Alors que les partis politiques sont au coeur de la vie démocratique, ils n’occupent qu’une place marginale dans les modèles d’économie politique. Merlo (2006) fait l’analogie entre la place de la firme en organisation industrielle et celle des partis en économie politique. Une des difficultés de modéliser les partis vient du fait qu’il n’existe pas de définition unique de ce qu’est un parti politique. Un parti politique est généralement défini comme un groupe de personnes qui partagent des intérêts, des opinions et des idées communs, et qui s’associent dans une organisation ayant pour objectif de se faire élire, d’exercer le pouvoir et de mettre en oeuvre un projet politique. S’il est parfois difficile d’établir des différences conceptuelles entre les partis politiques et d’autres organisations comme les groupes de pression, les corporations ou les syndicats, l’objectif de gouverner distingue en général les partis de ces autres organisations. Pourtant, par rapport à ces autres acteurs et institutions, les partis politiques sont encore le parent pauvre de l’économie politique. En effet, les électeurs, les politiciens et les gouvernements restent les acteurs de base de la modélisation. Une des raisons de ce désamour relatif est qu’il n’existe pas de théorie unifiée de ce qu’est et de ce que fait un parti politique. Comme nous le montrons dans la section 1, il existe de nombreuses théories pour expliquer l’existence des partis politiques. Les partis servent à résoudre de multiples problèmes qui surviennent dans les relations entre politiciens et électeurs. Ces problèmes peuvent être d’ordre informationnel, peuvent relever de la théorie de l’agence ou bien encore provenir de la difficulté de coordination entre les agents. La littérature a considéré ces différents aspects et a développé des modèles correspondant à chaque situation. Dans la section 2, nous passons en revue la littérature qui analyse le fonctionnement des partis politiques en tant qu’institutions et en tant qu’organisations complexes. Finalement, dans la section 3, nous verrons comment la modélisation des partis politiques permet de mieux comprendre certains phénomènes d’économie politique. À la fin de chaque section, nous discutons les travaux empiriques qui testent directement les théories présentées ou ceux qui sont considérés comme centraux pour les sujets abordés. La modélisation en économie politique a longtemps gommé la différence entre partis et politiciens. Dans son livre, Downs (1957) utilise de façon interchangeable les termes de parti et de candidat. Le modèle de Downs, du fait de sa simplicité, a été très largement utilisé depuis aussi bien en économie politique qu’en sciences politiques. Son succès tient aussi au fait que la démocratie américaine laisse la part belle aux candidats et les partis politiques sont souvent considérés comme une coquille vide (voir Katz et Kolodny, 1994). La différence entre partis et candidats a été remise au goût du jour avec l’apparition des modèles de candidat citoyen (Osborne et Slivinski, 1996; Besley et Coate, 1997). Un candidat est défini par ses préférences idéologiques. En particulier, un candidat ne peut s’engager de manière crédible à mettre en place des politiques qui diffèrent de ses préférences. Les électeurs savent qu’une fois élu, le candidat mettra en place des politiques conformes à son idéologie. Ce modèle a donné lieu à une très vaste littérature. Mais, en miroir au développement du modèle du candidat citoyen, comme nous le rappelle Roemer (1999, 2006), il est devenu apparent que le rôle des partis politiques était mal compris et souvent oublié. Ces 20 dernières années, la littérature a essayé d’ouvrir la boîte noire des partis politiques. Levy (2004) développe un modèle dans lequel le rôle des partis est d’étendre l’ensemble des programmes électoraux qu’un groupe de politiciens peut proposer. En …
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