

Soviet Legacy and Colonial Mentality: Continuity and Change in Ukraine's Higher Education

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Article abstract

This article considers the forces that impeded university reform in Ukraine prior to the Russian invasion in 2014 and the onset of the full-scale war in 2022. Ukraine's post-Soviet educational system, which was originally designed to reproduce the subservience, compliance, and rigidity of the Russian and Soviet empires, preserved administrative mechanisms and entitlements that curbed institutional transformation. Russia's invasion, however, spurred universities in Ukraine to make a radical move away from the Russian/Soviet template of higher education. This paper contextualizes the contentious history of Russo-Ukrainian relations within a discussion of the constraints spawned by the Soviet legacy and colonial mindset in Ukrainian universities. An analysis of the challenges to transformation is followed by policy recommendations for reformers and intellectual leaders seeking to decolonize their academic communities through the internationalization of higher education.



Soviet Legacy and Colonial Mentality: Continuity and Change in Ukraine's Higher Education

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Abstract: This article considers the forces that impeded university reform in Ukraine prior to the Russian invasion in 2014 and the onset of the full-scale war in 2022. Ukraine's post-Soviet educational system, which was originally designed to reproduce the subservience, compliance, and rigidity of the Russian and Soviet empires, preserved administrative mechanisms and entitlements that curbed institutional transformation. Russia's invasion, however, spurred universities in Ukraine to make a radical move away from the Russian/Soviet template of higher education. This paper contextualizes the contentious history of Russo-Ukrainian relations within a discussion of the constraints spawned by the Soviet legacy and colonial mindset in Ukrainian universities. An analysis of the challenges to transformation is followed by policy recommendations for reformers and intellectual leaders seeking to decolonize their academic communities through the internationalization of higher education.

Keywords: higher education, Ukraine, Soviet legacy, colonial mentality, decolonization.

I. INTRODUCTION

Russia's annexation of the Crimea and invasion of the Donbas in 2014—the precursors to world order-shattering war crimes across the entire territory of Ukraine in 2022—piqued global interest and concern about the Kremlin's imperial legacy, which was earlier thought to have withered in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Cohen 13). Not only did this legacy rebound, but it has also stimulated post-truth politics and encouraged the mixing of hard and soft powers for the purpose of reinstating the supremacy of Russian values and beliefs in the global space of knowledge-making (Mäkinen 183). Natalia Forrat observes that Russian universities became hostage to the Kremlin's world view while seeking extra resources through the 5–100 Project (which aimed to improve their global prestige), and they shirked their responsibility to nurture civil society and accountable governance.

In the initial days following the 2022 invasion, the Western community, which had been preoccupied with Russia's integration into the global

“prestige economy,” was shocked when the Russian Union of Rectors (“the group representing more than 700 rectors and university presidents”) expressed unwavering support for “Russian troops and Russian president Vladimir Putin” (Lem). As Pola Lem points out, this was “a day after the International Criminal Court’s top prosecutor said it would investigate Russia’s role in possible crimes against humanity in Ukraine, and as Russian forces intensified their shelling of civilian and residential areas.” The global community expected Ukraine to collapse within several days of the Russian invasion but was amazed by the Ukrainians’ defiance and heroism. This gave rise to the hope that a smaller nation-state could withstand an assault by the “world’s second army” and defend its identity and agency.¹ While such hope sustained the war effort throughout 2022, considerable worry arose within the Ukrainian academic community² regarding the Soviet legacy and colonial mindset prevalent in universities and communities notwithstanding the war. As the Armed Forces of Ukraine fought an existential battle in the trenches, professors and students who formed part of the civilian rearguard were feeling a duty toward eradicating the previously ignored pillars of Russian legitimacy and influence in Ukrainian society and universities.

In 2022, Olena Betlii noted that the Ukrainian discourse was being increasingly drawn toward concepts of decoloniality (denoting de-Russification) and was building on previously launched processes of de-Sovietization and decommunization. De-Russification was nothing new in many other post-Soviet republics—for example, Kazakhstan (Koch 47) and Georgia (Oleksiienko, “De-Sovietisation” 8). In the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, which were historically bound to Russian Orthodoxy and politics, de-Russification efforts intensified after Russia’s invasion of the Crimea and occupation of the Donbas—many Ukrainians were not only “shedding their Russianness” but also “changing the meaning of being Ukrainian” (Kulyk 119).

In previous decades, numerous Russified Ukrainians had actually gravitated toward the *Russkii Mir* (Russian World), believing that “Russia is more ‘spiritual’ and ‘Christian’ than ‘secular’ and ‘godless’ Europe” (Searle 289). In the early 2000s, when Russian reformers began to promote the global university model, some Ukrainian diehard opponents of reform colluded with their counterparts in Russia to challenge this model. They mounted a resistance to the “American-spawned” English Medium Instruction (EMI), global rankings, and world-class universities, claiming the

¹ For more insights, see Shelest.

² As observed on social media platforms, such as Ukrainian Scientists Worldwide on Facebook.

seeding of new forms of Western colonization in the post-Soviet space (Oleksiyenko, "From the Revolution" 52). A sort of post-Soviet schizophrenia took hold in Ukrainian academic circles—a stance that endorsed joining the European Union (EU) politically and economically while conforming to the Russian and Soviet traditions of anti-Westernization and patriotic science (or no science) in universities. Valentina Shevchenko suggests that dithering among Ukrainians along with disappointments experienced in the country by EU Bologna moderators perpetuated a gamut of conflicting signals and messages while at the same time signifying that Kyiv was unable to come to terms with its Soviet legacy in education. Notably, this legacy and its impact on Ukrainian academia have remained underanalyzed in higher-education literature.

