

Les ateliers de l'éthique The Ethics Forum

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À propos de *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* de William Galston, un dialogue avec l'auteur, septembre, 2005

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Article abstract

The publication of *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* has appeared as an event of first importance regarding contemporary theory about the relation between pluralism and liberalism. William Galston's theory has had a visible evolution: in *Liberal Purposes*, the main object is a critique of neutralism and a defence of perfectionist liberalism, whereas *Liberal Pluralism* main concern was to draw the limits of state intervention. This evolution is the object of numerous questions in the following discussion. *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* operates an interesting synthesis on this point. Galston defines himself as a liberal pluralist such as Berlin, but although he acknowledges that conflict between values can be tragic, he minimizes this aspect in the following discussions, and considers the possibility of having *prima facie* duties (cf. the discussion on his rejection of moral particularism). One of the main arguments for the defence of value pluralism is its capacity to explain the complexity of the moral universe (cf. the discussion on pluralism and regret). Galston endorses a political pluralism, which means that the sources of authority are multiple. Galston's liberalism is very tolerant regarding non-liberal communitarian practices, although this tolerance is based on the defence of an exit right, which is a fundamental notion in his theory. In the following discussion Galston proposes how to understand this right of exit in an adequate manner (cf. the questions regarding expressive liberty, exit rights and autonomy).

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À PROPOS DE *THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM*
DE WILLIAM GALSTON, UN DIALOGUE AVEC
L'AUTEUR, SEPTEMBRE 2005.

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TRAVAIL/WORKING PAPERS

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RÉSUMÉ :

La publication de *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* est apparue comme un événement de première importance dans la réflexion contemporaine sur l'apport du pluralisme au libéralisme. La pensée de William Galston a connu une évolution : dans *Liberal Purposes*, l'accent est mis sur la critique du neutralisme et la position d'un libéralisme perfectionniste, tandis que *Liberal Pluralism* s'intéresse au contraire aux limites de l'intervention étatique. Cette évolution fait l'objet de nombreuses questions dans la discussion qui suit. *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* opère une synthèse intéressante sur ce point. Galston se définit comme un libéral pluraliste dans la lignée de Berlin. Bien qu'il insiste sur le conflit tragique des valeurs, il minimise cet aspect dans les discussions qui suivent, et pose la possibilité consécutive d'avoir des devoirs *prima facie* (cf. la discussion sur sa négation du particularisme moral). Un des arguments centraux pour justifier le pluralisme des valeurs est qu'il rend le mieux compte de la complexité de notre univers moral (cf. la discussion sur le pluralisme et le sentiment de regret). Galston endosse également un pluralisme politique, lequel signifie que les sources d'autorité sont multiples. Le libéralisme de Galston est très tolérant à l'égard des pratiques communautaires non libérales. Cette tolérance est cependant assortie de la défense du « droit de sortie », notion qui apparaît donc comme fondamentale. Dans les discussions qui suivent, Galston propose la manière adéquate de comprendre l'exercice de ce droit de sortie (cf. les discussions sur les rapports entre liberté expressive, droit de sortie et autonomie).

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ABSTRACT:

The publication of *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* has appeared as an event of first importance regarding contemporary theory about the relation between pluralism and liberalism. William Galston's theory has had a visible evolution: in *Liberal Purposes*, the main object is a critique of neutralism and a defence of perfectionist liberalism, whereas *Liberal Pluralism* main concern was to draw the limits of state intervention. This evolution is the object of numerous questions in the following discussion. *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* operates an interesting synthesis on this point. Galston defines himself as a liberal pluralist such as Berlin, but although he acknowledges that conflict between values can be tragic, he minimizes this aspect in the following discussions, and considers the possibility of having *prima facie* duties (cf. the discussion on his rejection of moral particularism). One of the main arguments for the defence of value pluralism is its capacity to explain the complexity of the moral universe (cf. the discussion on pluralism and regret). Galston endorses a political pluralism, which means that the sources of authority are multiple. Galston's liberalism is very tolerant regarding non-liberal communitarian practices, although this tolerance is based on the defence of an exit right, which is a fundamental notion in his theory. In the following discussion Galston proposes how to understand this right of exit in an adequate manner (cf. the questions regarding expressive liberty, exit rights and autonomy).

I. PRÉSENTATION DU PLURALISME LIBÉRAL DE WILLIAM GALSTON, PAR GENEVIÈVE ROUSSELIÈRE

La publication de *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism*¹ est apparue comme un événement important dans la réflexion contemporaine sur l'apport du pluralisme au libéralisme. L'auteur, William Galston, a pour caractéristique d'être à la fois un philosophe, auteur d'ouvrages théoriques de premier plan², et un homme de terrain qui a participé en première ligne à la vie politique américaine, notamment comme conseiller du président Clinton pour la politique intérieure, mais aussi en s'impliquant dans nombre de campagnes (école publique et planning familial notamment). Ce double profil se retrouve dans son œuvre, où son argumentation mélange des niveaux d'empiricité et d'abstraction divers, et allie l'exigence théorique à la nécessité de trancher dans la pratique.

Il apparaît clairement que la pensée de Galston a connu une évolution : dans *Liberal Purposes*, l'accent est mis sur la critique du neutralisme et la position d'un libéralisme perfectionniste, tandis que *Liberal Pluralism* s'intéresse, au contraire, aux limites de l'intervention étatique. Les premiers lecteurs, qui ont pu penser que Galston était un perfectionniste, se retrouvent donc obligés de revoir leurs premières impressions en suivant les positions ultérieures de Galston, qui affirment avec vigueur les limites de l'intervention de l'État et octroient une marge de manœuvre très grande aux différentes communautés ethniques ou religieuses. Ce point fait d'ailleurs l'objet de nombreuses questions dans la discussion qui va suivre. *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* opère une synthèse intéressante sur ce point.

Le propos de cette introduction est seulement de présenter sans trop de déformation les lignes les plus importantes de la pensée de Galston telles qu'elles se dessinent dans *PLP* afin de donner un cadre aux discussions qui vont suivre. À cet effet, je vais reprendre brièvement les trois concepts majeurs qui structurent selon lui le pluralisme libéral : (1) le pluralisme des valeurs; (2) le pluralisme politique; (3) la notion de liberté expressive.

