Volume 23, Number 2, 1992

EN:

On July 29 1987, after 20 years of sustained inter-communal conflict and under great political pressure and war weariness, leaders of the government of Sri Lanka signed an Accord with the Indian government which had_y at Sri Lanka s request, intervened in Sri Lanka's military and political conflict. The Accord aimed at the cessation of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs signalled a decisional shift among Sri Lanka's leaders from a policy of resolving the conflict by military means to one of seeking political accommodation with the Tamil separatists. However, the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and previous attempts by the Indian government to air drop supplies to Tamil rebels signalled the beginning of international crisis between India and Sri Lanka. This paper traces the events and decisional flow of Sri Lanka s elites from the pre-crisis period ofl983 to crisis abatement in 1990 in an attempt to understand the events and patterns of behaviour that led to an international crisis between Sri Lanka and India and more generally to elucidate the relationship between domestic ethnic conflict and international crisis. This paper argues that Sri Lanka entered into an international crisis precisely because of internal threats to its political integrity engendered by its domestic ethnic conflict. First, the theoretical literature is explored, allowing for a fuller exploration of the linkages between international crisis and ethnic conflict. Second, the perceptions of Sri Lanka's decision-maker s in response to increasing Indian involvement during the pre-crisis and crisis period are assessed. Third an analysis of SriLankan decision-making process is weighed against patterns of coping found in the theoretical literature. Fourth and finally, implications for further research are explored, specifically the role that ethnic conflicts play in triggering international crises and the implications that has for the management of ethnic conflicts by regional hegemons.

EN:

It has been said that Resolution 688 (1991) established a "right to interfere" for humanitarian reasons. This right - reference was even made to a "duty of humanitarian interference" - would allow third-party states to take the initiative of committing acts of humanitarian intervention on behalf of minorities subjected to ill treatment by the authorities of their country.

Resolution 688 (1991), however, does not establish this right. Although the Security Council recognized itself as being competent to intervene, it did so because it had succeeded in identifying a threat to peace. Furthermore, although the United States, France, and Great Britain intervened, they were able to do so because they had breathed new life into humanitarian-motivated intervention by giving it the form of a sanction-intervention.

EN:

This article is about Canadian investments in Brazil in the 70's and the 80's. It attempts to explain the relative decline of Canada's position on the Brazilian market. Canada was the 3rd largest investor in Brazil in the 60's. By the middle of the 80's, it ranked 6th. This paper argues that this situation is mainly due to the insufficient development of R-D in Canada and the consequent low level of technological innovation in this country. One significant effect of that is the inability of Canadian enterprises to compete successfully with those of other countries. This is supported by the massive concentration of investments in Brazil by Canadian-owned firms in the more traditional industries (mining, smelting, etc.), the dominant position of Canadian-based affiliates of foreign firms in that process (Canadian investments in Brazil) and their concentration in the most technologically-advanced industries, the over-all technological dependence of the Canadian economy and the low level of funding of R-D activities.

EN:

This article examines the place held by multilateral development banks in Canada's policy of external cooperation. It seeks to show how, in keeping with the overall logic of its aid policy, Canada's participation in these international financial institutions has resulted from a many-sided configuration of political, development al, and economic interests. The purpose of this article finds it s justification first of all in the fact that, by focusing mainly on bilateral assistance programs, the literature on Canadian aid has largely neglected the study of the many channels for distributing multilateral assistance.