ror.org/05em8ne27
Abstracts
Résumé
L’article présente une revue de la littérature théorique et expérimentale sur les préférences sociales dans le jeu du dictateur et dans le jeu de la confiance. Deux types de préférences sociales sont analysés, l’aversion à l’inégalité associée aux préférences distributives et l’aversion à la culpabilité associée aux préférences dépendantes des croyances. Nous montrons dans un premier temps comment les deux types de préférences peuvent expliquer les déviations par rapport aux prédictions théoriques de la théorie des jeux standard. Nous discutons ensuite de l’insuffisance des modèles avec préférences distributives pour expliquer en détail les données expérimentales obtenues pour ces deux jeux de dilemme social. Notre principale conviction est que les modèles avec préférences dépendantes des croyances sont plus adaptés pour décrire l’hétérogénéité des comportements habituellement détectée dans de telles expériences. En particulier, sous l’hypothèse que la fonction d’utilité des joueurs dépend également de leurs croyances, alors la corrélation, entre le choix du dictateur (du receveur, dans le jeu de la confiance) et ses croyances de second ordre, habituellement observée pour ces deux familles d’expériences, peut être expliquée. Ce que ne permettent pas la théorie des jeux standard et ses extensions avec préférences distributives.
Appendices
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