Abstracts
Résumé
Cet article fait le point sur la question des règles budgétaires, qui occupe une place centrale dans les débats de politiques publiques sur la résorption éventuelle des déficits hérités de la Grande Récession. Il revient d’abord rapidement sur la littérature théorique relative aux règles budgétaires. Il dresse ensuite une nomenclature des règles budgétaires en vigueur dans les provinces canadiennes. La nomenclature proposée est plus fine que celle existant dans la littérature et elle se fonde sur les travaux récents menés sur les États américains. Le menu des options de politiques publiques disponibles dans le contexte canadien est enfin évalué, afin d’examiner les performances relatives des diverses règles existantes.
Appendices
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