Abstracts
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous tentons de répondre à deux questions : (1) La concurrence entre gouvernements est-elle bénéfique? (2) Si la réponse à cette question est non, peut-on corriger les problèmes qui découlent de cette concurrence?
Abstract
In this paper, we attempt to answer two questions: (1) Is competition between governments advantageous? (2) If the answer to this question is no, what can be done to solve some of the problems generated by this competition?
Appendices
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