This paper galvanizes a discussion by exploring the axiological orientations and existential challenges faced by Ukrainian universities and the academic profession. The paper does not claim exclusivity or exceptionality with regard to key premises and arguments in this discussion. Instead, it seeks to investigate the institutional foundations of problems undermining the emergence of an intellectual leadership focused on the de-Sovietization and de-Russification of Ukrainian academia. The following sections examine the underpinnings of the Soviet legacy and its role in shaping Ukrainians' coloniality and their apathy toward deconstructing the past. The paper subsequently looks at path dependencies that feed the Russified mentality and reinforce allegiances to orthodoxy in higher education.

II. SOVIET LEGACY

Several venerable institutions, including the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, and Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, are well known. But the majority of extant Ukrainian universities were established during Soviet times.³ Thirty years after the collapse of the USSR, many of them continued to exhibit an organizational culture that reproduced the same tradition of rigidity, indoctrination through teaching, feudal academic relations, and excessive bureaucracy (Oleksiyenko, "Higher Education Reforms" 134). This tradition turned out to be unassailable, even after multiple rounds of reforms in education. The reform failures could be attributed to the special institutional

³ For details, see the 2006 UNESCO monograph by Vasyl Kremen and Stanislav Nikolajenko.

archetype that the Soviets had created in keeping with an “army-style organizational format” (Kuraev 183), which forced academics to serve a mono-ideological, repressive state. This format corresponded well to later versions of a “rigid” university manifested in the neo-liberal model (described in my research papers in 2014 and 2016).⁴ But the Soviet university differed from the neo-liberal version in that the former was an inseparable part of a military-industrial complex that was commissioning supplies of specific batches of “human nuts and bolts” as needed for the tightly controlled planned economy regulated by the single-party police state. Soviet mind-shaping was structured to cultivate proletarian consciousness and to prepare personnel for wars with Western imperialism—either hot ones, like World War II, or rhetorical ones, like the Cold War—with the goal of realizing the Marxist-Leninist prophecy of the ultimate triumph of global communism.

The Soviet *universitet* shaped a new, de-ethnicized Soviet (wo)man who unquestionably served the Communist Party while proudly propagating the principles of socialist manufacturing, fair distribution of state-owned goods, and the universal right to mandatory Marxist-Leninist education and prescriptive employment. To discourage critical inquiry within this Orwellian society, the Soviet university trained the academic “proles” of Ukraine to copy/paste knowledge from the imperial centre. They periodically replicated, according to Madina Tlostanova, acts of “imperial jingoism and revenge” (46) or “extremist militant forms of self-exclusion and intellectual revanchism” (50), which were encouraged by the Russian imperial bureaucracy as a response to its nemeses—modernization-oriented Westernizers.

Among contemporary Ukrainian reformers, the legacy of the Soviet university is often a reason for exasperation. While Ukrainian civil society heroically stood up against the Kremlin’s interferences during the 2014 Revolution of Dignity (also known as the Maidan Revolution) and subsequent military aggression, expanding to a full-scale invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian higher-education system largely failed to take up the fight against the Soviet legacy. In December 2022, when the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) restricted the use of Russian publications and references in the Ukrainian scholarly discourse as a response to Russia’s information warfare, military aggression, and genocidal acts, the established post-Soviet professoriate raised an intense debate about the judiciousness of such political interventions and their impact on their Soviet-era publications. Many feared that their names would simply disappear from the scientific and scholarly

⁴ See Oleksiienko, “Socio-economic Forces” and “Higher Education Reforms.”

record, given that their major papers were published in Russian. The level of agitation among post-Soviet professors regarding this issue far exceeded the degree of anxiety or debate about the disproportionate role of the Russian discourse and legacy in Ukrainian academic circles. The option of translating scholarly works into Ukrainian was rarely considered by these professors—as had been the case in the preceding thirty years of post-Soviet transformation. Instead, as before, the Soviet legacy-holders hoped that the de-ethnicized bureaucracy from the past would continue to endorse them in return for their unwavering loyalty to the Soviet legacy. Ukrainian reformers, frustrated with the colonial mentality of these professors, often felt conflicted.

III. COLONIAL MENTALITY

The literature on the academic profession⁵ provides a range of explanations as to why the protection of entitlements and legacies is central to the academic ethos and egos across higher-education systems. Contextually, the ideas of university and academic roles and responsibilities are generally shaped by successive mentorship, and the mindsets of the mentors contribute to the moulding of each new generation of scholars within a particular institution and in society—or, as Robert Blackburn and colleagues put it, “[c]loning” takes place (315). From this point of view, it is important to consider the ways in which the colonial mentality contributes to the previously described conservatism and resistance to changes in Ukrainian society, which has been kept under the control of the “Russian subaltern empire” (Tlostanova 47).

While Ukrainian territories have been subject to transcontinental movements and conquests from the North, South, East, and West (as described, for instance, by Timothy Snyder), it was post-Mongolian Muscovy that had the greatest impact on the mental construct of many Ukrainians—initially, by deposing democracy and fortifying autocracy, as Dustin Hosseini contends, and then, by shaping the Ukrainian mentality for subservience to, and compliance with, the Russian tsarist regime (Subtelny 181–87). As Serhii Plokhyy argues, Ukrainian (“Little Russian”) intellectuals continued to play a significant role in subsequent centuries, and they shaped the mentality of colonial dependence in the newly created Russian Empire. Many of these intellectuals believed that they were building a unique culture and identity within the Slavic world. Unable to secure independence from a brutal and

⁵ See, for example, a study by Johannes Angermüller.

bellicose Muscovy, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ukrainian clerical scholars established a foundational myth rooted in medieval Kyivan Rus' that seeded the notion of an imperial Greater Rus(sia).

