Abstracts
Résumé
Au Bénin, la décentralisation se matérialise par le transfert de ressources financières de l’État vers les collectivités locales (CL). Toutefois, l’analyse du lien entre ces transferts et le développement local demeure encore peu explorée dans la littérature empirique. Cette étude vise à combler ce vide en examinant l’effet des transferts de l’État sur le développement local des collectivités béninoises. Elle met en évidence l’impact différencié des transferts, qu’ils soient conditionnés ou non, sur le développement local. Sur le plan méthodologique, l’étude s’appuie sur une analyse économétrique de données de panel couvrant 77 communes béninoises sur la période 2003–2022, en mobilisant la méthode des Moindres Carrés Entièrement Modifiés (Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares – FMOLS). Les résultats empiriques montrent que les transferts conditionnés au secteur de la santé (FADeC affecté santé) sont positivement liés au développement local. En revanche, les autres transferts, notamment ceux conditionnés au secteur de l’éducation (FADeC affecté éducation), présentent une corrélation négative avec le développement local. Ces résultats mettent en évidence plusieurs implications majeures pour la conduite des politiques de décentralisation et de développement local au Bénin, en soulignant notamment l’importance du ciblage sectoriel et de l’efficacité de l’allocation des ressources transférées aux CL.
Mots-clés :
- Investissement communal,
- Décentralisation,
- ressources propres,
- transferts de l’État,
- santé,
- éducation
Abstract
In Benin, decentralization is implemented through the transfer of financial resources from the central government to local governments (LGs). However, the relationship between these transfers and local development remains underexplored in the empirical literature. This study seeks to fill this gap by examining the effect of central government transfers on local development in Beninese local governments. It highlights the differentiated impact of both conditional and unconditional transfers on local development.
Methodologically, the study relies on an econometric panel data analysis covering 77 local governments over the period 2003–2022, using the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) estimation technique. The empirical results show that health-sector conditional transfers (FADeC earmarked for health) are positively associated with local development. In contrast, other transfers, particularly those earmarked for education (FADeC earmarked for education), are negatively correlated with local development.
These findings reveal several important policy implications for the design and implementation of decentralization and local development policies in Benin, particularly with regard to the sectoral targeting and efficiency of resource allocation to local governments.
Keywords:
- Municipal investment,
- Decentralization,
- own resources,
- State transfers,
- health,
- Education
Appendices
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