Le pluralisme des valeurs

Galston se définit comme un libéral pluraliste dans la lignée de Berlin : les valeurs diffèrent qualitativement et ne peuvent pas être ordonnées. Il pose toutefois l'existence d'une distinction objective entre bien et mal, et, bien que dans *PLP* il insiste sur le conflit tragique des valeurs, il minimise cet aspect dans les discussions qui suivent, et pose la possibilité consécutive d'avoir des devoirs *prima facie*.³ Un des arguments centraux pour justifier le pluralisme des valeurs est qu'il rend le mieux compte de la complexité de notre univers moral⁴. Si Galston assure que l'absence de hiérarchisation simple des valeurs n'implique ni un relativisme ni un particularisme moral, son travail ne propose cependant pas d'explication détaillée sur la conciliation de cette thèse⁵ avec celle de l'objectivité de la distinction entre bien et mal.

Son point d'intérêt porte, en effet, moins sur les questions d'épistémologie morale que sur le lien à penser entre théorie morale et politique. (« There is one assertion on which I remain steadfast – the propriety of rejoining value theory and political theory »⁶). Pourtant, la théorie morale sur laquelle s'appuie le pluralisme libéral a vocation à être vraie. De ce point de vue, il y a une démarcation nette avec la stratégie rawlsienne de *Political Liberalism* qui laisse en suspens la nature de la théorie morale.

Le pluralisme des valeurs galstonien ne prend sens que relié à la conviction théorique de l'existence d'une fondation éthique propre au libéralisme, et de la nécessité pratique de promouvoir les valeurs libérales pour que l'unité civique soit possible. Dans ses ouvrages antérieurs à *PLP*, il emploie donc un vocabulaire « perfectionniste » fort :

« Civic virtues are not innate. Liberal pluralism requires a parsimonious but vigorous system of education that teaches tolerance [...] and help equip individuals with the virtues and competences they will need to perform as members of a liberal pluralist economy, society and polity. »⁷

Ce « perfectionnisme » est pourtant très limité en raison de la force de la distinction entre privé et public, qui le place très loin d'un perfection-

nisme plus robuste, comme peut l'être par exemple celui de Michael Sandel. Il faut plutôt le comprendre comme un positionnement contre le courant libéral neutraliste anti-perfectionniste⁸. Contrairement à Rawls, Galston estime que le politique n'est pas un domaine indépendant dans lequel nous pouvons (ni devrions) nous abstraire de nos valeurs : c'est pourquoi il pense sa théorie comme englobante (« comprehensive ») au sens rawlsien.

Le pluralisme politique

Le pluralisme politique est à distinguer du pluralisme des valeurs. Il signifie que les sources d'autorité sont multiples et que l'État n'a pas une position surplombante qui lui permettrait d'avoir le dernier mot sur la société civile. Pratiquement, cela signifie que l'État a une marge de manœuvre limitée par rapport aux différentes associations :

« I begin with the intuition that free association yields important human goods and that the state bears a burden of proof whenever it seeks to intervene. »⁹

Galston est donc un défenseur de la liberté des individus et des groupes qui ne veulent pas être soumis à tel ou tel aspect des politiques publiques. Cela implique que dans le débat autour de la notion rawlsienne de « raison publique », Galston estime qu'il est insensé d'exclure du domaine public les arguments de type religieux, notamment dans le cas précis des « defensive claims » :

« It is difficult to imagine that any liberal democracy can sustain conscientious support if it tells millions of its citizens that they cannot rightly say what they believe as part of democratic public dialogue. I want to suggest that an inclusive understanding of public reason is especially appropriate in the context of what I have called defensive public claims. »¹⁰

Le libéralisme de Galston est donc très tolérant à l'égard des pratiques communautaires, y compris dans leurs aspects les moins libéraux¹¹. Il se place, par exemple, du côté des parents fondamentalistes qui s'étaient opposés au contenu des manuels scolaires pour des motifs religieux, dans le cas *Mozert v. Hawkins county Bd of Ed.* (484 US 1066 [1988]).

Cette tolérance très grande (voire cette défense) des pratiques communautaires est cependant assortie de la défense du « droit de sortie ». Cette notion d'*exit right* apparaît donc comme fondamentale, car sa force doit être relative à l'ampleur des libertés laissées aux communautés dans leurs pratiques. Dans les discussions qui suivent, Galston propose la manière adéquate de poser les conditions de possibilité pour l'exercice de ce droit de sortie¹².

La liberté expressive (expressive liberty)

Le concept de « liberté expressive » fait la jonction entre les éléments théoriques précédents. Il est défini comme la capacité des individus à vivre leur vie comme ils l'entendent, à partir de ce qui leur paraît doté de sens, dans la limite des variations autorisées par le pluralisme libéral :

« By expressive liberty I mean the absence of constraints imposed by some individuals or groups on others that make it impossible or significantly more difficult for the affected individuals or groups to live their lives in ways that express their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning and value to life. Expressive liberty offers us the opportunity to enjoy a fit between inner and outer, conviction and deed. »¹³

D'un côté, la liberté expressive, contrairement à l'autonomie, n'implique rien sur la source de la croyance (puisque'elle n'est pas un rapport entre une croyance et sa source, mais entre une croyance et sa réalisation) : elle soutient donc un pluralisme plus large (pas d'exclusion des traditionalistes « non-autonomes »). D'un autre côté, elle se distingue de la liberté négative puisqu'il ne s'agit pas seulement de ne pas être empêché de mettre en œuvre sa conception du bien, mais de pouvoir effectivement la réaliser.

On voit donc ici comment ce concept est une clé de voûte chez Galston qui cherche à justifier une restriction forte de l'étendue de l'action de l'État, tout en voulant légitimer la nécessité pour l'État d'établir les conditions de possibilité de cette réalisation positive et pluraliste des valeurs.