In practical terms, these Ukrainian intellectuals, and others who followed, buttressed the Russian emperors and sold them the notion of Ukrainians as docile and kind-hearted servants who were happy to live on the periphery while guarding the interests of the new empire. According to Plokyh, as imperial Russia became wealthier and more expansionistic—conquering new territories in both the west and the east—the Russian tsars built up a police state that restricted the emergence and spread of any liberal or self-determination movements inside the territories they controlled. This included the suppression of Ukrainians' advocacy for their indigenous language and identity. The nineteenth-century Ukrainian pro-autonomy movement was particularly astonishing and frightening to the imperial rulers in light of the fact that in previous centuries, Ukrainians had demonstrated complicity with, and loyalty to, the Russian narrative, and they had seemingly acquiesced to Russian control. Imperial universities in Kharkiv (founded in 1804) and Kyiv (founded in 1834) were established in order to reinforce the supremacy of the Russian language and culture. As Serhiy Bilenky notes, “[i]t was not until 1917 that a limited use of the Ukrainian language at Kyiv University was permitted.” These institutions reproduced the “Russianness” of the local elites while foiling pro-European orientations in the colony (especially those promoted by the Polish elite, argues Plokyh). Moreover, these universities generated, according to Bilenky, “social barriers affecting large groups of [the] Ukrainian population: peasants, burghers, and Cossacks[, who] could not enter universities as full-time students without obtaining a ‘leave pass’ from their communities.” The imperial universities nurtured nobles who would depreciate their own language and culture and advocate instead for the supremacy of Russian civilization, which denoted autocracy and orthodoxy as reinforced through police-state bureaucracy and an expansionistic military machine. Maria Mälksoo (drawing on the ideas of David Chioni Moore and Mykola Riabchuk) points out that

local elites were assimilated into the imperial project and colonial relations were ethnicized: “local language and culture became a stigma, a sign of backwardness, ‘blackness’, and inferiority vis-a-vis the superior Russophones who represented both wealth and power—a relative, largely fictitious wealth of the Soviet cities, and absolute, highly coercive power of the totalitarian state.” (qtd. on 473–74)

Loyal Russophone servants were promoted in the colonies; the more brilliant ones were sent to work for the central government in St. Petersburg and,

subsequently, in Moscow. The prospect of upward and outward mobility bought the loyalty of the brightest colonials and created a continuity in hierarchic oversight and allegiances in the peripheral offices, inasmuch as repatriated colonials would manage their lower-ranking compatriots when back at home.

Both tsarist and communist imperialists worked hard to expunge Ukrainian nationalists, who resisted the colonial idea and imperial influence. Russian imperialists today often try to equate *Ukrainian nationalism* with *Nazism*. Historically, they also sought to discredit competing national movements, above all the Ukrainian one. And as Dominic Lieven observes, "Ukraine itself was subjected to a far more systematic policy of linguistic and cultural russification than was the case in the non-Slav republics" (611). Thus, when Western right-wing or left-wing ideologues and other Russophile or Russocentric analysts blindly follow Russian propaganda, they do a great disservice to post-colonial development in Ukraine, as Peter McLaren remarked following the 2022 re-invasion:

To claim that Putin merely wants to protect Mother Russia and save Ukraine from itself by eradicating all the Nazis goose-stepping in union along the boulevards to the tune of 'Erika' and through the fields of sunflower and maize is a Potemkin village justification for an imperialist invasion.

Since the 1991 declaration of independence, Ukrainian scholars and politicians have laboured to explain to the global community that the Ukrainian national movement has a unique connotation in the context of post-colonial liberation. It should be recognized, though, that the Kremlin succeeded in exploiting the vulnerability of Ukraine in entrenched global narratives (and scholarly orthodoxies) strongly influenced by Russian/Soviet propaganda, declaring, as Olivia Waxman underscores, the de-nazification of Ukraine as a pretext for the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Historians with deep regional expertise have written extensively on Russian imperialism.⁶ Archival documentation (that was previously classified or censored by Russian security forces but was gradually released by Ukraine after the 1991 declaration of independence) has provided evidential firepower in the battle against Russian propaganda. Post-Soviet publications documenting the repression and assassination of Ukrainian elites, cultural erasure and linguicide, man-made famines, deportations, and wars triggered anti-colonial passions that came to underpin social movements and new legislative acts in Ukraine. After the Kremlin's annexation of the Crimea and its military intervention in eastern Ukraine in

⁶ See, for example, the historical analyses by Plokhly and Snyder.

2014–16, anti-colonial sentiment swelled, as Volodymyr Kulyk points out. Ukrainian cities began to de-Russify their streets and remove en masse monuments to Soviet and Russian luminaries⁷ following the Russian government's devastating attacks on civilian targets (energy infrastructure, schools, hospitals, churches, and museums) using missiles, heavy-artillery shells, and rockets and as Russian soldiers and mercenaries killed, tortured, raped, and forcibly deported civilians from occupied areas.⁸ Although the process of de-Russification was only superficially accepted and implemented before 2022, its importance became broadly recognized by the public in February 2022, and it is increasingly considered to be inevitable and urgent as the war continues and more Russian atrocities are revealed.

IV. POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATIONS

What challenges have Ukrainian change-makers been facing when attempting to break the mould of post-colonial dependence in higher education?

