Abstracts
Résumé
Dans cette recension, je proposerai un résumé ainsi que des commentaires critiques, chapitre par chapitre, du livre de Samuel Lepine La nature des émotions : Une introduction partisane (2023). Je ferai un rapide compte-rendu des premiers chapitres, mais discuterai plus en détail les trois derniers, où se situent les contributions les plus inédites et, à mes yeux, les plus intéressantes.
Abstract
In this review, I will offer a summary as well as critical comments, chapter by chapter, of Samuel Lepine's book La nature des émotions: Une introduction partisane [The nature of emotions: An opiniated introduction] (2023). I will briefly summarize the first few chapters and discuss in more detail the last three chapters, where the most novel and most interesting contributions of the author are to be found.
Appendices
Bibliographie
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