II. DISCUSSION

CONFLITS DE VALEURS, REGRET, PERFECTIONNISME

ROBERTO MERRILL

1. *Conflits de valeurs : Berlin et Ross*

Vous écrivez, dans l'introduction de votre livre (2004 : 7), que le pluralisme des valeurs, tel que vous le comprenez, vous engage à endosser le « généralisme rossien », bien que le pluralisme de Isaiah Berlin reste une influence centrale dans votre défense du pluralisme. Or, à première vue, il existe des différences entre les théories pluralistes de Berlin et de Ross, qui me laissent dubitatif quant à la possibilité de pouvoir se revendiquer des deux à la fois. À titre d'exemple, une différence importante concerne la nature du conflit entre les valeurs, conflit qui peut être parfois tragique selon Berlin, mais pas selon Ross. Comme on le sait, selon Berlin, certains conflits de valeurs peuvent être tragiques lorsque les valeurs en conflit sont également ultimes et incommensurables. Si par exemple, la liberté et l'égalité sont deux valeurs de ce type, alors chaque fois qu'une décision accorde une priorité à l'une sur l'autre, nous avons la certitude, du point de vue pluraliste berlinien, qu'un tort a été commis (« a grave wrong » selon Berlin) entraînant des pertes irréparables (« irreparable loss »). Il peut exister de bonnes raisons de donner une priorité à une valeur sur l'autre, mais celles-ci ne sont pas suffisantes pour enlever la certitude qu'un tort a été commis, puisque la valeur qui a été exclue est aussi fondamentalement ultime que celle retenue. C'est cette certitude de l'inévitabilité du tort qui donne un caractère tragique à certains conflits de valeurs, selon Berlin. Or, selon Ross, au contraire, les conflits entre valeurs n'ont vraisemblablement jamais ce caractère tragique. Car lorsqu'il y a conflit entre ce qu'il appelle des « devoirs *prima facie* » ou *pro tanto*, nous avons toujours la possibilité de décider lequel de ces devoirs *prima facie* doit générer ce qu'il appelle notre « devoir actuel » ou « absolu ». Certes, décider lequel de nos devoirs est notre devoir actuel n'implique pas que le conflit entre devoirs *prima facie* est illusoire chez Ross, comme certains critiques l'ont avancé. Bien que ce conflit soit

réel, il n'est pourtant pas tragique, puisque nous avons la possibilité, selon Ross, de décider de notre devoir « absolu », ce qui sans doute nous libère du dilemme tragique pluraliste de Berlin. J'aimerais donc vous demander de préciser en quel sens votre théorie pluraliste peut se revendiquer de ces deux théories à la fois, car du moins sur ce point elles semblent opposées.

2. *Conflits de valeurs et regret*

Sur le conflit de valeurs encore, vous rejetez le monisme de Dworkin car, entre autres raisons, vous ne voyez pas de quelle manière celui-ci peut être compatible avec le regret rationnel (2004 : 18). Mais je ne comprends pas en quel sens un moniste serait à tous coups irrationnel d'éprouver du regret. Par exemple, j'endosse une théorie moniste en posant le bonheur comme la valeur dominante. Et supposons que, lors d'une humeur exceptionnelle, j'ai le choix entre donner 20 minutes de bonheur à une personne ou bien 10 minutes de bonheur à une autre. Pour faire un plus grand bien qu'un moindre bien, je décide de donner 20 minutes de bonheur à l'une et donc rien à l'autre. Je suis donc convaincu d'avoir pris la bonne décision, mais je regrette de ne pas avoir pu donner 10 minutes de bonheur à l'autre. En quoi ce regret n'est pas rationnel? Excusez-moi si l'objection perd de vue votre point, mais au moins j'espère que vous pourrez le développer. Par ailleurs, vous dites que le besoin de la part du moniste d'effacer le phénomène du regret, plutôt que de le sauver, renforce la théorie pluraliste (2004 : 18-19). En admettant que le monisme ne puisse pas rendre compte du regret rationnel, un moniste comme Dworkin pourrait vous objecter que supposer des conflits entre valeurs là où en réalité il n'y en pas, et donc supposer des raisons de regret là où il n'y en a pas, renforce à son tour la théorie moniste. C'est d'ailleurs ce qu'il fait, comme vous semblez l'admettre, en montrant que le conflit entre liberté et égalité selon Berlin proviendrait en réalité d'une définition erronée de la liberté par celui-ci.

3. *Perfectionnisme et paternalisme*

Vous écrivez qu'endosser le pluralisme libéral implique le rejet du paternalisme ainsi que celui du perfectionnisme politique (2004 : 154-5). S'il

est vrai que l'objection de paternalisme peut être rejetée par la théorie pluraliste, en revanche, je ne vois pas clairement pour quelles raisons celle-ci impliquerait le rejet du perfectionnisme politique. Il est certain que le sens du perfectionnisme politique varie beaucoup dans la littérature. Mais si l'on prend une définition assez large de celui-ci, comme par exemple celle proposée par Stephen Wall : « Perfectionism is committed to the thesis that political authorities should take an active role in creating and maintaining social conditions that best enable their subjects to lead valuable and worthwhile lives » (*Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint*, OUP, 1998 : 8), alors il me semble que le pluralisme libéral peut être considéré comme une forme de perfectionnisme politique. Pourriez-vous préciser les raisons qui vous poussent à le rejeter?

William Galston:

1. I am not committed to every detail of Berlin's interpretation of value pluralism. Specifically, I do not believe that every conflict of goods or principles is "tragic": some are, some aren't. This helps close the gap between Berlin and Ross. Nor did I intend to endorse every detail of Ross's position. In the passage to which you referred, I stated as clearly as I knew how (I am not a professional moral philosopher) that I was deploying Ross as an ally against the full-blown theory of moral particularism - the metaethical position that the moral valence of every good and principle varies with context. I reject that view: some things are good simpliciter, whether or not they are dispositive reasons for action in specific contexts.

2. With regard to regret, please look at my response on this point to Speranta below (I answered the various queries in reverse order of receiving them) and then identify which parts of your question I have left undressed.

3. Your third question is the easiest. As I use the term (and I don't think my usage is idiosyncratic) perfectionist theories are those that affirmatively specify, in some detail, the content of what Wall calls "valuable and

worthwhile lives". To say, as my value pluralism does, that human beings experience life without liberty, security, and decent material provision as less than fully valuable and worthwhile, is NOT to offer an affirmative theory of the lives that are "truly" worthwhile. If perfectionism is reduced to what H. L. A. Hart called the "minimum conditions of natural law", then it ceases to be a term of distinction, because virtually every moral and political philosopher will in some manner embrace the content of those conditions. In a phrase: decency is one thing, perfection another. Liberal pluralists believe, of course, that the institutions and practices that characterize the liberal-pluralist polity are the most conducive to individuals be able to lead lives consistent with their own individual conceptions of what gives meaning to life. But that, it seems to me, is consistent with rejecting perfectionism, as I understand it.

POLITICAL PLURALISM AND IMMIGRATION GENEVIÈVE ROUSSELIÈRE

1. On political pluralism

In PLP, you advocate for the largest possible independency of families, civil associations or faith-communities from state intervention. This includes practices that are disapproved of within the public sphere:

"In filling positions of religious authority, faith communities may use, without state interference, gender-based norms that would be forbidden in businesses and public accommodations. "

It is no great mystery that these religious gender-based norms are historically based on a severe discrimination toward women, which is present in dogma (however open-minded practitioners may be in practice). It seems that this discrimination should qualify as what you call an "objective evil". However, your point is not only that these communities should be tolerated but rather that they are, and should be, an independent source of legitimate authority. You said in an interview that "faith communities are a very important part of the process of cultural change, and cultural change is an important part of social change". You ask for a

redefinition of the relationship between political and non-political associations: it should not be vertical but horizontal – which is for you true political pluralism.