There is a hopeful start to their story. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided unprecedented opportunities for positive change in Ukrainian higher education. Some of these opportunities were fully seized. For example, several private universities were established, and the age-old Kyivan Mohyla Academy (which was opened in 1615, closed in 1817, and re-established in 1991) emerged as the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA).⁹ NaUKMA took a leadership role in propelling new forms of institutional governance, curriculum development, admissions, and assessment by actively absorbing Western practices, relying on extensive technical assistance from the EU and North America, and partnering with leading universities in the West, and also by trying to restore the national context of higher education (Kvit, "Towards the Freedom-Seeking Mission" and "Higher Education"). NaUKMA seemed to be a harbinger of institutional transformation across the entire system (Kvit, "Higher Education"), especially in the fight against the long-standing problem of corruption—a scourge fuelling the proliferation of degree mills and poor-quality education (Osipian). In the early 1990s, owing to the efforts of NaUKMA and other

⁷ See, for example, Karina Pasichnyk's *NV—New Voice* report of 22 April 2022.

⁸ A selection of stories documenting Russia's genocidal campaign can be found in a collection of the Ukrainian Institute (see "Decolonization").

⁹ See the narratives on post-Soviet transformation by Bilenky and Kremen and Nikolajenko.

national universities (especially in the three major intellectual centres of Kyiv, Lviv, and Kharkiv), Ukraine saw a burgeoning in a range of new academic disciplines, such as political science, sociology, public administration, public health, and social work; as Serhiy Kvit maintains, they did not exist in Soviet curricula. Many graduates of those programs went on to obtain accreditation in Western universities. Some new universities, most notably the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) in Lviv, attracted funding from sponsors at home and abroad and developed sustainable international fellowships and exchanges (Dzhedzhora 26).

However, institutional innovations were few and far between in the public sector. First, the bankrupt post-Soviet government had no money for institutional transformation—even at leading universities (Hladchenko et al. 122). And as in colonial times, the imperially trained governors (who remained in the post-Soviet government of Ukraine) had little faith in the local capacity to launch and sustain original projects. Moreover, they were not prepared to think independently, given the ensconced tradition of taking cues from Moscow authorities (Oleksiyyenko, “Academic Freedom” 586). As in Soviet times, private and creative initiatives in education were met with skepticism or opposition (Oleksiyyenko, “Higher Education Reforms” 135). In order to establish greater autonomy for innovation, many universities sought to acquire the prestigious *national university* designation (Hladchenko et al. 122). However, any benefits derived from an enhanced status came with increased political costs and downsides, including greater oversight by a colonially minded ministerial bureaucracy.

In the early 1990s, when Ukraine was experiencing a deep economic crisis and the cash-poor post-Communist government was encouraging the decentralization of university programs in order to enable the pursuit of private donations and grants, ministerial oversight was an asset viewed as neither meaningful nor important. The significance of governmental influence began to increase when Communist apparatchiks-turned-oligarchs seized full control of university budgets, impelling the hyper-centralized regulation of all university funds through the Ministry of Finance. The nouveau riche power brokers of Ukraine found more support for their style of work in Russia than in the EU (Oleksiyyenko, “From the Revolution” 51–52). The post-Soviet elites in Russia and Ukraine spoke a common language, and they favoured mobster-style extortion and the monopolization of privatized resources for the suppression of competition in the post-Soviet economy and the control of taxation and labour laws. The transnational mafia also steered their governments toward more-intense oversight of higher education. The cross-border collusion in this area benefited President Vladimir Putin, who was concerned about Russia’s loss of control over its former colonies

(Mäkinen). By manipulating narratives about the declining statuses of Russian minorities and language and by engaging “a support base of hitherto marginalized, but newly empowered social groups” (Malyarenko and Wolff 192), the Kremlin constantly sought opportunities to install Russian neo-colonialism with the help of pro-Russian universities and think tanks in the vulnerable regions of Ukraine. By 2013, Moscow was able to infiltrate the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science, and it urged its collaborators in Kyiv, led by Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk, an advocate of “an authoritarian ‘Russian-style’ management system for higher education” (Kvit, “Higher Education” 142), to amend Ukrainian history curricula and eliminate the anti-colonial and anti-Soviet interpretations that had emerged during the presidency of Viktor Iushchenko (2005–10). Moscow perceived a serious threat in the Ukrainianization of public policies in Ukraine (an unreasonable concept when viewed, for instance, in relation to the Polonization of Poland, or the anglicization of England)—this was a process aimed at reinstating the pre-eminence and authority of the Ukrainian language in the public domain.

The struggle between neo-colonialists and anti-colonialists intensified over time and erupted during the Euromaidan protests. NaUKMA president Kvit was particularly resolute (as his personal reflections attest) in resisting pro-Russian interests in the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science and their attempts to undercut the status of Ukrainian history and language. Anti-colonial resistance energized student activism on the NaUKMA campus, which had also been conspicuous during the 2004 Orange Revolution. The strength of the student voices and leadership emerging at this liberal-arts university (which had once been abolished by the Russian tsars) was most symbolic. During winter 2013–14, NaUKMA professors and administrators marched alongside their students toward Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv to confront the Moscow-infiltrated riot police and security forces (Wynnyckyj). This massive student movement demonstrated the success of anti-colonial investments in new curricula in the fields of history, sociology, and political science, as well as in other disciplines that had been forbidden or censored during Moscow’s rule. Ukrainian social scientists, by overcoming the legacy of political control and purges, had managed to educate a new generation of thinkers and activists who aspired to the ideals of an open society, democracy, accountable governance, and freedom of thought and speech. This corresponded well to the organizational principles of the EU but caused considerable unease in the Kremlin.

