromise.

In 1963, a modern Czechoslovak historian, *Frantisek Kavka* an orthodox Marxist, squarely blamed the compromise for the severe Magyarization after 1867.⁷⁵ Even the Slovak schools set up twenty years earlier were closed. The Slovak intelligentsia could obtain education only in Hungarian schools. The remnants of feudalism were more visible in Hungary than in Austria but the supremacy of German bourgeoisie in Austria was a disaster for their Czech counterparts who had now to ally themselves with the Czech nobility to retain their existence.

Kavka roundly condemned the *Ausgleich* but for different reasons than the anonymous "German-Austrian" in 1867: "1867 marked the legal acknowledgement of the triumph of capitalism in Austria-Hungary."⁷⁶

In 1964 *Robert A. Kann*, published in the United States his searching study on the Habsburg realm.⁷⁷ He noted that there was a "marked difference" in the basic principles upon which the compromise was built even if the actual provisions concerning common affairs were identical. Hungarian constitutional law was the basis for the settlement as far as Hungary was concerned but no such historic foundation existed in Austria. Kann pointedly referred to the unwillingness of the Magyars to allow changes in the Austrian half of the realm. The most decisive case in point was the belated attempt of the emperor Charles in October 1918 to make radical constitutional changes in Austria. Despite his assurances as to the continued integrity of the Hungarian half of the realm, the Magyars severed the union with Austria.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ F. Kavka, *An Outline of Czechoslovak History*, Prague, 1963.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁷⁷ R. Kann, *The Multinational Empire, 1848-1918*, 2 Vols. New York, 1964.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 22, 23.

Kann blamed the selfish attitude of the Magyars towards their own national groups for their opposition to any changes towards federalization in Austria. Only if the fiction was maintained that the Austrian half was not a multinational state, could this same fiction be applied in Hungary.

In 1870 the attempts of the Austrian government to arrange a coronation for Francis Joseph in Prague had to be abandoned because of Magyar opposition. In 1918 the emperor went ahead and Hungary broke away.

Hence the contention of Kann that the compromise of 1867 made an early South Slav union within Austria impossible. Serbian independence in 1878 ended any hopes to keep Serbians within the realm.⁷⁹

As for the other national groups, Kann believed that the compromise blocked "a just, comprehensive and wise solution of the national problem."⁸⁰ The "strongest aspect" of the agreement was for Kann the fact that it lasted for half a century.

CONCLUSION

When twenty-four opinions, spread over almost a century, are referred to with regard to an historic event one is prepared for a fair divergence of opinions.

Two writers, the anonymous "German-Austrian" of 1867 and the present-day Czech historian Kavka, reject the compromise *per se* and all aspects of it. Two others, the Frenchman Eisenmann and the Magyar Jászi, believed that the compromise could not have been successful in the long run because of its basic faults. However, they examined carefully all the aspects of the agreement and their criticism diverges not very far from that of others, less pessimistic.

The agreement gave a dominant position to the Magyars and Germans in the realm to the detriment of other national groups; it brought, though in different fields, advantages to both halves of the realm; views varied how much better off the one part was than the other in consequence, it seemed that the Magyars had the better deal. Most observers noted that an agreement affecting three was concluded by two parties without consultation of the third party though it was vitally affected by it. Many observers, though not all, agreed that in 1867 it was the best possible arrangement.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 252.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 132.

The most glaring defects were noted by most to be a vagueness of the wording, a rigidity which did not allow for evolution; severely criticized were the arrangements over financial and economic matters and the provisions for decennial negotiations in these fields which gave rise to bitterness between the partners. Most writers agreed that the crown and the Magyars had different aims in view even if they could agree on terms. There was agreement that the mass of the people in either half of the realm never really became involved in the arrangement and accepted it, in consequence, the long-term prospects for success were poor. Agreement was also on the fact that the Magyars were the better and more effective negotiators during the decennial negotiations; most writers agree also as to the reasons for this.

Only one Slav historian has been quoted but in view of the so obvious disadvantages of the compromise for the Slav people and for reasons of space, more comments from that corner were omitted.

With the hindsight of a century and from a distance of more than two thousand miles Canadian observers in the latter part of the 1960s might look at the handiwork of Beust, Deák and Andrassy with sympathetic understanding. Perhaps the emperor in 1867 did not quite realize how far he had tied his hands and how strong the forces of nationalism really would become. Have the leaders in the twentieth century done any better to solve the problems of their minorities in their various countries around the globe?

Note: Some excellent studies on the nationality problem of the Habsburg realm were presented at an International Conference at Indiana University April 2-6, 1966. These papers were issued in Volume III, Part 1 and II, 1967 of the *Austrian History Yearbook* published by Rice University.