My point is the following: if certain private associations (religious or not) rely on gender-inequality (such as saying that only men can be prophets, or popes, etc - i.e. that men can hear and transmit the voice of God, but not women), why would the state do anything more than just tolerate them? Why grant them an independent authority?

2. On the relation between reason and faith

Do you think that rational and non-rational sources of authority should not be rank-ordered and should share the public space at the same level? Do you deny that there should be a priority of reason over faith and that it would be legitimate for the state to have a vertical control of religions?

3. On the limits of state intervention

You accuse Okin of “civic totalitarianism”, and it is true that the limits of state intervention are not always clear in her work. But don’t you think that the public/domestic dichotomy should not be taken for granted and should be challenged if only because domesticity and the private sphere are the very place of the reproduction of gender inequalities?

4. On the duty of welcoming dissenting immigrants

You write, in the conclusion of your book, that “exit rights” should not be available only on a domestic level, but also on an international level:

“It implies a corresponding duty, binding on the international community as a whole, to ensure that these dissenting emigrants have someplace to go.”

If anyone should be able to have a right to dissent and thus to exit the society in which he didn’t choose to be born, the international consequences are huge and would end up in the opening of all frontiers to free human circulation. This would change the policies of all countries that

deem nowadays that they have a duty to welcome people under immediate threat (refugees) but not those who merely “dissent”. Could you flesh out your view on the subject? How would you rank this right with other priorities (such as economic viability, national allegiance, etc.)?

William Galston:

1. With regard to faith communities, my point is not that their inner principles will always be as good as (let alone better than) those of the political community, but rather that within their sphere they enjoy an independent authority that cannot rightly be taken away from them through the exercise of political power. To acknowledge their authority is not necessarily to approve the way they exercise it. Citizens and political leaders outside these communities need not celebrate the inner principles structuring these communities; indeed they are free to challenge these principles. So “toleration” (not celebration) will often be the most that the political community can offer.

2. I do deny that reason should always take priority over faith, and so do most believers. An individual’s understanding of his/her duty to God may very well contradict the state’s understanding of civic obligations (for example, Quakers refuse to submit to the military draft), and I believe that state power must take this into account. That is why I defend the possibility of what we call in the U.S. “conscientious objection”.

3. While I agree that no definition of the public/private distinction should be embraced dogmatically, I insist that sound politics must embody some understanding of that principle. The alternative is the plenipotentiary state without limits, along the lines of Plato’s Republic. The impulse to reconstruct every sphere of human life in light of a singular understanding of justice or equality is in my view tyrannical. That is the core of my objection to civic totalitarianism, whether Okin’s brand of it or anyone else’s.

4. Concerning immigrants and exit rights: you are correct; this would imply a substantial change in the way we do business internationally. But note that I speak of a collective obligation; no single nation is required to

do more than its fair share. As a practical matter, I do not believe that this would be likely to overwhelm the other priorities you list. But if it did, I am committed (as a pluralist) to take these competing values into account, for example, in specifying a conception of a nation's "fair share".

REGRET AND MINIMAL DECENCY SPERANTA DUMITRU

1. You argue that: "If regret is a rational moral emotion, it is because the clash of plural values evokes it. Conversely, if monism is correct, regret is unreasonable" (2004:18). I have the same feeling as Roberto that regret is neither conceptually nor empirically related to value pluralism. But my question is different. You may be right that rational regret is a marker of pluralism. Even examples like Roberto's could be restated as illustrating value conflict. If there is regret in this example, one might say, it is because the dilemma is not only between 10 min. v. 20 min. pleasure, but also between "maximum time of pleasure" and "concern for individual pleasure". However, even if regret were the marker of pluralism, why would we take this as a plea for pluralism? One can imagine the exactly opposite argument. Since minimizing regret is generally thought to be a rational constraint, monism will be the preferred account rather than pluralism. More generally, the question is why would a moral theory be constrained to take regret into account?

A part of the answer is suggested in your book: if a theory doesn't succeed in taking into account our moral experience, so much the worse for the theory. But what is at first sight a merit of value pluralism can turn into its disadvantage. One might argue that the consequence of value pluralism is to leave us with an inappropriate description of our moral experience, as being perpetually subject to regretful decisions, a moral world in which donations to children become merely regrettable failures to invest in retirement funds, and vice versa. Moreover, one might multiply the descriptions of an action according to the number of incommensurable values: donations to children are not just failures to invest but also failures to help disabled people, to enjoy art, to build hospitals, to fly on Mars, and so on. The more we have incomparable values, the greater will

be our regret. However, one can doubt that regret in this case is a rational moral emotion, even if health, science and arts are all thought to be genuine and incommensurable values. Thus, my second question is: in what degree is a moral theory constrained to take regret into account? I wonder if the notion of rational regret is not dependent on, rather than prior to, a given theory.

2. You argue that pluralists are committed to a standard of minimum decency. But how do they this, theoretically speaking? The defence of a decent minimum is surely not a way to create "comprehensive" or "full" orderings among goods (p. 11), but it is nevertheless a way to assert some values as prior ("some goods are basic", p. 12). One may wonder why values could be ordered and measured in order to define what are "great evils", but in every other case, this becomes inappropriate.

A related question concerns Rawls' two principles: you say that a pluralist cannot embrace them (p. 117). In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls changed the status of the difference principle, by arguing that it is not a constitutional essential. Instead, he maintained that a social minimum is prior to the principle of equal liberty. Are these changes, in your view, more compatible with a pluralist position? Moreover, if one remembers how many problems were raised by the Rawls' list of primary goods, it is difficult to see how the bundle of basic goods can be composed if we are to respect an additional constraint of pluralism.

William Galston:

1. I am not advocating regret as an emotion, but merely pointing out that one's metaethical position influences our stance toward it. From a utilitarian stance, where the good to be promoted is understood monistically and (as Rawls rightly says) the separateness of persons is set aside, regret is indeed unreasonable. The course of action that maximizes the good trumps all other alternatives, which are clearly inferior from a rational point of view. At the other extreme is "Sophie's choice": if a mother is compelled to sacrifice one child to save the other, how can deep regret be avoided, and should it be? Even though the mother has done her best, can-

not be reproached, and should not reproach herself, wouldn't it be a sign of moral indifference not to feel regret for the good against which she was compelled to act? My position is that it is right to feel regret in some (not all) circumstances in which we are forced to choose among competing values, and that pluralism gives a more plausible account of why this sentiment is reasonable than does monism.