The 2014 display of anti-colonial resistance revealed an internal conflict between members of the following groups: Ukrainophone and/or Russophone Ukrainophiles; and Ukrainophone and/or Russophone

Russophiles.¹⁰ Prior to the war with Russia, the first split category supported a pro-European position, while the other preferred to build stronger relations with Russia. During the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, when the pro-EU movement gathered strength, NaUKMA and other institutions with a traditionally greater proportion of Ukrainophile students allowed students to take to the city streets, and they became harbingers of the social movement. Meanwhile, rectors at several Soviet-era universities where divided attitudes prevailed campaigned against revolutionary activism, and they urged their faculty and students to remain ensconced in lecture halls during winter 2014. The administration of the Kyiv Medical University (KMU) took the step of locking its campus gates—a measure that some local observers believed was aimed at maintaining the normalcy of classroom activities and regulating student behaviour. While some students circumvented the lockdown and joined their peers from other universities on Independence Square, others complied and stayed put (Channell-Justice). Following the subsequent Russian invasion sparking the wider war of 2022, there was a shift of allegiances toward the position of the Ukrainophone and/or Russophone Ukrainophiles, according to Mansur Mirovalev, with Ukrainian patriotism and the choice to use the Ukrainian language receiving more support, even in cities that had previously been mostly Russian speaking.

The divisive attitudes that had prevailed in peacetime began to change after the Russian military invasion in 2014. While the Russophiles stayed put or moved eastward, the Ukrainophiles fled westward. Elsewhere, I reported that the forced migration that followed the invasion caused shifts in commitments to language, cultural affiliation, and identity in eastern and southern Ukraine (Oleksiyyenko et al., “What”). Kulyk has referred to this process as “[s]hedding Russianness” (119). When NaUKMA president Kvit and other Euromaidan activists joined the Ministry of Education and Science in 2014, the Ukrainization of discourse increased, and the battle against the Soviet legacy of nepotism, parochialism, and corruption intensified (Osipian). These activists-turned-legislators succeeded in pushing through a range of legislative acts aimed at modernizing and internationalizing academic programs. Many social-media outlets emerged to boost discussion on the burning issue of higher-education reform and to seek synergies of ideas and resources throughout local academic communities.¹¹ Grassroots scholarly forums, such as the Ukrainian Community for Higher Education Research (UCHER), sprang up to facilitate capacity building in academic writing and

¹⁰ See this dilemma partially discussed by Taras Kuzio.

¹¹ See, for example, Ukrainian Scientists Worldwide.

research. For several, critical years after the 2014 Russian invasion, UCHER stimulated a reform-oriented discourse through annual conferences attended by scholars working on organizational changes in higher education, advancing institutional research and the westernization of Ukrainian universities.

Correspondingly, some private universities called for a more intense socialization of curriculum design. For example, the UCU in Lviv benchmarked new programs in accountable public governance, community building, and business ethics, as well as in rehabilitation and counselling for displaced and war-affected people. According to Olena Dzhedzhora, the UCU also spearheaded institutional innovations (such as the creation of previously non-existent endowment funds) in order to engage a broader community of supporters at home and abroad, and thus to ensure greater institutional autonomy and developmental capacities.

However, as one Ukrainian activist regretfully remarked in a private conversation during my visit to Kyiv in 2018, one “could count on the fingers of one hand” the actual systemic changes resulting from these initiatives. The removal of the outdated post-Soviet system was halted as Ukraine navigated shifting political winds; meanwhile, problems like degree mills were left unresolved and key crisis-management actions, such as university mergers, were suspended. The initially celebrated legislative acts calling for budgetary autonomy and transparent governance stayed in the realm of populist declarations that failed to give rise to effective institutional mechanisms for battling corruption (Osipian). In fact, many institutional change-makers became immobilized as they awaited new regulations and direct commands from the Ministry of Education and Science regardless of its avowal of universities’ right to assume “autonomy.” The Catch-22 seemed to be that “[the authorities] cannot develop university autonomy without having true universities first, nor can it build true modern universities without having university autonomy as an embedded feature” (Osipian 241). In the absence of “financial autonomy,” being encouraged to be “autonomous” made no sense to the rectors of many public universities, as it was still the Ministry of Finance that controlled all of their resources (Kvit, “Higher Education” 152). In 2019, the reformist government of President Petro Poroshenko was replaced by the new government of Volodymyr Zelens'kyi, who won the presidency on a platform criticizing his predecessor for corruption and making numerous promises about innovation and reforms. But a year into his presidency, the new government’s performance was disappointing. On 22 July 2020, Steven Pifer, a former United States (US) ambassador to Ukraine and a long-time observer of Ukrainian politics, regretfully remarked: “Just thirteen months after assuming office, his [Zelens'kyi’s] approval rating

plummeted to 38 percent in June, a far cry from the 71 percent he enjoyed last September. His apparent reversal on corruption and long-needed economic reforms undoubtedly contributed to that.” Zelens'kyi, in a show of disdain for academic conventions and public sentiment, fired the reformist team in the education portfolio and appointed a new minister of education and science who not only was suspected of plagiarizing his doctoral thesis but also seemed to be resurrecting anti-Maidan sentiment and the rhetoric of ousted minister Tabachnyk (see Novosad). The colonial legacy was apparently relentless.

