ror.org/04sjchr03
Abstracts
Résumé
Nous discutons de quelques développements récents en économie expérimentale sur la relation entre la loi et les normes sociales dans la détermination des comportements. Dans l’approche traditionnelle de l’analyse économique du droit, l’effectivité des lois repose uniquement sur le système répressif mis en oeuvre pour les faire respecter. De nombreuses expériences de laboratoires montrent cependant que les obligations légales influencent aussi les comportements par un effet sur les anticipations, ce qui permet la coordination sur de « bons équilibres » par le jeu des préférences sociales, ainsi que par un effet direct sur les préférences elles-mêmes. Ces résultats ont des conséquences importantes pour l’analyse économique des politiques légales et réglementaires.
Abstract
This paper discusses recent papers in experimental law and economics studying the relation between laws and social norms. Traditionally the law and economics analysis of legal compliance focuses on the effectiveness of the legal system in law enforcement. However, recent lab-experiments have shown that obligations might affect behaviors by influencing expectations about others’ choices, thus allowing the emergence of virtuous equilibria in games where social preferences matter. Moreover, obligations might directly affect preferences. These results have implications for the analyses of legal rules and regulation.
Appendices
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