

Ethnic Separatism

Colin H. Williams

Volume 24, Number 61, 1980

La problématique géopolitique du Québec

URI: <https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/021459ar>

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7202/021459ar>

[See table of contents](#)

Publisher(s)

Département de géographie de l'Université Laval

ISSN

0007-9766 (print)

1708-8968 (digital)

[Explore this journal](#)

Cite this article

Williams, C. H. (1980). Ethnic Separatism. *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, 24(61), 47–68. <https://doi.org/10.7202/021459ar>

Article abstract

The paper outlines the main characteristics of ethnic separatism as a process. It then analyses two theories designed to explain the resurgence of reactive peripheral identity, the Internal Colonial thesis and the role of the ethnic intelligentsia. Some of the inherent contradictions in the Parti Québécois's attempt to create a genuine Québécois nation through the promotion of French culture are explored as are some of the pitfalls of a referendum on Sovereignty-Association.

THE DESIRE OF NATIONS: QUÉBÉCOIS ETHNIC SEPARATISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*

by

Colin H. WILLIAMS

*Department of Geography & Sociology,
North Staffordshire Polytechnic,
Stafford ST18 0AD, United Kingdom*

ABSTRACT

The paper outlines the main characteristics of ethnic separatism as a process. It then analyses two theories designed to explain the resurgence of reactive peripheral identity, the Internal Colonial thesis and the role of the ethnic intelligentsia. Some of the inherent contradictions in the Parti Québécois's attempt to create a genuine Québécois nation through the promotion of French culture are explored as are some of the pitfalls of a referendum on Sovereignty-Association.

KEY WORDS: Political Geography, separatism, core-periphery relations, cultural division of labour, ethnic intelligentsia, Western Europe, Québec.

RÉSUMÉ

Colin H. WILLIAMS : Le désir des nations : le séparatisme ethnique québécois dans une optique comparative.

L'article décrit les principales caractéristiques du séparatisme ethnique en tant que processus. Il analyse ensuite deux théories susceptibles d'expliquer la renaissance, en périphérie, d'une identité réactive, la thèse du colonialisme interne et le rôle de l'élite ethnique. Il aborde les contradictions inhérentes à la politique du Parti Québécois, qui veut créer une nation purement québécoise par la promotion de la culture française, et expose les pièges du référendum sur la souveraineté-association.

MOTS-CLÉS : Géographie politique, séparatisme, rapports centre-périphérie, division culturelle du travail, élite ethnique, Europe de l'Ouest, Québec.

*
* *

Why Should Norway be independent and not Brittany? Why Ireland and not Scotland? Why Nicaragua and not Québec?

As we ask ourselves these questions, it becomes apparent that more than language and culture, more than history and geography, even more than force or power, the foundation of the nation is will. For there is no power without will!

Pierre E. Trudeau, 1965¹.

Interpreting the will of the nation is a notoriously difficult task, as leaders of the international political community are so painfully aware. One interpretation is that the nation is never fully self-aware or developed so long as it remains under the political control of another nation. What constitutes benign political control for one generation may turn out to be totally intolerable for the next: thus timing is of considerable importance in interpreting the desire of nations.


Five years ago, many predicted that the strength of Celtic nationalism was such, that devolution, and possibly even independence for Scotland if not for Wales, would be an inevitable consequence of the changing power structure within the United Kingdom. Today, devolution, not to mention independence, is a low priority in political circles and the nationalist parties are embroiled in internal disputes, ideological vacillation and post-election depression. Yet one should not underestimate the power of nationalism, that most opportunist, chameleon-like, political theory. Nationalism, by defining the nation as the supreme political community, to whom ultimate loyalty is due, invests the nation with transcendent moral sanction and authority. The nation, thus defined, can only fully realize itself if it is freed from all constraints upon its autonomy. Québec is in a far stronger position to realize the ideal of independence than either Scotland, Wales or a number of other ethnic homelands in Western Europe (figure 1). It has deep-seated, historic ambitions of self-government nurtured by a distinctive culture and ethnic group identity. It is far richer in human and physical resources than the vast majority of actors in the international state system. It already possesses most of the institutional apparatus of a sovereign state and seems likely to accrue more power to itself in the future. Above all it has a government elected with a clear mandate to renegotiate the terms of her future relationship with the rest of Canada. Whatever form that future may take, Québec is surely fortunate to be engaged in a political dialogue with members of a political system which are likely to honour the desires of her citizens, if it can be demonstrated that the proposed constitutional changes are the express will of the majority. Events in the rest of the world cast doubts on the ability of ethnic minorities to establish independent states in a democratic fashion.

My aim in this paper is to look at some recent explanations for the emergence of ethnic separatism, and to apply them briefly to Québec. I shall not provide detailed commentary on the development of the separatist movement, nor on the programme of the Parti Québécois, preferring instead to highlight some of the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the explanations offered for the resurgence of politicised ethnic identity².

TERRITORIAL AND ETHNIC SEPARATISM

An important analytic distinction exists between 'territorial' and 'ethnic' separatism. The former rests its case primarily on the spatial distinctiveness of the potentially independent unit. Distance, relative isolation and a perception of unfulfilled resource potential can be powerful mobilising influences in the development of a separatist movement, especially when allied to a regional distinctiveness which may encompass other variables such as language, religion or a common shared history of exploitation³. The history of European Imperialism abounds with cases of overseas colonies, whom having seceded from Me-

Figure 1



ropolitan cores, commonly trace a particular epoch in their experience when the 'materials' of their uniqueness were moulded by geographic isolation, despite the many apparent similarities in racial origin, culture system and settlement pattern between Metropole and colony⁴.

'Ethnic' separatism, on the other hand, rests its case on the cultural distinctiveness of the community pressing for independence. Frequently, but not necessarily so, they are 'renewal movements' seeking to recover the cultural identity of a formally independent unit⁵. For nationalist leaders, imbued with the uniqueness of their destiny and contribution to the common good of world civilisation, the incorporation of their group into a multi-national state is inherently contrary to nature and a severe impediment to the full realisation of their group development potential. As Smith has demonstrated

"the watchwords of ethnic separatism are identity, authenticity and diversity... it seeks through separation the restoration of a degraded community to its rightful status and dignity, yet it also sees in the status of a separate political existence the goal of that restoration and the social embodiment of that dignity"⁶.

It follows that for independence to be achieved the primary function is to translate the goal of a separate ethnic identity into a political ideology which will animate a movement for national freedom⁷.

The remarkable feature of many contemporary separatist movements in advanced industrial states is that both types of separatism, the territorial and the ethnic, are increasingly being combined to produce 'ethno regional movements' which seek to liberate their respective peoples firmly settled in distinct, if subservient, territories⁸. Thus ethnoregionalism, defined as a species of the genus nationalism⁹, should not be confused with, nor measured in the same way as, regionalism¹⁰, a term which has long intrigued competent researchers in Political Geography¹¹.

THE SUBSTANCE OF SEPARATENESS

We have identified 'ethnicity' and 'territory' as the key 'materials' of distinctiveness. We may elaborate upon ethnic separatism, the primary concern of this article, as a powerful, if somewhat vague, sentiment. It would incorporate descent as a basis of group and of individual status, and of spiritual confirmation. We need to know to whom else we belong, ethnic separatism can thus provide a 'myth of origins'¹². It can also provide a historic explanation for the tragic events of past conquest and subordination and a rationale for group superiority achieved through suffering, a 'myth of development'¹³. Underlying this, of course, is the question of isolation, of self-sufficiency, of the relative infrequency of sustained inter-cultural contact giving rise to ethnocentrism, a 'myth of uniqueness'.