V. TRANSFORMATIONS OR IMITATIONS?

Since 2014, Ukrainian reformers have faced subtle resistance on the part of powerful rectors who have sustained “old boys’ networks” within the government, thus securing subsidies for their universities (Oleksiyenko, “Higher Education Reforms” 138). In this setting, it has been difficult to promote change that would lead to the emergence of a new university model. Vira Usyk and I, in our presentation at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, reported that Soviet-style university administration was named among the top three barriers (following low income and corruption) to higher-education reform in Ukraine. Meanwhile, precarity was often intentionally sustained by rectors and by oligarchic parties in the Verkhovna Rada in order to keep critical inquiry and academic activism under control. The low-paid professoriate would be urged to take on more commitments to entrepreneurial projects outside the university, limiting their ability to build solidarity for civic action or transformation within the university (as my previous studies have shown). Similar developments were observed at Russian universities controlled by the Putin regime; however, professors at Moscow’s elite universities were given priority funding and much higher wages. In Ukraine, many promising talents who found themselves unable to secure sufficient income for supporting themselves and their families faced an excruciating dilemma—to stay in academia or to leave it. *OECD: Better Policies for Better Lives* report that “[b]rain drain’ has been a long-standing challenge for science in Ukraine,” given that Ukrainian governments have tended to allocate much lower budgets for R & D expenditures in comparison with the EU or Russia (“Future” 1–2). While university rectors delivered passionate, reform-oriented speeches on local and international stages, behind the scenes, there was a lot of commotion aimed at protecting entitlements for already-privileged individuals, advocating for their comfortable superannuation rather than adopting new forms of knowledge

production needed for a rapidly changing society and industry, according to Ukraine's former minister of education Hanna Novosad.

Many university power brokers continued to act in keeping with old bureaucratic templates. For instance, there were administrators who espoused their right to control faculty members' office hours with the help of check-in and checkout sheets, as one professor stated during my research visit to Ukraine in 2018. Some Ukrainian faculty members complained that their universities had retained the practice of centralized bell-ringing for the framing of lecture periods. This type of routine coincides with Alex Kuraev's observations about the military-style organizational design of a typical Soviet-era university. According to one local critic with whom I spoke during my 2018 Kyiv visit, these administrative habits both continued and reinforced the old paradigm of mistrust and surveillance of students and faculty members. In the course of analyzing failures in the implementation of institutional changes, it was unsurprising to see senior professors either ignoring harmful practices or tacitly legitimizing the Soviet style of administration. Indeed, for many, it was the only form of governance that they personally understood well. So, why would they challenge or change it? With Soviet patterns entrenched in Ukrainian universities, managerialism found fertile ground in which to take root several decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that anti-colonial reformers faced great difficulty in the consolidation of intellectual forces as universities started the long-awaited process of modernization by switching performance expectations in order to abide by neo-liberal standards. This caused faculty members across the board to compete with one another and worry about the increasing threat of layoffs. The reformers, instead of combining forces for change, organized rival political factions for resistance. A punitive interpretation of the idea of global university rankings, as viewed through the lens of the prestige economy in higher education, united early career scholars and their mentors around shared anxieties rather than around aspirations for shared success. Their concern was understandable. Most Ukrainian academics possessed limited English fluency prior to 2022 (Osipian 236). This excluded them from major global discourses in their disciplines. Few had skills in the academic-writing standards required by the prestige industry of SSCI (Social Sciences Citation Index) and Scopus journals. And not many could fund their international trips or participate in global forums and important conferences in relevant fields of knowledge, which precluded them from exchanging knowledge and forming new connections (Kovtun and Stick).

In such circumstances, numerous social scientists who had exhibited promise in adopting new methods and becoming intellectual leaders in social

reform evolved into precarious post-Soviet hybrids (Gomilko et al.). They lacked an understanding of the purposes, values, and methods of qualitative research. As illustrated by Yevhen Baranchenko and Andrey Yukhanaev, they were overly swayed by the positivist thinking reproduced by their Soviet-era mentors, who subscribed to Stalinist statistical standards relying on dehumanizing data and propelling self-serving interpretations (Wheatcroft). Moreover, many still depended on second-hand sources accessed via translations produced by Russian publishers. During my 2018 research in Kyiv, I found that the Russophile domain of thought had been generating apathy toward Ukrainophone transformation agendas. Young scholars, pressed by their supervisors to use Soviet-style templates for publications and reporting, often saw little value in doing globally significant research and competing for access to prestigious international journals. The Ukrainian Scientists Worldwide group shows a number of complaints regarding the futility of publishing in Scopus- or Web of Science-indexed journals.

Ukrainian reformers, as feeble and forgiving as they had been in Soviet times, often allowed their nemeses to manipulate resources and defame modernization (Kovtun and Stick; Shevchenko). Driven by uncritical thinking about freedom and democracy, the Ukrainian reformers seemed to be unable to manage legitimization and empowerment in decision-making processes and often enabled overt (and even overpowering) anti-autonomy and anti-modernization discourses in higher education.¹² Thus, most modernization efforts at Ukrainian universities were uncreative and solicited ministerial approval rather than buoying collegial enthusiasm for innovation. As a result, the reformers were practically incapable of advancing new concepts of academic governance. University administrators, for the preservation of their legitimacy and power, continued to promote subservient, complacent, and precarious faculty members. Academic meritocracy often gave way to the surrogates of hierarchic entitlements and feudal dependency. By periodically punishing anti-colonial activism, the administrators were signalling to the academic community that the status quo should be treated as sacrosanct.¹³ In the Soviet-era university, an employee had been expected to show allegiance to the orthodoxy of thought and behaviour in academic relations while also being cognizant of how and when to sprinkle expressions of loyalty into their speech and writing (Oleksiyenko, "Academic Freedom" 583). Some participants in my 2018 study argued that young scholars were often left with little choice but to exhibit reverence for, and compliance with, the old

¹² See my 2016 and 2021 publications regarding this problem (Oleksiyenko, "Higher Education Reforms" and "Is Academic Freedom Feasible").