2. Concerning a standard of minimum decency: I am trying to give a theoretical account of moral experience, both in individual and collective circumstances. The minimum decency/basic goods thesis captures an important component of that experience: there are certain goods that no human being would willingly do without, and political authority behaves wrongly when it disregards or contradicts this fact, which is, I am convinced, at the heart of international human rights standards. That this imposes a constraint on full pluralism cannot be denied, nor do I wish to. So pluralism operates with fewer constraints above the floor of basic decency than below it. This thesis may generate difficulties, but they are not the same as Rawls's list of primary goods, which he presented as universal means rather than (as I would have it) conditions that are ends, and good in themselves without regard to their use.

I am all in favor of maximizing the "practical guidance" (your phrase) that a moral or political theory can offer. But the clear guidance that a mistaken theory provides is likely to be misguided in practice. There is room for deliberation and choice in politics precisely because there are limits as to the guidance that moral and political theory can furnish to citizens and officials.

SOPHIE'S REGRET: IS THERE ANY CASE FOR MONISM?

SPERANTA DUMITRU

I fully agree with you that in many cases "pluralism gives a more plausible account of why this sentiment is reasonable than does monism", but I doubt that "if monism is correct, regret is unreasonable". Sophie's choice seems to be a good counter-example. Her tragic choice is whether to let one of her children die or both of them, and we can imagine she has no

other value than the care for her children. Does it follow from her monism that regret is unreasonable?

But perhaps she is not a monist, and "save children" is a too coarse-grained description for her values. May be she has two conflicting values (or imperatives), such as "no trade-off with regard to the life of your children" and "never let die your children". Or "save at least one child" versus "never let die a child". The problem of how values are to be de-composed is not a trivial one for moral or political philosopher (think of how a single liberty can be decomposed and dilemmas about what is to be protected). My question is whether in your opinion value pluralism is (also) about this kind of value fragmentation. We might argue in this case that there is no such defensible position as "value monism".

To resume, it seems that either monism is compatible with regret, or there is no such position as monism. In the first case pluralism loses a bit of its advantage, while in the second it loses its opponent... well, at least in theory.

William Galston:

Your question is fascinating, because it suggests that how one conceives of the specification of values may have deep implications. I would be tempted to say that Sophie's highest value is "preserve the life and well-being of my children." She understands that proposition as a unity not capable of division or quantification. Therefore, saving one child does not bring her halfway to realizing that good. For her, losing one child is the emotional and moral equivalent of losing both.

I would also distinguish between sorrow and regret. One feels sorrow when something bad happens without one's personal agency being involved - for example, when a heart attack suddenly and unexpectedly kills a parent. Whether or not the people of New Orleans should feel sorrow or regret depends on whether they had a realistic chance of acting other than how they did. Some did; some such as the elderly, sick, and disabled probably did not. The officials who failed to help them should feel regret, even if that failure was in the name of what they believe is a greater public good.

PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, PLURALISMS, NATURAL LAW, KEKES, FAITH VERSUS REASON BERNARD REBER

1. Regarding the lack of practical guidance of monistic moral theories, could you be more explicit about this lack of guidance when it comes to choice in politics?
2. You recognize two kinds of pluralism: moral and political. What would be their combination?
3. You seem to endorse Hart's claim. What does "natural law" mean in terms of values if you want to reintroduce this problematic notion in your perspective? Do you make any difference between "natural law" and decency?
4. Would you consider that a conservative pluralist theory, like the one defended by John Kekes in his book *Moral Pluralism* (1993), would be less hospitable to moral pluralism?
5. Your denial that reason should always take priority over faith is one of the basis of your defence of conscientious objection. But I have doubts with the possibility of a general justification of this religious opposition, since there seems to be a variety of positions regarding submission to authorities. I have in mind here for example the case of Epistel of Paul to the Romans (Rm 13, 1-7, and the question of recognition and submission to the authorities which have the power; also the varieties of the positions in the Christian theology and history: opposition to the Romans; cesaropapism; calvinian; gallicanism).

William Galston:

1. Concerning choice: my point is that if a theory tells us precisely what to do, then our only "choice" is to do what's right, or not. That is not what most people have in mind when they speak of deliberation and choice in

politics. We must make political choices precisely because in most situations there is a range of reasonable disagreement about what to do, with no alternative clearly dominating the rest.

2. Concerning pluralism: in both of my recent books, *Liberal Pluralism* and *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism*, I distinguish between value pluralism and political pluralism, each of which is an (independent) part of the foundation of my theory.
3. Concerning Hart and natural law: my point was not to reintroduce natural law into my theoretical structure, but rather that if one looks at the content of what Hart means, it closely resembles what I mean by the "great evils" of the human condition that decent politics will strive to minimize.
4. Concerning Kekes: while he is a political conservative, he appears to me to be a kind of philosophical liberal. Given his view of human nature and of moral pluralism, he is not and cannot be in favor of a state that promotes a single conception of the good and denies a wide range of individual liberty. There is not much in the concluding chapter of his book *The Morality of Pluralism* with which I disagree. But note that after he describes his own political theory on p. 214, he says that "this may seem suspiciously like the political program of liberalism". Indeed it does!

5. Concerning faith and reason: Yes, there is a big difference between Christianity and Judaism, but despite its lack of central authority and established dogma, Judaism posits a core of evil deeds that one is forbidden to commit, regardless of what the government may order you to do. I would be surprised if the matter were different in Islam. So I do not see in principle why my defence of conscientious objection is mistaken. To prevent its abuse, of course, legal systems must create rules to distinguish between genuine and spurious objections based on conscience. This is not an easy matter, but imperfect rules are better than the total rejection of this possibility.

LIBERTÉ EXPRESSIVE ET AUTONOMIE

ROBERTO MERRILL

1. Sur Berlin et Ross, mon intention n'était pas exégétique, mais simplement de mettre en relief un point qui rend leurs théories difficilement compatibles à première vue : parfois, les conflits de valeurs peuvent être tragiques selon Berlin, mais jamais pour Ross. Je trouve en réalité le rapprochement entre Berlin et Ross, et de manière générale la résurgence actuelle de l'intuitionnisme moral, comme un moyen de clarifier et éventuellement de fortifier la théorie pluraliste, et j'étais donc curieux d'en savoir un peu plus sur vos idées sur Berlin et Ross. Mais je comprends bien en effet que vous citez le généralisme rossien comme moyen de faire barrage au particularisme moral, et n'ai pas d'objection à cela.