Culture separateness reinforces the sense of unique descent and destinable history. It operates through three salient markers, the meanings of which can vary in different social settings within the ethnic territory. The first are group customs and institutions which serve as group boundaries, as modes of exclusion and as sustainers of special routines and distinctive procedures. A second important variable is language, for not only is it a functional means of communication, it is also a preserver of common shared experiences and an instrument for cultural division. Often it provides the most tangible barrier to assimilation, because of its pervasive influence in societal interaction¹⁴. A third 'material' of culture distinctiveness is religion, a phenomenon capable both of uniting and dividing populations at a local and universal scale¹⁵.

The salience of ethnic resurgence cannot be ignored. It is evident from Table 1 that most West European states as well as Canada are experiencing serious ethnoregional challenges. We have outlined elsewhere the characteristics of ethnic secession in Western Europe¹⁶. It was concluded that a number of factors serve to influence the likely transformation of 'regional autonomist' movements into outright 'ethnic regional movements', chief of which are the historical circumstances of the minority's incorporation into the now dominant centralised state, the tolerance of the state toward politicised ethnic sentiment, the industriousness and skill of the mobilising nationalist élite and the international dimension of ethnonationalism. Let it not be forgotten that the majority of small nation-states were created in the aftermath of continental warfare and revolutions, as in the 1840's, 1920's and 1940's. They were hardly ever purely domestic, administrative and constitutionally devolved territories. More often the resultant new states and their boundaries existed despite the claims of nationalist leaders to honour culturally defined borders to avoid ethnic conflict. Rather they conformed to the reality of super-power hegemony in Europe. Under such circumstances many political leaders faced a paradox in that the boundaries of the political unit they were to operate within, did not correspond to the boundaries of the ethnic group on whose behalf the claim of independence had been made. Europe has since witnessed a succession of cases of nationality formation attempting to make state and nation coextensive, a process I suggest which is currently being undertaken in Canada, both by the federal authorities, and more especially, by successive Québécois governments culminating in the election of a party dedicated to the self-government of the 'Québécois nation'. (table 1)

The materials of separateness have to be translated into a self-conscious group identity before they can become politically useful in the drive for national independence. This process, of nationality formation, is one in which objective differences between peoples acquire subjective and symbolic significance, are transformed into group consciousness, and become the basis of political demands. There are two main stages in the development of a politicised nation. In the first stage, the thwarted intelligentsia attaches symbolic value to certain objective characteristics, creates a myth of group history and destiny, and attempts to communicate that myth to the defined population, especially to the socially mobilising segments.

Four interactive requisites are essential for the successful transformation of an objectively different group into a subjectively conscious community:

- namely 1) the existence of a 'pool of symbols' of distinctiveness to draw upon;
- 2) an élite willing to select, transmit, and standardise these symbols for the group;
 - 3) a socially mobilising population to whom the symbols of group identity can be transmitted;
 - 4) the existence of one or more other groups from whom the formative group is to be differentiated (figure 2).

Of central importance is the relationship between rates of social mobilisation and assimilation of an ethnic group in relation to another, dominant or competitive group. The leading hypothesis here is that the conditions for the differentiation of a culturally distinct ethnic group from a rival group with which it must interact and communicate, occur when the rates of social mobilisation within the group move faster than the rates of assimilation of that group to the language and culture of its rival.

Table 1
Some major separatist movements in the Western World

<i>Ethnoregional Group</i>	<i>Major Ethnonational Linkage(s)</i>	<i>Degree of Institutionalisation</i>
Québécois (6.0 million in Québec, Canada)	<i>Parti Québécois</i> —Governing party of Québec Province since November 1976.	High: Successive transfer of power from Ottawa to Québec; promise of a referendum on Sovereignty-Association in 1980.
Scot (5.2 million in Scotland, United Kingdom)	Scottish Nationalist Party—17.24% of the Scottish vote in May 1979 British general election.	Medium but diminishing; despite narrow majority in Devolution referendum the promise of legislative devolution to an elected Scottish Assembly shelved by new Tory government.
Welsh (2.7 million in Wales, United Kingdom)	<i>Plaid Cymru</i> —8.1% of Welsh vote in May 1979 British elections; <i>Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg</i> , a mobilised interest group committed to preserving the Welsh culture and language.	Low; outright rejection of Labour's Devolution proposals for an elected Assembly in March 1979 referendum.
Flemish (5+ million in Flanders and bilingual Brussels in the Belgian state)	<i>Volkswaard</i> —(Flemish People's Party) 11.3% of Flemish Belgium's vote in the December 1978 Belgian general elections.	Extensive institutionalisation in the 'regionalised' Belgian state created by the 1970 revision of the Belgian constitution, including Cultural Councils inside the Belgian parliament, advisory regional assemblies for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Brabant, and with the 'Accord d'Egmont' a step toward a Federal system.
Francophone Belgium composed of the Walloons (3+ million in Wallonia) and the nearly one million Bruxellois.	<i>Rassemblement Wallon</i> party, with 9.2% of Wallonia's vote in 1978, and the <i>Front démocratique des francophones bruxellois</i> , with 27.98% of Brussels' total vote in 1978.	
Jura francophones (60.000 citizens of northernmost part of Switzerland's German-speaking canton of Bern)	<i>Rassemblement Jurassien</i> , system—participatory party now eclipsing earlier protest movements seeking a separate canton for the region's francophones.	By referenda, area separated from Bern canton—separate status as the Republic of Jura within the Swiss Confederation.

<i>Ethnoregional Group</i>	<i>Major Ethnonational Linkage(s)</i>	<i>Degree of Institutionalisation</i>
South Tyroleans (220.000+ German speaking inhabitants in Italy's Alto Adige region)	<i>Sud Tiroler Volks Partei</i> —30+% of the vote in the Trento-Bolzano region of the 1972 Italian general election.	Limited implementation of the 1969 <i>Package</i> designed to guarantee political and cultural autonomy of region; 1971 the creation of Autonomous Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, subdivided into German province with some local authority.
Alsacians (approximately 1.3 million inhabitants of France's Alsace—Lorraine region).	Several quasi-political associations with an interest group hue seeking to preserve area's dialect and language, including the Alsatian Party of Progress.	Virtually none; however since the summer violence of 1975 and 1979 France has instituted a re-evaluation of its regional policies vis-à-vis its ethnoregional minorities.
Corsicans (150.000 Corsican nationals in a total island population of 250.000)	<i>Action pour la renaissance de la Corse</i> , and other smaller action groups seeking regional political autonomy for the island.	Since 1975 they have gained some limited concessions, the right to teach Corsican in schools, a promised reopening of a university, and the appointment of Corsica's first Corsican prefect since 1870.
Bretons (nearly 2.4 million inhabitants in the Brittany area of France)	Three banned, paramilitary, clandestine organizations, each with a limited following and commitment to regional political autonomy.	Virtually none, as above; however, Giscard d'Estaing's minister of education in 1975 announced a programme of state subsidies for the teaching of Breton.
Northern Ireland's (essentially) Celtic-descended "Catholics" (35% of the regional population)	The Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army, a clandestine terrorist organization seeking an end to British rule and "Protestant" domination, drawing a wider, but spasmodic following among the inhabitants than either the official I.R.A. or its political auxiliaries.	Non-functional. N. Ireland has possessed a regional assembly since Ireland's partition; for most of the half century before its suspension it was dominated by a "Protestant" majority insensitive to the needs of the Catholic minority and overtly discriminatory. Efforts to re-establish civilian government since 1973 have focussed on a power-sharing committee system scheme designed to replace the former cabinet-government majority rule system with shared authority; so far, efforts to create this system have been thwarted by the uncompromising opposition of the Protestant community's principal linkages to the shared power concept.
Northern Ireland's (essentially) English-or-Scottish descended "Protestant" majority (65% of the regional population)	United Ulster Unionist Council, a party committed to Loyalist and Protestant cause which won 46 of the 78 seats in the regional constituent assembly elected in June 1975; several clandestine Protestant terrorist movements.	

