ror.org/02feahw73
Abstracts
Résumé
Cet article décrit de manière sommaire les principaux modèles de vote stratégique avec un grand nombre d’électeurs, dits modèles d’élections de masse. Dans ces modèles, on suppose que l’électeur décide de son vote en fonction des pivots, c’est-à-dire des événements où son unique voix va faire une différence quant au résultat de l’élection. Les principaux messages de ces modèles sont illustrés avec des exemples simples; ils sont ensuite présentés plus en détail; on examine enfin leurs applications et limites, notamment en ce qui concerne l’économie expérimentale.
Appendices
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