¹³ Marharyta Tulup finds this out in her interview with Novosad (see Novosad).

norms¹⁴ in order to secure jobs and climb academic ladders. These trends persisted in other post-Soviet republics, where authoritarians sought to undermine critical inquiry and innovative mindsets (as, for example, with Putin's manipulation of research-university agendas [Forrat]). But in Ukraine, these tendencies proved to be particularly dangerous—in light of Russian genocidal policies—as they created greater legitimacy for Russophiles seeking the eastward integration of Ukrainian universities and society.

VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REAL CHANGE?

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which resulted in devastating war crimes and genocidal acts, spurred great change in national and international thought on the agency of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Mälksoo makes an excellent point about the problem that Ukraine had had in developing political agency amid competing discourses (and simultaneously converging discourses with regard to Ukraine's marginality) promoted by Russia and the EU when she writes that "Ukraine has featured as a territory 'acted upon' in the realities and mindscapes of international relations, rather than an actor embracing autonomous agency on behalf of its own interests and agendas in the twentieth century" (473). Serhiy Kudelia, among others, is convinced that the heroic resistance of Ukrainians in 2022 finally forced the world to perceive more value in Ukrainian civil society, which seemed to have its own ambitious and justifiable identity (contradicting the story propagated by Russian mythmakers about Ukrainians' inability to build an independent state). Previously intercompeting Ukrainophone and Russophone Ukrainophiles were able to coalesce their allegiances and powers in the fight against a looming tyrannical future. As missiles shelled their houses and destroyed their comfortable lifestyles, the Ukrainophone and Russophone Russophiles of Ukraine were also radically rethinking their allegiances (Mirovalev). The ability of the whole society to reorient and reconsolidate itself in the face of an existential threat was both astonishing and inspiring to observers. In addition, international solidarity and military support, especially from strategic partners in the EU and other G7 countries, has been essential in enabling Ukrainian continued resistance to Russian aggression over an extended period of time. The Ukrainian academic community has been a significant beneficiary of international help as well,

¹⁴ Once called "Soviet" and then simply rebranded as "Ukrainian"; in fact, they were a hybrid of the two.

especially with the large number of Ukrainian refugee scholars and students hosted by various universities in Europe and North America.¹⁵

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has unequivocally demonstrated that the belligerent Russian world view and colonial interventions have no place in independent Ukraine and in a world governed by the liberal order. De-Russification is a logical step in liberating Ukrainian academia from Soviet-style tenets of pseudo-science and jingoism, which, according to Umland, have legitimized and empowered Russian academics in fuelling genocidal acts in Ukraine. As online discussions in the group Ukrainian Scientists Worldwide indicate, Ukrainian intellectuals were struggling but still sought to conceptualize a new idea of the university and of the academic profession (not simply borrowing them from an imperial centre, like the Russian universities participating in the 5–100 Project did). Thus, they were looking for opportunities to strengthen their original output, identity, and agency in the international context of higher education. In this regard, Ukrainian scientists' engagement with global discourse (for instance, on the building blocks of a powerful university within a transforming society, especially in terms of strengthening democracy and expanding academic freedom) has certainly offered a significant boost for higher learning in the societal milieu while shaping Ukraine's resilience during the war with Russia.

Enlarging on previous discussions in global higher education, it should be noted that the prevailing research-university model is a concept that is both intriguing and challenging for countries like Ukraine. The research-university idea flowed primarily from ambitious twentieth-century democratic societies and well-to-do economies, especially from the ascendant global power the US, which was rethinking its own university model with an eye on fashioning a more-powerful scientific institution (Thelin). The goal was to strengthen democratic society, on the one hand, and enhance national security, on the other. In the twenty-first century, this idea allowed the US to develop a more creative knowledge economy (Lanford and Tierney). By combining high-quality graduate education and critically minded research, the American approach was able to take a significant step forward in redesigning the Humboldtian idea of the university while empowering faculty members to take greater freedoms (in inquiry, teaching, and governance), but also urging them to take more responsibility for the production of transferable and applicable knowledge (Cole). However, with the rise of neo-liberal managerialism, post-truth politics, and academic precarity resulting from the pursuit of enhanced performativity and competitiveness, this model began to decline (Giroux).

¹⁵ See the OECD report regarding this development ("Future").

The aggressive spread of corrupt performativity in developing countries—which generally have limited public budgets—has led to an increase in inequality, international-status anxiety, and resentment. My comparative study on China and Russia (in collaboration with Qiang Zha, Igor Chirikov, and Jun Li [see *International Status Anxiety*]) shows how the two higher-education systems were affected by the Soviet legacy of resentful restructuring in higher education. Both university systems, which had tremendous ambition but a limited capacity for critical inquiry, inadvertently ended up reifying the global university rankings and galvanizing sham projects (as described in the Russian case by Chirikov). Ultimately, the mindless and manipulative application of this concept was able neither to build a culture of academic freedom and institutional autonomy nor to enhance the civic duties of local professors and students to curb corrupt practices in Russia (Forrat; Umland). Likewise, this model failed to succeed in developing countries that were seeking to eradicate colonial legacies (Mbembe).