Ethnoregional Group	Major Ethnonational Linkage(s)	Degree of Institutionalisation
Catalonians (8 million in northeastern Spain)	<i>Esquerra Democratica and Lliga</i> —leftist-and rightist-oriented parties seeking regional political autonomy.	Very limited. Some limited cultural autonomy and February 1976 verbal recognition by Government of the region's unique identity (for first time in 40 years) promise of more devolution to come.
Basques (nearly 2 million in the four provinces of northern Spain and the three of southwestern France)	<i>Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna</i> (ETA—"Basque Homeland and Liberty"); an outlawed, clandestine and violent irredentist group seeking a free Basque state in a "European Federation of Races"; <i>Enbata</i> , a Basque association of pro-(cultural and political) autonomy groups in Basque, France, also outlawed.	Developing: after decades of neglect, and recent waves of bomb attacks and political assassinations, the Spanish state is offering a form of Home Rule to the Basques and has legalized the use of the Basque language. It remains to be seen whether the measures will placate the demands of the "poli-milis" who have always insisted on independence.

(As at May 1979).


The second stage in nationality formation involves the articulation and acquisition of political rights for the group as a group and not on the basis of individual rights. Political demands may be articulated by an élite even before a group acquires cohesion. They may even be conceded in the absence of group cohesion. But the clearest proof of the existence of a nationality is the achievement and maintenance of group rights through political mobilisation. This movement from communal consciousness to political action requires two preconditions:

- 1) a perception of inequality in the distribution of, and competition for, the allocation of scarce resources and material rewards between groups, and
- 2) a political organisation to articulate group demands.

Government policies may intensify or moderate group conflicts, but the kinds of political demands made are likely to depend more upon calculations relating to the relative power of competing élites in a political system than to the adequacy of government policies in satisfying group demands. The willingness of competing communal élites to share political power is of greater importance in maintaining the political cohesion of multi-national societies than any other factor. Where that willingness is in evidence, communal conflicts can be accommodated, where it is absent, separatist demands and overt violence and civil war are to be expected.

In our discussion of nationality formation we should take due cognizance of two caveats. Firstly, it is intended that the objective markers of group identity, such as language and religion, are not 'givens' from which national identity naturally springs, they are themselves subject to variation and manipulation. Secondly, not all symbols of group identity are of equal value in a functional sense. Often nationalist élites tend to emphasize one symbol above all others and strive to bring other symbols into congruence with it. Two types of structural constraints must be overcome by the nationalist movement to expand

Figure 2



its social base. It must firstly challenge the politically established 'colonial-type' élite who controls the means of violence in the territory. Secondly, because of the constraints inherent in a pre-industrial traditional culture, it must attack the social control of traditional institutions and their political rationalisation by alien rule. This leads the nationalist movement into its third, offensive phase, simultaneously challenging the legitimacy of the exercise of power of the state as presently constituted, and the legitimacy of the basic values underpinning indigenous traditional social structures. At times this attack on tradition in the name of modernisation and industrial development may cause ambivalence as certain portions of the native culture must be retained, and even exalted, for the sake of ethnolinguistic continuity.

The fourth and final stage of a successful nationalist movement is to create a new consensus in support of the new nation-state. As Guindon observed a decade ago, this requires, to varying degrees, "wresting the masses from the symbols of tradition, creating and celebrating a new kind of man, a product of the changing society, by initiating and controlling the formal and informal means of socialization—the schools, the public mass media, etc.—and finally, establishing a considerable degree of bureaucratic control and centralization over the whole territory to avoid the fractionalism of tribal (read ethnic) or local cultures once the political dominance of the aliens has been removed".

THE ETHNIC REVIVAL

A satisfactory understanding of contemporary ethnic separatism necessitates a clear formulation of state development and of ethnic group formation. Of the interesting accounts advanced in recent years two are of particular relevance for our comparative review, namely Hechter's work on ethnoregionalism based on the central concept of Internal Colonialism¹⁸, and Smith's work focussing on state bureaucracy and the ethnic intelligentsia's discontent¹⁹. In 'Internal Colonialism' it was argued that ethnic solidarity among any objectively-defined set of individuals is due primarily to the existence of a hierarchical cultural division of labour which promotes reactive group formation. This cultural division of labour is typically found in regions that have developed as internal colonies, that is, ethnic enclaves of powerful, modernised nation-states. As capitalist exploitation, from the late eighteenth century onwards, follows ethnic cleavages and promotes cultural assimilation into the core area, industrial expansion must always be to the disadvantage of peripheral ethnic collectivities. On realising their condition, the ethnic intelligentsia must advocate separatism, if they are ever to avoid the inevitability of economic development as a perpetual dependency of the state core region. Whilst, Hechter argues, most ethnoregional movements in Western Europe appear to have emerged in such regions, there are notable exceptions (among them Scotland, Catalonia and the Spanish Basque country) which necessitate a reinterpretation of the original thesis. In his more recent work a second, segmental division of labour was identified; this leads to interactive as opposed to reactive group formation, being largely determined by the ethnic group itself.

How do these mechanisms explain why specific regions are able to maintain their ethnic identity despite modernisation and state centralisation²⁰? The crucial distinction between an hierarchical and a segmental division of labour appears to relate to the power and vitality of the ethnoregional group's interaction with the international economic order and the residual customs and institutions which the peripheral region was allowed to maintain after its initial integration into the developing state. As Hechter explains "the hierarchical mechanism contributing to the formation of the ethnic group is the extent to which group membership determines individual life chances. The greater this is, the grea-

ter the psychic significance of ethnicity for the individual—and, by extension, for the group as a whole"²¹. Thus in West European peripheral regions, where individuals are not assigned to occupations solely on ascriptive criteria, ethnic identity tends to be strongest among those groups at the lower end of the stratification system.

"The segmental mechanism contributing to the formation of ethnic solidarity is the extent to which members interact wholly within the boundaries of their own group. The most critical locus of this interaction is the work site, and the best single indicator of it is the degree to which group members monopolize certain niches in the occupational structure. Occupational specialization of this kind contribute to group solidarity by establishing settings for personal contact that strengthen ties between individuals with a set of common material interests that serve to reinforce informal social ties"²².

If we translate these socio-structural characteristics into regional characteristics we find that in 'hierarchical' cases individuals avowing the importance of their culture in peripheral regions (e.g. those with distinctive language or religion such as Wales, Brittany and Corsica) are primarily found in the lower ranking positions of the regional class structure. In 'segmental' cases, individuals adhering to the peripheral culture have succeeded in monopolising key occupations and maintaining a separate set of 'national' institutions. Both types of situation structure the respective interaction with the centralising Western European state. The former, where the peripheral culture remained beyond, or tangential to, the interests of the ruling élite of the state, produces a reactive response; the latter, where the peripheral culture was protected by the existence of distinctive regional institutions promotes interactive group formation.

