Abstracts
Résumé
Cet article soutient la thèse selon laquelle le capital social des délinquants leur permet d’augmenter de manière significative les revenus qu’ils retirent de leurs activités. La démarche utilisée pour rendre opératoire cette proposition a pour effet de renouveler de différentes façons la sociologie criminelle : il ne suffit pas de savoir si un délinquant « fréquente » d’autres délinquants ou non, il faut mesurer la qualité relationnelle et instrumentale des rapports qu’il entretient avec eux et son aptitude à exploiter les opportunités qu’ils ouvrent ; il ne suffit pas de qualifier les délinquants de « chroniques » ou d’« occasionnels », il faut plutôt se demander si leur trajectoire délinquante est « réussie » ou non ; et, finalement, il ne suffit pas de décrire les trajectoires délinquantes, il faut en resituer l’analyse dans le contexte plus large des parcours individuels et collectifs de mobilité professionnelle. Un des bénéfices marginaux d’une telle approche est de remettre en cause la thèse selon laquelle les délinquants seraient inaptes au « succès » en raison de leur témérité, de leur impulsivité ou de leur présentisme. Les données de l’étude proviennent d’entrevues auprès d’un échantillon de 156 détenus fédéraux dans le cadre d’une enquête qui s’intéressait à leur situation financière durant les trois années qui avaient précédé leur incarcération actuelle.
Abstract
This study follows recent research on criminal earnings and examines the impact of underlying traits (low self-control) and personal organization attributes (non-redundant networking) on criminal earnings amongst a sample of incarcerated offenders previously involved in market and predatory crimes. Controlling for various background factors (age, non-criminal income, lambda, and costs of doing crime), both low self-control and non-redundant networking independently explain why some offenders are more successful than others in achieving higher monetary standards through crime. While efficient, brokerage-like networking enhances market offenders’ earnings, low self-control emerges as an asset for predatory offenders: the lower the self-control, the higher their criminal earnings. For market offenders, however, low self-control has no direct effect, but it does mitigate the impact of efficient networking on criminal earnings. The results emerging from this study have implications for Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theory of crime and the advent of a criminal network perspective. Extensions are also made towards the conventional/criminal embeddedness framework and deterrence research.
Appendices
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