Nonetheless, the transformative powers of the early (pre-neo-liberal) American prototype are still an important factor, with the successful bridging of freedom-driven education and research; significant public investment; and the accumulation of scientific and intellectual resources over the past century or so (Kwiek). At a time when Ukraine is reconceptualizing its university system, there are several critical points to consider with regard to the American model of an engaged and useful university. As has been the case elsewhere in the post-Soviet space (for example, in Estonia and Kazakhstan), de-Russification of the academic sphere can be achieved through intensive strategic internationalization—that is, government-sponsored English-language education balanced with a respectful positioning of the national language; participation in EU-generated university networks and mobility programs; and the integration of Western forms of governance and knowledge production into the national domain of higher education.¹⁶ Instead of focusing on one-size-fits-all legislative modifications, as has been done in the past, Ukrainian reformers need to increase the institutional implementation of Western-style teaching and research that has the potential of jump-starting reforms across the whole university system (like in Kazakhstan).

According to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), in postwar Ukraine, the development of academic departments and research centres will indeed be driven by collaborations

¹⁶ See insights from Natalie Koch's analysis of Kazakhstan and Merli Tamtik and Laura Kirss's paper on Estonia.

with Western counterparts, including the Ukrainian diaspora (“Future”). These collaborations are currently designed to bear more fruit in science and technology (for example, in aerospace and artificial intelligence). But it is essential to form strategic partnerships in the humanities and social sciences—with a focus on qualitative research methods and achieving deeper engagement of scholars from the Ukrainian diaspora in joint studies and cross-cultural learning projects that could enhance curricula and everyday social practices to strengthen national identity, security, and dignity, as well as to consolidate progressive reforms in territories and institutions that have been excessively Russified in the past. The eradication of the Soviet legacy and colonial mindset should be viewed as the cornerstone of a new idea of university in Ukraine. In the pre-war period, the hidden agendas of Russophiles prevailed in relations with Western partners and largely undermined the progress and success of EU-sponsored projects in Ukraine (as we are reminded by Shevchenko). The postwar design of strategic partnerships entails rigorous scrutiny of the agency and intentions of internationalization in higher education.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The eradication of the rigid colonial mindset that was reproduced and sustained by Russophile governments and academics in previous decades should be the key objective of higher-education reform in postwar Ukraine. Such elimination requires the intentional and emphatic discouragement of Russian-style (orthodox and bureaucratic) administration in Ukrainian universities and the empowerment of academic agency, all for the advancement of the Humboldtian principle of the freedom to teach, learn, inquire, and govern. The Ukrainian university, unchained from the Soviet/Russian tradition, will flourish through the agency and leadership of creative individuals, including globally connected and socially influential scholars who will deliberately pursue the growth of curricula and research projects aimed at enhancing national identity, dignity, and security while drawing on related experiences and strategic partnerships in the EU and OECD countries.

As part of the internationalization process, campus administrations and departments of the Ministry of Education and Science can achieve a great deal by financially supporting top scholars who can set new standards of academic performance as well as empower a grassroots movement aimed at the decolonization of the academic profession and society at large. Bruce Macfarlane’s idea of intellectual leadership is essential to stimulating thought

tracks on the relations between institutional and human agencies in the process of decolonization. Institutional agency will have more power and legitimacy to enact successful reforms when intellectual leaders are put in the driver's seat of cross-university and public discussions on quality improvements in higher education and when both organizations and individual scholars benchmark knowledge production through participation in global networks pursuing excellence in scholarship and graduate education. The "international imperatives" of such academic empowerment include placing renowned international experts on award committees. This activity can play an important role in advancing a high degree of integrity, visibility, quality expertise, and valuation in research and teaching (Altbach). At the same time, the Russian tokenistic utilization of foreign experts, primarily for contestations with local dissidents, should be avoided (Crowley-Vigneau et al.).

The enhanced role of human agency in driving academic reform implies that individuals must take greater personal responsibility for reaching out to world-class research centres and for achieving academic excellence as measured by international standards. When international engagement is contemplated, Ukrainian academics should be confident that they can benefit from being advised by their international counterparts and not just by internal interest groups or ministerial directives. This will give rise to opportunities for more intense exchange and collaboration with peers at leading intellectual institutions abroad, especially in those countries and universities that have become strategic partners during the war (for example, established centres of Ukrainian studies at Alberta, Cambridge, Harvard, and Toronto Universities, as well as new ones, as reported by *Erudera: Your Path to Education* [see "List"]). The established Ukrainian institutes and centres, in addition to facilitating cross-cultural learning about decolonization, can be valuable conduits for the consistent integration of knowledge about Ukrainian identity, culture, history, language, and political developments into the Western axiological discourse of values and traditions—and vice versa. Such cross-cultural learning would allow for faster de-Russification and eradication of the colonial mindset in both Ukrainian universities and Russocentric analytical circles of the West.

Given that Soviet-era administrators and professors are still likely to seek a place for themselves in newly designed university governance structures, it is important to remain cognizant of the dangers inherent in their habits and expectations of one-size-fits-all formats of curricula, inquiry, and assessments across departments and universities. Holders of rigid administrative mindsets tend to champion pseudo-equity while refusing to admit the reality of institutional, organizational, and disciplinary diversities

that are essential for successful knowledge production in the global domain. Ukrainian universities and their sponsors should find a way of mitigating the desire of post-Soviet managers (1) to fixate on structure and the norms of performance and (2) not to concentrate on creating an environment geared toward more resilient agency in knowledge production. One must keep in mind that the bright future of the Ukrainian university is only possible amid an active pursuit and engagement of critical inquiry and academic freedom and excellence, which characterize a genuinely well-respected and influential university within global leagues and networks.

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