ror.org/002rjbv21
Abstracts
Résumé
Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur le positionnement des partis politiques dans des espaces uni- et multidimensionnels. Tout au long de ce document, nous faisons l’hypothèse que deux partis s’affrontent dans le cadre d’une élection et s’engagent à tenir leurs promesses électorales une fois élus. Cette étude souligne l’importance de trois hypothèses de modélisation : (i) l’influence du type d’incertitude sur l’issue électorale, (ii) l’objectif des partis politiques (objectif électoraliste – qui consiste à maximiser l’espérance du nombre de voix reçues ou la probabilité de gagner les élections – objectif idéologique – fondé sur les programmes politiques – ou les deux), et (iii) les préférences des électeurs (dans quelle mesure ceux-ci se soucient de l’identité des partis au-delà de la politique mise en place par le vainqueur).
Appendices
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