An alternative perspective is provided by Anthony Smith who seeks to explain the politicisation of ethnic consciousness primarily in terms of the rise of scientific bureaucracies and secular education²⁴. Modern bureaucracies, unlike previous forms of state administration, are not only more complex, more centralised and more interventionist, but also more 'scientific', that is they incorporate into their organisations the latest techniques and methods of scientific technology. This innovation not only requires a new type of personnel as bureaucrat, but also assists the effective penetration of the state apparatus to the farthest part of the state territory. This new kind of bureaucracy demanded a more secular, utilitarian and rational perspective and relied more on experimental and methodical techniques. 'Rational' education began to displace the classical/clerical education and the secularisation of society began to undermine the cosmic myths which had formed the close traditional bond between State and Church. State modernisation and its pattern of uneven development began to erode established agrarian norms and roles, favouring the centre at the expense of the periphery and the educated intelligentsia at the expense of the landed classes²⁵.

"Since the new bureaucracies, often situated in the capitals, tended to command many of the avenues to wealth and power, ambitious and qualified professionals clamoured for admission. Hence the rise of scientific bureaucracy and critical education spurred a whole wave of elite mobility, and paved the way for a potentially dissident stratum, and one more dangerous than any predecessor on account of their education and ability to organise into factions and movements"²⁶.

Discontent was deepened amongst the ambitious professionals from peripheral areas and minority ethnic groups because of the many discriminatory barriers erected against them by the imperial and colonial administration which restricted coveted positions to the élite of the dominant group²⁷.

As a second stage, Smith argues that increased state intervention in the present century has produced an aggravated crisis for the thwarted intelligentsia in ex-imperial

medium sized states, such as Britain and Spain, because the traditional overseas outlets for talented professionals are withering away. The effect, he claims, is worse for the ethnic élites of Scotland, Wales or Corsica, because the increased competition in the domestic sector means they can no longer be accommodated, nor their aspirations filled. Struggling under their 'double burden' of exclusion and ambition the intelligentsia turn inwards to reach a deeper understanding of their own ethnic community. In such a milieu nationalism is embraced for it seeks to offer an historical vision of man in society, and because it is especially concerned with the formation of identity through autonomy it promises to provide a respected place for the committed intelligentsia which bureaucracy helped to create. Nationalism from this perspective is a meaning—and role-seeking movement²⁸.

Government policies become the decisive determinant as to which direction the politicized ethnoregional movement will take. Insensitive bureaucratic policies or benign neglect will tend to evoke a separatist challenge, while an accommodating system participatory approach will tend to blunt the separatists' grievances and lead to communalist options. Ultimately, of course, the success of the separatist movements in the West will be heavily influenced by the unfavourable international climate as sub-state dissolution in any one medium-sized state might herald the beginning of wider fragmentation within the international political system.

QUÉBEC

"I know of no national distinctions marking and continuing a more hopeless inferiority... if they prefer remaining stationary, the greater part of them must be labourers in the employ of English capitalists. In either case it would appear that the great mass of French Canadians are doomed, in some measure, to occupy an inferior position, and to be dependent on the English for employment. The evils of poverty and dependence would merely be aggravated in a ten-fold degree, by a spirit of jealous and resentful nationality which should separate the working class of the community from the possessors of wealth and employers of labour..."

Lord Durham, 1838.

How did separatism arise amongst this 'jealous and resentful nationality'? Several central problems confront us in the application of Hechter's and Smith's discussion of ethnic resurgence to the province of Québec. The first main problem is the use of Québec as the politico-spatial unit of analysis. As we shall see, nationalist leaders face the long established problem of making state and nation coterminous. The basis of Québécois separatism is a reinvigorated ethnic consciousness, or 'will' to use Trudeau's terms. But rather than undertake the dangerous and politically suicidal task of redrawing Québec's boundaries to coincide with the ethnic majority—the francophone nation—separatist ideology attempts to convince the non-francophone minorities that the P.Q.'s conception of nationalism is territorial and state-based, consequently pluralistic and liberal. The second major problem is that no theory, when grounded in the reality of other case examples (such as the British example used by Hechter), can do more than point to the complex structural conditions which engender separatist movements. One should be wary then of asking a particular model to explain too much. The third problem is that aggregate level theories often fail to account for the significant, if at times ephemeral, quality of leading personalities, the charismatic leadership and myriad interpersonal contacts which contribute to the development of unique political cultures. Finally the interpretation of contemporary history is a notoriously difficult and humbling task, the details of which we all too often misrepresent in order to be theoretically consistent.

There is little doubt but that the history of Québec's post-Conquest development reveals much in the relations between Québec's English-speaking minority and French-

speaking majority which supports Hechter's twin elements of segmentation and hierarchy in his cultural division of labour²⁹. By the nineteenth century French-Canadian society was essentially rural consisting of a loosely integrated system of expanding parishes³⁰. Within this context a set of supra-parochial institutions gave rise to an ethnic élite composed primarily of the clergy and seigneurs who, when faced with a surplus population on a rapidly diminishing land resource base, needed "structural relief" to maintain their dominance. Guindon argues that structural relief in that milieu, could only consist in industrialisation, the very reform the traditional élite could not ensure since it was not, and had not been primarily an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and hence lacked the requisite capital³¹. McRoberts has recently demonstrated that during the earlier period of New France French-Canadians did in fact possess an entrepreneurial capacity based on the fur trade³². Their failure to accumulate capital in post-Conquest Québec was due to major structural changes within the Québec economy and to a reorientation of Canada's trade resulting from the replacement of France by Britain and the U.S.A. as the main market, thereby disadvantaging French-Canadian entrepreneurs many of whom ceased their business ventures as a result. Whilst successive French-Canadian economic ventures remained small and limited, English-Canadian ventures in Québec developed as a result of the expanded international market afforded by the Empire and the industrialisation of both Canada and her Southern neighbour.

Hierarchical structures developed relatively late in Québec, becoming marked only in the early decades of the twentieth century as a consequence of increased inter-ethnic interaction. Large scale rural-urban migrations and industrialisation had created an occupational system where French-Canadians were disproportionately concentrated in blue collar positions and underrepresented in managerial and technical positions within the overwhelmingly Anglophone-owned enterprises. The evidence points to an established and widely recognised cultural division of labour. Yet it is a misconception to explain this situation as being a direct reflection of the value system of the two contending ethnic groups, as some have done. The orthodox explanation, until recently, implied a deterministic subordination of French-Canadians, to the more innovative, rational and entrepreneurial orientated English-Canadian character type³³. As a counter-argument, two "structural" explanations are offered in the literature³⁴. One concentrates on ethnic discrimination where English-Canadian owners have shown a preference toward appointing personnel from within the Anglophone community³⁵. The other stresses the role of language as a "sorting device" in the allocation of English and French occupations. Given the fact that until recently, few in the province were functionally bilingual, Québec Anglophones had a distinct advantage in achieving top managerial positions. It has also been shown how the language barrier might stifle not only the performance of French-Canadians, but also the capacity of Anglophone managers to recognise and promote talent³⁶. Under such behavioural circumstances language discrimination need not be a conscious ploy of an ethnic élite, but an inbuilt structural mechanism reflecting the unquestioned dominance of English in the Québec business world. Added to the traditional linguistic division of labour, there has been an expansion of the provincial governments' responsibilities with those institutions dependent on the provincial state becoming French workplaces while the corporate sector has remained an English workplace. The expansion of the provincial public sector gave rise to new bureaucratic élites whose occupational promotion was dependent upon their linguistic competence. In addition the persistence of linguistically-differentiated educational institutions, the development of an aggressive and innovative French-language mass media and the expansion of provincially financed social welfare services had, by the sixties, created a comprehensive arrangement of French—medium institutions. Thus "linguistic and cultural differences have persisted not so much because they have been the criteria of a cultural division of labour, although they clearly

have been, but because they are embedded in a whole network of distinctly French-language institutions which embrace much, if not all, of the day-to-day worlds of most Quebec Francophones³⁷.