2. Sur le perfectionnisme politique, dans *Liberal Purposes*, vous endossez un perfectionnisme que vous considérez fin, comme alternative au libéralisme neutraliste, en spécifiant quelles sont selon vous les conceptions du bien qui ne peuvent servir de fondement à des politiques gouvernementales :

« The liberal account of the good, to begin with, is deliberately thin. It constitutes, intentionally, a kind of minimal perfectionism that both defines a minimal, decent human functioning and fall short of defining a full way of life. [...] The liberal theory of the plural good is thick enough to rule out (1) secular nihilism – the belief that human life and purposiveness are without moral significance; (2) theological withdrawalism – the belief that what happens here on earth doesn't matter because the real action is in the afterlife; (3) moral monism – “one size fits all” accounts of the good; (4) Nietzschean irrationalism; (5) barbarism – deliberate or heedless deprivations of minimal goods. » (1991: 177)

Il me semble que pour la plupart des libéraux, du moins ceux qui défendent un libéralisme neutre, cette liste de conceptions du bien exclues de la justification doit sembler arbitrairement sélective, et que le pluralisme moral, par exemple, devrait être exclu comme base de l'action publique exactement pour les mêmes raisons que le monisme moral. C'est parce que vous fondez le libéralisme sur une conception du bien, la théorie pluraliste, et non pas l'abstinence éthique, qu'il ne me semble pas faux

de considérer votre théorie perfectionniste. Il est certain que ce perfectionnisme est selon vous si fin, en permettant de spécifier seulement des biens de base, qu'il peut sembler trivial d'insister sur ce point, puisqu'en réalité à ce niveau il ne se distinguerait pas de théories libérales anti-perfectionnistes, lesquelles spécifient des biens de base. Dans ce cas, on aurait l'avantage d'une justification perfectionniste qui éviterait les difficultés de justification de l'abstinence neutraliste, de même qu'elle éviterait celles d'un perfectionnisme paternaliste.

Je reste cependant dubitatif quant à la capacité de votre théorie à ne pas dépasser la ligne de la « decency ». Car en se fondant sur le pluralisme, votre théorie libérale accorde à la liberté expressive une valeur prioritaire. Certes celle-ci est assez large pour que l'État protège des modes de vies que beaucoup d'individus peuvent considérer comme non libres. C'est pourquoi vous attachez une grande importance à ce que l'État protège le « droit de sortie » des individus de ces groupes où la liberté peut être pénalisée. Ma question est : pour que ces droits de sortie ne soient pas seulement formels, i.e. pour que les individus aient la possibilité effective de sortir de leur groupe, ne doivent-ils pas être autonomes? Mais pour qu'ils soient autonomes, l'État ne doit-il pas créer les conditions de leur autonomie, comme l'éducation civique dans les écoles, que par ailleurs vous préconisez? En somme, il semblerait que le respect de la liberté expressive impliquerait une éducation à l'autonomie, et si c'est bien le cas, alors le perfectionnisme politique pluraliste, que vous préconisez, ne se limiterait pas à la protection des biens de base nécessaires à une vie décente, mais impliquerait également la protection de vertus perfectionnistes substantielles, comme l'autonomie, qui seraient à la base du respect de la liberté expressive de chacun.

William Galston:

Concerning “perfectionism”: I think we are both coming to realize that this question is more terminological than substantive. I freely admit (indeed, I insist) that liberal pluralism is (in Rawls's terms) a “comprehensive” rather than a “political” theory, in that it is grounded in an account of the structure of morality that claims to be true. But “perfectionism” as

I have always understood is a particular kind of comprehensive theory: it involves the proposition that a particular way of life is preferable to others and that it is the business of government to promote it. To have a conception of the great evils to be avoided (some version of Hobbes's *summum malum*) is not to have an affirmative conception of the human good. It would be odd, I think, to describe Hobbes as a perfectionist; *mutatis mutandis*, equally odd to describe me as one.

Your objection concerning exit rights is echoed by many others. I will give you the same response I have given them. Autonomy is more than negative liberty. As contemporary political theorists use the term, it implies highly developed capacities for rational reflection, for self-criticism, and criticism of the norms and practices of one's community. Exit rights as understood are far less demanding. To be sure, they involve more than pure negative liberty. There are certain forms of communal isolation that amount to brainwashing, and there are certain practical arrangements (fully communal property that reverts to the community upon departure, for example) that in effect nullify exit rights. The liberal pluralist state, I argue, has an affirmative obligation to prevent these communal practices - but NOT to promote that Socratic/John Stuart Mill outlook, which is what most theorists today really have in mind when they advocate autonomy as a political goal.

PLURALISME ET SUPEREROGATION RAUL MAGNI BERTON

Dans la version « tragique » du pluralisme, il peut arriver que quoique nous fassions nous sommes contraints de manquer à nos obligations. Quoiqu'il arrive, nous avons tort. Dans la version plus optimiste du pluralisme, que vous défendez, on peut résoudre les dilemmes moraux en ayant raison. On peut légitimement privilégier un choix plutôt qu'un autre. Cette version optimiste, me semble avoir l'implication suivante : étant donné l'incompatibilité et l'incommensurabilité des valeurs, si je fais une bonne action c'est bien, mais si je ne la fais pas (parce que je privilégie une autre valeur), ce n'est pas grave. C'est là la définition d'une action supererogatoire : c'est bien de la faire, mais ce n'est pas grave si

on ne la fait pas. Mon impression est que la version optimiste du pluralisme transforme la majorité des enjeux éthiques en des enjeux supererogatoires. Par exemple, si un État privilégie la liberté c'est bien, et s'il privilégie l'égalité c'est bien aussi. La seule contrainte est qu'il est interdit de ne privilégier ni l'un ni l'autre. Les valeurs du pluraliste optimiste (contrairement au tragique) ne créent donc pas des obligations, mais seulement des suggestions, il me semble. Je voudrais insister au moyen d'un exemple : imaginons que M. Dupond voit une personne en train de se noyer, mais qu'il ne fasse rien pour la secourir. Si je suis un pluraliste tragique, je peux l'accuser de non-assistance à personne en danger parce qu'elle est obligatoire : dans tous les cas, c'est un tort de ne pas la faire. C'est Dupond qui doit m'apporter la preuve qu'il se trouvait face à un choix tragique et qu'il a privilégié une autre option. Par contre, si je suis un pluraliste optimiste, je ne peux pas accuser Dupond du simple fait qu'il n'a pas respecté une « obligation », mais je dois aussi montrer qu'il n'a respecté aucune des valeurs alternatives qui sont importantes pour lui. Parce que je sais que, parfois, on peut ne pas aider une personne qui se noie, et avoir raison quand même.

William Galston:

Your observations are very acute, but I do not entirely agree that "optimistic" pluralism does not create obligations. As I have written, pluralism is compatible with the thesis that there are ethical "presumptions" - norms that can be violated only for weighty reasons, which do not arise in the normal course of events. One needs a good reason (not just a competing value) to disregard a promise; one needs a very strong reason not to intervene when another's life is at stake. The pluralist position does imply, however, that few if any obligations can be understood as "overriding" regardless of circumstances; it is always possible that extraordinary circumstances can make it permissible to do what one would nearly always be prohibited from doing.

PLURALISME ET AUTONOMIE

DANIEL WEINSTOCK

There are two issues that I thought I would bring up. First, I have a question about the relationship you see between value pluralism, and the kind of political pluralism you espouse. Value pluralism, as I understand it, is a metaphysical, rather than a moral or a political claim. It says that there are many fitting objects of human pursuit; that cannot be reduced to one metavalue. It says something about the structure of the axiological universe. Does it follow from the truth (if it is a truth) of value pluralism, that we ought to tolerate diverse ways of life? The kinds of ways of life that are often at issue in these discussions are after all ones that deny the truth of value pluralism, that claim to be possessed of the one exclusive truth about what gives life meaning. If we want people to live as it were in the light of the truth of value pluralism, we should be promoting the kind of judgmental autonomy that allows agents to appreciate the truth of value pluralism, and to see the diverse values that make up the universal of values as live options.

Another way of saying the same thing is that a view of politics that takes its grounding in a claim about the truth of some metaphysical doctrine seems to have affinities with a perfectionist politics that affirms that doctrine, rather than one that countenances ways of life that are diametrically opposed to it.

This is not to deny that a liberalism of tolerance is not the way to go, but simply to question that it is best grounded in value pluralism.

A second question is downstream from these lofty metaphysical questions. In your writing, you claim that liberals must accept the presence of ways of life that do not affirm liberal values, and that may involve what looks to us like oppression of some members, as long as exit rights are in place. But you have a very exigent set of conditions that have to be in place in order to be able to say that members of these groups have real exit rights. They would involve the state intervening massively in educational matters, to ensure that people are epistemically, psychologically and practically able to access other options. Does your view of exit rights not lead to your backing in to a perfectionist, interventionistic liberalism

that seeks to inculcate autonomy so as to make sure that all citizens can truly be said to possess exit rights?

Both these questions in a way are animated by the same concern: you may be closer to autonomy liberalism than you let on.

William Galston:

The conditions I lay out for effective exit rights are intended to meet two minimum criteria: (1) it must be practically (physically, economically, logistically) possible for someone who wishes to exit to act on that desire (call this the anti-imprisonment criterion); and (2) education and cultural circumstances should not be such as to eradicate any meaningful capacity to choose (call this the anti-brainwashing criterion). Clearly this requires more than negative liberty, narrowly interpreted. Still, I do not believe that my anti-brainwashing provisions amount, either in theory or in practice, to a full-fledged endorsement of what most theorists mean by “autonomy.”

Concerning the relation between axiology and tolerance: There is no direct road from value pluralism to tolerance. I argue in *Liberal Pluralism* that value pluralism imposes limits on the kinds of arguments that can be deployed to support the use of political power to repress certain ways of life. (In legal terms: it serves as a principle of discursive estoppel.) In practice, I believe, this takes us some distance down the road toward the practice (though not to the classic theory) of tolerance. And while the value pluralist is bound to disagree with those who insist that only One Way is the Truth, that disagreement need not culminate in state repression of the One Way-ers. And finally, as you know from my response to you in *Liberal Pluralism*, I am not committed to the proposition that all should live in the light of the truth of value pluralism. Among other reasons, truth as a value is but one among many. In politics as in daily life, other values may properly dilute or even trump it. (I am not affirmatively in favor of lying, but I can think of lots of circumstances in which not telling the truth, or the whole truth, may well be the best course of action. The Enlightenment proposition that life, public and private, is always best lived in the light of the truth is not one I can accept.)

LOSING ONE CHILD = LOSING TWO? BERNARDO BOLAGNOS

Le professeur Galston écrit : « I would be tempted to say that Sophie's highest value is "preserve the life and wellbeing of my children". She understands that proposition as a unity not capable of division or quantification. Therefore, saving one child does not bring her halfway to realizing that good. For her, losing one child is the emotional and moral equivalent of losing both ».

Je suis conscient du danger de vouloir quantifier ce qui n'est pas ou ne doit pas être quantifié, mais le danger contraire (le scepticisme de la quantification, l'intuitionnisme généralisé) est aussi dangereux. Je connais des personnes qui ont malheureusement perdu deux fils, et je vous assure que ce n'est ni moral, ni émotionnellement équivalent à en perdre seulement un. Et cela ne veut pas dire que ces personnes font des calculs avec la vie des gens.

William Galston:

I agree that numbers often matter, and I did not intend to issue a blanket prohibition against quantification in moral evaluation. But I think the account I have given of Sophie's understanding of her choice is accurate. The question then arises, should she have evaluated her situation differently, and should she have come to forgive herself? That is, should she have said to herself (eventually, if not immediately): "This is the worst thing that ever happened to my family, and I cannot remove the stain of having been an agent (however reluctant) in producing the abhorrent outcome. But given the horrible circumstances in which I found myself, I did the best that anyone could." I simply do not know. What does the group think?

IMMIGRATION, NATIONALISME ET LIBERTÉ SPERANTA DUMITRU

Au tout début du chapitre 4 sur la liberté expressive, vous rappelez une affaire de la Cour suprême (*Minersville v. Gobitis*) dans laquelle des Témoins de Jéhova argumentaient contre la décision d'une école d'impo-

ser aux enfants le salut obligatoire du drapeau américain. Ils avaient considéré cette forme d'idolâtrie comme interdite par leur religion.