Hechter's cultural division of labour is intimately connected to his inter-regional conceptualisation of core-periphery relations. By relating ethnic identity and territorial autonomism to the economic inequality of disadvantaged peripheral regions, the internal colonial theory attempts to link them to a central mechanism of international capitalism, the uneven development of regions. We may accept the operation of a cultural division of labour in Québec without necessarily accepting Québec as a dependent periphery, and this for a number of reasons. Firstly, as the core-periphery model is essentially a regional level type of explanation, it in no way accounts for differential development amongst individuals. Thus some members of the periphery will undoubtedly gain from the extension of the core's political and commercial activity, e.g. the entrepreneurial classes and the intermediaries of regional administration and commerce, whilst other will often lose, e.g. the traditional political élite and landed classes. Similarly in the core, some may lose out as a result of peripheral incorporation, e.g. manual and semi-skilled workers, whose competitiveness may be undercut by cheaper labour costs in the periphery. In addition, after integration, many in the periphery may experience an absolute rise in their standard of living and welcome closer economic ties to the core, even though relative to the core's population they are still disadvantaged. Secondly, there are likely to be clear spatial differences between different sub-regions of the periphery which confuse its categorisation as either core or periphery. Thus whilst Eastern Québec remained underdeveloped, Montréal continued to be the financial center of Canada long after Ontario had emerged as the industrial center. Also a region may at the same time be both core and periphery depending upon which regions one is comparing. Whilst Québec exhibits many of Hechter's characteristic traits for a periphery in relation to Ontario, she is undoubtedly a core in her relations with the Atlantic Provinces and the West. Even if we limited the comparison to Ontario, the model is further weakened by the fact that Québec does have a provincial state government which of late has done much to erode the cultural division of labour by political means, irrespective of core interests. Hence, historically, it must be concluded that Québec's decline owes more to her geographic location, her resource underdevelopment and the relative advance of other Canadian regions, rather than to the specific role which cultural factors played in determining economic opportunity and performance. We must therefore turn to other explanations for ethnic separatism, ones which, while not denying the importance of inter-regional inequalities, do not focus on the regional level to the exclusion of analysing the role of key actors in the nationalist struggle, the ethnic intelligentsia.

THE ROLE OF THE ETHNIC INTELLIGENTSIA

We may therefore accept a revised account of Hechter's cultural division of labour, without necessarily accepting its predicted relationship with the core-periphery model. However, it is possible, *a priori*, to assume that the grievances which arise from the occupational discrimination which underlie the cultural division of labour, will be translated into a political movement designed to redress such grievances. This in no way determines that the resultant movement will necessarily be a separatist one as Hechter seems to imply. It could be, and in fact was in Québec, a Social Credit Party, or a reformist Liberal Party, neither of which challenged the legitimacy of the federal system, merely its operation when it seemed to threaten Québécois interests. Now although feelings of disadvantage are common within the French-Canadian population, only some translate these grievances into a preference for the independence option. The differences between the general elec-

torate and the more committed P.Q. supporters appear to derive from different estimates of the chances of improvement coming with independence. This would appear to be the touchstone of the separatist case for a better life in a future sovereign Québec³⁸. It is not that nationalist ideology is a new element in the situation. Nationalism has long been a prominent feature of Québécois politics ever since the Patriotes movement of the 1820's and 1830's. But it has always been contained within a federal structure, within a broad philosophy of élite accommodation. What we have seen in Québec of late is a reformulation of the basic principles of Québec self-determination; one in which a radical and reforming ethnic technological and bureaucratic élite have played a leading role, both in the development of a separatist ideology and in the establishment of an effective and innovative state apparatus which has become the prime instrument for separation.

From Confederation to the present the pattern of ethnic accommodation between French and English in Québec developed within the context of rapid industrialisation. Historically, ethnic accommodation has been based on Québec's segmented character, with separate ethnic schools, religious organisations, means of communication, residential differentiation and trade unions providing a self-perpetuating institutional separation serving both linguistic communities. What disturbed this arrangement and fueled the separatist cause was modernisation and its attendant new actors the 'scientific bureaucrats'. In the immediate post-war period, the growing discontent with federal-provincial relations, and the opposition to the policies and character of the Duplessis regime, as evidenced by the asbestos workers strike of 1949, hardened the split between the secularising intelligentsia and the defensive, clerico-nationalist ideology which had underpinned Church-State relations since Confederation days. The attack on Church dominated education, health and welfare services which the Quiet Revolution heralded was spearheaded by the expanded provincial bureaucracy created by Premier Paul Sauvé³⁹. Hence forward, it was the provincial state apparatus which was to be used as the reforming instrument capable both of allowing Québec to 'catch up' with neighbouring Ontario as a modern society, and of providing employment, status and a future political role for the ambitious ethnic bureaucrats within a network of Francophone public and parapublic institutions. "The aspirations of the new middle class and the growth and development of the institutions they staffed were to become the political priorities of the provincial state"⁴⁰. Having replaced the Church as the main source of authority, the new bureaucratic élite now successfully challenged the leadership of the institutional élite by restricting the traditional management prerogatives of the authorities of such institutions as local school boards, hospital administrations. They espoused a politically centralised bureaucratic model of social modernisation which apart from curtailing the authority of French institutional managers, also transformed the Anglophone institutional managerial élite into a minority dependent on the state and its dictates. The whole modernisation process pointed to the pivotal role of the state as the focus of reform, initiative and enterprise. State financed ventures such as Hydro-Québec, the Sidbec Steel complex and the pension and investment fund represented instruments for extending greater Québécois control over economic development also. But increasingly the leaders of the Lesage and successive governments recognised that Québec's drive toward autonomy would clash with federal priorities, especially as the federal government was now playing a more aggressive role in such fields as regional development and cultural affairs, policies which did not always accord with Québec's interests⁴¹.

Social mobilisation and state modernisation thus gave rise to a new nationalism in the sixties, which is now dominant within the Parti Québécois, and quite distinct from previous Québécois nationalism in several important respects. First, as we have seen, the new nationalism embraces the logic of social and economic modernisation as the key to a

dynamic and prosperous Québécois future. Second, whilst traditional nationalism has been conservative and engaged in the politics of cultural defence, the new nationalism was activist and interventionist, engaged in the politics of cultural promotion. Third, where the old nationalism was content to maintain the ethnic institutional separation, even if this meant that Anglophones had the upper hand in certain sectors, the new nationalism now sought to penetrate all sectors developing new forms of competition with the English. Fourth, where the old nationalism had challenged the federal system only when it seemed to infringe on Québec's jurisdiction—the new nationalism called into question the basis of Confederation, challenging Ottawa's right to determine revenue levels and resource allocation. Finally, the traditional nationalism's suspicion of the state as an instrument of governance, was displaced by an ideological commitment to state intervention and planning, such that it became the key actor in the struggle for ethnic survival and the springboard for group development⁴².

We have argued that the ethnic bureaucratic élite played a decisive role in shaping Québec modernisation, but what of separatism and ethnic promotion⁴³? To many outsiders, language and cultural questions seem to have received a disproportionate amount of attention by former Québec governments and by the Parti Québécois. This is mainly because such observers fail to appreciate the pervasive role which language plays in almost all aspects of contemporary public life, most notably in education, the workplace and in government⁴⁴. Given the overriding concern to preserve the 'French fact in North America' it is not surprising that language, the essence of French distinctiveness, should be a primary political concern of the new nationalists. This concern is largely related to the fear that in time the language of the economic élite, with its associated technological specialisms, will come to dominate the language of the passive majority if the state does not intervene. In addition the trend of recent immigrants to assimilate into the Anglophone community has led to emotional assertions that in the absence of restrictive language policies only a tiny proportion of immigrants would opt for the French language instruction offered by education boards. Demographic forecasts of continuing declines in the fertility levels of Francophones underpin the minority consciousness, which Camille Laurin reflects in his characterisation of the Québécois as an "endangered species" as a result of these three trends.

One explanation for the central role language priorities play within Québécois politics today relates to the growth of the state sector. The new middle class is overwhelmingly concentrated in the public and parapublic sector as a result of the intensive institution building of the sixties when the municipal civil service, health and education systems required and absorbed Francophone social scientists, engineers and business graduates. Also to integrate into the public sector, one did not have to be a fluent bilingual, a requirement of the corporate, private sector. Once the state sector began to be adequately manned, language became a political issue as the aspiring middle classes, blocked in their attempts to swell the state bureaucracy, looked to the Anglophone dominated private sector for employment. Disadvantaged linguistically and experiencing blocked mobility and ethnic discrimination both in the federal government bureaucracy and in the private sector, the thwarted intelligentsia reinforced its determination to seek in separatism a collective, and then political solution to its dilemma. Only in a separate, independent nation-state could the full aspirations of the Francophones be realised. 'Maître chez nous' was to become a fact as well as a promise.

In the event, when a nationalist government became elected on November 15, 1976 the Parti Québécois instituted many reforms and programmes which heralded the creation of a national state culture based on the language of the majority—French. The ideals of the ethnic bureaucrats and academics, technologists and businessmen who constitute the

government of Québec have been crystallised into the concept of sovereignty-association. Association with Canada is dependent upon Québec achieving her sovereignty, and this in turn is to be determined by a referendum. But as British experience has recently demonstrated referenda are fraught with ambiguity and invariably provide 'results' which please no particular section and antagonise most because of their indecisiveness.

Thus the issue of Sovereignty-Association, the details of which are available in government proposals, must surely be dependent upon the direction and strength of the separatist vote in the forthcoming referendum⁴⁵. At root the issue revolves around the best way of measuring the democratic will of the people of Québec, accepting of course, that the referendum is but one mechanism by which that will may be expressed. In due time it is likely that other political methods may be necessary to resolve the Canada-Québec impasse.

SEPARATISM AND DEMOCRACY

We return in this final section to some of the contradictions inherent in the ethnic separatist case. Many of the issues raised, albeit briefly, are fundamental to the Political Geography of state formation and deserving of more attention. The separatist case is based on the premise that ethnic majorities within a multi-ethnic policy have the right to constitute national governments in their own sovereign states—the claim of national self-determination. Initially such claims appear to be framed in majoritarian terms and hence inherently democratic. But on closer examination we find that there is much ambiguity in the justification for majoritarian independence. The Parti Québécois pins its hopes on a referendum mandate for the sovereignty-association option. The recent devolution referenda in Britain should alert us to the critical question of how large a majority would be necessary in the referendum to justify the sovereignty-association proposals. In the United Kingdom a clear majority of Scots voters approved the devolution measure. However, this was declared invalid as they did not represent the minimum required proportion of the total potential electorate (at 40%). Some might argue that given the importance of the issue in Québec, a minimum of 50% to 55% vote in favor would be too close. From the perspective of the P.Q. leadership, however, a 55% vote would mean acceptance by a "huge majority" of Francophones—somewhere around 65%⁴⁶. The implication is that a genuine victory of the majority of Francophones would be assured. Note that in this interpretation, the majority is defined, not in terms of a collection of individuals, but by cultural groupings. "What this implies is not that the numerical majority ought to rule, but that the majority of the majority culture, should rule; which is as much as to claim a right to rule on behalf of a certain group within society, not simply by virtue of its being the majority, but by virtue of its cultural characteristics, or its substantive way of life"⁴⁷.

Although it is framed as an exercise in democracy, the forthcoming referendum has been criticized on the grounds that only citizens resident in Québec are eligible to vote. Opponents argue, as they did in the U.K., that if it is such a major constitutional proposal, then surely the voice of the country as a whole should be heard and not just those in the part which is culturally different. Separatism has implications far beyond the borders of Québec. The retort, of course, is that the basis of the separatist claim is a cultural one, in the only political unit in which the French are a majority. The rest of Canada is hardly likely to vote for its own dismemberment! Further it is argued that it is the special responsibility of the Québec state to represent the interests, not simply of individuals per se, but of the French culture; the corollary of this is that it is the French nation which has the right to separate if it so chooses. Now this is a right which is claimed, irrespective of majoritarian

status, for if we change the scale of the context and look at Canada as a whole, the culture which is said to have the right is clearly a minority one. It is the political context which determines majority-minority rights, a separate issue altogether from the collective claims to independence as a right per se. The emphasis on the appropriate political context provides further illustration of the tensions inherent in the separatist ideal. In the past the P.Q. leadership, Camille Laurin in particular, have pressed the claim of the Francophone nation to independence because it is the *only nation* in Québec (implying that only territorially defined majorities have rights to constitute nations); other ethnic groups have a responsibility to participate and cooperate to develop the national culture of Québec⁴⁸. However, the Minister also uses the term nation in a way which is synonymous with the state, and not the *ethnie*. Separatist rhetoric refers to Québec as a nation struggling for political independence. In order to do so this argument must maintain that the Québec state represents not only the embodiment of the French nation (as used to be argued), but of all the people within it. In other words, the "national culture" of Québec, though decidedly French, is the common property of all its citizens. The extension of this nationalist doctrine is that the state, primarily responsible for the promotion of national culture, has the responsibility to ensure that every citizen learn the single official language. Thus the preamble of the original version of the Language Charter declared that "the French language has always been the language of the Québec people, that it is, indeed, the very instrument by which they have articulated their identity"⁴⁹. To maintain this identity throughout the province the language was to be used as an instrument of French cultural promotion. Québec's non-francophone population saw in this formulation the establishment of an official state culture, with the implication that they would become disadvantaged citizens even within their own province. Recognising this fear and in the light of substantial criticism of its earlier drafts, the preamble to the new bill (Bill 101) was modified, referring to French as "the distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking... the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity". Yet as Knopff maintains this awkward reformulation does not remove the inherent ambiguity which gave rise to the legal enforcement of French culture in Québec, that is "that the nationalist position, when pushed to its logical extremity, leads to difficulties which force the nationalists to embrace a majoritarianism which itself entails an abandonment of the fundamental premise of nationalism, namely that nations and states should be coextensive".

The dilemma facing the Parti Québécois is that the rationale for the separatist drive is 'ethnic nationalism'. But rather than re-draw Québec's boundaries to coincide with the Francophone nation (to possibly incorporate irredentist minorities in Madawaska, Acadia, North-Eastern Ontario and parts of the U.S.A.) the Parti Québécois prefers to avoid the dilemma by referring to the *Québécois nation's right to self-government*, thereby converting an ethnic nationalism to a territorial nationalism. It hopes to persuade non-francophones that its conception of nationalism is territorial and state-based, one in which they make partake if they choose to exercise their right to assimilate into the dominant 'national culture'. Indeed participation will be encouraged, as the Parti Québécois is anxious to portray its government as a government for all in the province regardless of ethnic origin.