J'aurais voulu avoir votre sentiment concernant une réalité semblable, dans la France d'aujourd'hui. À partir de cette année, la réforme mise en place par le gouvernement en matière d'éducation implique entre autres l'obligativité de l'enseignement de l'hymne national, La Marseillaise. Cette ordonnance n'est peut-être pas sans lien avec une autre loi récente, qui interdit le port de signes religieux « ostensibles », notamment le voile islamique, sous peine d'exclusion de l'école. S'il y a une chose que ces deux lois ont en commun, c'est certainement le rejet de ce qu'on appelle, en France, « le communautarisme », l'attitude de rappeler ou de mettre en valeur l'appartenance à une ethnie ou une religion. Le petit débat que nous avons eu sur l'enseignement obligatoire de l'hymne national rappelait que les paroles de cette chanson guerrière pouvaient être offensantes pour certains élèves, notamment les vers « aux armes citoyens [...] qu'un sang impure/ abreuve nos sillons » (*drench our fields/ With the corrupted blood!*). Aussi « Oui! Déjà d'insolents despotes/ Et la bande des émigrés/ Faisant la guerre aux Sans-Culottes/ Par nos armes sont altérés » (*And the migrant gang/ Making war to Sans Culottes/ By our arms be defeated*).

J'aurais trois ou quatre questions plus générales à vous poser. D'abord, un libéral pluraliste peut-il légitimer le « communautarisme majoritaire », c'est-à-dire l'effort de renforcer les liens nationaux par le rappel des symboles qui appartiennent à la majorité? Est-ce qu'il est légitime que quelqu'un se plaigne de perte de liberté indépendamment du contenu de ces symboles? Si les paroles d'une chanson sont offensantes, mais qu'elles ont été composées il y a deux siècles, y a-t-il offense? Enfin, est-ce que la liberté expressive est susceptible de nous fournir un argument supplémentaire pour voir autrement ce débat?

William Galston:

The questions you raise are not simple. In the United States, our laws and courts allow some other impermissible public manifestations of religion on the grounds that they represent "ceremonial deism" - that is, public rit-

uals that do not actually affirm the literal meaning of the words being recited or sung. It might be possible to interpret the words of *La Marseillaise* in those terms.

It is important to remember that the subjective sentiments of individuals are not dispositive. From a liberal pluralist point of view, in order to serve as a basis of exemption from otherwise binding requirements, the objections raised by individuals (or groups) must be based on important issues of religion or conscience, not mere aversion to bloodthirstiness. The Jehovah's Witnesses' objection to the U. S. Pledge of Allegiance as "idolatry" clearly meets that standard; other objections would not. You must also distinguish between requiring students to participate in public practices as opposed to prohibiting them from engaging in their own religious or conscientious practices. In the latter case, the students themselves are in a better position to interpret the significance of what they are being prevented from doing. If practice X is an affirmative obligation, then denying students of a particular religion the right to do X is very serious and should be done only for the gravest of reasons. From my standpoint, the civic republican impulse that led to the veiling prohibition in French schools represents an abuse of public power. But I can understand why your public officials, steeped in a tradition that goes back to Rousseau, acted as they did. That does not mean that I can endorse their action, theoretically or practically.

EXCISION AND CIRCUMCISION ROBERTO MERRILL

I would like to submit a practical problem to your examination. Simply put, from a liberal pluralist standpoint, we must tolerate the widest range of conceptions, beliefs and practises. Nevertheless, the scope of toleration is limited by what L.H.A Hart calls "the minimum content of natural law". You have addressed yourself to a lot of questions about the status of minimum decency, so let us skip theoretical difficulties with the justification of a standard of minimum decency and face a few practical problems:

1. Can we tolerate excision? This is a rhetorical question and the answer

to it is obviously negative, as excision is clearly an unacceptable violation of the human body. Now, I would like to draw your attention on another practise, very similar to the previous one and yet tolerated as a normal one: circumcision. Then, unsurprisingly, my second question is the following:

2. Can we tolerate circumcision? I must confess that I am very embarrassed about this question. Personally, I do not see any problem with circumcision and yet, when I consider it, I cannot see the difference between circumcision and excision. I would be most grateful if you could clarify this problem or at least give us some hints.

William Galston:

To my mind, circumcision is an easy case. For Jews, anyway, it symbolizes a covenantal relationship. It does not impede normal human functioning, imply subordination to other human beings, or impose significant physical pain.

Excision practices for women are more troubling along all these dimensions. On the other hand, anthropologists have pointed to a wide range of concrete practices, in Africa and elsewhere, as well as widely differing cultural interpretations. In some communities, resistance to the practice is indigenous. In others, outside pressure is a source of resentment.

So while (1) I do see important distinctions between male circumcision and female excision,
(2) female-directed practices constitute hard cases in ways that male practices do not. I have no trouble accepting male-directed practices and am not sure what to think about their female counterpart.

NOTES

¹ *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism*, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Cet ouvrage sera désigné par l'abréviation *PLP*.

² *Kant and the Problem of History*, Chicago University Press, 1975; *Justice and the Human Good*, Chicago University Press, 1980; *Liberal Purposes: Goods, virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State*, Cambridge University Press, 1991; *Liberal Pluralism*, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

³ Cf. la discussion sur la négation du particularisme moral.

⁴ Cf. la discussion avec S. Dumitru sur la capacité du pluralisme à seul rendre compte du sentiment de regret.

⁵ « Objective goods cannot be fully rank-ordered. This means that there is no common measure for all goods, which are qualitatively heterogeneous. It means that there is no *summum bonum* that is the chief good for all individuals. It means that there are no comprehensive lexical orderings among types of good. It also means that there is no “first virtue of social institutions” but rather a range of public goods and virtues the relative importance of which will depend on the circumstances », *Liberal Pluralism*, p. 5.

⁶ *Liberal Pluralism*, p. 92.

⁷ *Liberal Pluralism*, p. 26. Voir aussi sur ce point *Liberal Purposes*.

⁸ On trouve ainsi une virulente attaque de la neutralité dans *Liberal Purposes* (cf. aussi « Two Concepts of Liberalism », *Ethics*, vol. 105, 1995, p. 516-534.)

⁹ *Liberal Pluralism*, p. 9.

¹⁰ « Diversity, Toleration and Deliberative Democracy », p. 43, in Macedo S. (éd.), *Deliberative Politics*, OUP, 1999, ou *Liberal Pluralism*, p. 116.

¹¹ Cf. la discussion suivante sur la question de la circoncision et de l'excision où Galston ne condamne pas l'excision avec fermeté.

¹² Cf. les discussions avec Roberto Merrill et Daniel Weinstock.

¹³ *Liberal Pluralism*