Now this tension between 'ethnic' and 'territorial' nationalism is a common characteristic of separatist movements. The Biafran secessionist attempt failed in large part to convince the non-Ibo minority groups within Biafra that Ibo ethnic nationalism was but the spearhead of a larger Eastern Region territorial nationalism. Similarly the failure of Plaid Cymru to significantly extend its electoral base out from the Welsh-speaking western heartland is due in the main to their failure to convince the 70% non-Welsh-speakers that their nationalism is at least as territorially motivated as it is culturally motivated⁵⁰. If the Parti Québécois can arrive at a programme of action which can reconcile both ethnic and

territorial-state nationalism, then the separatist option of Sovereignty-Association will be both more democratic and more likely to provide a surer foundation for an independent Québec. For, recall that nations are formed and not given.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have argued that the uneven spatial impact of modernisation, coupled with the cultural division of labour are important structural components of the development of ethnic relations in Québec. However, the role of the thwarted ethnic intelligentsia was considered to be crucial in explaining the timing and the political character of the resultant separatist movement which culminated in the government of the Parti Québécois. It remains to be seen to what extent the ideal of independence, cherished by a section of the Québécois élite, will be endorsed by the general population of this most distinctive of Canadian provinces.

NOTES

* The phrase 'desire of all nations' comes from Haggai ii,7. It has reference to the rebuilding of the Jerusalem Temple after the Exile and the reconstituting of Israel—an appropriate reference in speaking about national regeneration. It reads, "And I will shake all nations, and the desire of all nations shall come; and I will will this house with glory, saith the Lord of Hosts"; see JONES, R.T. (1974) *The Desire of Nations*. Llandybie, Wales, Christopher Davies Publishers.

¹ TRUDEAU, P.E. (1965) Federalism, Nationalism, and Reason. In Crépeau, P.-A. and Macpherson, C.B. *The Future of Canadian Federalism*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, p. 20.

² WILLIAMS, C.H. (1979a) Ethnic Resurgence in the Periphery, *Area*, 11 (4): 279-283; for work on Québécois separatism see, amongst others, SMILEY, D.V. (1977) French-English Relations in Canada and Consociational Democracy. In Esman, M.J. *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press; SAYWELL, J. (1977) *The Rise of the Parti Québécois*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press; McWHINNEY, E. (1979) *Québec and the Constitution*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press; SIMEON, R. (ed.) (1977) *Must Canada Fail?* Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press; WILLIAMS, C.H. (1974) Québec after the elections. *Planet*, 21; HAMILTON, R. & PINARD, M. (1976) The Bases of Parti Québécois Support in Recent Québec Elections. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 9 (1): 3-26; *ibid.* The Independence Issue and the Polarization of the Electorate: The 1973 Québec Election. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 10 (2): 215-259; McKINSEY, L.S. (1976) Dimensions of National Political Integration and Disintegration. *Comparative Political Studies*, 9 (3): 335-360; CUNEO, C.J. & CURTIS, J.E. (1974) Québec Separatism: An Analysis of Determinants within Social-Class Levels. *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 11 (1): 1-29; see also the special issue of *Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism*, (1978) 5 (2) devoted to Québec nationalism.

³ See WHEBELL, C.F.J. (1973) Territorial Separatism. *Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers*, 5; see also SMITH, A.D. (1979) *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford, M. Robertson.

⁴ Successful cases of territorial separatism would include the independence of the American colonies from Great Britain, Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan, Iceland's separation from Norway, and the majority of the former British 'Dominion' states. Obviously the form which separation took, whether legislative, civil war or referendum, differed quite markedly in these cases, but distance and spatial distinctiveness were cited as determining causes despite the often apparent similarity of cultural and political organisation of the conflicting units. For illustration see CUMMING, W.P. and RANKIN, H. (1975) *The Fate of a Nation*. London, Phaidon; GIBSON, J.R. (ed.) (1978) *European Settlement and Development in North America*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press; YOUNG, C. (1976) *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press; GRIERSON, E. (1972) *The Imperial Dream*. London, Collins.

⁵ Of course it is possible that a group with no formal independence can also give rise to a renewal movement, e.g. Wales and Brittany being instances.

⁶ SMITH, A.D. (1979) Towards a theory of ethnic separatism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2 (1), p. 22.


⁷ Many nationalists insist that they are 'independentists' not separatist as the latter concept implies disintegrative and negative characteristics.

⁸ This is not to deny that at previous historic periods both 'ethnic' and 'territorial' separatisms have coincided; e.g. any distant colony whose indigenous population is ethnically different from the imperial country's. Here one might not have to decide whether it is 'ethnic' or 'territorial' separatism, but accept that it contains elements of both.

⁹ The feature which distinguishes this phenomenon from other kinds of regionalism based on material demands, is that ethnoregionalism rests upon regional claims to ethnic distinctiveness such as language, religion or phenotypical markers. For elucidation see HECHTER, M. & LEVI, M. (1979) The comparative analysis of ethnoregional movements. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2 (3), p. 262.

¹⁰ DICKINSON, R.E. (1964) *City and Region*. London, Routledge.

¹¹ I append a simple diagram showing the species-genus taxonomy:



¹² For the structure of the next paragraphs I am grateful to A.D. Smith for providing me with examples. Material relating these observations to French Canada can be consulted in WADE, M. (1968) *The French Canadians, 1760-1967*. Vol. 1., Toronto, Macmillan; McRAE, K. (1967) *The French Empire in Canada*. In Tepaske, J.J. *Three American Empires*. New York, Harper & Row; JONES, R. (1972) *Community in Crisis*. Toronto, McClelland & Stewart; SMITH, A. (1970) Metaphor and Nationality in North America. *Canadian Historical Review*, 51 (3).

¹³ See JONES, R. *op. cit.* "The French Canadian of our day considers himself, consciously or unconsciously, to be part of a colonized minority. It is this particular image that is the source of his nationalism... A people without a history would have shallow roots indeed, but this is scarcely the plight of French Canadians. The question then becomes not whether there is a history, but instead how this history is understood, how it is interpreted". pp. 11-15. For an expansion on this interpretation see his chapter 'Self-image and the Nationalist' *ibid.* A good summary of the distinctive 'myths of development' between Québécois and Acadiens is provided in WADE, M. (1974) Québécois and Acadien. *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 9 (2): 47-53.

¹⁴ For an elaboration of the role and significance of language see the early theoretical chapters of WILLIAMS, C.H. (1978) *Language Decline and Nationalist Resurgence in Wales*. 2 vols, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wales.

¹⁵ Witness the claims of the Holy Roman Catholic Church to being an universal church in comparison to state and national churches of Protestantism, e.g. The Church of England, the Church in Wales, The Dutch Reformed Church, the United Church of Canada.

¹⁶ WILLIAMS, C.H. (1980a) Ethnic Separatism in Western Europe. *Tijdschrift voor Econ, en Soc. Geografie*, 71 (3): 142-158.

¹⁷ As Smith has noted it is not entirely satisfactory to distinguish between 'home rule', 'regional autonomist' and 'separatist' movements in W. Europe as they all present possible transitional phases in the development of a nationalist movement. Initially many separatist movements are curtailed by the activities of unresponsive governments and revert to more limited demands for cultural or regional devolution.

¹⁸ HECHTER, M. (1971) Towards a theory of ethnic change, *Politics and Society*, 2 (1): 21-45; *ibid.* (1973) The persistence of regionalism in the British Isles, 1885-1966, *American Journal of Sociology*, 79 (2): 319-342; *ibid.* (1975) *Internal Colonialism*. London, Routledge; *ibid.* (1977) Language loyalty in theoretical perspective, *Language Problems and Language Planning*, 1 (1): 1-9; *ibid.* (1978) Group formation and the cultural division of labour, *American Journal of Sociology*, 84 (2): 293-318; HECHTER, M. & BRUSTEIN, W. (1980) Regional modes of production and patterns of state formation in Western Europe, *American Journal of Sociology*, 85 (5): 1061-1094.

¹⁹ SMITH, A.D. (1971) *Theories of Nationalism*. London, Duckworth; *ibid.* (ed.) (1976) *Nationalist Movements*. London, Macmillan; *ibid.* (1979) *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford, M. Robertson; *ibid.* (1979) Towards a theory of ethnic separatism, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2 (1): 21-37; *ibid.* Nationalism, Ethnic Separatism and the Intelligentsia. In Williams, C.H. (ed.) *National Separatism*, in press, Cardiff, University of Wales Press.

²⁰ For more detailed criticism of theories of ethnic revival see WILLIAMS, C.H. (1979a) Ethnic Resurgence in the Periphery. *Area*, 11 (4): 279-283.

²¹ HECHTER, M. & LEVI, M. (1979) *op. cit.*: 'Alternatively when one's life chances are seen to be independent of inclusion in a particular ethnic group, the subjective significance of membership in that group will tend to recede or to disappear altogether'. p. 263.

²² HECHTER, M. *Ibid.* p. 263.

²⁴ SMITH, A.D. (1979a) *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford, M. Robertson, especially chapters 7 and 8; SMITH, A.D. (1979b) Towards a theory of ethnic separatism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2 (1): 21-37; SMITH, A.D. (1980) Nationalism, ethnic separatism and the intelligentsia. In Williams, C.H. *National Separatism*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press.

²⁵ For a discussion of core-periphery relationships and state development see WILLIAMS, C.H. (1980) Ethnic Separatism in Western Europe. *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie*, 71 (3): 142-158.

²⁶ SMITH, A.D. (1979b) p. 29.

²⁷ In part, Smith's explanation here comes close to Hechter's interpretation of the cultural division of labour.

²⁸ One immediate effect of the introduction of a technical intelligentsia is that it brings an air of 'realism' into many nationalist demands, often abandoning outright independence and settling for regional autonomy, together with a greater emphasis on economic concerns and a welfare or collectivist approach to problem solving.

²⁹ An excellent application of the Internal Colonialism thesis to Québec may be found in McROBERTS, K. (1979) Internal Colonialism: the case of Québec, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2 (3): 293-318.

³⁰ CARTWRIGHT, D.G. (1977) Institutions on the Frontier: French-Canadian Settlement in Eastern Ontario in the Nineteenth Century. *Canadian Geographer*, 21 (1): 1-21.

³¹ GUINDON, H. (1964) Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution. *Queen's Quarterly*, 71, pp. 150-62.

³² A long dominant theme in the industrialisation of Québec is that the cultural values of Francophones were less appropriate to entrepreneurship than those of the Anglophones of Québec, Canada and the United States. McRoberts has convincingly argued that the failure of the proto-bourgeoisie to develop beyond the period of New France can be accounted for by certain structural consequences of the British conquest, entirely independent of the cultural differences between French-Canadian and Anglophone settlers in post-Conquest Québec. These structural consequences were to include a shift in access to the capital, suppliers and markets which followed upon the Conquest. Also it has been argued that the British dominated business world alienated potential French operators because of its negative associations with conquest and colonisation.

⁴⁴ LANGLOIS, G. (1960) Cultural Reasons Given for the French-Canadian Lag in Economic Progress. *Culture*, 21 (2): 152-170.

³⁴ McROBERTS, K. *op. cit.* p. 305.

³⁵ Little detail need be given here, but see PINARD, M. (1975) *The Rise of a Third Party*, esp. chapter 7. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press; MILNER, H. and MILNER, S.H. (1973) *op. cit.*; GOLD, G.L. and TREMBLAY, M.A. (1973) *Communities and Culture in French Canada*. Toronto, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

³⁶ GUINDON, H. *op. cit.* p. 232; KEYFITZ, N. (1963) Canadian and Canadiens. *Queen's Quarterly*, 70: 171-174.

³⁷ McROBERTS, K. *op. cit.* p. 310: the argument in the next few paragraphs borrows from McRoberts, I do not however, wish to claim his authority for my views.

³⁸ HAMILTON, R. and PINARD, M. (in press) The Québec Independence Movement. In Williams, C.H. *National Separatism*, *op. cit.*; they report that their poll data show widespread fear about the likelihood of economic deterioration. The possibilities are viewed more favourably with respect to the self-development of the French and the condition of language and culture. Even so, some of the independentists recognise that the economic conditions may be worse with independence, though they are willing to pay these costs.

³⁹ GUINDON, H. (1978) The Modernization of Québec and the Legitimacy of the Canadian State. In Glenday, D. et al. *Modernization and the Canadian State*. Toronto, Macmillan.

⁴⁰ GUINDON, H. *op. cit.* p. 214.

⁴¹ Details of inter-provincial and federal-provincial relations may be found in MEEKISON, J.P. (1971) *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*. Toronto, Methuen.

⁴² DE WILDE, J. (1977) The Parti Québécois in Power. In Simeon, R. (ed.) *Must Canada Fail?* Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press.

⁴³ Scholars such as Albert Breton argue that this is an opportunist nationalism, a device by which the middle class can create lucrative positions for themselves, and that the ever increasing state interventionist role merely makes it more difficult by imposing extra financial burdens on the working classes of the province.

⁴⁴ STEPHENS, M. (1977) *Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe*. Llandysul, Gwasg Gomer; WILLIAMS, C.H. (1977) Non-violence and the development of the Welsh Language Society. *Welsh*

History Review, 8 (4): 426-455; WILLIAMS, C.H. (1978b) Some spatial considerations in Welsh Language Planning. *Cambria* 5, (2): 173-181; WILLIAMS, C.H. (1979b) An Ecological and Behavioural Approach to Ethno-linguistic Change in Wales. In H. Giles, H. and Saint-Jacques, B. *Language and Ethnic Relations*. Oxford, Pergamon.

⁴⁵ For the details of the proposed Sovereignty-Association see *D'Égal à Égal, Manifeste et propositions concernant la souveraineté-association*, Parti Québécois, Mars 1979; *Official Programme of the Parti Québécois*, (1978 ed.); and for two critical viewpoints see the Canadian Government Reports, *Sovereignty-Association—the contradictions*, Ottawa, 1978, and *Trade realities in Canada and the issue of 'sovereignty-association'*, Ottawa, 1979.

⁴⁶ KNOPFF, R. (1979) Democracy vs Liberal Democracy: The Nationalist Conundrum. *The Dalhousie Review*, 58 (4), p. 639.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 639.

⁴⁸ Quoted in BEHIELS, M.D. (1978) Camille Laurin and the Dilemma of Québécois Secessionist Nationalism. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*.: 41-44.

⁴⁹ KNOPFF, R. *op. cit.*, p. 641.

⁵⁰ WILLIAMS, C.H. (1974) *Manifestations of Third World Separatism: The Case of Nigeria/Biafra*. Paper presented at the Canadian Association of African Studies Conference, Dalhousie University, Halifax; WILLIAMS, C.H. (1976) Cultural Nationalism in Wales. *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*. 4 (1): 15-37.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge the cartographic assistance of Mrs. J. Perks, Cartographer in the Department of Geography, North Staffordshire Polytechnic.